Gay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] ICQ 28

Anderson v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance [2011] QSC 101

Gay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 141

Langridge v Workers Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 251

Rooke v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] ICQ 021

Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge [2025] ICQ 008

Mr J.A. Greggery, KC and Ms L Dawson of Counsel for the appellant instructed by Organic Legal

Mr S.A. McLeod, KC for the respondent directly instructed by the Workers' Compensation Regulator.

• [1] This is an appeal to the Industrial Court of Queensland ('the Court') from a decision[1] of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') dismissing an appeal from Aaron Scott Gay ('the appellant').

• [2] The appellant was employed as a furniture removalist with Kent Transport, a business located in Townsville. The appellant claims to have suffered an injury to his lumbar spine during his employment.

• [3] The appellant applied to WorkCover for an assessment of degree of permanent impairment ('DPI') on 13 October 2016 pursuant to s 132A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WCR Act').

• [4] WorkCover rejected the application for assessment of DPI finding that Mr Gay had not suffered an injury within the meaning of s 31 of the WCR Act.

• [5] The Regulator upheld the decision of WorkCover to reject the appellant's application for assessment of DPI on the basis that the appellant had already lodged an application for a lumber spine injury and therefore was excluded from making an application by virtue of s 132A(1) of the WCR Act.

• [6] The issue in this appeal is whether the injuries suffered by the appellant were the subject of the applications for compensation and an assessment of DPI.[2]

Having correctly construed s 132A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (WCR Act), the Commissioner (sic) erred at law in determining whether the appellant suffered the injury alleged in his application under s 132A of the WCR Act and his earlier application for compensation under s 132 of the WCR Act.[3]

• [8] The appellant seeks the appeal be allowed, the decision of the Commission be set aside and the appellant be referred for assessment pursuant to s 179 of the WCR Act. Costs of the hearing in the Commission and the Court are also sought.

Relevant provisions of the WCR Act

• [9] Section 132 of the WCR Act provides for the making of an application for compensation as follows:

(1) An application for compensation must be made in the approved form by the claimant.

(2) The application must be lodged with the insurer.

(a) a certificate in the approved form given by -

(i) a doctor who attended the claimant; or

(ii) if the application relates to a minor injury - a nurse practitioner who attended the claimant and who is acting in accordance with the workers' compensation certificate protocol; and

(b) any other evidence or particulars prescribed under a regulation.

(4) A registered dentist may issue the certificate mentioned in subsection (3)(a) for an oral injury.

(5) If the claimant can not complete an application because of a physical or mental incapacity, someone else may complete it on the claimant's behalf.

• [10] At the relevant time of injury, s 132A of the WCR Act provided for a worker to apply for assessment of DPI before applying for compensation as follows:

132A Applying for assessment of DPI before applying for compensation

(1) This section applies to a worker who has not made an application under section 132.

(2) The worker may apply to the insurer to have the worker's injury assessed under section 179 to decide if the worker's injury has resulted in a DPI.

(i) a certificate in the approved form given by a doctor who attended the worker; and

(ii) any other evidence or particulars prescribed under a regulation.

(4) A registered dentist may issue the certificate mentioned in subsection (3)(c)(i) for an oral injury.

(5) If the worker can not complete an application because of a physical or mental incapacity, someone else may complete it on the worker's behalf.

• [11] Section 179 of the WCR Act refers to s 132A, and relevantly provides an assessment of DPI as follows:

(1) An insurer may decide, or a worker who has made an application under section 132 may ask the insurer, to have the worker's injury assessed to decide if the worker's injury has resulted in a degree of permanent impairment.

(2) The insurer must have the degree of permanent impairment assessed -

(a) for industrial deafness - by an audiologist; or

(b) for a psychiatric or psychological injury - by a medical assessment tribunal; or

(c) or another injury - by a doctor.

(3) The degree of permanent impairment must be assessed in accordance with the GEPI to decide the DPI for the injury, and a report complying with the GEPI must be given to the insurer.

(4) If the worker sustains permanent impairment from multiple injuries sustained in 1 event -

(a) the degree of permanent impairment for the injuries, other than a psychiatric or psychological injury, must be assessed together to decide the DPI for the injuries; and

(b) the degree of permanent impairment for the psychiatric or psychological injury must be assessed separately to decide the DPI for the injury.

• [12] On 27 August 2014 the appellant made an application for compensation pursuant to s 132 of the WCR Act. The appellant's s 132 application for compensation referred to:

(a) the nature and location of the injuries as being, "lower back, trauma to muscles/tendon not classified";

(b) the date of injury as being 9 August 2014 (all parties agree the correct date is 14 August 2014); and

(c) the injury having occurred when lifting filing cabinets.

• [13] In evidence before the Commission, the appellant said he was rostered to work on 14 August 2014 when he recalled suffering a back strain while lifting a filing cabinet that day. The history is relevantly set out in the reasons of her Honour:

[114] An incident report records an event occurring at 8am on 14 August 2014 which is considered further below.

[115] Mr Gay was rostered to work on 14 August 2014. Mr Gay gave evidence that he recalled suffering a back strain when lifting a filing cabinet at work that day. His evidence was as follows:

1. ... I was lifting one of the filing cabinets on to the other filing cabinet. I've just done the twist. Just hurt my back. I've told Joel that I've hurt my back. I couldn't, sort of, move. He said don't do no more and they rang Jason. I think Danny come and got me, if I remember correctly. Took me back to the yard. I think it was a Saturday morning because Jason Flynn had to come in and that's when we
2. done the incident report.

[116] As 14 August 2014 was a Saturday, Mr Flynn, Mr Gay's manager, was not working and came into the office after being told of the incident by Mr Gatcliffe, in order to assist Mr Gay to complete the incident report.[4] (citations omitted)

• [14] The appellant applied to WorkCover on 10 October 2016 for a s 132A application.

• [15] The Commission set out the relevant details as follows:[5]

[80] This information was confirmed and expanded on in a conversation with a WorkCover representative on 3 September 2014. The notes from that conversation record the following:

Are you wishing to proceed with your WorkCover Claim? YES

- YES full time worker - Worker is a furniture removalist - Been with company for 4 years

- Worker was picking up a small 3 drawer filing cabinet, as turning it over to place on top of another filing cabinet

- Worker felt "same pain as last time" when your back goes

Injury sustained? Lumbar back pain with right leg pain (Unsure if disc of muscular at this stage)

When did event occur? 09/08/204 What time? 8am (Worker starts at 6am)

Who did you report the incident? Manager - Jason Flynn (DOI)

- Worker did not go to the GP immediately as thought is [sic] would be okay

- Worker has back pain on and off (been removalist for 30 years)

- Worker advised that [he] was at home on 23/08/2014 and took a step down and jarred his back and was taken to hospital in an ambulance

What are the symptoms you are currently experiencing?

- Pain in lumbar back, cannot stand up or lie down for too long

Have you ever experienced these symptoms prior to DOI?

[81] On 1 October 2014, WorkCover rejected Mr Gay's s 132 application for compensation.

[82] Mr Gay signed the s 132A application on 31 March 2016 and it was submitted by his legal representatives to WorkCover on 10 October 2016.

[83] The s 132A application included the following information:

(a) that the event resulting in the injury occurred over a period of time commencing on 28 July 2014 and ending on 10 August 2014;

(b) those symptoms first began on 9 August 2014;

(c) that Mr Gay first consulted a medical practitioner on 23 August 2014 when he attended the Townsville Hospital;

(d) that the injury said to have been sustained was located in Mr Gay's lumbar spine and the nature of the injury was a soft tissue injury; and

(e) that the specific incident was not reported to his employer.

[84] Mr Gay provided the following description of the event causing the injury in the s 132A application as follows:

Between 28 July 2014 and 10 August 2014 the Applicant was required, together with his co-workers, to dissemble, package, transport and reassemble pianos to and from various locations in Townsville for use in performances during the Australian Festival of Chamber Music ("the task").

On each workday during the above period, the Applicant and his co-workers generally moved at least 5 or 6 pianos, and on occasions, up to 20 pianos per day.

The pianos were a combination of upright, baby grant, grant and a concert grand piano, each of which weight between approximately 250kgs and 750kgs.

As a consequence of the repetitive and excessive physical strain involved in the task, the Applicant suffered injuries to his lower back.

[85] From the above, Mr Gay contends that each of the separate events relied on respectively in the s 132 application and the s 132A application, result in two separate injuries. The consequence of this, Mr Gay argues, is that s 132A(1) does not apply. (citations omitted)

• [16] The argument advanced by the appellant was that each of the separate events relied on respectively in the s 132 application and the s 132A application, result in two separate injuries. Consequently, the appellant contends that s 132A(1) has no application.

• [17] The s 132 application related to an 'event' identified as "lifting filing cabinets" on 14 August 2014. The s 132A application related to an event identified as the lifting of pianos.[6]

• [18] In relying on his written submissions, the appellant said the question is framed by the following:[7]

The appellant contends in arriving at this conclusion, the Deputy President erred by engaging in the substantive factual questions of whether the appellant suffered the injury the subject of the Application and the earlier application for compensation under s 132 of the Act. In adopting this approach, the Deputy President acted contrary to s 132A.

The correct approach was to determine the exclusionary question created by s 132A(1) of the WCR Act (which is focussed on the concept of compensation) by comparing the terms and content of any application for compensation with the terms of the Application. That is by asking whether the applicant would have been entitled to compensation for the injury the subject of the Application, in the event the application for compensation was successful. This approach is consistent with the purpose of the related sections, and the administration of the Workers' Compensation scheme generally and the threshold entitlements to commence pre-court proceedings for a claim for damages.[8]

• [19] Before this Court the appellant argued that her Honour had erred by engaging with the substantive factual questions of whether the appellant suffered the injury the subject of the s 132A application and the earlier s 132 application. This he contended, was contrary to s 132A. In the written submissions, the appellant said:

Without indicating which of the competing contentions premised on the construction of s. 132A were correct or why it was necessary to determine whether the appellant in fact suffered the injury alleged in the Application on the proper construction of s. 132A, the Deputy President proceeded to determine that fact. That analysis led to the ultimate finding set out above in paragraph 4.

In doing so the Deputy President erred at law. The issue was not capable of determination in the QIRC appeal but was a question of fact for determination by medical experts under the process of assessment pursuant to s. 179 of the Act. For the reason that the Application related to a different injury to his application for compensation, WorkCover was required to refer the applicant for assessment under s. 179.[9] (citations omitted)

• [20] The appellant submitted the error arose as the parties differed in relation to the approach to be taken in that the appellant had the onus to demonstrate he "suffered a different injury the subject of the application for assessment to that referred to in the application for compensation".[10]

• [21] In submissions referring to s 132 of the WCR Act, the appellant said the sole question for the Commission to consider was the exclusionary provision s 132A(1).[11] He went on to say:

And put in the way in which the Act phrases the question, has Mr Gay made an application under section 132 for compensation in relation to the injury the subject of the application for assessment of permanent impairment. That's the question. The question is not whether he suffered one injury, in fact. It's a question of whether the application for compensation related to the same injury and those are two very significant questions - - - [12]

• [22] On the appellant's submission, the correct approach was to determine the exclusionary question created by s 132A(1) of the WCR Act (which is focussed on the concept of compensation) by comparing the terms and content of any s 132 application with the terms of the s 132A application. It was submitted therefore that the question to be asked was whether the appellant would have been entitled to compensation for the injury the subject of the s 132A application, in the event the s 132 application was successful.

• [23] The respondent submitted that the primary issue before the Commission was accurately set out in paragraphs [73] - [74] of her Honours decision:

[73] In order to determine whether a s 132 application for compensation has been made, for the purpose of determining whether s 132A applies, regard must be had to the injury that the application for compensation relates to.

[74] The parties differ in terms of how such an assessment occurs.

• [24] The respondent defended the decision in the Commission arguing that her Honour was correct in engaging with the evidence to determine the primary issue.

• [25] The respondent argued that the WCR Act is focussed on a range of matters as set out in Chapter 1 Part 2 of the Act. It is not solely focussed on compensation. Section 132A does not deal with compensation but rather provides a pathway to claiming damages when there has been no previous application for compensation for the same injury. It does not provide any entitlement to compensation

• [26] Based on the evidence the respondent submitted that her Honour determined the appellant suffered from one injury, diagnosed by Dr Maguire, sustained over time from 28 July 2014 to 23 August 2014.[13]

• [27] The respondent submitted that her Honour made no finding as to whether the two alleged injuries had occurred. Further, the respondent did not "join issue" on whether the appellant suffered the injury alleged in the s 132A application.[14]

• [28] In the submissions of the respondent the appellant's s 132 application of 27 August 2014 related to a lumbar back strain injury for which it is said the symptoms occurred on 9 or 14 August 2014, and for which he first presented for a medical consultation on 23 August 2014. The s 132A application of 13 October 2016 related to a lumbar spine soft tissue injury with symptoms first appearing on 9 August 2014 and for which he first sought medical attention on 23 August 2014.[15]

• [29] On the respondent's submission, on the face of the documents, the applications relate to the same personal injury albeit that the appellant has nominated different events as the cause.

• [30] The respondent submitted that her Honour's reasoning and determination were in accord with the approach taken by Dalton J in Anderson v Aged Care Employers Self Insurance[16] where the applicant was assessed for, and suffered from, the same injury. Dalton J wrote:

[23] An injury is not the means by which damage is inflicted, but is the effect on the person of the worker of an event, as can be readily seen when the schedules to the WCR Regulation are perused. In common parlance one might speak of being injured by lifting a heavy load. But in terms of the WCRA definitions, lifting the heavy load is the event, the injury is what results from that, say a back strain.

[24] Ms Andersen's application for compensation was for one injury within the meaning of the WCRA. That injury was described by her as "L5/S1 prolapsed disc" and ACES (self-insurer) accepted it as a "strain of lower back with aggravation of pre-existing degeneration of the lumbosacral disc", in accordance with the description of its doctor, Dr McPhee.

Ms Andersen's of statement 11 September 2007 was manifestly about one injury, as defined, see the underlined parts extracted above. It described one set of symptoms: pain in her lower back and down her right leg, first temporarily, and then more permanently. It described her attendance on her doctor for that injury when the pain from it persisted, and the doctor's diagnosis of it. The statement says that Ms Andersen did not know what had caused her injury, but suggested two events within the meaning of the WCRA - on 22 and 23 August 2007 - as possibilities. Dr Martin thought the earlier event the likely cause; Dr McPhee the later. The point is, both of them assessed one injury, and this is evident from the underlined parts of their reports, above.

• [31] Before her Honour was the Regulator's decision upholding the decision of WorkCover to reject the appellant's application for assessment of DPI in reliance on s 132A(1) of the WCR Act on the basis that the appellant had previously made an application for compensation for the injury.

• [32] What was critical to her Honour's determination was whether the s 132 and s 132A applications relate to the same injury.

• [33] It was not in contention between the parties that if the answer to the question is 'yes', on the basis that each application is for the same injury, then the operative effect of s 132A(1) of the WCR Act is triggered and the appeal before the Commission should be dismissed.

• [34] On the appellant's argument if the answer to the question is 'no', then the Commission was required to determine whether there is a further question to be resolved in the appeal, namely, whether s 132A impliedly imposes an obligation upon the insurer (and the Regulator) to determine whether the appellant in fact suffered an injury before referring the application for an assessment of DPI pursuant to s 179 of the WCR Act.

• [35] The respondent contended that if the 'threshold' issue was determined in the appellant's favour, the matter should be remitted back to the Regulator to determine if the appellant suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act. Her Honour did not accept that submission[17] concluding that:

[66] The plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the pre-amended s 132A do not import a requirement on the Regulator to determine if Mr Gay is a 'worker' or has an 'injury' before an application is referred to an assessment. Following receipt of a s 132A application, the insurer is obliged to:

(a) be satisfied that the applicant had not made an application under s 132; and

(b) be satisfied the application was in the approved form, together with the documents prescribed in the Regulation that support the application.

[67] Upon satisfaction of the matters in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the insurer is then required to refer the applicant for assessment pursuant to s 179.[18]

• [36] In oral submissions the appellant contended that her Honour, correctly construed s 132A of the WCR Act.[19] She writes:

[72] The consequence of this construction of s 132A as in force at the relevant time, is that it is unnecessary to consider the evidence relied on as to whether Mr Gay suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act within this appeal.[20]

• [37] However, the appellant argues[21] that her Honour then proceeded to determine the question of injury contrary to that construction as follows:

[157] In the context of this history and the medical evidence, I consider that Mr Gay suffered one injury, as diagnosed by Dr Maguire, which he sustained during the 2014 injury period.

[158] It follows that, I consider that the injury referred to in the s 132A application is for the same injury as the s 132 application for compensation. Consequently, s 132A(1) of the WCR Act is invoked and Mr Gay is not entitled to apply for assessment of DPI pursuant to s 132A of the WCR Act.

• [38] The appellant called evidence related to the factual question of whether he suffered the injury alleged in the s 132A application because it was in issue between the parties in their respective notices of contention and, depending upon the construction of s 132A, had the potential to be an issue for determination by her Honour.

• [39] In her Honour's reasons, she observed that the issues raised in the Commission were akin to the matters raised in the subsequent decision of Langridge v Workers Compensation Regulator[22] which also required consideration of s 132A of the WCR Act as in force between 21 January 2014 and 31 January 2015:

[22] The decision in Langridge has been appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland. The decision of the Court is yet to be published. When determined, the decision will be authoritative with respect to the construction of s 132A and the approach to be taken by the insurer on receipt of a s 132A application. However, in the absence of that decision, I will consider the statutory construction of s 132A. It is necessary to do so at the outset of this appeal, in order to determine whether it is necessary to consider the evidence called and relied upon going to the issue of whether Mr Gay suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act.

• [40] Her Honour determined that in light of her construction of s 132A as in force at the relevant time, it was unnecessary to consider the evidence relied on as to whether the appellant suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act.[23]

• [41] The construction of s 132A was considered by Davis J in Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge.[24] In that case, the Regulator appealed against a decision of the Commission which determined that s 132A of the WCR Act obliged WorkCover to refer Langridge's injury for assessment upon an application for assessment being made in the prescribed way. An assessment of injury is a precondition to the right of an injured worker to sue their employer for common law damages. WorkCover did not refer the injury for assessment, and it found that Langridge had not suffered an "injury" as defined by the WCR Act. The Regulator upheld that decision.

• [42] On appeal, the Court determined that there was no power to refer for assessment an "injury" other than an "injury" as defined by the WCR Act, suffered by a "worker" as defined by the Act. The insurer may only refer a "worker" who has an "injury" for assessment. Davis J wrote:

[65] Therefore, in order to comply with the statutory command to assess the "worker's injury", the insurer must determine whether the request is made by a "worker" who has an "injury". The fact that an assessment of compensation is ultimately performed under s 179 or s 180 does not mean that the insurer is not obliged to determine whether the person seeking an assessment is entitled to do so. The fact that s 237 entitles a person who holds an assessment under s 179 to commence a claim for damages does not obviate the obligations of the insurer to determine whether the person who is seeking the assessment is entitled to do so; that the person is a "worker" who has an "injury".

• [43] Her Honour was not required to determine the s 132A application. As the respondent submitted, that was a secondary issue. The discrete question before the Commission was whether the s 132 and s 132A applications relate to the same injury. Her Honour set out in her reasons the approach to be taken to answer the question:

[60] In order to determine whether s 132A(1) applies, it will be necessary to consider the subject matter of the s 132 application for compensation and the s 132A application. This will necessarily include consideration of what the 'worker's injury' is in each of the applications.[25]

• [44] A claimant making an application for compensation under s 132 is required to fulfill the statutory tests of "worker" and "injury" as defined under the WCR Act.[26] As was found in this Court in Rooke v Workers' Compensation Regulator[27] a central question to be determined in deciding whether to grant an application made under s 132A of the WCR Act (for the worker's injury to be assessed for permanent impairment under s 179 of the WCR Act) is whether the worker suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32(1) of the WCR Act.

• [45] The main objects of the WCR Act are stated at Part 2. One of the objects as set out in s 5(1)(a) is to provide benefits to workers who sustain an injury in their employment (and for their dependents). Section 5 of the WCR Act sets out of the objects of the Act with s 5(2) providing:

(2) The main provisions of the scheme provide the following for injuries sustained by workers in their employment-

(a) Compensation

(b) Regulation of access to damages.

• [46] Medical evidence supporting the existence of the personal injury, allegedly caused by an employment event, is reasonably required to successfully claim compensation or proceed to a claim for common law damages, in accordance with the objects of the Act.

• [47] The legislative scheme required WorkCover, or on appeal the Commission, to determine whether the injury nominated in a s 132A application was the same injury or a separate injury for which an application for compensation under s 132 had been made. In undertaking that task, the Commission was required to assess the factual and medical evidence submitted in support of the s 132A application.

• [48] The task for her Honour necessarily involved an assessment of the evidence to determine if there was a factual basis to support a separate injury occurring; and whether the medical evidence before her supported the appellant's contention that a separate injury arose out each of the stated events.

• [49] Having preformed that task, her Honour concluded that Dr Maguire had assessed the same injury. The medical evidence did not support a conclusion that the appellant had suffered separate injuries from each of the separate events encompassing what was described as the "2014 injury period".

• [50] After considering the evidence of the appellant and the medical evidence of Dr Maguire, her Honour concluded that the appellant suffered from one injury over the period of time 28 July to 23 August 2014:

[155] To adopt the language of her honour Dalton J in Anderson, there is an artificiality of the exercise to attempt to separate the cause of one injury to the lower back into separate injuries based on separate events occurring within a period of time. I note relevantly, in this appeal Mr Gay only attempts to separate the two events of the music festival and the filing cabinet incident, presumably due to his assertion that they occurred whilst he was working.

[156] I am satisfied that this view of the medical evidence is consistent with the Appellant's evidence. Mr Gay had a long history of back pain he says arising out of his employment as a furniture removalist. He had previously lodged, inter alia, claims relating to his lower back in 2013. He had time off work because of this. He said he continued to experience pain and stiffness. He managed this by taking pain relief and utilising leave and taking time off to rest his back. Mr Gay's evidence was that his back deteriorated during the period of the music festival. It is relevant that during that period Mr Gay did not exclusively work at the music festival but continued to perform other jobs as a furniture removalist. On the final day of the music festival, the evidence was that Mr Gay felt pain whilst at work and rested for some time on the job but then resumed his duties that day, lifting lighter weights. Mr Gay worked the following day but says he stayed at home on 13 August 2014 in order to lie on the ground and rest his back. The following day Mr Gay attended work and experienced pain whilst lifting a filing cabinet. The response of Mr Gay and others implies that this incident was treated more seriously by him and his work colleagues as he was driven back to the office, an incident report was completed and he was told to stay at home and rest his back. On 18 August 2014, Mr Gay returned to work and worked intermittently until 23 August 2014. As noted already, Mr Gay experienced sharp pain at home and was taken to hospital by ambulance on 23 August 2014.

[157] In the context of this history and the medical evidence, I consider that Mr Gay suffered one injury, as diagnosed by Dr Maguire, which he sustained during the 2014 injury period.[28]

• [51] Having formed the conclusion in respect of the evidence, in particular, the evidence of Dr Maguire, her Honour reached the conclusion that the injury for which the appellant made a s132 application for compensation was for the same injury as that for which he sought an assessment of DPI. Accordingly, the operative effect of s 132A(1) of the WCR Act was triggered and the appeal before the Commission, dismissed.

• [52] However, should her Honour have determined that the s 132 application for compensation was not for the same injury and, in light of the reasoning in Langridge, the appropriate course would have been to remit the matter back to the Regulator to determine whether the appellant had suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act.

• [53] The appellant has not demonstrated any error in the conclusion reached by her Honour. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The respondent file and serve any written submissions and affidavits in support on the question of costs by 4.00 pm on 15 December 2025.

3. The appellant file and serve submissions and any affidavits in support on the question of costs by 4.00 pm on 5 January 2026.

4. Either party may by 4.00 pm on 12 January 2026 give notice to the other and to the Industrial Registry of an intention to make oral submissions on costs

5. In the absence of notice being given pursuant to order 4, the question of costs will be determined on the basis of any written submissions received and without further oral submissions.

[1] Gay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 141 ('Primary Decision').

[3] Notice of Appeal filed 21 June 2024.

[6] Appellant's submissions filed 25 July 2024, [9]-[10].

[8] Appellant submissions filed 25 July 2024, [6]-[7].

[13] Respondent's submissions filed 22 August 2024, [17]; Primary Decision, [157].

[14] Respondent's submissions filed 22 August 2024, [18]-[20].

[16] [2011] QSC 101.

[22] [2021] QIRC 251.

[24] [2025] ICQ 008.

[26] Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge [2025] ICQ 008.

[27] [2024] ICQ 021, [42].