Gazin & Gazin [2025] FedCFamC2F 810 (20 May 2025)

with the children to be delivered to the home of the mother, MS GAZIN ('the Mother'), at the conclusion of time with the Father.

1. Spend time arrangements be and are otherwise suspended during the school holidays and the orders of 30 April 2024 otherwise remain in full force and effect.

1. The Father shall forthwith pay the costs of a supervised chain of custody hair follicle test by AWDTS for alcohol/EtG to the trust account of the Mother's solicitors.
2. Within 14 days of the payment being made by the Father pursuant to order 3 herein, the Mother, MS GAZIN, shall do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to facilitate a supervised chain of custody hair follicle testing by AWDTS as follows:

(a) provide a sample of hair preferably at least 3.9cm in length;

(b) the purpose of the hair follicle testing shall be to test for alcohol/EtG.

1. To facilitate the Mother undertaking hair follicle testing in accordance with order 4, the Mother shall contact AWDTS to arrange a locality for the supervised hair follicle test to take place.
2. Until completion of the hair follicle testing the Mother shall refrain from taking any step which may interfere with the provision of hair samples or to interfere with the test results including taking any step to shave, cut, shorten, colour, bleach any scalp or body hair and the Mother shall be restrained from cutting her head and body hair shorter than 3.9cm in length.
3. The Mother is directed to provide a copy of these orders to the relevant facility.

1. The Mother's costs of this day and for the Father's Application in a Case filed on 14 February 2025 be and are reserved in the amount of $4,606.18.

1. Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.
2. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.

1. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the court and then to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.

1. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.
2. If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the settled reasons of a judgment delivered ex tempore. These reasons were delivered orally. These settled reasons have been corrected from the transcript where appropriate to correct grammatical errors, to add citations, passages of authorities and evidence, and to attempt to make the orally delivered reasons easier to read. The substance is unchanged.

1. In the matter of Gazin the parties are fortunate to have three children: the oldest born in 2011 and 14 years old, the middle child born in 2013 and eleven years old, and the youngest child born in 2016, almost nine. The parties commenced to live together in early 2003. They married in 2007, and they separated in April 2021.
2. There is alleged to be an agreed arrangement on an every week basis with the children being with one parent for three nights and with the other parent for four, which is not exactly equal. But when you consider that it would mean that the parent with the three nights would spend time with the children on or over four days and the other parent on or over five days, that, in my view, is clearly a shared care arrangement. That arrangement broke down and the parties hotly dispute between them why that broke down, and on this interim hearing are I unable to find why that was so. Each puts the responsibility for the breakdown of that arrangement at the foot of the other parent.
3. The Father issued proceedings in March 2024. On 30 April 2024 orders were made by consent that provided for, until further order, the Father to have an alternate three-night school-to-school weekend, half the school holidays and Tuesday night in the other week for a meal. Those orders were made by consent, but the Father says in his affidavit material that he only consented to those orders because he was at a low ebb and emotionally beaten down by the Mother's manipulation of events, including intervention orders. In the meantime, an intervention order had been sought by the Mother but withdrawn, and the Father expresses his opinion about why that was so. The Father sought an intervention order against the Mother. In the end no intervention orders were made.

1. The orders of April 2024 were holding orders until a Child Impact Report could be prepared. In the meantime, before the parties received that child impact report, the Father left Australia to go to Country B, but not permanently, he says. The Mother complains that she received no notice from the Father or very short notice from the Father, but that the children knew, and what they were told was confusing. The Father now asserts, and I am told that the Mother was not provided with these dates and any certainty beforehand, that he has lived in Country B from July 2024 until returning to Australia in August 2024. He next left Australia in October 2024 and returned in November 2024. He next left Australia in February 2025 and returned in April 2025. He remains here until he will leave Australia in July 2025, but would have returned in September 2025, but will he says, in fact return earlier to accommodate the final hearing of this matter listed for 5 September 2025.

1. The Father's primary application is that the children should live with him in Country B and spend school holidays with their Mother in Australia. The Mother seeks that the children live with her in Australia and, when the Father is in Australia, that he spend alternate weekends and half school holidays with them as per the current orders. The Father asserts that he is likely in the future to live a month or two in Country B and then a month or two back in Australia, and largely, at the moment, that is intended to be centred around being in Australia for school holidays and court events.

1. The Father alleges a significant problem with alcohol or, as he describes it, an addiction by the Mother, which the Mother rejects and says the mere allegation is offensive to her. Nonetheless, for the purpose of removing that issue from the litigation, the Mother says she will agree to an order that she undertake a hair follicle test, notwithstanding there's absolutely no reason or justification for that. The Father says, to ensure that occurs, he is prepared to pay for that, to ensure it happens, and I will make that order.

1. The Father alleges the Mother manipulated the children and events to end up with a situation where the only time he had with the children was the 30 April 2024 court ordered time. The Mother says effectively, "Well, that is pretty weird, when you object to the time of those orders, but then leave the country for months at a time." The Father says, "That is my job." He is able to continue working in that employment when he is in Australia, he says, and he attends his employment in Country B when he is in Country B. The Mother says, "Well, that is a bit weird because you told me you are unemployed and you told the court you are unemployed."

1. One thing I am satisfied of is that neither parent trusts the other very far. In all of the circumstances, save for fixing school holidays (as is agreed), time for the children should be fixed for the next two school term holidays. I am not satisfied that there is any reason on this interim hearing, when so many matters are in dispute, to change the existing orders. I have determined that the children should be with the Father for the first half of the September school holidays.
2. The children should be with the Mother for the second half of both the July mid-year and September-October school holidays, because the Mother asserts that it is very important to X that she attend a particular sporting event that she has been chosen for. I make no findings about that, but I cannot dismiss on this interim hearing that that may well be very important to X as her Mother asserts. So I have made those rulings in regard to the September school holidays for that reason.
3. Apart from settling the issue of the school holidays and ordering effectively by consent that the Mother undertake a hair follicle test, I am not satisfied that I should otherwise make orders on this interim hearing.
4. At this interim hearing, I must have regard to the procedure and the law followed on an interim hearing in the decision of Goode & Goode [2006] FLC 93-286[1] where at [81] and [82] states:

[81] In making interim decisions the Court will still often be faced with conflicting facts, little helpful evidence and disputes between the parents as to what constitutes the best interests of the child. However, the legislative pathway must be followed.

[82] In an interim case that would involve the following:

(a) identifying the competing proposals of the parties;

(b) identifying the issues in dispute in the interim hearing;

(c) identifying any agreed or uncontested relevant facts;

(d) considering the matters in s 60CC that are relevant and, if possible, making findings about them (in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence to enable more than a limited consideration of these matters to take place);

1. The long and the short of it is that the Court should be circumspect about making factual findings of disputed facts on an interim hearing. That principle has more weight when I am not making interim orders for a year or two, but rather for months until September. And that is so in this case, notwithstanding that I may not be able to give a decision at the end of that trial and might have to reserve because of other work that has to be done until I can write a decision. The ideal is that I can deliver the decision there and then, but I may not be able to because I might be starting another case on the Monday and I will need to read about that on the Friday.
2. Hopefully, this case does not take five days as it is booked in for and is able to be concluded in a short period. I put the parties on notice that I intend to control the length of the proceedings and the cross-examination so that the matter may well end or conclude earlier than five days. And that is so, notwithstanding that this is an international relocation case on the primary application of the Father.
3. They are my reasons. Thank you.

I certify that the preceding fifteen (15) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.

[1] As adopted to the current provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).