FVG18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 149

1. The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who sought protection on the basis of claims to fear that, on return, harm would be occasioned because of his religious identity and beliefs and past experiences of threats and harassment.
2. The Applicant now seeks judicial review of a tribunal decision to affirm the administrative decision to refuse him a protection visa.
3. For the reasons that follow, the application must be dismissed.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, of Sinhalese ethnicity and identified as both Buddhist and Catholic growing up but follows the Roman Catholic faith.
2. On 1 July 2009, the Applicant arrived in Australia holding a student visa.
3. On 25 September 2014, the Applicant applied for a protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa.
4. On 22 September 2016, a delegate of the First Respondent refused to grant the protection visa (delegate's decision).
5. On 20 October 2016, the Applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was) (Tribunal) for review of the delegate's decision.
6. On 24 October 2016, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant via his then representative to acknowledge receipt of the review application. By that correspondence, the Tribunal acknowledged receipt of the review application and advised if they wished to provide material or written arguments for the Tribunal to consider, they should do so as soon as possible.
7. On 12 July 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant via his then representative in respect of the impending hearing and availability. By that correspondence, the Tribunal advised that the case was being prepared for hearing and if they had any additional evidence that was relevant to the application to please send it as soon as possible.
8. On 20 September 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant via his then representative and invited them to attend a hearing. By that correspondence, the Tribunal advised that, having considered the material before it, were unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone and invited the Applicant to appear to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in the case. The Applicant was informed to bring copies of any original document to be submitted at the hearing as evidence. The cover letter also stated that the following should be provided by 4 October 2018:

(a) a written submission setting out all claims made and maintained by the Applicant, accompanied by a signed declaration from the Applicant that it had been read and explained to them and accurately and completely presented their claims; and

(b) a witness statement for any witness proposed to give evidence at hearing or at least particulars of the evidence the witness is expected to address and its relevance to the case.

1. On 1 October 2018, the Applicant signed a response to hearing invitation form. On that form, the Applicant indicated that he would take part in the hearing, his representative would not be attending and he did not need an interpreter.
2. On 11 October 2018, the Applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal and gave oral evidence on that day. Copies of original documents (passport, Sri Lanka driving license) were provided to the Tribunal on that day.
3. On 17 October 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review (Tribunal's decision). It is that decision to which the present proceedings relate.

1. On 8 November 2018, the Applicant filed an originating application and an affidavit which annexed a copy of the Tribunal's decision. The originating application identified 2 grounds of review, expressed in the following terms:

1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not afford procedural fairness. Applicant has forwarded several evidences to prove his protection claims which have not been considered.

2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal applied the wrong legal test.

(sic.)

1. On 8 March 2019, the First Respondent filed a response which sought orders that the application be dismissed with costs on the basis that the application for judicial review did not provide any particulars and did not establish any jurisdictional error.
2. On 2 September 2020, the Minister filed a court book.
3. On 11 June 2025, procedural orders were made which listed the matter for final hearing on 17 July 2025.
4. On 4 July 2025, the Applicant filed an outline of written submissions.
5. On 11 July 2025, the First Respondent filed an outline of written submissions and a list of authorities.
6. On 17 July 2025, the First Respondent filed an affidavit of service.
7. On 17 July 2025, the matter was called on for final hearing but did not proceed because the Applicant informed the Court that he required an interpreter. The matter was then adjourned for further final hearing.
8. On 11 November 2025, the matter was called on for final hearing but did not proceed on account of interpreter unavailability. The matter was then adjourned for further final hearing.
9. On 29 January 2026, the matter proceeded to final hearing at which the Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Sinhalese interpreter and the First Respondent was represented by a solicitor advocate.

1. A "privative clause decision" as defined at s.474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) is final and not amenable to judicial review in any Court. Absent identification of jurisdictional error, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of the Tribunal's decision: s.476 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
2. The task on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the decision or substitute it with a decision which the Court considers ought to have been made. The jurisdiction, being supervisory, allows for a decision to be quashed on established grounds, the most important of which is jurisdictional error. And, where appropriate, to order that the matter be remitted and reconsidered according to law: see Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), as cited in BIJ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 443 at [19]-[20] (Kelly J).
3. The grant of a protection visa is (and at the relevant times, was) confined by the criteria at s.36 of the Act. Relevant to the present application, ss.36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) provides (and, at the relevant times, provided) that "a" criteria for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm.

1. An administrative decision maker is required to refuse to issue a visa absent the requisite state of satisfaction that the criteria applicable to the visa application are satisfied: s.65 of the Act.

1. By the first ground, the Applicant contended that he was denied procedural fairness and the Tribunal had not considered evidence of the Applicant to prove his protection claims. He was understood to say that both issues infected the Tribunal's adverse findings as to his credibility and of inconsistencies in his evidence.
2. In his written submissions and at hearing before this Court, the Applicant elaborated by taking issue with the absence of an interpreter at the Tribunal hearing. He said this created difficulty in expressing himself clearly and in explaining the incidents during his oral testimony and therefore the Tribunal's finding that he had fabricated his claims was unwarranted.
3. Further, the Applicant contended that the Tribunal failed to consider his oral evidence of two particular incidents and otherwise did not consider new evidence that he could provide.

1. As the above summary of the context discloses, the Tribunal records establish that the Applicant was invited to tell the Tribunal if he needed the assistance of an interpreter at the Tribunal hearing and, in his response, made the express election that an interpreter was not needed (by ticking the "no" box in response to that question).
2. Taking the Applicant's submissions to this Court at their highest, his standard of English was not good at the time. That the Applicant chose to be represented throughout the visa application process until the hearing invitation was received, and then did not get assistance in completing the response to hearing invitation form, is a matter for him. Further, there is no transcript of the Tribunal hearing before the Court to demonstrate that there were in fact difficulties in comprehension or understanding at the hearing nor any request at that time for assistance of an interpreter that were denied.
3. Without more, I am not able to discern a denial of procedural fairness in respect of the absence of an interpreter at the Tribunal's hearing.

1. In relation to the alleged failure to consider oral evidence given, the Tribunal's reasons disclose that the single particularised incident was addressed in the Tribunal's reasons - at [65]. There, the Tribunal gave consideration to the incident involving a group of Sinhalese Buddhists who he said had visited his sister at her home and asked of his whereabouts shortly after he first moved to Australia.
2. To the extent that the Tribunal made adverse findings of credit in respect of the Applicant's account given for the first time at hearing (and not given in the prior submissions, the original visa application or before the delegate), the Tribunal was entitled to do so. On analysis of the Tribunal's decision record, the Tribunal engaged with the Applicant's claims about their reasons for seeking protection in Australia and their claims to fear persecution and of risk of harm. That the Tribunal did not accept that certain parts of the Applicant's evidence were reliable or credible is not demonstrative of an error or a failure to consider evidence.
3. To the extent that the Applicant sought to allege that the Tribunal's findings in relation to credibility were legally unreasonable, that submission ought be rejected. That another decision maker might have decided differently is not to the point. It was a matter for the Tribunal to weigh the material it had before it. I am persuaded that the Tribunal's decision is logical and not unreasonable in the legal sense.
4. The final limb to the first ground was understood to constitute an attempt to have the Court take new evidence into account, including of events that have occurred in the period since the Tribunal's decision (raised in the Applicant's written submissions and at hearing before the Court where he sought to hand up new evidence in support of his protection claims). As I endeavoured to explain to the Applicant at the hearing, at this stage of the process, the Court is unable to re-make the factual findings that were made by the Tribunal or to receive new evidence or to assess whether or not the Applicant's claims for protection ought to be accepted. Merits review is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
5. As the factual summary above highlights, the Applicant received numerous correspondence from the Tribunal which invited the presentation of new evidence and submissions. I am satisfied that the Applicant had a fair opportunity to present new information at hearing before the Tribunal and there is no error in this respect.

1. I discern no error of jurisdiction as contended and the first ground of the application is not made out.

1. By the second ground, the Applicant contended that the Tribunal applied the wrong legal test.
2. There was no particularisation of the alleged error of law in written or oral submissions. This of itself is a sufficient basis to dismiss the ground: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 (Gilmour J) at [35]; BDE16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 816 (Reeves J) at [20] and [24].
3. Without more, and on analysis of the materials before the Cout, I am unable to discern an error of jurisdiction in this respect.

1. For the above reasons, the application does not establish any error of jurisdiction and must be dismissed. It is an appropriate case to order that the Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs as sought, being fixed in the amount of $5,000 which is less than the scale amount for final hearing.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Mansini.