Statutory context
10 Section 206A of the Corporations Act provides that a person who is disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Act commits an offence if:
(a) they make, or participate in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
(b) they exercise the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; or
(c) they communicate instructions or wishes (other than advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation) to the directors of the corporation:
(i) knowing that the directors are accustomed to act in accordance with the person's instructions or wishes; or
(ii) intending that the directors will act in accordance with those instructions or wishes.
11 As noted, s 206B(3) relevantly provides that a person is disqualified from managing corporations if the person is an undischarged bankrupt under the law of Australia.
12 A person who is disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 may only be appointed as director of a company if the appointment is made with permission granted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) under s 206GAB, or with leave granted by the court under s 206G: s 201B(2).
13 Section 206G of the Corporations Act empowers the court to grant leave for a disqualified person to manage corporations. It relevantly provides:
206G Court power to grant leave
(1) A person who is disqualified from managing corporations may apply to the Court for leave to manage:
(a) corporations; or
(b) a particular class of corporations; or
(c) a particular corporation;
if the person was not disqualified by ASIC.
(2) The person must lodge a notice with ASIC at least 21 days before commencing the proceedings. The notice must be in the prescribed form.
(3) The order granting leave may be expressed to be subject to exceptions and conditions determined by the Court.
Note: If the Court grants the person leave to manage the corporation, the person may be appointed as a director (see section 201B) or secretary (see section 204B) of a company.
(4) The person must lodge with ASIC a copy of any order granting leave within 14 days after the order is made.
(5) On application by ASIC, the Court may revoke the leave. The order revoking leave does not take effect until it is served on the person.
14 In Frigger, in the matter of an application by Frigger [2019] FCA 1730, Jackson J summarised the principles relevant to such an application and I respectfully adopt that summary:
[8] In Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 762 at 764, Street J identified the fundamental principles which informed the court's discretion under a statutory predecessor to s 206G as follows:
The section under which this application is made proceeds upon the basis that a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is prima facie not to be permitted to act as a director or to take part in the management of a company. The Court is given jurisdiction to grant leave for such activities to be carried on, but an applicant who comes to the Court seeking leave must bear the onus of establishing that the general policy of the Legislature laid down in this section ought to be made the subject of an exception in his case. It should be borne in mind that the section is not in any sense a punishment of the bankrupt. Nor should a refusal to grant leave under the section be regarded as punitive. The prohibition is entirely protective, and the power of the Court to grant leave is to be exercised with this consideration in the forefront.
[9] Even in the absence of a contradictor it is for the applicants for leave to place before the court evidence in appropriate form that is capable of satisfying the court that, in the given case, an exception should be made to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition in the Act. ASIC's absence is not necessarily to be given significant weight: Watts, in the matter of Watts [2011] FCA 1185; (2011) 284 ALR 403 at [18] (Yates J).
[10] Generally, before it can lift the disqualification the court needs to know what the applicants propose to do by way of corporate management, although this may not be necessary if the application is for leave to take part in the management of a specified corporation or corporations: Re Shneider (1996) 71 FCR 69 at 73 (Drummond J). In those cases the court will consider the structure of the companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders, creditors and employees, and any risks to those persons or to the public which may be involved in the applicants assuming positions on the board or in management: Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557; (2003) 46 ACSR 68 at [8] (Lindgren J).
[11] As one would expect, the attitude of the shareholders to the application can be a relevant factor: see e.g. Jansen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 1564 at [12], [14] (Mansfield J).
[12] The court will also look to the circumstances in which the debts giving rise to the bankruptcy were not paid, and the extent to which an applicant has cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy: GRD v BJD [2018] WASC 374 at [12] (Master Sanderson), applying Chye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] FCA 1405 (Bromberg J).
15 The object of the SIS Act is to make provision for the prudent management of certain superannuation funds (among other funds and trusts) and for their supervision by certain regulators, one of which is the Commissioner of Taxation: s 3(1). In return for such regulation, the funds and trusts may become eligible for concessional taxation treatment: s 3(2).
16 A superannuation fund is a self-managed superannuation fund for the purposes of the SIS Act only if it satisfies the conditions set out in s 17A of the SIS Act. Where the trustee is a body corporate, those conditions include that each director of the trustee is a member of the fund: s 17A(1)(c).
17 Under the SIS Act, a person is disqualified from acting as a responsible officer of a trustee of a superannuation entity if they are an insolvent under administration. It is an offence for a disqualified person to do so: s 126K(4).
18 Section 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act provides that a disqualified person may apply to this Court for an order that they are not a disqualified person.
19 In Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431 Foster J made the following observations about s 126J:
[29] … I think that s 126J(1)(b) should be interpreted as conferring a broad discretion upon the Court to decide whether to make the order contemplated by the subsection and, if so, on what terms. In considering whether to exercise the discretion and, if so, how, the Court must take into account the purpose or object of the SIS Act and, in particular, the purpose or object of Pt 15 of that Act. The object of the SIS Act is set out in s 3. The object of Pt 15 is specified in s 119. Therefore, in any given case, when the Court's jurisdiction under s 126J(1)(b) is engaged, the Court is obliged to determine the application by paying due regard to the fact that:
(a) Part 15 of the SIS Act is intended to set out rules governing the eligibility of persons to take up positions of responsibility with superannuation entities; and
(b) The principal object of the SIS Act generally insofar as superannuation entities are concerned is to make provision for the prudent management and supervision of such entities.
20 His Honour also observed (at [31]) that in applying s 126J the court was entitled to have regard to the jurisprudence developed in relation to the disqualification and reinstatement of officers of corporations pursuant to the Corporations Act, including in relation to s 206G of that Act.
21 Having regard to all of those principles, it can be seen that the main consideration in applications under s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act and s 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act is therefore the interests of third parties; the shareholders, creditors and employees of the relevant company, and the public at large (Frigger at [34]). As discussed in GFD v BJD [2018] WASC 374 at [11]-[12], other considerations may include:
(a) the protection of the public and any shareholders;
(b) the nature of the disqualification;
(c) the applicant's character and conduct since the disqualification;
(d) the structure of the company and the nature of the business;
(e) the potential for repetition of contraventions;
(f) the risk to survival of the company;
(g) the effect on any third parties of the company being unable to have the benefit of the applicant's knowledge; and
(h) insofar as bankruptcy is involved, the circumstances in which the debts giving rise to the bankruptcy were not paid and the extent to which an applicant cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy.