Relevant principles
14 The overarching principle to be applied in determining whether or not leave should be granted, in circumstances such as the present, was identified by Street J in Re Altim Pty Ltd (1968) 2 NSWR 762 at 764 as follows:
The section under which this application is made proceeds upon the basis that a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is prima facie not to be permitted to act as a director or to take part in the management of a company. The court is given jurisdiction to grant leave for such activities to be carried on, but an [applicant for leave] who comes to the court seeking leave must bear the onus of establishing that the general policy of the legislature laid down in this section ought to be made the subject of an exception in his case. It should be borne in mind that the section is not in any sense a punishment of the bankrupt. Nor should a refusal to grant leave under the section be regarded as punitive. The prohibition is entirely protective, and the power of the court to grant leave is to be exercised with this consideration in the forefront.
15 In Re Shneider (1996) 71 FCR 69 at 73, Drummond J observed:
Given that this is the legislative policy behind the section, it is difficult to see how the Court could properly grant a relaxation of the ban unless it knew something of what the [applicant for leave] proposed to do by way of becoming involved in corporate management, that is, unless the [applicant for leave] put before the Court a proposal for him to take part in the management of a specified corporation or corporations.
16 Although Shneider was a case in which the applicant for leave was disqualified because of a criminal conviction, rather than bankruptcy, Drummond J's observations remain relevant to all cases in which leave is sought under s 206G(1) of the Act.
17 Similarly, in Adams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 68 Lindgren J, in the course of summarising a number of principles that are relevant to the application of s 206G(1), observed (at [8]):
… Where, as here, the [applicant for leave] seeks leave to become a director and to take part in the management of particular companies the court will consider the structure of those companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders creditors and employees. One matter to be considered will be the assessment of any risks to those persons or to the public which may appear to be involved in the [applicant for leave's] assuming positions on the board or in management …
18 It is clear from these observations that it is for the applicant for leave to place before the Court evidence in appropriate form that is capable of satisfying the Court that, in the given case, an exception should be made to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition in the Act. This remains the case even though there is no contradictor before the Court who actively opposes the application. The mere absence of a contradictor does not discharge the applicant for leave from the obligation of satisfying the Court, on an appropriate basis, that leave, as sought, should be granted. The fact that ASIC has not appeared is not a matter on which I place any significant weight: see Re Australian Limousin Breeders Society Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 426 at 429-430.
19 Furthermore, the requirement to establish an appropriate case for the exercise of the discretion that is sought is not lessened by the opportunity afforded to ASIC by s 206G(5) of the Act to apply to the Court to revoke any leave that might be granted under s 206G(1). As Brooking J observed in Re Ansett (1990) 3 ACSR 357 at 359, if the Court is not persuaded on the evidence before it that the discretion should be exercised in the applicant for leave's favour, "it cannot stretch a point on the basis that a mistake can always be set right by a subsequent revocation".
20 It should also be noted that hardship, in the form of disqualification, is not, alone, a persuasive ground for granting leave: see Adams at [8]; Chew v National Companies and Securities Commission (No 2) [1985] WAR 337 at 340-341; Re Maelor Jones Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 4 at 13; Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 12 ACLC 11 at 14. This is because that particular form of hardship is implicit in the legislative prohibition. The legislative policy of protecting the public, reflected in the prohibition itself, remains in the forefront of considerations: Altim at 764; see also the cases cited in Adams at [8].
21 The general principles informing the exercise of the discretion under s 206G(1) of the Act were recently noted in Carey, in the matter of Carey [2011] FCA 235. Mr Watts has placed particular reliance on that case. While that case concerned a plaintiff who was an undischarged bankrupt who successfully obtained leave, the facts of the case, and the particular grant of leave that was sought, are removed from the present case.
22 Mr Watts has also placed reliance on the summary of the general principles in Duffy; Re Westgate Ports Pty Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 267 at [19]. This case, however, concerned disqualification by reason of conviction of an indictable offence. Once again, the facts of the case, and the particular grant of leave that was sought, are removed from the present case.