Undue influence - legal principles
158In addition to the various arguments of construction with which I have dealt above, the defendants submitted that Mr Harris' execution of the Notices was procured by undue influence. With one fundamental exception, there was no dispute between the parties as to the legal principles to be applied:
(1)The exercise of the power of nomination by the Notices is susceptible to the application of the doctrine of undue influence.
(2)The mere reposing of trust or confidence in another does not mean that every benefit conferred on that other is subject to being set aside. The influence exercised by reason of that trust or confidence must be "undue" in the sense that the impugned act was the product of the improper use of that influence so that it was not, in the fullest sense of the words, the actor's free, voluntary act.
(3)A relationship of influence may be presumed (for example, between solicitor and client) or proved.
(4)The relationship of adult child and elderly parent does not create a presumption of undue influence: McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 at [14].
(5)To rebut the presumption of undue influence "it is not sufficient to show that the weaker party understood what he was doing or the significance thereof. What has to be shown is that the formation of his intention was free from the influence of the other party, and that he was at the time of the gift 'emancipated' from that influence. The circumstances of the case thus will require close examination; the stronger party may rebut the presumption in any manner open to him on such circumstances. But in many cases the courts have placed particular reliance upon the presence or absence of improvidence and independent advice": Meagher Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 4th ed, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002 at [15-125] ("MGL"); and
(6)In the absence of a presumed or proven relationship of influence, it nevertheless remains open to a party to prove that a particular benefit was in fact procured by the undue influence of another.
159With the exception of the proposition set out in sub-paragraph [158(1)] above, the preceding summary is derived from the compendious treatment of undue influence in Chapter 15 of MGL. The subject of the proposition in sub-paragraph [158(1)] above was disputed between the parties and I now set out my reasons for that proposition.
160George submitted that "the presumption of undue influence does not arise merely from a relationship between the parties in which one has the opportunity of obtaining an ascendency over the other, but from what amounts to an extravagant disposition of property which cannot be explained", citing the High Court in Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 at 675. For undue influence to be established, there had to be an unfair exploitation of influence in order to obtain a substantial proprietary benefit. The appointment of George to the office of appointor/protector did not amount to a conveyance of a proprietary interest, noting the fundamental distinction between a power and property: Ex parte Gilchrist; re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521; Hudson v Gray (1927) 39 CLR 473 at 515. The appointment was not a transaction, the object of which was to convey property or confer any benefit on the plaintiff. Therefore, the doctrine of undue influence did not apply.
161The defendants submitted that the application of the doctrine was not confined to a transaction which involved any immediate disposition of "property" in a narrow sense. They drew attention to statements in leading texts that were not confined to dispositions of property. For example, in the 18th edition of Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009, it is stated in relation to undue influence that "Under the head of constructive fraud, equity recognises a wide variety of situations in which intervention is justified by reason of a defendant's influence or dominance over the claimant in procuring his execution of a document (such as a settlement) or his entering into an obligation" (at [26-007]; emphasis added).
162The defendants submitted that while, for obvious reasons, the vast majority of cases and related commentary concerned gifts and dispositions of property, there is no reason in principle for the equitable doctrine to be limited to benefits of that kind. They drew attention to other cases where undue influence has been called in aid which did not involve a gift or transfer of property. Examples included cases seeking to set aside consent orders such as Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235 at 243-244 and the decision of Palmer J in Tjiong v Tjiong [2010] NSWSC 578 where two beneficiaries were entitled to a declaration that their consent to the establishment of a family trust had been obtained by undue influence.
163I accept the defendants' submissions. The use in both the cases and texts of language such as "transaction" and "benefit", while entirely understandable, is apt to mislead if read as prescribing the limits of the application of the doctrine. The key features which invoke the equitable jurisdiction are a particular kind of relationship of dependence or reliance by A on B and the unconscientious use of that relationship by B which has brought about a change in A's legal rights and entitlements. Insofar as that change involves a disadvantage to A or a benefit to B (or any other person), equity will look to substance rather than form and will treat those concepts in their widest possible senses.
164Rowley v Rowley (1853-1854) Kay's Reports 242 provides an instructive analogy. In the course of dealing with what was described as "the corrupt motive of the donee of the power", Vice-Chancellor Sir W Page Wood observed (at 262) that "it would be impossible to contend, if a direct bribe were given to the appointor, ... that the appointment could be upheld in favour of the party to whom the fund subject to appointment was given". Bribery is a very obvious example of fraud. Similarly, "undue influence is only one of the instances of fraud; and undue influence itself is manifested in a variety of ways ... but still it is in all cases bottomed in fraud": Symons v Williams (1875) 1 VLR(E) 199 at 216 per Barry J cited in MGL at [15-005].
165If, as Rowley v Rowley makes clear, the exercise of a power of appointment (as traditionally understood) could be vitiated by fraud, there is no reason in principle why the doctrine of undue influence would not extend to the exercise of a slightly different power, in this case to appoint someone to the office of appointor or protector of a trust. Having said that, I should note that the nature and scope of the powers of an appointor or protector remain the subject of some debate. The presence of such an office in discretionary trusts was remarked upon by the Court of Appeal in Belfield v Belfield [2012] NSWCA 416; (2012) 16 BPR 31,177:
[72] While it was far from universal, it was by no means uncommon for [discretionary] trusts to be associated with a device whereby the instigator achieved at least some practical control or influence over the decisions the trustee made ...
[73] One device that has come to be used sometimes is to create a discretionary family trust that has an office, separate to that of the trustee, which is commonly called by a name such as "protector" or "guardian": P W Young, "Non-Fiduciary Trust Administrators" (2010) 84 ALJ 668; Heydon and Leeming, Jacobs on Trusts, 2006, at [320]; H A J Ford and W A Lee, Law of Trusts, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, paras [12.250], [5.12170] and [8180]. Such devices were well known before 1982 to Australian lawyers who practiced in trusts and estate planning: for example, S E K Hulme QC, "Difficulties in the Use of Trusts in Estate Planning" (1976) 5 Aust Tax Rev 134, p 143. Commonly, a trustee who is proposing to exercise a discretionary power is required to give the "protector" or "guardian" a particular period of notice before that power is actually exercised. If the "protector" or "guardian" disapproves of that decision, the "protector" or "guardian" has the power to remove the trustee and replace it with another whose opinions are more in accord with those of the "protector" or "guardian". Alternatively, the "protector" or "guardian" could be given a power of veto of decisions of the trustee. As well, other powers could be conferred on a "protector" or "guardian". When there is any such arrangement, it will require a close analysis of the terms of the particular trust documentation ...
166There is a live academic and judicial debate about the extent to which the powers of an appointor/protector are fiduciary. Since the appointor/protector does not hold the trust property, he or she is not a trustee. Nevertheless, the generally accepted view appears to be that the powers of an appointor/protector will generally be fiduciary, but need not necessarily be so. For example, a protector with the power to remove or appoint trustees will be a fiduciary, just like any other person with such a power: In re Skeat's Settlement; Skeats v Evans (1889) 42 ChD 522. Other powers may be personal, depending on the proper construction of the trust instrument. The state of the debate may be ascertained by reference to G Thomas and A Hudson, The Law of Trusts, 2nd ed, OUP, 2010 at 23.34-23.36; Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2010 at 1.76-1.92; and, D.W.M. Waters "The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?" in A.J. Oakley (General Editor), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law, OUP, 1996 at pp 63-122 especially at p 81.
167The significance of the distinction is that while all power holders must act within the scope of their powers, only those whose powers are for the benefit of others (such as fiduciaries) are subject to the "fraud on a power" rule. That rule requires the power holder to act in good faith and for a proper purpose. Insofar as a power is fiduciary, then it is a straightforward conclusion that, if the power has been exercised subject to undue influence, equity will not regard it as having been exercised in good faith or for a proper purpose. If the appointor's/protector's power to appoint a nominate a new appointor or protector is a fiduciary one, then this line of reasoning supports the conclusion that the power purported to be exercised by the Notices is amenable to the doctrine of undue influence.
168On the other hand, if, on the proper construction of the trust deed, the power to appoint a new appointor/protector is a purely personal (non-fiduciary) power, it might be argued that a different result would follow. This is because, as D.W.M. Waters points out at page 81 of his article just cited, "provided he acts within the scope (and intention) of his power, it seems to be generally accepted that, if the holder of a power does not hold that power as a fiduciary, the courts are not going to impose restraints or criteria as to behaviour upon him in the exercise or non-exercise of that power". To the extent it may be necessary, my view is that the power to appoint a new appointor/protector under the First and Second Trusts is a personal one. However, that does not put the exercise of the power beyond the reach of the doctrine of undue influence. Unless it is clear from the instrument conferring the power, where a personal power is conferred on someone it is axiomatic that for the exercise of that power to be within its scope and intention, it must be the free and voluntary act of the holder of the power.
169For these reasons, whether or not the power to appoint a new appointor/protector is fiduciary or personal, the exercise of such a power is susceptible to the application of the doctrine of undue influence.