2. The main consideration which led to the grant of special leave to appeal was that the issues included questions about the nature and effect of "attributable blame" or "unconscionable conduct" on the part of a plaintiff who would otherwise be entitled to a declaration that property is held upon trust for him or her. It became apparent, in the course of argument of the appeal, that those questions only arise in the present case if the appellants succeed in showing either that there was a common intention among the parties to create a trust or that the facts of the case are such that, subject to any question of the existence or effect of any "blame" or "unconscionable conduct" on the part of one or both of the appellants, a constructive trust arose or should be imposed. The appellants contend that a constructive trust arose or should be imposed by reason of unconscionable conduct on the part of the mother or on the ground of unjust enrichment or estoppel. Neither the learned primary judge nor the members of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia found either a common intention to create a trust or that any relevant trust existed or should be imposed.

3. Having had the benefit of full and careful argument, we have come to a firm conclusion on the particular facts of the case. That conclusion is that those facts preclude a finding of a common intention to create a trust and do not give rise to, or warrant the imposition of, a constructive trust upon any of the grounds for which the appellants contend. That being so, the appeal must necessarily fail without there being any need to consider the question of the existence or effect of "blame" or "unconscionable conduct" on the part of the appellants, or either of them. In these circumstances, the appropriate course is to revoke the grant of special leave to appeal.