[2008] VCAT 1687
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2008-08-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
The application under section 87 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 to amend planning permit 1364/2005/A (amended) is refused.
Mr Henry Jackson of counsel, instructed by Minter Ellison
Buildings and works for garden supplies and a concrete batching plant, with permission for reduced car parking provision and waiver of requirement for bicycle parking in accordance with the endorsed plans.
(1) Any person who objected or would have been entitled to object to the issue of a permit may ask the Tribunal to cancel or amend the permit if -
(b) the person believes that the person has been adversely affected by -
(i) a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit; or
(ii) any substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit; or
(iii) any material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit.
[33] ... It is the residential zone land within 300 metres, and residential properties within that distance, that give rise to the need for a planning permit to use the land for a concrete batching plant. Consequently it is considerations in relation to those properties that must be assessed in deciding whether such a permit should be granted.
[34] Furthermore, residential uses beyond the 300 metre threshold distance do not occasion the need for a "use" permit. They do not "trigger" the need for such planning permission. As with properties within the business 4 zone, so also in relation to residential properties outside the 300 metre threshold distance, this concrete batching plant could be established without a permit. The relevant considerations in relation to the granting of a permit relate to those residential properties and that portion of the residential zone falling within the 300 metre distance, and not those outside it. ...
[101] ... modelling of the possible impacts from a concrete batching plant is not required in the approval process. What is required is an adoption of those aspects of best practice management that are relevant to the works application. Such practices are designed to address possible air emissions to remove or reduce dust emissions to an acceptable level. These practices are set out in the Environmental Guidelines for Concrete Batching Industry[12] (the environmental guidelines).
[103] ... These additional reductions can be achieved by placing the aggregate storage hoppers underground (or more precisely at a level) where unloading into the hoppers is directly from the delivery vehicle, removing the need for double handing with a front end loader (this being common ground from all experts as one of the main sources of dust emissions). Stored aggregate could then be distributed via a more sophisticated system of weigh hoppers and covered conveyor belts to the mixer loading point.
[4] It should be noted that this is a formal order made in the circumstances stated and the Tribunal has not considered the merits of the application.
This letter is response to your request seeking EPA's position on your application to VCAT vary the layout of the cement batching plant at 115 Grove Road Grovedale.
In July 2007, just after the issuing of this works approval EPA remade the Scheduled Premises and Exemption Regulations. This resulted in the removal of concrete batching plants. This means that the works are no longer controlled by the issued works approval. However EPA still expects all works are in keeping with the protocol for environmental management for concrete batching works and as a minimum will be kept to the same standard as required by the approval.
The proposed relocation of the plant and storage bins is in keeping with the good practice stipulated in the works approval and therefore they are not of concern to EPA.
(b) the owner and the occupier of the land concerned;
(c) any person who asked for the cancellation or amendment of the permit under section 87;
(e) any person who asked for the amendment of the permit under section 87A;
Has there been a material misstatement or concealment of fact?
It appears to be clear that, for Wednesbury unreasonableness to be established, it is not enough that the reviewing court has reached the conclusion that the statutory decision-maker erred, even seriously, in his or her assessment of the facts. Although the matter has been expressed in various ways in particular cases, a recurrent theme is that there must be something that, in effect, vitiates the decision-maker's exercise of discretion.
Sand and aggregates should be stored in a hopper or bunker which shields the materials from winds. The bunker should enclose the stockpile on three sides. The walls should extend one metre above the height of the maximum quantity of raw material kept on site, and extend two metres beyond the front of the stockpile.
The hopper or bunker should be fitted with water sprays which keep the stored material damp at all times. Monitor the water content of the stockpile to ensure it is maintained in a damp condition.
If a combination of wall height and length coupled with water sprinklers is unable to contain the material, roofing and/or rubber entry curtains should be installed.
In-ground storage bunkers minimise dust emissions from stockpiles. Where these are filled by drive-over deliveries, the bunker should be shielded on two sides by shrouds or walls that are at least 0.5 metres high and extend the entire length of the bunker.
It is still essential to ensure the raw ingredients are damp on receipt and before they are delivered to the in-ground bunkers.
[117] Mr Southall contended that, by reference to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, the Minister had a duty to provide affected persons with an opportunity to make submissions about the December 2001 Concept Plan before he gave approval to this plan. Having regard to my findings, it is unnecessary to determine this submission. However I doubt whether it is correct. In Mietta's Hotels Pty Ltd v Roper (1988) 1 AATR 354 Beach J expressed the view that provisions in the Act concerning the notification that is required for an amendment to a planning scheme forms a code and prevents any implication being made that there is some requirement, over and above those contained in the Act, to observe the rules of natural justice. This decision was followed by Brooking J in Grollo Australia v Minister for Planning [1993] VicRp 45; [1993] 1 VR 627. It seems to me that this same principle is likely to apply to the whole of the Act. The Act makes it clear that certain decisions are to be made after notification, whereas other decisions can be made without notification. Given the extensive consideration which the Parliament has clearly given to this question, it would seem odd if the Parliament intended that additional notification requirements were to be implied.
[14] In West Valentine Pty Ltd v City of Stonnington I examined the implications of provisions in the Act and in planning schemes that exempt certain categories of permit applications from third party notice and appeal rights. This case is authority for the proposition that whilst it is only the review rights of section 82(1) that are exempt under these provisions, which relate to an objector's right to apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision of the responsible authority to grant a permit, the scheme within the Planning and Environment Act 1987 is also intended to exclude the participation of objectors who are exempt from section 82(1) from other applications for review in respect of the decision; for example applications by permit applicants in respect of refusal (section 77), failure (section 79) and conditions (section 80).
[15] The West Valentine case was concerned with the rights of third parties in respect of applications for review of a decision regarding the grant of a permit. I consider that the principle it establishes can be extended to applications to cancel or amend a permit under section 87 as well as applications concerning the initial grant of a permit. Indeed, it would be strange if it was otherwise. As I said in the West Valentine case:
[14] ... The Act and the planning scheme provisions set out certain classes of applications for permit that are exempt from the notice and review provisions of the Act by third party objectors. It would be contrary to the purpose underlying these provisions if, by nevertheless submitting an objection, a person could thereby gain rights to be a party in applications for review other than one concerning a decision to grant the permit.
It would equally undermine the purpose underlying the provisions of the Act and planning scheme regarding exempt applications if a person who was not entitled to notice or review rights could nevertheless challenge a permit, once granted, by lodging a request under section 87 to cancel or amend it.
[16] There is a very explicit scheme in the Act that exempts objectors from reviews in certain classes of permit applications. In my view, the words "entitled to object" in section 89 must be read having regard to the scheme established by the Act as a whole with respect to the opportunities and rights of third parties to participate in the decision making process about the issue of permits.
[17] It is true, as noted in West Valentine, that there is nothing in the Act that precludes a person who may be exempt from notice and review rights from submitting an objection. However, the point was made that:
[6] ... if no notice is required to be given under section 52(1) or the planning scheme of an application, section 60(3) provides that the responsible authority is not required to consider any objection or submission in respect of the application which may have been made. Again, the Act does not preclude a responsible authority from considering such objections if it wishes but that does not thereby create any rights for those objectors.
[18] The whole tenor of the provisions in the Act is that in the case of exempt applications, third parties have no 'rights' to object. They may in fact object but those objections carry no rights to be considered by the responsible authority, or for objectors to be given notice of the decision or to participate in a review of the decision.
to give (a person or thing) a title, right, or claim to something; furnish with grounds for laying claim .
In the context of applications that are exempt from third party rights of notice and review, such as clause 43.01-3, if a third party objects they have no rights as a result of that objection. In my view, this means they cannot be said to be entitled to object to the issue of a permit. They are not given a right or furnished with grounds for laying any claim, which is what being entitled to something means.
[20] On this basis I therefore find that the applicant was not a person who was entitled to object to the issue of the permit in this case and consequently is not a person who has standing under section 89(1) of the Act to request cancellation or amendment of the permit.
[1] Flintstones Garden Supplies Centre Pty Ltd v Greater Geelong CC [2007] VCAT 1614
[2] Application P1298/2008 (27 May 2008). The Tribunal ordered as follows:
The order of the Tribunal is that planning permit 1364/2005 is amended by replacing the endorsed plans with the amended plans marked:
[3] There were a couple of other minor changes, which are not relevant for present purposes.
[4] See City of Springvale v Kydas (1990) 4 AATR 317; Stonnington CC v Cull [2003] VCAT 84
[6] Environmental Guidelines for the Concrete Batching Industry, EPA Publication 628, June 1998
[7] Under section 149A or section 149B of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 depending on who the applicant is.
[8] Clause 34.04-4 Greater Geelong Planning Scheme
[9] [2007] VCAT 1614 at [18] - [42]
[10] I note that there appears to be an error in the Tribunal's decision. It clearly determines to grant a permit for both use and development, but the order only states that a planning permit is granted "for buildings and works for garden supplies and a concrete batching plant". No reference is made to use for concrete batching plant, although clearly this was intended. The planning permit has been issued in accordance with the Tribunal's order. A correction order pursuant to section 119 of the Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 is required to remedy this error. I propose to refer this error to the Tribunal members (Senior Member Byard and Member Potts) to make an appropriate correction order.
[12] Environment Protection Authority (State Government of Victoria) Environmental Guidelines for Concrete Batching Industry June 1998.
[14] [2007] VCAT 1614 at [108] - [109]
[15] The concern was that this approach might lead to an application for review under section 149 of the Act which could cause delay. As work had already commenced, Flintstones wished to obtain a decision on the amendments as soon as possible.
[16] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wensbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
[17] Per Wilcox J in Australian Pork Limited v Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine [2005] FCA 671 at [300]
[18] The last paragraph of the EPA letter to Flintstones dated 16 May 2008 set out above states:
The proposed relocation of the plant and storage bins is in keeping with the good practice stipulated in the works approval and therefore they are not of concern to EPA.
Geelong Community for Good Life Inc
Greater Geelong CC [2008] VCAT 1687