[2025] WASC 384
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2025-09-17
Solomon J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($65,000.00) to my daughter ROSEMARY; and
>
> (b) The remainder of my Trust Estate to my daughter WARATAH for her own use absolutely and should she predecease me, such remainder to those of her three children ELLEESE, SHANA and BRANDON as survive me as tenants in common in equal shares.
Exhibit A - the subsequent document and the Italian note
THESE ARE MY
LAST INTENTIONS (WILL)
I LEAVE TO ROBERT MY SON
THE SUM OF 45 THOUSAND
DOLLARS, THEN WARATAH
WILL GIVE this
MONEY LITTLE BY LITTLE
PAYING FOR [THINGS] LIKE
LIGHTING AND GAS AND OTHER
THINGS,
THEN EVERYTHING that
THERE IS IN this
HOUSE GOES TO ROSEMARY
AND ROBERT
INCLUDING JEWELLERY AND
IF THERE IS ANY MONEY IN [THE]
BANK
I Hope
THAT I HAVE EXPLAINED MYSELF
YOUR MUM
(Angela Gallotti)
Subject to sections 17 and 20 and Parts XA, X and XI, a will is not valid unless -
(a) it is in writing; and
(b) it is signed by the testator or signed in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's presence and by the testator's direction, in such place on the will so that it is apparent on the face of the will that the testator intended to give effect by the signature to the writing signed as the testator's will; and
(c) the testator makes or acknowledges the signature in the presence of at least 2 witnesses present at the same time; and
(d) the witnesses attest and subscribe the will in the presence of the testator but no publication or form of attestation is necessary.
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person, even though it has not been executed in the manner required by this Act, constitutes -
(a) a will of the person; or
(b) an alteration to a will of the person; or
(c) the revocation of a will of the person; or
(d) the revival of a will or part of a will of the person,
if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the person intended the document to constitute the person's will, an alteration to the person's will, the revocation of the person's will or the revival of a will or part of a will of the person, as the case may be.
In forming its view, the Supreme Court may have regard (in addition to the document) to any evidence relating to the manner of execution or testamentary intentions of the person, including evidence (whether admissible before the commencement of this section or otherwise) of statements made by the person.
In Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408 [56], Powell JA (with whom Priestley and Stein JJA agreed) identified three questions of fact that arise under the New South Wales equivalent to s 34, those questions being:
...
It is, however, important always to bear in mind that while it is necessary that the document in question sets out the deceased's testamentary intentions, that is not of itself sufficient. Section 34 does not enable any document which expresses the deceased's testamentary wishes to be admitted to probate. The document must be intended to be the legally operative act which disposes of the deceased's property upon their death; that is, it must have been intended by the deceased to have present operation as his or her will. A person may have set down in writing their testamentary intentions but not intend that the document be operative as a will. Thus, for example, it will not be sufficient if it is a document intended to record gifts or intended gifts during the deceased's lifetime, or to be a note of instructions, or a draft will or a 'trial run': In the Estate of Masters (Dec), Hill v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446 at 455; Equity Trustees Ltd v Levin [2004] VSC 203. As Young CJ in Eq pointed out in Macey v Finch [2002] NSWSC 933 [23], even where a draft will has been prepared in accordance with the deceased's instructions, it is quite common for testators to change their mind after giving instructions or on seeing the draft will.
It is therefore of fundamental importance that the person seeking to propound the document establish that the deceased, by some words or act, demonstrated an intention that, without more, the document should have effect as his or her will.[50]
[B]y the requirement that the document which, by definition embodies the testamentary intentions of a Deceased person, should be described as constituting 'his or her will' the legislature plainly drew a distinction between those documents of testamentary intentions which constituted the Deceased's Will and those which did not. I regard the distinction thus made as one between a generalised homily as to the testamentary intentions ... and a document which, although falling short on formalities sufficiently evidences that by it the Deceased intended to govern the disposition of his or her property after death.
Often it will be difficult to tell into which category a propounded document falls. Section 18A(2) of the Act permits extrinsic evidence to given which may sometimes help. But in this case, as in most, that evidence will contain elements pointing in conflicting directions.
[T]here is in principle a distinction between a document which merely sets out what a person wishes or intends as to the way his property shall pass on his death and a document which, setting out those things, is intended to cause that to come about, that is, to operate as his will.
Since the critical question is, what was the Deceased's intention at the time she placed her signature on what is, after all, no more than a note as to the manner in which she wished her Will to be changed, it seems to me that what is required is an approach similar to that which is called for when the Court is called upon to determine whether an informal document was intended to constitute, or record, but a limited consensus or concluded agreement - in such cases it is not only legitimate, but almost inescapable, that one should have regard to the totality of events in order to determine what was the party's intention.
All persons making or permitting to be made any payment or transfer bona fide upon any probate or administration granted under the authority of this Act shall be indemnified and protected in so doing, notwithstanding any defect or circumstance whatsoever affecting the validity of such probate or administration not then known to such person.
In the notes to s 66 of the Act appearing in Hastings and Weir, ProbateLaw and Practice 2nd ed, (1948) at 225 the learned authors record (inter alia):
A general (ie, not a limited) grant of administration will be revoked only for good cause shown. ... A general grant will be revoked in the following classes of cases: -
...
(iii) where, although regularly obtained, it has become void or
inoperative through subsequent circumstances. Examples of
such cases include: -
More extensive statements of the English practice appear in Williams Mortimer and Sunnucks, Executors Administrators and Probate 16th ed,(1982). Thus, (at 314-315) the learned authors record (inter alia):
...
Grounds for revoking a grant
The principal grounds for revoking a grant are: (i) That it was obtained by a false or incorrect statement. (ii) That there is a supervening defect in the grant. (iii) That the grant was in effect a nullity. (iv) That the name of the deceased was wrongly stated in the grant.
Examples of revocation ordered under this head are:
...
(b) Where after a grant of probate, a codicil is discovered altering or revoking the appointment of executors. In this case a new grant is made of probate of the will and codicil, but if the appointment of executors is not affected, separate probate of the codicil is granted.
Where a codicil is discovered after a grant of administration (with the will) the grant is revoked and a fresh grant of administration with the will and codicil annexed is made. ...
(emphasis added)
[T]he Notes to Pt 78, r 38 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 appearing in Ritchie's Supreme Court Procedure (NSW) contain the following:
...
(b) Where a will has been discovered after a grant of letters of administration, or a later will after a grant of probate, or where the grant has been made pending a caveat, the original grant may be revoked. In Re Harley [1972] QWN 13, a grant of probate was revoked after discovery of a codicil to the will of which probate had been granted. A fresh grant was then made in relation to the will and the codicil.
By s 29 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) it is provided that:
(1) Where administration of the estate of a person has been granted the Court may, at any time, upon the application of any person interested in the estate or of its own motion on the report of the Principal Registrar, revoke the administration.
It may be open to question whether or not that power is confined to grants of letters of administration made by the court, as distinct from grants of probate, because a dichotomy between such grants appears to exist in ss 3, 6 ‑ 8 and elsewhere in the Administration Act ...
RSC O 73 contains the rules of court dealing with contentious probate proceedings which include any action for the revocation of a grant of probate or letters of administration.
Any narrow questions as to the extent of the probate jurisdiction of the court are resolved by the ample grant of jurisdiction upon the court contained in s 18 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) which provides:
The Supreme Court shall have voluntary and contentious probate jurisdiction and authority in relation to the granting or revoking of probate of wills and letters of administration of all real and personal estate whatsoever within Western Australia and its dependencies of any deceased person; and all such powers and authorities in respect of such jurisdiction as were given to the Court by the Administration Act 1903, and any other Act in force in Western Australia immediately before the commencement of this Act, with authority to hear and determine all questions relating to testamentary causes and matters.
There is a wide variety of circumstances under which revocation of a grant of probate or letters of administration, which have not been the subject of proof in solemn form, may be made. Broadly, these may be divided into two categories. The first being where it is discovered that there is some error which has been made in the grant of representation or where the particular grant should not have been made (for example, the discovery of a later will, or of a subsequent marriage which revoked the will in question). The second category includes revocations made necessary or desirable to ensure the due administration of the estate such as, for example, where the grantee becomes sick or disabled, or has disappeared. The ultimate purpose of the court is to ensure the due and proper administration of the estate and of the interests of the parties beneficially entitled to it ‑ see Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed, Reissue) par 259 and Re Loveday [1900] UKLawRpPro 13; [1900] P 154. For a detailed discussion of the various examples where revocation may be justified see Tristram & Coote's Probate Practice (29th ed) pars 17.01 ‑ 17.33 and Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks 'Executors & Administrators of Probate' (18th ed, 2000) pars 27‑15 ‑ 12‑30.
The revocation of a grant of probate is equivalent to the setting aside of a court order; the power to do so is not exercised as of course or as of right. The purpose of the court's power of revocation is to ensure the due and proper administration of the estate and of the interests of the beneficiaries. But the court is cautious and sparing in the exercise of the power; it is a major step as it includes the removal of the person chosen by the deceased as the person considered suitable.
(citations omitted)
(1) The court's power to revoke a grant of probate is at least an inherent power of the court;
(2) The power is discretionary;
(3) The power is exercised sparingly;
(4) However, where a subsequent will or codicil is discovered after the grant of probate, the discretionary power should ordinarily be exercised to revoke the grant;
(5) Nevertheless, the power remains discretionary. In special circumstances, in may not be appropriate to revoke a grant of probate notwithstanding the discovery of a subsequent will or codicil.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] Throughout these reasons, Mrs Gallotti's middle name is spelled 'Alfonsa', consistent with the grant of probate dated 24 February 2020. The alternative spelling, 'Alphonsa', is used in the parts of this judgment that directly quote Mrs Gallotti's will documents and statutory declaration dated 2 June 2011, in which that spelling appeared.
[2] Plaintiff's Trial Bundle, 17 June 2024, 8 (Exhibit C); Defendant's Trial Bundle, 18 June 2024, 7 (Exhibit D).
[5] Statement of Claim, 15 October 2024 [6] (Statement of Claim).
[9] Transcript, Gallotti v Gallotti-Brown, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 5 June 2025, 29 - 30; Transcript, Gallotti v Gallotti-Brown, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 10 June 2025, 39.
[11] Defendant's Further Amended Submissions, 20 January 2025 [1.1].
[15] Transcript, Gallotti v Gallotti-Brown, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 19 June 2025, 39 (ts).
[46] See footnote 1 regarding the alternative spellings of Mrs Gallotti's middle name.
[53] See Young v Martin [2018] WASCA 206 at [14] and most recently Cronan v Coates [No 2] [2024] WASC 184 at [24].
[54] In the Estate of Masters (Deceased); Hill v Plummer; Plummer v Hill (1994) 33 NSWLR 446, 455.
[55] Kemp v Findlay [2024] NSWSC 902 at [147]; Peek v Wheatley [ 2025] NSWSC 554 at [128] (Peek) citing Windeyer AJ in National Australia Trustees Ltd v Fazey [2011] NSWSC 559.
[56] See [27] and [67] of these reasons.
[57] See for example Campton v Hedges [2016] NSWSC 201 [61]; Lindsay v MsGrath [2015] QCA 206 [19]; Newman v Brinkgreve; Estate of Verzijden [2013] NSWSC 371 [104].
(1994) 33 NSWLR 446
(1991) 24 NSWLR 334