Gebicki v State of Queensland & Anor [2025] QCAT 126

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 48(2)(a), s 209

Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56; (1989-1990) 168 CLR 165

Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92; [2003] HCA 62

M Fuller of Counsel instructed by Crown Law for the respondents

• [1] This matter has had an unfortunate procedural history that did not much improve by the time it came on for final hearing. It arises out of a complaint lodged by the applicant, Mrs Peri Gebicki, in the Queensland Human Rights Commission on or about 9 March 2023 and which was referred to the Tribunal on or about 25 September 2023. It concerns the way that the applicant contends she was treated by the Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services ('the Department') an agency of the State of Queensland and specifically alleged conduct by the second respondent ('Ms Scott') and who, from 2 February 2023 until 31 March 2023, was the assigned Child Safety Officer ('CSO') for the six biological children of the applicant and her husband. The children were subject to long-term guardianship orders granting the long-term guardianship of each of the children to the Chief Executive of the Department until they each respectively turn 18 years of age.
• [2] As the Gebicki CSO for the children, Ms Scott's duties included attending to supervise "family contacts" between Mr and Mrs Gebicki and the children approximately fortnightly and would usually attend family contacts with one other employee of the Department.
• [3] The applicant contends that she has a protected attribute namely vision impairment and says that she is legally blind, as she put it, in one eye. Initially, the respondents put in issue whether she had that impairment in fact, however, based on the applicant's oral testimony, and a limited concession made in final addresses that only the extent of her impairment was in issue, I find that she has such an impairment and that it significantly affects her ability to read ordinary sized print on documents.
• [4] There have been in the past other proceedings before this Tribunal between Mr and Mrs Gebicki and the first respondent in relation to family contact and the care of the children. Ms Scott was not directly involved in those proceedings. At the time she commenced as the assigned CSO for the children, she recalls being instructed that any documents should be provided to Mrs Gebicki in A3 format and that Mrs Gebicki was "blind''. Ms Scott has cause to doubt that she was, in fact, vision impaired, for reasons that do not concern us, because in my view she misinterpreted her observation that the applicant was able to read from a phone screen, however, that is explained by the fact that the screen could be enlarged. She may also have seen her read from writing on an A4 sheet. That does not mean that she is not vision impaired.
• [5] In relation to those other proceedings, it became necessary for her to be served with documents. On 16 February 2023, Ms Scott and a Child Safety Support Officer attended a family contact with Mrs Gebicki, Mr Gebicki and the children at the Botanical Gardens, Bundaberg. At the family contact, she served documents in relation to separate proceedings commenced by Mr and Mrs Gebicki in this Tribunal on Mr Gebicki in A4 format, being an affidavit of Ms Jade Schneider and a Reviewable Decision Letter regarding ongoing family contact.
• [6] Ms Scott says she provided copies of the Letter and affidavit of Ms Schneider to Mrs Gebicki in A3 format. She says she does not recall not providing copies of the RDL and/or affidavit of Ms Schneider, or any part thereof, to Mrs Gebicki in A3 format on or about 16 February 2023. I am not clear on what she could have recalled about something that she says did not happen. I take that to be evidence that her recollection is that she did serve it on her in A3 format, importantly in enlarged font size.
• [7] The next day, on or about 17 February 2023, Ms Scott made a case note of the family contact on or about 16 February 2023, where she relevantly wrote, that she had "served Karl [Gebicki] his court document for the upcoming QCAT hearing (printed in A4) and serving Peri [Gebicki] her court documents (documents were printed in A3) ...".
• [8] There is the possibility that one or more of the exhibits to that affidavit were not enlarged print or paper however Ms Scott swears, and I accept, that if she did not provide any document or part thereof to Mrs Gebicki in A3 during the period she was the assigned CSO for the children, that if she did not provide any document or part thereof to Mrs Gebicki in A3 during the period she was the assigned CSO for the children, this would have been the result of an administrative error and not deliberate.
• [9] There was agreement reached by the parties that she would be served with A3-sized documents. The applicant then complained of non-compliance or non-service at all as it turns out because her postal address had changed and the Department inadvertently did not send it to her new address.
• [10] Essentially, the applicant's complaint is that on 8 March 2023 and possibly at other times which she does not specifically identify, she has been served with documents she could not read. She says the matter has been mediated at least twice before and she believed the matter had been finalised and for a period of one week after the mediated outcome the documents received were in A3 but after that, all documents started appearing in A4 or smaller again.
• [11] In her complaint the applicant said the event complained about was on 8 March 2023 and that;

As I have a visual impairment, it has been disclosed and agreed that all documents given to me must be in a three, so I am able to read it. I am visually impaired.

This is previously been done the new caseworker state she has read all of the material, and has failed to supply documents in A3 which is causing a disadvantage to myself.

Decisions being made based on my input to a meeting, but the documents were not supplied in the size which I was able to read during the meeting

• [12] There is no evidence that the applicant actually met with Ms Scott on 8 March 2023. Indeed, I find that there was no meeting that day and that the applicant is confused about her dates. She may be referring to the 16 February 2023 events. I find that Ms Connor and Ms Scott had telephone contact with Mr and Mrs Gebicki on 8 March 2023 during which Ms Connor asked Mr and Mrs Gebicki if they had been served with the affidavit of Ms Schneider. Mr Gebicki advised they had received it, but that Exhibit 7 to the affidavit of Ms Schneider had not been provided in A3 format. Ms Connor advised that Exhibit 7 would be printed and provided in A3 format at the next family contact but which, as events would have it, did not occur because of other things that occurred at that meeting and led to police becoming involved. Later, exhibit 7 was mailed to her, but possibly did not reach her because of a change in her postal address not noted in the records.
• [13] On 6 November 2024, the applicant lodged a letter in the Tribunal stating that she is seeking that the Tribunal make orders;

...that they must supply everything in A3.

If it is not supplied in this format A3 the document is classified as invalid and has no weight in a court of law or in a tribunal.

(T)hat the department to supply all information going back to 2017 in A3 format within a period of 30 days of the decision being made at their cost.

• [14] Until the very end of the hearing, it had never been apparent exactly what the applicant was seeking by way of relief in the Tribunal, although some sort of idea of it can be gleaned from the 6 November 2024 letter.
• [15] There was an application in 2024 for dismissal of the complaint which was heard on the papers by Senior Member Traves, who dismissed the application, but not without criticism of the conduct of the matter by the applicant. The reasons summarise the history of the matter.
• [16] On 10 October 2023, the Tribunal made directions which, in effect, asked Ms Gebicki to answer questions directed to the elements of direct and indirect discrimination; to identify whether she sought a remedy under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and to outline the remedies she was seeking. Ms Gebicki was directed to comply with those directions by 31 October 2023.
• [17] On 12 December 2023, Ms Gebicki was given an extension of time to comply to 23 January 2024 and, in the same directions, was warned that a failure to comply by that date may result in her matter being dismissed. On 14 March 2024, Ms Gebicki was given a further extension of time to 5 April 2024.
• [18] On 9 May 2024, the Tribunal directed Ms Gebicki to notify the Tribunal that if she wished to rely on certain email correspondence as her statement of contentions then she needed to notify the Tribunal and the respondents that she would not be filing anything further by 16 May 2024. These directions also warned Ms Gebicki that a failure to do that may result in her referral being dismissed. On 14 June 2024, the Tribunal extended the time to comply to 5 July 2024.
• [19] On 17 June 2024, the first respondent filed an application seeking that the referral of Ms Gebicki be dismissed pursuant to s 48(2)(a) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ('QCAT Act') on the basis Ms Gebicki was acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the State of Queensland and Bonita Scott, including by not complying with Tribunal directions without reasonable excuse. On 26 July 2024, Ms Gebicki was directed to file submissions in response to the application to dismiss her referral by 23 August 2024.
• [20] On 27 August 2024, the Tribunal extended the time to comply to 10 September 2024 and warned that if no submissions were filed, the application would be determined on the papers on the basis of any submissions received by 10 September 2024 and that the Tribunal would also consider dismissal on the basis of non-compliance with Tribunal Directions. Ms Gebicki filed no submissions in response to the application to dismiss.
• [21] On 14 October 2024, the matter was listed for a Directions Hearing to be conducted by telephone on 25 October 2024, at which time the parties were directed to come prepared to make submissions regarding the application to dismiss. On 16 October 2024, the Tribunal contacted Ms Gebicki to make sure she received the Notice of the Directions Hearing and would be attending. Ms Gebicki confirmed she would be attending.
• [22] On 25 October 2024, at the commencement of the Directions Hearing, the Tribunal attempted to call Ms Gebicki on her mobile number but the person on the other end of the call, hung up. The Tribunal Directions dated 25 October 2024 issued at the Directions Hearing in the absence of Ms Gebicki, describe the nature of the complaint to be determined by the Tribunal, as gleaned from the referral.
• [23] The Tribunal Directions also directed, noting disengagement of Ms Gebicki's telephone upon contact at the Directions Hearing and her failure to comply with Directions that, unless she complied with a direction requiring her to file a statement addressing the issues outlined in direction 4 her complaint would be dismissed.
• [24] Ms Gebicki was directed to file the statement by 8 November 2024. On 6 November 2024, Ms Gebicki sent an email to the Tribunal and the respondents but which failed to summarise her case and gave no further details of her visual impairment. She did not say how she was treated less favourably by the respondents than someone without a visual impairment in the same situation. She did not say why or on what basis she was treated unfavourably. She did not then and has not since said what were required to do that someone without her visual impairment could do. She did not say why that requirement was unreasonable. She did not then and has not since said how the respondents failed to comply with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
• [25] That remains the position, even after the final submissions were made before me.
• [26] In Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92; [2003] HCA 62 ('Purvis') the High Court considered the earlier authorities in the context of a claim of disability discrimination. In that case, the relevant Act stated that it was unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate against a student "on the ground of" the student's disability. It stated that a person discriminates against another person on the ground of that person's disability if, "because of" the person's disability, the discriminator treats him or her less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person without the disability.
• [27] Chief Justice Gleeson said that

In Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic, Deane and Gaudron JJ said that it is necessary to determine the "true basis" for the act or decision. This indicates that it is the reason for the decision that must be considered. Their Honours referred with approval to Lord Goff's statement in Birmingham regarding motive and intent to discriminate. They accepted that genuinely assigned reasons may in fact mask the true basis for the decision. Dawson J also said that the test is not subjective - the mere assertion of a ground that is not sex will not prevent the act from being discriminatory if the "true basis" for the act in question is in fact sex.

• [28] After referring to the judgements referred to above from Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349 ('Waters'), of Mason CJ and Gaudron J and that also of McHugh J, the Chief Justice said at [159]-[160]:

...However, McHugh J's misgivings were more the result of the ambiguous use of the words "intention" and "motive" in Birmingham and Banovic than any real difference of approach with that of Deane and Gaudron JJ.

[160] The reasoning in discrimination cases in this Court is consistent with the view that, while it is necessary to consider the reason why the discriminator acted as he or she did, it is not necessary for the discriminator to have acted with a discriminatory motive. Motive is ordinarily the reason for achieving an object. But one can have a reason for doing something without necessarily having any particular object in mind.

• [29] After referring to later authority he said:

[166] The weight and course of authority no longer accepts that the "but for" test is the accepted test of causation in the context of anti-discrimination legislation. That is because that test focuses on the consequences for the complainant and not upon the mental state of the alleged discriminator. Although the Commissioner said that he was applying the "but for" test, the extract referred to from the reasons of Kirby J in IW v City of Perth is not expressed as a "but for" test. Correctly, it focuses on the "real reason" for the alleged discriminator's act.

• [30] The leading judgment in Purvis was delivered by Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. For present purposes, relevantly, they identified the issue under consideration here as the "second issue" in the appeal, identified as being whether the Commissioner's conclusion that the student's behaviour occurred as a result of his disability and that "in this case, Daniel's behaviour is so closely connected to his disability that if ... less favourable treatment has occurred on the ground of Daniel's behaviour then this will amount to discrimination on the ground of his disability". They did not reference in their reasons the cases discussed by the Chief Justice on how to identify the "true basis" for the act or decision.
• [31] The question was posed in these terms by reference to what was required to show direct discrimination:

[224] The circumstances referred to in s 5(1) are all of the objective features which surround the actual or intended treatment of the disabled person by the person referred to in the provision as the "discriminator". It would be artificial to exclude (and there is no basis in the text of the provision for excluding) from consideration some of these circumstances because they are identified as being connected with that person's disability. There may be cases in which identifying the circumstances of intended treatment is not easy. But where it is alleged that a disabled person has been treated disadvantageously, those difficulties do not intrude. All of the circumstances of the impugned conduct can be identified and that is what s 5(1) requires. Once the circumstances of the treatment or intended treatment have been identified, a comparison must be made with the treatment that would have been given to a person without the disability in circumstances that were the same or were not materially different.

[225] In the present case, the circumstances in which Daniel was treated as he was, included, but were not limited to, the fact that he had acted as he had. His violent actions towards teachers and others formed part of the circumstances in which it was said that he was treated less favourably than other pupils. Section 5(1) then presented two questions: (i) How, in those circumstances, would the educational authority have treated a person without Daniel's disability? (ii) If Daniel's treatment was less favourable than the treatment that would be given to a person without the disability, was that because of Daniel's disability? Section 5(1) could be engaged in the application of section 22 only if it were found that Daniel was treated less favourably than a person without his disability would have been treated in circumstances that were the same as or were not materially different from the circumstances of Daniel's treatment.

• [32] Hence those judges held that the 'circumstances referred to in section 5(1) are all of the objective features which surround the actual or intended treatment of the disabled person' by the alleged discriminator.
• [33] In Purvis, the circumstances in which the student was treated as he was included, but were not limited to, the fact that he had acted as he had. His violent actions towards teachers and others formed part of the circumstances in which it was said that he was treated less favourably than other pupils were. Accordingly, the comparator was a student who was not disabled, but who had acted in the same violent manner as Daniel. Callinan J agreed with Gummow, Hayne and Heydon as to the circumstances that were to be ascribed to the comparator.
• [34] The judgement of the dissenting judges McHugh and Kirby JJ, on the issue of the appropriate comparator and as to the causation issue are informative. As to the former they said:

[130] Provisions that extend the definition of discrimination to cover the characteristics of a person have the purpose of ensuring that anti-discrimination legislation is not evaded by using such characteristics as "proxies" for discriminating on the basic grounds covered by the legislation. But the purpose of a disability discrimination Act would be defeated if the comparator issue was determined in a way that enabled the characteristics of the disabled person to be attributed to the comparator. If the functional limitations and consequences of being blind or an amputee were to be attributed to the comparator as part of the relevant circumstances, for example, persons suffering from those disabilities would lose the protection of the Act in many situations. They would certainly lose it in any case where a characteristic of the disability, rather than the underlying condition, was the ground of unequal treatment.

• [35] In relation to the causation question McHugh and Kirby JJ said after reviewing a body of Authority;

[157] These more recent English authorities are consistent with the approach taken by the Australian courts. In Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic, Deane and Gaudron JJ said that it is necessary to determine the "true basis" for the act or decision. This indicates that it is the reason for the decision that must be considered. Their Honours referred with approval to Lord Goff's statement in Birmingham regarding motive and intent to discriminate. They accepted that genuinely assigned reasons may in fact mask the true basis for the decision. Dawson J also said that the test is not subjective - the mere assertion of a ground that is not sex will not prevent the act from being discriminatory if the "true basis" for the act in question is in fact sex.

[158] In Waters v Public Transport Corporation, Mason CJ and Gaudron J (Deane J agreeing) approved the view of Deane and Gaudron JJ in Banovic that motive or intention to discriminate is not required. Their Honours said that it is enough if the difference in treatment is based on the prohibited ground, notwithstanding an absence of motive or intention.

[159] In Waters, McHugh J rejected the statement of Lord Goff in Birmingham and the statements of Deane and Gaudron JJ in Banovic concerning motive or intention, in so far as they might suggest that it is not a necessary condition of liability that the conduct of the alleged discriminator was actuated by the prohibited ground. His Honour said:

The words 'on the ground of' and 'by reason of' require a causal connexion between the act of the discriminator which treats a person less favourably and the status or private life of the person the subject of that act ('the victim'). The status or private life of the victim must be at least one of the factors which moved the discriminator to act as he or she did.

However, McHugh J's misgivings were more the result of the ambiguous use of the words "intention" and "motive" in Birmingham and Banovic than any real difference of approach with that of Deane and Gaudron JJ.

[160] The reasoning in discrimination cases in this Court is consistent with the view that, while it is necessary to consider the reason why the discriminator acted as he or she did, it is not necessary for the discriminator to have acted with a discriminatory motive. Motive is ordinarily the reason for achieving an object. But one can have a reason for doing something without necessarily having any particular object in mind.

[168] The validity of this principle can be seen by considering situations where the disability manifests itself in ways that society perhaps finds more acceptable than in cases where the disability manifests itself in dangerous conduct. In Randell v Consolidated Bearing Co (SA) Pty Ltd, for example, an employer was held to have discriminated against an employee on the ground of his disability by dismissing him because of his difficulties with the stock numbering system used in the employer's warehouse. These difficulties were a manifestation of the employee's dyslexia.

[169] The Commissioner also found that the reason for Mr Hoggan's exclusion from the school, unlike the reason for his suspensions, included issues other than his behaviour. The Commissioner found that, although Mr Hoggan's behaviour was a factor in his exclusion, it was not the only factor. He found that the principal had also acted because Mr Hoggan was unable to cope with the stresses of high school life as a result of his disability. Section 10 of the Act states that, if an act is done for two or more reasons and one of the reasons is the disability of a person (whether or not it is the dominant or a substantial reason for doing the act), the act is taken to be done for that reason. Because the Commissioner found that the decision to exclude Mr Hoggan was made on this basis, the Commissioner's decision can be supported without having to consider issues relating to behaviour.

[170] In our view, when the Act is applied according to its true construction, the Commissioner was correct in finding that the State through its agents had discriminated against Mr Hoggan.

• [36] As Justice McHugh said in Waters "on the ground of" and "by reason of" require a causal connection between the act of the discriminator which treats a person less favourably and the status or private life of the person the subject of "the victim".
• [37] The protected attribute, to use the language of the Queensland Act, must be at least one of the factors which moved the discriminator to act as he or she did. And as his Honour said, of course, in determining whether a person has been treated differently "on the ground of" that matter this Tribunal is not bound by the verbal formula which the discriminator has used.
• [38] If the reason for the use of the formula was that it enabled a person to be treated differently on the ground of status or private life, then "the ground of" the act of the discriminator was the status or private life of the victim.
• [39] In my view, there is no evidence in this case that, even if, as I have decided is not the case, the applicant was not provided with one or more documents on 8 March 2023 in A3 format and enlarged print, that this occurred "on the ground of" her impairment. The real reason for it, if it occurred, was the erroneous belief that she was being accommodated in relation to her vision impairment and related reading difficulty, when inadvertently some part of the material served may not have been enlarged for her.
• [40] The basis for the decision here was not the relevant attribute in the sense contemplated by section 10 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('AD Act'). The claim therefore based upon direct discrimination must fail.

• [41] The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person, in many areas of public life, including employment, education, getting or using services, renting or buying a house or unit, and accessing public places, because of their disability. Indirect discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act also covers situations where you could have met the condition if you had been provided with reasonable adjustments, but the discriminator failed to provide them. The complaint here is not under the Disability Discrimination Act of course.
• [42] Section 11 of the AD Act provides as follows:

(1) Indirect discrimination on the basis of an attribute happens if a person imposes, or proposes to impose, a term -

(a) with which a person with an attribute does not or is not able to comply; and

(b) with which a higher proportion of people without the attribute comply or are able to comply; and

(c) that is not reasonable.

(2) Whether a term is reasonable depends on all the relevant circumstances of the case, including, for example -

(a) the consequences of failure to comply with the term; and

(b) the cost of alternative terms; and

(c) the financial circumstances of the person who imposes, or proposes to impose, the term.

(3) It is not necessary that the person imposing, or proposing to impose, the term is aware of the indirect discrimination.

(4) In this section -

term includes condition, requirement or practice, whether or not written.

Example 1 -

An employer decides to employ people who are over 190cm tall, although height is not pertinent to effective performance of the work. This disadvantages women and people of Asian origin, as there are more men of non-Asian origin who can comply. The discrimination is unlawful because the height requirement is unreasonable, there being no genuine occupational reason to justify it.

Example 2 -

An employer requires employees to wear a uniform, including a cap, for appearance reasons, not for hygiene or safety reasons. The requirement is not directly discriminatory, but it has a discriminatory effect against people who are required by religious or cultural beliefs to wear particular headdress."

• [43] As has been often recognised in this context, it is important that the term which it is alleged was imposed be formulated with some precision; Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56; (1989-1990) 168 CLR 165 at 185. That has certainly not occurred here.
• [44] The focus is first on whether the discrimination is on the basis of an attribute that has happened if a person imposes, or proposes to impose, a term (a) with which a person with an attribute does not or is not able to comply; and (b) with which a higher proportion of people without the attribute comply or are able to comply.
• [45] Conceptually, the failure to make reasonable adjustments to take into consideration. The applicant does not articulate a case for indirect discrimination. The applicant's vision impairment might be capable of being treated as indirect discrimination. However, there is no factual basis to make a finding that, in fact, reasonable adjustments were not made or that in any relevant or material sense she was not provided with documents that were not already in an enlarged format or could have been enlarged to A3 by her own efforts enlarged so that she could read them even if they were otherwise too small for her to read. It is well known that documents can be enlarged when they are photocopied or printed in larger format at many retail outlets.
• [46] Ultimately though, I accept the evidence of the second respondent that there never was an occasion when she was not served with documents in A3 format or that if she inadvertently was, that, that it was a matter that was later and fairly promptly rectified.
• [47] As I have said earlier, there is no basis for a finding of direct discrimination in the sense that to the extent that potentially she might have been served with a document which was not an enlarged format, that this occurred unintentionally and not specifically on the basis of her impairment.
• [48] I am not satisfied that a case for indirect discrimination has been made out. That ultimately means that the application must fail. No claims for compensation of any kind were made. Had I found that there had been some form of discrimination, I would not in any event have made the orders that were sought.
• [49] I do not consider that it is appropriate for me to direct the first respondent to provide to the applicant several years' worth of historical documents referencing its dealings with the applicant when the evidence about why she does not have them is that essentially, she had them but she lost them in personal circumstances.
• [50] In final addresses the applicant articulated her claims as being, first, that she sought an order that any documents to be served by the applicant were to be in A3 format so she can read what she is signing. As to this, the State says it is happy to do this and will continue to use its best endeavours to make that happen. The first respondent, by its counsel, undertook to this tribunal that she would be provided with documents in A3 enlarged format and I willingly accept that undertaking. That means there is no purpose been making any specific order to reflect that practice.
• [51] Secondly, the applicant articulated her claims as being that she sought an order if the documents to be given to her are not required to be signed, it can be sent to her as a digital copy attached to an email. Again, the Department says this is already occurring and gave a similar undertaking to continue that practice.
• [52] Thirdly, the applicant sought an order that any material that is required in a court proceeding needed to be supplied in A3 format, not digital. That is referable to any material which is relied upon by the Department in any court or Tribunal proceeding. Again, the Department says this is already occurring and gave a similar undertaking to continue that practice.
• [53] Fourthly, the applicant sought an order that if there are non-compliances with those three earlier orders, then the document is "invalid". In relation to that, the respondents point to the fact that under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) which govern civil process in the Courts, although not this Tribunal, documents for filing in the registry are to be in A4 and specified font size. In my view that does not mean that in its dealing with her that other accommodations would not be provided. It is not for this Tribunal to determine the evidentiary status of documents used in other proceedings merely on the basis that it was not provided in an enlarged format. It would be for that other court or tribunal to ensure procedural fairness.
• [54] It follows that the claims based on direct and indirect discrimination fail, and I am satisfied no orders should be made of the sort asked for, presumably under s 209 of the QCAT Act.

• [55] For the reasons that I have given, the complaint is dismissed.
• [56] I grant the parties liberty to apply in respect of any other consequential or other orders which might be required to be made.