Chronological findings
75 Before considering the chronology, it must be noted that much of the affidavit evidence advanced for GFIN took the form of reconstruction well after the relevant events occurred. The reconstruction by each of Mr Gale, Mr Bignell and Mr Cameron was undertaken when they obtained bank account records and financial records of GFIN. Those investigations were undertaken in the second half of 2018 and resulted in the commencement of an application to bring these derivative proceedings. The views expressed in the affidavits based upon these investigations are not evidence as to actual events. They are evidence of views formed by the three deponents based upon their examination of the financial records. In relation to these aspects of the evidence, save for limited respects in which the familiarity with the facts on the part of Mr Gale, Mr Bignell and Mr Cameron enables them to point to matters to which the bank records and financial records might relate, I have had regard to the documents themselves rather than the argumentative conclusions reached by the deponents as to what may be concluded from those documents.
76 The following chronological account is taken from the affidavit evidence relied upon by GFIN and the admissions of Mr Gooden in his defence. The deponents were not cross-examined. Save for respects in which the affidavit evidence is contradicted by contemporaneous documents, the following account reflects the unchallenged account given by the witnesses relied upon by GFIN.
77 At all material times, the directors of GFIN were Mr Gooden, Mr Cameron and Mr Gale.
78 GFIN was registered by Mr Gooden in April 2010. GFIN Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (GFIN Financial) was a wholly owned subsidiary of GFIN. The only significance of GFIN Financial for present purposes is that GFIN sold its shares in GFIN Financial for over $600,000 in July 2017 and the manner in which those funds were dealt with by GFIN forms part of the relevant chronology (see below).
79 The initial equity shareholders in GFIN (which included UTS and JGFI) and Beagle entered into a shareholders agreement in 2010. Clause 4 of the agreement provided that Mr Gooden shall be the managing director. Clause 20 of the shareholders agreement provided that the managing director would receive a salary of $70,000 per annum from 1 January 2011 and if the profit of GFIN reached $500,000 per annum then the salary would increase to $150,000. There was evidence to the effect that no increase in the salary of Mr Gooden as managing director was agreed. However, there was an agreement made between GFIN and JKB which indicates that there was an agreed increase in salary to $100,000, at least an increase with which JKB agreed. However, I note that for the shareholders of GFIN to allow it to pay Mr Gooden a salary greater than that specified in cl 20 without a unanimous resolution of all would be a breach of the shareholders agreement.
80 From the outset, Mr Gooden acted as managing director of GFIN and acted as the manager of its financial affairs and day to day operations. Mr Gooden entered into arrangements with contract traders, made arrangements with banks, managed the company accounts and arranged the technology that was used for derivative trading. The other directors left all such matters in the hands of Mr Gooden.
81 GFIN entered into contract trading agreements with various entities. The terms of those arrangements varied with contract traders being entitled to payment of an amount of the order of 85% of the net trading profits attributable to their trading activities.
82 On 25 February 2014, Mr Cameron sent the following email to Mr Gooden with the heading 'Gfin Questions':
As time goes on I am wondering if and when I get a return on my shareholding and and funds sitting at Gfin. I am aware we have had our hiccups along the way - however at the moment - and for a long while I am getting no return on $400k in my trading account and no return on my shares (and I don't know what return on Gfin Green $60k) I keep more money there than I need to as I am aware that Gfin needs funding - however even $400k in a term deposit is going to earn me $14k per year. These funds are at risk from other traders however I am not being paid for that risk.
I keep thinking its early days yet- but in reality its not. I think we need to really look at things - at this stage I have not seen any financials for Gfin and believe me that is a concern. I have many other shares and know the balance sheets and profit and loss of these companies - however with Gfin I don't know whether we are scraping by or making money.
83 As will emerge, the fact that Mr Cameron was well aware that the funds held in what he described as his 'trading account' were at risk of being diminished by the activities of other traders at GFIN is a significant matter. This reflected the nature of the arrangement whereby he was trading on GFIN's account and therefore losses made by other traders on GFIN's account exposed contract traders to the risk that GFIN would have to cover those losses by resorting to funds shown in the trading accounts of other traders.
84 The email prompted a long response from Mr Gooden in which the exposure of the amount held in the trading account to the risks of the GFIN business was acknowledged.
85 In a reply email Mr Cameron objected to some of the matters in Mr Gooden's response. He expressed concern that he could not see the GFIN financials. He concluded:
I remain a committed stakeholder and will continue to try and build my account balance - I just need reassurance that this ship is fit to sail and is building it's funds. Its very hard for me to leave $500k at Gfin and not know anything about its P/L.
86 The email exchange continued and produced this further statement from Mr Gooden in response to Mr Cameron on 28 February 2014:
From my perspective, it's troubling me that having spent many years now working with you both at Aliom and GFIN that I need to continue to reassure you that your funds are as safe as they can be and that your risk to other traders/clients is higher or lower than at any other time before. It's just not justified. As I've explained before, if you feel nervous about the risk associated with the funds you hold in GFIN then we can lower your holdings, but that will necessitate a different commercial deal. However, whether we alter your risk exposure or not, I must insist that once we agree to move forward that we are not continually forced to revisit this discussion any further.
…
I understand your shareholding is important to you both in the way that you receive payments and your potential earnings from it in the future. If however you wish to keep a different amount in your account (for whatever reason), we can adopt the following scale:
More than $400K - Current deal [which seems to have involved 100% of profit on trading being returned on the basis that Mr Cameron maintained a trading account with a minimum balance of $500,000]
$250K - $400K = 90% profit split (rebate included) and one trading system subsidised
Less than $250K = 80% profit split (rebate included) and no trading system subsidies.
All I want moving forward is for you to have a little faith in me. As I've explained before it is disappointing that this may not be the case.
I will extract everything out of our current trader base, bring new traders in and sack the ones that aren't performing. If I have something important to say then I will, otherwise it's probably not worth saying. I've hardened my approach significantly lately, and the team now realise that lack of performance equates to being discarded.
87 In around November 2014, JKB became an equity shareholder in GFIN acquiring a 9% shareholding from Beagle and leaving Beagle with a 51% equity shareholding and 100% ordinary shareholding. Mr Bignell who controlled JKB did not become a director of GFIN.
88 On 5 November 2014, Mr Gooden sent an email to Mr Bignell outlining what Mr Gooden described as 'an equitable commercial arrangement for your proposed trading activities'. The proposal as outlined dealt with the allocation of rebates from ASX 24 and proposed a 95% profit split on trading. As to payment of trading profits it said:
Payment of Trading Profits - as a shareholder, you will be entitled to draw on your trading profits via a combination of both consultancy payments and dividends from the company. We would obviously need to work through the best solution for you as well as ensuring GFIN isn't penalised if you wish to draw franked dividends prior to the tax being paid, etc. I'm happy to work with you on the best option for you.
89 The reference to the payment of trading profits as 'consultancy payments' is reflected in other documents. It reflects the fundamental nature of the trading arrangement. GFIN would allow trading on a contract basis on its account and then pay contract traders 'consultancy payments'. For shareholders who were contract traders there was also the potential to receive distributions as dividends.
90 The email set out a list of 16 names as 'the current group of traders at GFIN'. Then under the heading 'ABN AMRO FUNDS ON DEPOSIT/LIMITS' the email said:
I've had a long standing relationship with ABN Amro having founded Aliom, so in confidence they have provided me with a very good funding/commercial arrangement which was great especially when we were caught up in the MF Global situation. That has allowed me to pay as much to the traders as possible without having to retain monies. Initially our funds required was $500K, however that has increased to $650K and we will need to lodge a further $500K in the next quarter. Having experienced the MF Global situation, my aim is still to keep a minimum amount of funding on deposit with the clearer at any point in time. I think I have successfully managed to do that over recent years, it's always good to remain vigilant on these things. Our limits on the main products as a firm are as follows.
XT 8,000
YT 12,000
IR 12,000
It is important to note that we are only using a fraction of these limits. Most traders in recent months have scaled back their need for limits. Most of the traders are scalpers, stacking is essentially a thing of the past and as a firm we have very few positions on at 4.30. We may have a couple of hundred three years and maybe 100 tens and the same in bill spreads, etc. We have not had a haircut call (margin) since inception with ABN Amro.
I will however be retaining monies from the existing traders going forward, most likely in the form of retention of rebate for the next quarter or so. Given our funding requirements will increase it's a natural progression anyhow.
91 As this communication shows, it was part of the contract trading arrangement that each trader had to allow monies to be held back by GFIN in order to cover the risk associated with trading by all traders, hence the identification of who the traders were, the nature of their trading and the limits within which the overall trading activities of all traders at GFIN occurred. For the shareholders in GFIN there appears to have been a further obligation to contribute funds to GFIN that would be reflected in the balance of their sub-account as part of the omnibus account. These funds were provided to ensure GFIN could maintain sufficient funds to cover the minimum deposit required by the Clearing Participant bank.
92 Accordingly, Mr Bignell responded to the email by saying that he assumed that his capital injection through a stake in GFIN would be used to boost deposits held with ABN AMRO 'to cover the extra margin'. Mr Gooden responded: 'Yes the consideration for your shares would be injected into the company and would assist with margining requirements with the Clearer. That is the best use for them at present'. Mr Bignell deposed to complaints about what was done with funds that he paid to acquire shares in GFIN, but no reliance was placed upon those matters in submissions. This was relied upon as a matter that reflected adversely upon Mr Gooden and his conduct in relation to GFIN, but it was not the subject of any claim that the conduct amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty.
93 On 20 January 2015, Mr Gooden asked JAG Securities to transfer $200,000 to GFIN in the form of a loan for about six months until trading balances in GFIN built up and there were enough funds to meet the requirements of ABN AMRO. In his affidavit evidence, Mr Bignell raised complaints about what was done with those funds. However, he said that GFIN paid back the loan on 12 February 2016.
94 On 12 February 2015, GFIN and JKB entered into an agreement concerning the issue of new shares in the capital of GFIN which would be allotted to JKB. The recitals to the agreement state that it was entered into to reflect the issue of the shares and to outline 'the objectives, rights and obligations of JKB' in GFIN. The other shareholders were not parties to the agreement. Nevertheless its terms adopt the same form as the shareholders agreement entered into in 2010 and contains substantially the same provisions. As to payment to the managing director, it provides:
Shareholders agree that the Managing Director will receive a salary of One hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per annum as and from the 14 September 2012. In the event that the profit of the Company reaches Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) per annum then the salary of the Managing Director will increase to One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) per annum.
95 The reference to an agreed salary of $100,000 at this point in time is significant. It sits somewhat inconsistently with general evidence to the effect that no increase in the salary of Mr Gooden was agreed at any time.
96 In around May 2016, Mr Bignell raised with Mr Gooden the fact that he was considering withdrawing all his trading funds from GFIN (that is, the trading funds of JAG Securities) after he had separated from his wife. Mr Bignell's evidence as to his conversation with Mr Gooden at that time was as follows:
[Mr Gooden] suggested that withdrawal was not a good idea because I would have to cease trading. He suggested that a smaller amount be withdrawn from my trading account to be held by GFIN which would be repaid on my request and he also suggested that GFIN retain my rebates going forward until I requested them to be repaid. On 16 May 2016, by an agreement with [Mr Gooden], [Mr Gooden] withdrew the amount of $361,705.71 from my trading account. This was whilst I was awaiting clear advice from my family law solicitors concerning marital assets and I made it very clear to him the funds would need to be repaid.
97 Jumping forward, Mr Bignell deposed to complaints as to what occurred thereafter in paying out the balance of his account. In particular, he said that he received a payment of a further amount of $179,511.79 on 23 January 2017 on the basis that the whole amount was treated as a dividend from GFIN and GFIN would retain the tax and the dividend would be paid as fully franked, but there has never been a fully franked dividend. These matters of 'elaboration' were not relied upon by GFIN in the present proceedings.
98 Returning to June 2016, at that time one of the parties with which GFIN had a contract trader arrangement was Southend Futures. Mr Simon Lucas conducted derivatives trading on GFIN's account for Southend Futures. As at 23 June 2016, the value of the sub-account in the omnibus account at ABN AMRO with the name Simon Lucas was $47,297.18. Between 23 and 24 June 2016, trading positions on trades by Mr Lucas incurred losses of over $460,000 due to the derivatives market being affected by the Brexit vote announcement in the United Kingdom. The result was that the value of the sub-account for Mr Lucas went to a negative figure of $414,025.64. The effect on GFIN's omnibus account with ABN AMRO was to reduce the overall balance from $1,014,006.40 to $581,481.05 overnight.
99 ABN AMRO issued a notice to GFIN that it had violated the $1,000,000 minimum for its account and ABN AMRO requested that GFIN deposit $418,519 to cover the deficit.
100 On 27 June 2016, GFIN deposited $270,000 into the ABN AMRO omnibus account from its operating account. On 29 June 2016, a further $75,000 was deposited into the omnibus account from GFIN's operating account. Those funds ($345,000 in total) came from GFIN's operating account at Westpac. The GFIN admin sub-account at ABN AMRO actually had an increase in funds of about $440,000 (moving from a negative balance of $173,852.07 on 23 June 2016 to a positive balance of $268,991.11 on 29 June 2016). Therefore, there appears to have been funds in addition to the $345,000 (being about $95,000) that were paid into the ABN AMRO omnibus account at this time. Together with movements in other sub-accounts in the omnibus account at ABN AMRO, the total deposits of about $440,000 took the overall balance for the account to $1,041,145.76.
101 Then on 1 July 2016, the sub-account for Mr Lucas changed to negative $4,625.42 and the GFIN admin sub-account changed to negative $57,158.95. It may be inferred that there was a re-allocation of most of the $440,000 in funds that were added to the GFIN admin sub-account to the sub-account of Mr Lucas. Changes to the balances of other sub-accounts accounted for the fact that the negative balance in the GFIN admin sub-account did not go further into negative territory by that time.
102 Mr Gooden did not inform the other directors of what had happened with the trading by Mr Lucas and the deficiency in the omnibus account that had occurred as a result.
103 As to the source of the funds that were injected into the omnibus account, an amount of $250,000 was deposited into the operating account of GFIN on 27 June 2016 with the description 'Rtgs High Value Payment Ref 0416030 Southend Futures Simon Lucas' and an amount of $100,000 was deposited into the same account on 28 June 2016 with the description 'Deposit R M Ward Tfr from Wards'. These deposits correspond with the timing of transfers from the operating account to the ABN AMRO omnibus account of $270,000 on each of 27 June 2016 and $75,000 on 29 June 2016 respectively (total of $345,000), leaving a balance in the operating account on that date of just $19,613.88. Given the state of the operating account it was the funds that came from Mr Lucas and Mr Ward that enabled the payments to be made to ABN AMRO.
104 It is not indicated what was meant by the description 'Rtgs High Value Payment'. I note that the Reserve Bank of Australia maintains a High Value Payments system. It involves real-time gross settlement (or RGTS). The nomenclature on these transactions seems to indicate use of this system for the transfer.
105 The Court was not taken to any evidence as to a possible source of the remaining amount of about $95,000 that made up the total of about $440,000 in funds that were deposited into the ABN AMRO omnibus account at this time. However, it is to be noted that the FY2016 accounts for GFIN show a loan account for Mr Lucas in an amount of $95,790. If GFIN provided the additional $95,000 (or thereabouts) that would account for the amount of the loan. However, as is explained below, it is difficult to reconcile the FY2016 accounts with what happened at the end of June 2016 because the total amount of $350,000 in deposits from Southend Futures and R M Ward are not identified in the accounts whether as loans or otherwise. It is possible that these amounts were called in by GFIN as amounts due to it by those parties at that time. As a contract trader may have a responsibility to cover trading losses, it is equally explicable that the amount of $250,000 apparently received from Southend Futures or Mr Lucas on 27 June 2016 was a payment made in performance of an obligation of that kind. However, if that is so, it is not clear why the amount of $95,790 would be depicted as a loan. There is simply insufficient evidence from which to draw a conclusion.
106 It was submitted that it should be inferred that the transfer of $250,000 into the operating account was received from Mr Lucas as a loan. There are other entries in the operating account where the description 'loan' is used. For example, deposits of $100,000 made on each of 5 and 8 July 2016 into GFIN's operating account each have the description 'Deposit Tm Bank New loan from Kim'. However, an entry of that kind was not used for the amounts received from Mr Lucas or Mr Ward at this time.
107 It was further submitted that the amount of $250,000 was ultimately paid back to Mr Lucas on 1 June 2017 (almost a year later). On that date there was an amount of $275,000 received into the operating account with the description 'Rtgs High Value Payment Ref No 0306139 MacQuarie Bank Li/Rfb/Futures Qc'. Also on 1 June 2016 an amount of $250,000 was paid out of the GFIN operating account with the description 'Withdrawal Online 1606764 Pymt Southend F Southend Futures'. It was not explained how it might be concluded that the amount was a repayment of a loan rather than a disposition from the amount of $275,000 received into the operating account on the same day. There was no annotation on the account that provided any indication as to the purpose of the payment to Southend Futures. There is only the degree of correspondence in the amounts (noting that they are not identical).
108 GFIN points to an email from Mr Gooden to GFIN's accountant Mr Adam Cammidge on 13 February 2017 (concerning the preparation of GFIN's accounts for FY2016) as relating to the amount of $250,000. In that email, in response to a request from Mr Gooden to confirm the nature of certain items highlighted on a banking spreadsheet including a receipt of $250,000 from Mr Lucas, Mr Gooden said: 'Please apportion the $250,000 amount from Simon Lucas as trading profit. In addition, please create a loan with GFIN owing Simon Lucas $95,790.05'. To the extent that this fragment of information indicates anything, it suggests that the $250,000 was an amount which GFIN was entitled to receive from Mr Lucas. Save for the proximity to the events concerning the loss incurred by Mr Lucas on trading, there is no reason why the content of the email should lead to the conclusion that the $250,000 when received into the operating account of GFIN was a loan. That proximity might lead to Mr Lucas being called upon to perform an obligation to make some payment that was due to GFIN as much as it might lead to Mr Lucas making a loan.
109 As has been noted, the loan amount of $95,790.05 corresponds with the balance of funds in addition to the amount of $345,000 transferred from the operating account that seems to have been received into the omnibus account to cover the loss occasioned by the Brexit announcement. If so, it may have been a loan.
110 The evidence indicates that GFIN and Mr Lucas had ongoing commercial dealings. It is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the status of particular payments without understanding the overall nature of those dealings. Without some form of comprehensive analysis of the accounts for 2016 and what they show as to all of those dealings as between GFIN on the one hand and Mr Lucas and Southend Futures on the other hand, it is not possible to draw any inference as to the character of the amount of $250,000 that was received into the operating account of GFIN.
111 What is established on the evidence is that there was a substantial shortfall below the cover required by ABN AMRO on its omnibus account as a result of a loss being exposed on the positions taken on trading activity by Mr Lucas. The shortfall was covered by injecting funds into the omnibus account. A considerable part of those funds came from the GFIN operating account. About $95,000 came from a source that is not identified on the documents but may have been a loan from Mr Lucas. Both prior to and after those events the GFIN admin sub-account that formed part of the omnibus account at ABN AMRO was shown as having a substantial negative balance. Therefore, the total cover provided by the 'retentions' in the sub-accounts of contract traders was more than the overall requirement of $1,000,000 because it also needed to cover the extent of the negative balance in the admin sub-account. After the additional funds had been injected into the omnibus account that negative balance was only $57,158.95. Whether it was appropriate for the admin sub-account to be operated with a negative balance is considered below in addressing the individual claims made by GFIN. However, what may be noted at this point is that each of Mr Gale, Mr Bignell and Mr Cameron accepted that the 'retained funds' that were included in their sub-accounts were funds held to cover the trading losses of all contract traders. Therefore, even on their own evidence, the use of those 'retained funds' to cover the trading losses incurred by Mr Lucas was appropriate.
112 Mr Gooden commenced negotiations with Macquarie to take over the Clearing Participant responsibilities for GFIN trading on the ASX 24 market. The first in a series of emails in evidence was on 1 July 2016 when an officer at Macquarie sent an email to Mr Gooden in which he said that he was working on the various things needed to get GFIN up and running as soon as possible. The officer asked for the 'financials' for GFIN for FY2015. He said that he was 'discussing with our risk on getting the limits signed off'. Mr Gooden responded that he 'would appreciate confirmation of all limits and commercials based on our previous discussions prior to continuing'.
113 However, plainly there had been earlier discussions. In a later email dated 5 October 2016, Mr Gooden followed up a response to the last email to Macquarie sent on 19 July 2016. It said:
I've not received any feedback for a couple of months now and some of the traders have been enquiring as to if and when our clearing is moving.
Not sure where you are at, we are approaching 12 months since this discussion started and my impression is that you aren't able to cater to our requirements. Can you confirm this is correct?
114 Therefore, it appears that discussions between Mr Gooden and Macquarie commenced in the final quarter of 2015. It was submitted for GFIN that it should be inferred that the approach to Macquarie was prompted by what had occurred with Mr Lucas and Brexit in late June 2016 and was designed to reduce the minimum level of cover that was required. Indeed it was suggested that the reason for the move to Macquarie was to assist in covering up what had occurred. Based on the contemporaneous evidence of the content of the email exchanges with Macquarie, I do not accept those submissions as to findings that should be made.
115 Returning to the chronology, on 11 July 2016, Macquarie asked for some more financial details and amongst other things asked the following question which appeared to be directed to obtaining information to set an appropriate margin:
We have been checking with a number of our on-boarding customers on the way their Books worked over the brexit period, with the volatility spikes and margins increases.. did you see any increase in your IM requirements and also did the company balance sheet see a decline in P&L over this period.
116 In a response on the same day Mr Gooden dealt with the questions raised and responded to the above question as follows:
With regards to Brexit, we had one senior trader realise a loss which did affect our balance sheet. However this was a fraction of his performance for the financial year and our stance on retained trader funds provided the necessary protection to GFIN as an entity. All other traders either ceased trading over Brexit or registered profits. Needless to say trading conditions are tricky at present and will most likely remain so for the forsesable [sic] future.
117 This is a relatively candid response by Mr Gooden concerning the loss in relation to the Brexit announcement. It is inconsistent with any attempt to cover up the loss by moving to Macquarie.
118 By mid-October 2016, Mr Gooden was proposing a move to Macquarie on 1 December 2016. On 19 October 2016, Mr Gooden sent an email to Macquarie in which he said:
I am required to give ABN one months notice, so Nov 21 is a possibility provided everything is finalised in coming days. Otherwise we will find another date. My main concern is ensuring our current limits exist for the 1 million in funds lodged, if I can transition the traders without taking anything away from them then they'll be happy.
119 The content of this email is also inconsistent with the submission advanced for GFIN that the move to Macquarie was motivated by Mr Gooden seeking to reduce the level of cover required on the omnibus account. At the time, Mr Gooden was referring to maintaining the same limits as applied for ABN AMRO and the same amount to be held in the omnibus account.
120 The case for GFIN was that on the beginning of 25 November 2016, 'the balance in GFIN's ABN AMRO omnibus trading account was $1,587,662.82'. It also claimed that between 25 November 2016 and 20 December 2016, Mr Gooden caused $1,587,662.82 to be transferred from the ABN AMRO omnibus account to GFIN's operating account. The latter allegation was admitted by Mr Gooden in his defence. Therefore, irrespective of whether the omnibus account had that amount as at 25 November 2016, amounts totalling those funds were withdrawn and transferred to the GFIN operating account over the specified period.
121 It is also established that only $350,000 of those funds was then transferred to the new Macquarie omnibus account, being $250,000 on 16 December 2016 and $100,000 on 22 December 2016.
122 These events may be placed in the context of the following email from Mr Gooden to Macquarie on 5 December 2016:
Preparing for the roll now following another busy month in Nov, 460,000 lots from memory. Looking forward to moving across to Macquarie though!
We will only have a handful of smaller traders until late January, the larger guys are switching off over the break.
Quick question, John Bignell is finalising a rather expensive house renovation and is looking to draw on profits until he returns late Jan. Is it possible for us to seed the account with say $250K using only 5 to 10% of our allocated limits, then in late Jan the larger traders return and we will increase funds in excess of the million.
If the above isn't suitable then it may be easier for us to switch off until late Jan, let me know your thoughts and I can organise from there.
Otherwise not much else to work on. We have decided to refrain from transferring any existing LCC's. John may require an LCC once he returns however we can sort that over the break. In coming days I'll firm up the traders who may wish to start on Dec 15 and send over their system requirements and limits (depending on the above funding question).
123 It appears that operation at the lower limit was proposed as a temporary measure which would apply when Mr Bignell and others were not trading up until late January 2017.
124 The response came from Macquarie as follows:
For the traders that you would look to transition in December, can you supply a very quick trader/risk profile? Ultimately, I have no real issue with this but will need to give the Risk Management Team an understanding of the initial risk profile for Macquarie. I guess we will need to know i.e.
How Many traders
Intra day limits/position limits you would like to allocate to them
Typical overnight position if any
125 Also, on 16 December 2016, GFIN paid $438,331.52 to JAG Securities at the request of Mr Bignell. The amount included rebate adjustment amounts due to JAG Securities based upon its volume of trading. It came from the operating account and drew upon funds that had come across from the ABN AMRO omnibus account. There is no suggestion that this amount was improperly paid to JAG Securities.
126 On 21 and 29 December 2016 amounts totalling $16,500 were paid to Gale Capital. There is no suggestion that these amounts were improperly paid to Gale Capital.
127 However, GFIN focussed attention upon the following particular amounts that were paid to other parties in November and December 2016 by GFIN from its operating account. They are:
(1) 28 November 2016, to Jodie Kim, $10,500;
(2) 28 November 2016, to Scott Cossens, $91,000;
(3) 2 December 2016, to Mr Gooden $3,000;
(4) 2 December 2016, to Jodie Kim, $1,333;
(5) 8 December 2016, to Mr Gooden, $5,626;
(6) 13 December 2016, to Beagle, $5,500;
(7) 13 December 2016, to GFIN Green, $33,000;
(8) 15 December 2016, to Ronald Mur, $4,350;
(9) 16 December 2016, to Scott Cossens, $76,000;
(10) 16 December 2016, to Kerry Ward, $170,000;
(11) 16 December 2016, to Ronald Mur, $65,000;
(12) 16 December 2016, to Beagle, $11,000;
(13) 29 December 2016, to Beagle, $5,500;
(14) 3 January 2017, to Mr Gooden, $8,626; and
(15) 10 January 2017, to Beagle, $5,500.
128 The claim made is that the funds that came from the ABN AMRO omnibus account were not available to be used by GFIN for its general operating expenses and loan repayments. Complaint is also made about the use of some of those funds by making payments to Mr Gooden and Beagle. However, as to all of the payments it is said by GFIN that they were not made to meet GFIN's usual operating expenses. It is said that there was an obligation to transfer funds held in the ABN AMRO omnibus account that related to the trading activities of contract traders to the new Macquarie omnibus account and that did not occur. Instead the amounts in the list were paid out to persons from monies that should have been deposited into the new omnibus account at Macquarie.
129 There was no real evidence pointed to by GFIN upon which the Court might form a conclusion as to the reason for each of the disputed payments. Other than pointing to their amounts and the payees, no evidence was identified as a basis upon which the Court might conclude that the payments were not made to meet genuine liabilities of GFIN (noting that there are separate claims that there was no basis for any payments to Beagle and that Mr Gooden's entitlements were limited to his salary as managing director). There was no real evidence as to the nature of the business dealings conducted by Mr Gooden as managing director in enabling the derivatives trading by contract traders and employees on GFIN's account.
130 Therefore, the heart of the complaint about what happened when the omnibus account was transferred to Macquarie was the claim, in effect, that the monies in the omnibus account belonged to the traders and GFIN was not at liberty to apply those funds for its own purposes. The statement of claim describes these funds as 'Contract Traders' funds'. For reasons that have already been given that characterisation is problematic. The funds in the omnibus account were all GFIN's funds. They were held to cover trading risks to which GFIN might be exposed by the trading activities of contract traders. As was the case with Mr Lucas, there was the potential on any day for the position taken during the day to expose GFIN to a considerable loss that had to be covered when all trading was settled at the end of the day. In addition there were risks that would be carried forward if there were open positions at the end of one day's trading (although it is to be noted that there are references in the evidence to most trading occurring within each day). There was also evidence of calls being made from time to time for traders to pay amounts to GFIN to provide cover for trading risk and to meet the requirement for a minimum balance to be maintained for the omnibus account as a whole.
131 Therefore, the position in relation to the sub-account balances was much more complex than the simple foundation on which the case by GFIN was advanced. It appears that, at any point in time, the sub-account balances as depicted may be in part profits from trading and in part monies provided by the contract trader (shareholder) as a form of deposit to cover future trading risks. The retained profits from trading represented amounts that would be payable as to the agreed percentage share to a contract trader assuming that the trader had no open positions at the relevant point in time on which there was still uncertainty as to the outcome. Further, those funds were subject to the exercise by GFIN of its right to retain funds to cover day to day trading risks of the kind that had been manifested by the trading activities of Mr Lucas on the day of the Brexit announcement. In order for the contract trader to continue trading, an amount sufficient to cover the future daily trading risk for the particular trading had to be kept in the account. It was not an amount that was available to the trader unless the contract trading arrangement was to be terminated. Finally, putting to one side the retention right of GFIN, the whole of the retained profits shown in the account were not available to the contract trader. As was explained by Mr Gale, if an invoice was sent to GFIN for the payment of part of the amount represented by the sub-account balance, then GFIN would deduct its percentage share. Only the net balance, plus GST, would be paid to the contract trader by GFIN. In many instances GFIN's share was 15%. Mr Bignell seems to have been a large trader compared to others. For JAG Securities (Mr Bignell's trading entity), it appears that the agreed percentage was 5%.
132 In short, the amounts shown at any point in time as the sub-account balance of a trader did not represent funds that belonged to the contract trader nor did they represent an amount which GFIN was obliged to pay the contract trader. Amounts that might be paid by GFIN were exposed to the vagaries associated with future derivatives trading by all traders, itself a risky activity.
133 Returning to the list of payments between November and December 2016 (set out above) (Disputed Payments), I note that the sub-account documents before the court show that Scott Cossens was a contract trader. There is also a reference in a later email from Mr Gooden to Mr Gale dated 13 June 2018 (responding to queries raised by Mr Gale) to the effect that there were direct transfers by 'Scott' into the ABN AMRO account in November 2016 in two tranches totalling $110,000. Therefore, it is an available inference that the payments made to him were consulting fees under his day trading agreement with GFIN or the refund of amounts that had been contributed by him to provide cover for his trading activities. Payments to Mr Cossens account for $167,000 of the Disputed Payments. There is also in evidence a loan agreement between GFIN and Mr Cossens, but that is for a later date in 2017.
134 GFIN Green Pty Ltd was a subsidiary of GFIN. The bank documents before the court indicate that consulting fees were paid to GFIN Green by GFIN. The bank statements for GFIN's operating account refer to payments being made by GFIN to GFIN Green and being received by GFIN from GFIN Green. Some identify these as 'Gfin Fs Loan'. There are all sorts of valid commercial reasons why a payment might be made to a subsidiary. GFIN Green accounts for $33,000 of the Disputed Payments.
135 As had been noted, GFIN had received $100,000 from the Wards on 28 June 2016. A further $100,000 was deposited by three transfers into GFIN's operating account on 20 October 2016. Two of the deposits were annotated as 'Tfr from Wards'). The third as 'Deposit … Rem: Ronald Ward'. On the same date $68,000 in funds was also transferred into the operating account by GFIN Financial. Those deposits enabled GFIN on the same day to transfer to the ABN AMRO omnibus account an amount of $170,000. Further deposits totalling $50,000 were made into the operating account by the Wards on 1 November 2016. The same day $20,000 was transferred from the operating account to the ABN AMRO operating account. Finally, on 23 November 2016, an amount of $35,000 was deposited into the operating account of GFIN with the annotation 'Deposit … Rem: Murray Ward'. It enabled GFIN to transfer $36,000 the same day to the ABN AMRO omnibus account. It may be inferred from these bank records and other references to loans being made to GFIN by the Wards, that they provided considerable funds in 2016 which were paid by GFIN into the ABN AMRO omnibus account. One of the Disputed Payments was made to Kerry Ward. It may be inferred that this was a repayment of loan funds that had been directed to the ABN AMRO omnibus account. In short these payments seem to relate to repayment of funds that had, at least in part, been added to the funds held in the ABN AMRO account and, in that sense, were not a dissipation of funds that corresponded with accrued entitlements of contract traders.
136 The Disputed Payments also include $1,333 and $10,500 (together, $11,833) paid to Jodie Kim. As has been noted Ms Kim had deposited considerable funds into the GFIN operating account in July 2016. In addition on 14 November 2016, a total of $50,000 was deposited into the operating account with the descriptions 'Deposit Tm Bank New loan from Kim' and 'Deposit Scott Claughton new loan from Kim'. On the same date an amount of $50,000 was transferred from the operating account to the ABN AMRO omnibus account. It is open to infer that the payment to Ms Kim related to a loan that she had provided to GFIN which had been used to increase the funds in the omnibus account.
137 The Disputed Payments also include $69,350 paid to 'Ronald Mur'. There are references to 'Ronald Mur' and 'Ronald Ward' in the operating account of GFIN. It appears that the full name of Mr Ward was Ronald Murray Ward. Submissions were made for GFIN on the basis that this was the case. There appears to be no reference in the evidence to a Mr Mur. The significance of the connection with the Wards is that there were instances where monies received from them into the operating account were then transferred to the omnibus account.
138 On 25 November 2016, a few days before the Disputed Payments, an amount of $125,000 was transferred from the ABN AMRO omnibus account (described as 'Abnamroclearing') to the GFIN operating account. The same day $101,500 was withdrawn. Of that amount, $51,000 was noted as 'Rpy Mallam' and $50,500 was noted as 'Rpy Cossens'. I note that Ms Kim's full name is Jodie Kim Mallam. These amounts are not included in the Disputed Amounts, but provide context for considering what was occurring when amounts were transferred from the ABN AMRO omnibus account to the GFIN operating account in November and December 2016.
139 Therefore the above evidence shows transfers as between the operating account and the omnibus account directing funds to and from third parties. The manner in which these transfers occurred is consistent with GFIN borrowing funds to cover shortfalls in the funds in the omnibus account because of losses incurred by traders or to pay to contract traders their share of profits at times when it was necessary to top up the funds in the omnibus account to maintain the minimum balance. Indeed, the documents show that from time to time the sub-accounts for particular traders were in the negative. When that occurred, as might be expected from time to time given the risks inherent in derivatives trading, in order to maintain the overall minimum balance in the omnibus account (and so enable other contract traders to continue trading on the GFIN account) it was necessary for GFIN to cover the losses until the sub-account position improved. All of which is to say that the evidence does not demonstrate that in November and December 2016, Mr Gooden simply removed funds from the ABN AMRO omnibus account and misappropriated it by paying it to third parties. On the evidence it is equally open to infer that what occurred in relation to the majority of the disputed payments (other than the amounts paid to Mr Gooden himself and Beagle) was that funds that had been borrowed in order to maintain the $1,000,000 minimum balance required in the omnibus account and those funds were simply repaid to relevant parties in November and December 2016.
140 Nevertheless, for GFIN to operate its business on the basis that the sub-account balances from time to time were amounts which GFIN could expend without regard to the likelihood that, in due course, it was to be expected that GFIN could have to pay those amounts to the contract traders (after deducting its percentage share in those cases where the amounts represented accumulated trading profits or funds that had been contributed by contract traders) was a very risky approach to the prop shop business. It depended upon future GFIN earnings being sufficient to cover the shortfall.
141 A small deficit as between the accumulated entitlements of contract traders (which corresponded in broad terms to their balances in the sub-accounts) and the funds immediately available to GFIN to meet those entitlements if called upon to do so may be justified. But the greater the deficit the greater the risk that GFIN would be unable to pay the entitlements (or the greater the amount that it would need in its operating account to cover the deficit). However, in order to determine at any point in time whether there was such a deficiency it is necessary to understand the extent to which the funds in the omnibus account are funds that have been provided by third parties by way of borrowings to cover the minimum balance and the extent to which the contract traders have provided those funds (either by retained earnings or by contributions for the purpose of covering the minimum deposit). GFIN did not seek to demonstrate the overall position of the GFIN omnibus account as at November and December 2016 and so no conclusion can be reached in that regard. As a result it may be that $350,000 was the full extent of accrued entitlements of contract traders and the deposits provided by them that were not paid to contract traders at that time (noting that large amounts were paid out to JAG Securities ($438,331.52), Scott Cossens ($91,000) and Gale Capital ($16,500)).
142 Of the Disputed Payments, $27,500 were paid to Beagle (one of which was paid in January 2017). Each of those payments had the annotation 'Cons Fee'. That notation is consistent with Beagle acting as a contract trader because the same notation appears throughout the bank statements for the operating account of GFIN where payments are being made to contract traders. Further, each amount is consistent with the practice described by Mr Gale of a trader issuing an invoice to draw down an amount of accrued profit share (the amounts being $5,500 in three instances and $11,000 in another). Finally, there are references in the sub-account names to Beagle which are consistent with it having a contract trader account with GFIN. These matters are considered below in dealing with claim (a). At this point it is sufficient to note that the question whether there was a bona fide reason to pay Beagle is the subject of claim (a). Any complaint about payments to Beagle as part of claim (c) overlap with that claim.
143 Finally, of the Disputed Payments, $17,252 was transferred to Mr Gooden (one of which was paid in January 2017). In each case the notation in the bank statement was 'Payment Malcolm Go Salary Mg' or similar. At this point it is sufficient to note that the question whether there was a bona fide reason to pay Mr Gooden is the subject of claim (b). Any complaint about payments to Mr Gooden overlap with claim (b).
144 It was accepted by GFIN that other payments made by GFIN from its operating account in the relevant period were for operating expenses.
145 Therefore, the evidence establishes the following as to the period in November and December 2016 when the Disputed Payments were made:
(1) $1,587,662.82 was transferred from the ABN AMRO omnibus account to the GFIN operating account;
(2) $350,000 was transferred from the operating account to the Macquarie omnibus account;
(3) $438,331.52 was transferred from the operating account to JAG Securities, a contract trader;
(4) $167,000 was transferred from the operating account to Mr Cossens, likely in respect of his dealings as a contract trader;
(5) $16,500 was transferred from the operating account to Gale Capital a trader;
(6) $251,183 was transferred from the operating account to parties who had lent funds to GFIN that had been transferred to the omnibus account at ABN AMRO (Ms Kim and the Wards);
(7) $33,000 was transferred from the operating account to GFIN Green, a subsidiary of GFIN, a transaction that has not been shown to be improper in any way;
(8) $27,500 was transferred from the operating account to Beagle for Cons Fee which is a matter the subject of claim (a);
(9) $17,252 was transferred from the operating account to Mr Gooden who was entitled to a salary as managing director and there is a separate claim as to an alleged overpayment of his salary in this period (the merit of which depends upon a consideration of the payments to which he was entitled on an annual basis and the amount received by him on an annual basis); and
(10) The balance was for operating expenses of GFIN.
146 Therefore, of the $1,587,662.82, a total of $1,223,014.52 (being the sum of the amounts in (2) to (6) above) comprised amounts that were of a kind that were represented by the amounts in the omnibus account and on the logic of the case advanced by GFIN are not the subject of complaint. GFIN accepts that the balance was applied for operating expenses of GFIN. Therefore, it is only $44,752 (being the sum of the amounts in (8) and (9)) that may be questioned and whether there was a proper basis to pay those amounts depends upon claim (a) and claim (b).
147 As has been explained, within the omnibus accounts there were sub-accounts for each of the contract traders and a sub-account styled 'GFIN admin Account'. After the omnibus account was moved to Macquarie and the levels of trading increased after January 2017, there was no requirement imposed by Macquarie to increase the minimum amount held in the omnibus account to the required level of $1,000,000.
148 As a result, when a contract trader was given access to that trader's sub-account it showed a positive balance in favour of the trader, but what the trader did not know from the sub-account information was that the actual cash in the omnibus account was insufficient to cover the whole of that balance by reason that a substantial part of those funds was offset by the negative balance in the GFIN admin sub-account.
149 At no time did Mr Gooden inform Mr Cameron, Mr Gale or Mr Bignell that the amounts shown in the trader sub-accounts did not represent cash held in the omnibus account by reason of the negative balance in the GFIN admin sub-account. The question whether there was any significance for the case advanced by GFIN as a result of that failure is addressed below.
150 On 23 January 2017 a deposit of $200,000 annotated 'Remitter: Ronald Ward' was made into the GFIN operating account. On the same day a payment was made to JAG Securities of $179,511.79 annotated as 'Pymt Jag Securi Cons Fee Jag'. A few days later on 27 January 2017, there was a further deposit of $75,000 annotated as 'Deposit Scott Cossens Loan'. On the same day there was a payment of $16,840.35 annotated as 'Pymt Blarney Fu Cons Fee Blarney'. On 31 January and 1 February 2017 there were payments of 'Cons Fees' to Don Humphries, Kels Trading and Southend Finance as well as a salary to Scott Cossens. Therefore, what was occurring at this point is that funds were being received by GFIN into the operating account from third parties and it was those borrowed funds (rather than transfers out of the omnibus account) that were being used to make payments to GFIN's contract traders and employee traders.
151 The same practice continued into February, although on 9 February 2017 an amount was received into the operating account from 'Gay King Thompson' of $475,000 of which $250,000 was paid to Mr Bignell and $200,000 was transferred to Macquarie.
152 On 14 and 16 March 2017 there was a strange series of transfers. $1,500,000 came into the operating account with the annotation 'From Southend Futures'. The same amount (in two tranches) was transferred to the omnibus account the same day. Two days later the amount of $1,750,000 was transferred from the omnibus account to the GFIN operating account. Of that amount $1,561,000 was transferred out of the operating account with the annotation 'Payment Southend F Ln Rpy + Int Sthd'.
153 Not all payments into the Macquarie omnibus account came through the GFIN operating account. For example, on 12 May 2017 there was a cash receipt into the Macquarie omnibus GFIN admin sub-account of $55,000 that did not come from the operating account.
154 Thereafter, amounts were received into the operating account from the Macquarie omnibus account and 'Cons Fee' payments were made to various parties. This was the case up until May 2017. Throughout the period from December 2016 to May 2017, the GFIN admin sub-account at Macquarie remained in credit.
155 On 4 May 2017, Mr Gooden spoke to Mr Bignell and told him that Macquarie was putting pressure on him to increase the funding amount that GFIN had on deposit. He said that he was going to need Mr Bignell to inject at least another $450,000 if he wanted to keep trading, taking the amount in his account up to $500,000.
156 Whilst all this was happening, there was a delay in the preparation of the end of financial year accounts for GFIN for the year ending 30 June 2016. Ensuring the preparation of the annual accounts was a responsibility of Mr Gooden as managing director.
157 From February 2017, Mr Cameron and Mr Gale asked Mr Gooden to provide the accounts for GFIN for the previous financial year and a current balance sheet. Although Mr Gooden did not provide the accounts or a current balance sheet to them at that time, he did provide assurances that everything was fine with GFIN. The state of dealings between Mr Gale and Mr Gooden at the time concerning the accounts is evident from the terms of the following email sent by Mr Gale to Mr Gooden on 10 February 2017:
Thanks for the discussion about my status as a director of GFIN Pty Ltd the other day. I appreciate your suggestion to stand down if I was concerned about the risks. I suppose with any business there is risk and after thinking about it I'm happy to accept that and remain as a director if that suits you.
It probably makes sense from a corporate governance view as well to have two directors. Plus it's probably about time that I learnt more about how to manage a balance sheet.
As we discussed the other day I'm fine to be involved in as much or as little of the day to day decisions or negotiations as you would choose. The main thing for me is that I should be more proactive in making myself aware of the overall financial position of the company probably on a quarterly basis.
I suppose a good time to have the first look at it will be when Mitchell Wilson prepare the financial statements shortly. Then when you get time to have a chat about it we can run through the main parts of the statements and how they relate to the bottom line. I'm no accountant but to simplify it I suppose the important issue would be how much is owed for all potential outgoings such as traders' retained earnings and commissions, quarterly running costs, salaries and loans vs assets and cash position which I'm presuming would be mainly funds held with the clearer and in the bank. Or in other words how does the balance sheet/cash position look if everyone gets paid everything owed at the end of the quarter.
158 In late March 2017, Mr Gale received the financial accounts for GFIN and signed them as director on 27 March 2017. The accounts for FY2016 showed profit for the year of $30,968 (compared to profit for the previous financial year of $517,566). Significantly, the cash position of GFIN as at 30 June 2016 was shown in the FY2016 accounts as $13,014 (in a Westpac operating account) and $1,040,213 (in an ABN AMRO account, which appears to be a reference to the omnibus account).
159 The FY2016 accounts as signed by Mr Gale included Note 7 'Trade and Other Payables' as follows:
2016 2015
$ $