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[2025] QCA 78
respondent. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was dismissed with costs.
The Court of Appeal refused to let the applicant appeal out of time. It accepted that she had given an explanation for the delay, but held that lack of representation and formal training did not make it acceptable. More importantly, it found the proposed appeal had no merit: the orders were made when pronounced by the judge, the respondents could defend the claim, a copy of the registered mortgage was sufficient for the point raised, and the other proposed grounds did not disclose a viable basis for trial. The Court also saw no prospect of success in appealing the costs order. It dismissed the application with costs.
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2,263 words · generated 07/10/2026
Christina Galinovic applied to the Queensland Court of Appeal for more time to appeal orders made by a Supreme Court judge at Rockhampton on 26 September 2024. Those orders set aside her claim and statement of claim, dismissed her proceeding against ANZ, Shayne Elliott and Paul O'Sullivan, and required her to pay the respondents' costs on the standard basis: [1], [15].
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The underlying dispute concerned a loan and mortgage. Galinovic entered a loan contract with ANZ on 12 August 2011 to purchase an investment property. The loan was secured by a mortgage she signed, which was registered against the property's title on 24 August 2011: [5]–[6]. In July 2024, she filed a claim seeking, among other things, declarations that the mortgage was void and that no debt was owing, alongside damages exceeding $310 million and other relief: [7].
The respondents sought to have the claim struck out or set aside, arguing that it was irregular under r 16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR): [8]–[9]. Galinovic opposed that application and sought to strike out their conditional notice of intention to defend, as well as to obtain default judgment: [9].
The primary judge rejected the applicant's objections and concluded that the statement of claim disclosed no discernible cause of action. The Court of Appeal's reasons recount the primary judge's findings on the registered mortgage, the loan contract, execution of documents, alleged statutory and banking-code breaches, and the absence of evidence supporting the asserted claims: [10]–[15]. The appeal court then assessed whether there was a proper basis to extend the time for an appeal from those orders.
Galinovic said she had been unable to appeal within the 28-day period because of lack of legal assistance, lack of formal training and illness: [2]. She also argued that the proposed appeal raised serious errors and a substantial injustice: [3]–[4]. The Court dismissed the extension application with costs: [36].
The Court approached the extension application by considering the explanation for delay and the merits of the proposed appeal. It stated that extensions will usually be granted only to correct a substantial injustice, and identified the explanation and length of delay, prejudice to the respondent and merits as relevant considerations: [22]. It cited Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119 at [25] for that framework.
The explanation was not acceptable. The Court recognised that Galinovic had explained the delay, but said self-represented litigants remain obliged to comply with the UCPR, including its time limits. Lack of legal representation or formal training was insufficient to explain failure to file within the prescribed period: [23]. The Court did not treat self-representation as removing the procedural requirement.
The Court then considered the proposed appeal grounds and found them meritless: [24]. It rejected the argument that the orders were void because a Registrar had signed the sealed order. UCPR r 660 provides that court orders are made when pronounced by a judge, and the primary judge had pronounced them in open court. Rule 661 authorises a Registrar to issue a document recording the orders. The Court also rejected the contention that a failure to affix a formal seal invalidated the document, noting the order was sealed in accordance with Registry practices: [25].
The standing argument also failed. The applicant had named the respondents as parties and sought significant relief against them. The Court said they had standing to respond, and that their conditional notice of intention to defend did not have to be signed in the solicitor's personal name. It could be signed in the name of the law firm representing them: [26]. The Court referred to Permanent Custodians Ltd v Palmer [2009] VSCA 80 at [13] in support of the signature point.
On the mortgage, the Court held there was no requirement to produce the original document to prove the mortgage and underlying debt. It said a copy of the registered document was proof of the mortgage: [27]. The copy referred to an identified standard terms document filed in the Land Registry, which the Court described as an established way to identify the secured debts and liabilities. Section 73 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), it said, required description of the secured debt or liability, not that the loan sum be expressed in Australian currency: [27].
The Court also rejected the argument that electronic transfer meant no funds had been advanced. It stated that electronic advancement did not mean there had been no advance, referring to Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; [2004] HCA 55 at [43]–[46]: [27]. It further found no basis to treat execution by a duly authorised attorney, rather than bank directors, as invalidating the mortgage documents: [28].
The remaining allegations did not disclose a trial-worthy issue on the material before the Court. It said there was no evidence supporting alleged breaches of the Bills of Exchange Act, the Code of Banking Practice or fiduciary duties: [29]. It also rejected claims of unequal treatment and procedural unfairness. The primary judge had addressed compliance with formal UCPR requirements rather than mere formatting, the applicant had ample time to prepare, and the respondents' open letter was relied on only in relation to costs: [30].
Finally, the Court saw no prospect of success in appealing the costs order. Once the claim and statement of claim had been validly struck out, it considered that costs should follow the event: [32]–[34]. It therefore concluded that granting extra time would be futile: [35].
This judgment did not purport to change the law. It applied an existing approach to extensions of time, citing Carborough Downs for the factors relevant to the discretion: [22]. Its account of the approach is that an extension will usually be granted only to correct a substantial injustice, assessed in light of the explanation for delay, the extent of delay, prejudice and merits.
The practical application in this case is clear. A person litigating without a lawyer remains subject to the UCPR time limits. Lack of representation and formal training, without more in the circumstances the Court considered, did not make the delay acceptable: [23]. The Court also treated the merits of the proposed appeal as central to whether an extension would serve a purpose. It considered the application futile after rejecting the proposed grounds: [24], [35].
The judgment also applied procedural rules concerning the making and recording of orders. Under r 660, the orders were made when pronounced by the judge; under r 661, a Registrar could issue a document recording them: [25]. The ruling does not suggest that a Registrar makes the substantive order merely by signing the record.
As to mortgages, the Court applied the statutory and evidentiary propositions stated in its reasons. It treated the copy of the registered document as proof of the mortgage and regarded a description of the secured liabilities by reference to standard terms as sufficient for the issue raised under s 73 of the Land Title Act: [27]. It did not require the loan sum to be described in Australian currency, and rejected the proposition that electronic transfer negated an advance of funds: [27].
The judgment is therefore best read as an application of the cited rules to the pleaded claims and proposed appeal grounds, rather than as a new general rule about every mortgage dispute or every extension application. Its conclusions are tied to the record and arguments described in the reasons.
At [22], the Court said an extension will “usually only be granted to correct a substantial injustice.” In plain English, an extension is not automatic simply because a deadline was missed. The Court looks at whether extending time is justified in the circumstances, including the explanation for delay and whether the proposed appeal has merit.
At [23], the Court said self-represented litigants “are obliged to comply with the UCPR, including the time limits.” In plain English, not having a lawyer does not by itself suspend procedural deadlines. The Court held that lack of representation or formal training did not sufficiently explain the late filing in this case.
At [25], the Court explained that orders are made when pronounced by a judge, and that a Registrar may issue a document recording them. In plain English, the Court distinguished the judicial act of making an order from the administrative record of that order. It rejected the argument that a Registrar's signature on the record made the orders void.
At [27], the Court stated that a copy of the registered document was proof of the mortgage. It also said s 73 did not require the loan sum to be stated in Australian currency. In plain English, for the issues argued in this application, the registered mortgage copy and its reference to identified standard terms were sufficient; the Court did not require the original mortgage document or a currency figure in the form asserted.
At [35], the Court concluded that an extension would be futile because any appeal was “doomed to fail.” In plain English, the Court considered that giving more time would not change the result because it found no viable appeal ground.
The decision is relevant to applications seeking extra time to appeal where the applicant relies on lack of legal assistance or legal training as an explanation. The Court's stated approach is that self-represented litigants remain obliged to comply with procedural time limits: [22]–[23]. The judgment does not establish that illness can never explain delay; it records that illness was among the applicant's stated reasons, but its express discussion of why the explanation was unacceptable focuses on self-representation and lack of formal training: [2], [23].
The decision is also relevant where an extension application raises a challenge to a court order based on a Registrar signing the document that records it. The Court applied UCPR rr 660 and 661 and rejected that challenge where the judge had pronounced the orders in open court: [25].
Other potentially comparable fact patterns include disputes over whether a respondent named in a claim can defend it, whether a notice must be signed personally by a solicitor rather than by the solicitor's firm, and whether a registered mortgage copy can establish the mortgage for the issue in dispute: [26]–[27]. The judgment's conclusions should be read in context: the respondents were named in the claim, and the copy referred to standard terms identified in the Land Registry.
The extension application also involved allegations about electronic advances, execution by an authorised attorney, statutory and banking-code breaches, and procedural unfairness: [27]–[30]. The Court's conclusions on those matters depended on its assessment that the evidence did not support a trial-worthy issue in this case. The reasons do not decide every possible dispute involving electronic transfers, attorneys, banking conduct or procedural fairness.
The judgment text provided does not identify any later decisions considering Galinovic, and it cannot establish how later courts have treated it. The Court itself cited three authorities: Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119 at [25] on extension-of-time factors; Permanent Custodians Ltd v Palmer [2009] VSCA 80 at [13] on a notice signed in the name of a law firm; and Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; [2004] HCA 55 at [43]–[46] on the proposition concerning electronic advancement: [22], [26]–[27].
Those citations show the authorities the Court relied on for propositions in its reasoning. They do not, from the supplied text alone, establish later judicial treatment of Galinovic itself. Any assessment of subsequent treatment would require later judgments not included in the material provided.
The reasons do not set out the length of the delay in detail, identify any particular prejudice to the respondents, or separately explain how each factor in the Carborough Downs framework affected the outcome. The Court did state that the explanation was unacceptable and the proposed appeal lacked merit: [22]–[24]. The judgment does not provide a broader assessment of what kinds of illness-related evidence might make a delay explanation acceptable in another case.
The Court rejected the applicant's proposed grounds based on the material and arguments before it. It does not determine all possible questions about the evidentiary treatment of original mortgage documents in other proceedings, beyond stating that a copy of the registered document was proof of the mortgage in this matter: [27]. Nor does it examine the operation of s 73 in circumstances involving different mortgage wording or different registry materials.
The reasons likewise do not decide the validity of every document signed under a power of attorney, or the consequences of every alleged defect in mortgage execution. They state that execution by a duly authorised attorney was permitted and that there was no basis on the case presented to conclude that the documents were invalid: [28].
The judgment's conclusions on alleged statutory, banking-code and fiduciary breaches are expressed in terms of the lack of evidence supporting a trial-worthy issue in this proceeding: [29]. It does not set out the substantive elements of each alleged cause of action. The procedural fairness discussion is similarly tied to the primary judge's handling of this claim, the applicant's preparation time and the limited use of the open letter: [30].
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Galinovic v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2025] QCA 78
PARTIES: CHRISTINA GALINOVIC / (applicant) / v / AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED / ABN 11 005 357 522 / (first respondent) / SHAYNE ELLIOTT / (second respondent) / PAUL O'SULLIVAN / (third respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 16418 of 2024 / SC No 762 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Extension of Time/General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Unreported, 26 September 2024 (Crow J)
DELIVERED ON: 23 May 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 8 May 2025
JUDGES: Bowskill CJ, Mullins P and Boddice JA
ORDER: The application for an extension of time within which to appeal is dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – MOTIONS, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – where the primary judge made orders setting aside the claim and statement of claim, dismissing the proceeding, and awarding costs against the applicant – where the applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal those orders – where the application was filed outside of the 28 day period prescribed by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – whether the orders of the primary judge are void by reason of the sealed order having been signed by a Registrar – whether the respondents lacked standing – whether the primary judge was correct in concluding that there was no obligation on the respondents to produce the original mortgage document in order to prove the existence of the mortgage and of the underlying debt / Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 73, s 179 / Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 16, r 660, r 661 / Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119, cited / Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; [2004] HCA 55, cited
COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on her own behalf / N J Derrington for the respondents
SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on her own behalf / Gadens Lawyers for the respondents
THE COURT: On 26 September 2024, the primary judge ordered that a claim and statement of claim filed by the applicant against the respondents be set aside, that the proceeding be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding on the standard basis.
The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to appeal those orders. In support of that extension, the applicant filed an affidavit stating that she was unable to file the appeal within that prescribed 28 day period due to a lack of legal assistance, a lack of formal training and illness. The applicant also stated that the 28 day rule did not strictly apply in the circumstances as there were serious doubts as to the lawfulness and validity of the orders.
The applicant further stated that the proposed appeal is meritorious and a denial of leave would result in a substantial injustice due to significant wrongs, unfairness, multiple errors of law and there being a serious question of fraud requiring investigation and rectification.
The proposed grounds of appeal assert a lack of standing, failures to comply with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), failures to prove essential facts by production of the original mortgage document, including the existence of a debt due and owing in support of the mortgage, the subject of the proceeding and denials of procedural fairness.
Background
On 12 August 2011, the applicant entered into a loan contract with the first respondent. The loan, which was to purchase an investment property, was secured by a mortgage signed by the applicant.
On 24 August 2011, the mortgage was registered against the title of the property.
Proceeding below
On 29 July 2024, the applicant filed a claim and statement of claim, claiming declaratory and other relief against the respondents in respect of the debt secured by the mortgage registered over the applicant’s property. Among other things, the applicant claimed the mortgage was void and there was no debt owing. The applicant also claimed damages in excess of $310 million and other relief for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, negligence, breach of contract, unconscionable conduct, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties and breaches of statutory duties.
On 27 August 2024, the respondents filed a conditional notice of intention to defend, contending that the proceeding was irregular and that the claim was liable to be struck out and/or set aside under r 16 of the UCPR.
On 26 September 2024, the primary judge heard an application filed by the respondents on 6 September 2024, seeking the striking out of the claim and statement of claim and a cross-application filed by the applicant on 19 September 2024, seeking to strike out the conditional notice of intention to defend on the basis of invalidity and default judgment on the claim.
Primary decision
The primary judge found that the conditional notice of intention to defend was valid, there being no requirement that the solicitor acting for a party, sign in the solicitor’s own name, rather than the firm’s name. The primary judge further found that had it been necessary, the non-compliance would have been an irregularity such that the proceeding was not a nullity in any event.
The primary judge further found that there was no requirement for the respondents to produce the original mortgage document in order to prove the existence of a debt secured by the mortgage. A copy of the registered document, which on its face recorded it as a registered mortgage, was sufficient. Further, the registered document described the debts and liabilities secured by the mortgage, in accordance with the requirements of s 73 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). There was also found to be no substance in a contention that the mortgage had not been validly signed by the bank. The document was signed under a specific power of attorney which was authorised by s 126 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
The primary judge rejected submissions that the loans were not in existence because of a breach of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth), finding that the registered mortgage neither fitted within the definition of a bill of exchange, nor a promissory note. The primary judge also found that there was no basis to conclude that no monies had been lent under the registered mortgage. There was evidence of a loan document, clearly showing the existence of a loan contract of 12 August 2011, by which the applicant borrowed a certain sum on terms set out in the loan document for the purchase of the property, the subject of the registered mortgage. That loan contract was incorporated into the mortgage by its express terms. Further, its validity was not affected by whether monies were transferred electronically.
The primary judge also found that there was no evidence to support allegations of breaches of the director’s duties or of the Code of Banking Practice.
The primary judge found that the statement of claim disclosed no discernible cause of action and that as the applicant had been given considerable opportunity, during the hearing of the applications, to advance a case against the respondents and had been unable to do so, it was appropriate to exercise the discretion to strike out the claim and statement of claim.
The primary judge found that as the respondents had succeeded, it was appropriate to order that the costs be paid by the applicant, on the standard basis.
Leave to adduce further evidence
The applicant sought leave to adduce further evidence on appeal in the form of a forensic accounting report. The contended basis for the granting of leave was that the report supported the applicant’s contentions in relation to there being no valid mortgage, due to the absence of the original mortgage agreement documents and a lack of standing on the part of the respondents to enforce the mortgage, and the claimed damages.
As the proceeding below concerned whether the applicant’s claim and statement of claim disclosed a viable cause of action, such a report has no relevance.
In those circumstances, leave to adduce this further evidence was refused at the hearing of the application.
The applicant also filed another application for leave to adduce further evidence on the appeal. However, for the most part, it sought to refer to cases and legislation, which is not evidence. The only evidence sought to be relied on by this application, being the letter of offer, is before the Court (in exhibit 1).
Transcript below
At the hearing, the applicant advanced submissions that the transcript of the proceeding below, and the transcript of the oral reasons, had been impermissibly altered by the primary judge.
In so far as the transcript of the proceeding is concerned, no substantive error was identified. In so far as the transcript of the oral reasons is concerned, the applicant suggested some words had been removed by the primary judge, based on the applicant’s notes taken at the time the reasons were given. It is not unusual and is entirely permissible for the transcript of oral reasons to be revised by a judge.
Extension of time
An extension of time within which to appeal will usually only be granted to correct a substantial injustice. Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension, include whether there has been any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the extent of the delay, any prejudice to a respondent, and the merits of any proposed appeal.1
In the present case, although there has been an explanation for the delay, it could not be said to be acceptable. Self-represented litigants are obliged to comply with the UCPR, including the time limits. A lack of representation and/or formal training is an insufficient reason for having failed to file a notice of appeal within the designated time period under the UCPR.
In any event, an assessment of the proposed grounds reveals a lack of merit in any appeal.
First, there is no merit in the applicant’s contention that the orders of the primary judge are void by reason of the sealed order having been signed by a Registrar. Rule 660 of the UCPR specifically provides that the orders of the court are made upon them being pronounced by a judge. The orders in question were pronounced, in open court, by the primary judge. Further, r 661 provides the power for a Registrar to issue a document recording those orders. There is also no substance in the suggestion that the order issued was invalid by reason of a failure to affix the formal seal of the court. The order is sealed in accordance with Registry practices.
Second, there is no merit in the applicant’s contention that the respondents lacked standing. The applicant commenced the proceeding naming the respondents as parties and claiming significant relief against them. They had standing to respond to those claims. They filed a conditional notice of intention to defend in accordance with the UCPR. The validity of that document was not dependent upon it being signed by the solicitor, in that solicitor’s personal name. Such a document can be signed in the name of the firm of solicitors that represents the respondents.2
Third, the primary judge was plainly correct in concluding that there was no obligation on the respondents to produce the original mortgage document in order to prove the existence of the mortgage and of the underlying debt. A copy of the registered document was proof of the existence of the mortgage.3 Further, the copy evidenced that the document described the debts and liabilities secured by the mortgage, by reference to an identified standard terms document filed in the Land Registry. This is an established means by which to so identify the debts and liabilities secured. Section 73 of the (Qld) does not require the loan sum to be specified in Australian currency. It only requires a description of the debt or liability secured by the mortgage. The fact that the monies were advanced electronically does not mean there was no advance of funds.
Costs
The applicant also sought an extension of time within which to appeal the costs order.
A consideration of the circumstances supports a conclusion that such an appeal would have no prospects of success.
Once the claim and statement of claim were validly struck out, there was no basis to conclude that costs should be ordered, other than in the respondents’ favour. Costs in such circumstances ought to follow the event.
Conclusion
Orders
The application for an extension of time within which to appeal be dismissed with costs.
Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119 at [25]. ↩
As explained in Permanent Custodians Ltd v Palmer [2009] VSCA 80 at [13]. ↩
See s 179 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). ↩
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; [2004] HCA 55 at [43]–[46]. ↩
Galinovic
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2025] QCA 78
(2004) 218 CLR 471
The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was dismissed with costs.
Fourth, the primary judge properly rejected contentions that there was a serious question to be tried in relation to the signing of the mortgage and associated documents, by a person other than the directors of the first respondent. Execution of those documents by a duly authorised attorney was permitted and there was no basis to conclude that the documents were therefore invalid.
Fifth, the primary judge correctly concluded that there was no evidence to support contentions of a breach of the Bills of Exchange Act, or of the Code of Banking Practice, or of other fiduciary duties. There was no evidence to support a conclusion that there was any issue in respect of those matters warranting a trial.
Sixth, there was no unequal treatment or denial of procedural fairness. The primary judge dealt with complaints in respect of the statement of claim, not on the basis of formatting issues, but as to whether the formal requirements of the UCPR had been met. The applicant also had ample time to prepare her case as evidenced by the detailed documentation relied upon by the applicant at the hearing. There was also no improper reliance upon an open letter sent by the respondents. That letter was relied upon solely in respect of costs.
In circumstances where it had been established that there was a registered mortgage, with an underlying outstanding debt, and no viable claims in relation to the invalidity of the mortgage or the underlying loan contract, the primary judge was correct to conclude that the applicant’s claim was doomed to fail, ought to be struck out.