[2025] NSWCATAD 224
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity
2025-09-05
Original judgment source is linked above.
With the exception of officers of government agencies, the publication or broadcast of the name of any person mentioned in these proceedings or referred to in the documentary material lodged in these proceedings is prohibited. This order is made under section 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.
Note: a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.
(1) 23 October 1997: breach of bail, sentenced (not specified in criminal records check).
(2) 6 December 1998 and appeal 12 December 2000: assault, sentenced to bond four months and 18 days, following all grounds appeal on sentence and conviction, where the conviction was confirmed.
(3) 17 December 2021: assault occasioning actual bodily harm against a child, found guilty without conviction and sentenced to a conditional release order.
(4) 2 August 2022: three counts of contravention of prohibition/restriction in AVO, sentenced to monetary fines with all convictions being confirmed on appeal. In dismissing the appeal, the District Court (Judge Haesler SC) found that the appeal had no merit on its legal basis stating:
.......the bottom line is that the purposes inherit in our legislation require that courts acknowledge breaches and the seriousness of any breach of apprehended domestic violence orders. That is what the magistrate did. And, frankly, she dealt with it probably more leniently and more compassionately than I would have done if I had been dealing with it at first instance.
....in my view the evidence of the complainant's son who according to him was wearing silk pyjamas which would afford virtually no protection against a strike if you were struck with a belt. I have no doubt and certainly the young person who naturally I think would be reluctant to give evidence against his father in a court of law, certainly in his DVEC statement and his evidence today impressed me as a witness of truth, he had no hidden agenda, clearly was uncomfortable and disliked the thought of having to tell strangers, people who he has never met before in a court what happened on that evening, but was ready to make admissions against self-interest, he readily accepted he was disobedient, but the conduct he displayed towards his father was inappropriate, it was disobedient and that he was refusing to obey an instruction given by his father.
.......
I am satisfied that for the purposes of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. I accept the evidence of the young person and I have no doubt the welts are certainly consistent with the nature of the conduct that has been established. The question is whether or not the conduct was appropriate in the circumstances.
18 Determination of applications for clearances
(1) The Children's Guardian must not grant a working with children check clearance to the following persons ("disqualified persons")--
(a) a person convicted before, on or after the commencement of this section of an offence specified in Schedule 2, if the offence was committed as an adult,
(b) a person against whom proceedings for any such offence have been commenced, if the offence was committed as an adult, pending determination of the proceedings for the offence.
(2) The Children's Guardian must grant a clearance to a person who is subject to a risk assessment under Division 3 unless the Children's Guardian is satisfied that the person poses a risk to the safety of children.
(3) The Children's Guardian must grant a clearance to a person if it is satisfied that the person is not a disqualified person and the person is not subject to a risk assessment under Division 3. offences
61L Indecent assault
Any person who assaults another person and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.
61KC Sexual touching
Any person (the "accused person") who without the consent of another person (the "complainant") and knowing that the complainant does not consent intentionally--
(a) sexually touches the complainant, or
(b) incites the complainant to sexually touch the accused person, or
(c) incites a third person to sexually touch the complainant, or
(d) incites the complainant to sexually touch a third person,
is guilty of an offence.
28 Orders relating to disqualified and ineligible persons
(1) The Tribunal may, on the application of a disqualified person, make an order declaring that the person is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of this Act in respect of an offence specified in the order (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor.
(2) The Tribunal may, on the application of a person who is not eligible to apply for a clearance because the person has been previously refused a clearance, make an order declaring that the person is to be treated as a person who is eligible to apply for a clearance (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor.
(3) A disqualified person may make an application under this section only if-
(a) the person has been refused a working with children check clearance, or
(b) the person's clearance has been cancelled under section 23,
because the person is a disqualified person.
(4) The Children's Guardian is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under this section and may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order.
(5) An applicant must fully disclose to the Tribunal any matters relevant to the application.
(6) If the Tribunal makes an enabling order, the Tribunal may order the Children's Guardian to revoke an interim bar or to grant the person a clearance.
(6A) To avoid doubt, Division 5 of Part 3 applies to any clearance granted by the Children's Guardian in accordance with the Tribunal's order.
(7) In any proceedings where an enabling order is sought, it is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.
(8) An enabling order may not be made subject to conditions.
(1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part--
(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar,
(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred,
(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred,
(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,
(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,
(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,
(g) the person's present age,
(h) the seriousness of the person's criminal history and the conduct of the person since the matters occurred,
(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition,
(i1) any order of a court or Tribunal that is in force in relation to the person,
(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application,
(j1) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A,
(k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary.
(1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the "affected person") to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that-
(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and
(b) it is in the public interest to make the order.
A report referred to in section 29 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 may be provided to the Children's Guardian for the purpose of the exercise of the Children's Guardian's functions under this Act. Any such report may not be subsequently dealt with by the Children's Guardian in a manner that contravenes that section, except to the extent that it is necessary for the Children's Guardian to do so in the exercise of functions under this Act.
Evidence in relation to the disqualifying offence
Whilst admitting that he was violent to his wife during the marriage he stated that other problems arose due to his wife being traumatised by her father's sexual abuse of her as a child. He also stated that his wife has an alcohol problem.
...............
While stating his desire to reconcile with his wife, he appears to have limited relationship skills and neither he nor his wife have attended for relationship counselling together. [FRU] presents as having an unrealistic view of what appears to be a dysfunctional relationship.
Summonsed material from Dr Kye McCarthy and Relationships Australia
(1) The applicant refers to the disqualifying offence, being the offence of indecent assault and ADVO matters relating to his first ex-wife, being the offences for which he was convicted in 1996. The applicant stated that at the time of the offence he was 25, his first ex-wife was 24. They had been separated for about 6 months, and he had been staying at his ex-wife's house regularly to help her with household tasks and with the children.
(2) Throughout their marriage the applicant endured emotional abuse from his first ex-wife, which often involved her heavy drinking and mental health issues that stemmed from sexual abuse from relatives when she was young. He decided to plead guilty to the indecent assault charge and this was influenced by his desire to maintain his family and alleviate stress. The applicant denied that he engaged in any sexual misconduct. He further stated that his first ex-wife consistently filed complaints with police over minor issues, often using the children to manipulate and control him. The applicant's first ex-wife accused him of inappropriate behaviour towards his stepdaughter which was reported to community services. According to the applicant, the accusations were unfounded.
(3) The applicant's relationship with his first ex-wife ended around 1999.
(4) The applicant alleges that his involvement with his first ex-wife and her family has led to numerous unsubstantiated allegations against him. An example of this is an indecent assault allegation made by the younger brother of his first ex-wife in about 1994 when he was approximately 18 or 19 years and the brother was about 16 years old. This allegation was dismissed.
(5) There was a further allegation made in relation to an incident in 1998 where the applicant says he acted in self-defence. This is the conviction referred to at para 12(2) above. Despite the evidence supporting his defence, the applicant believes that because of his lack of legal representation the hearing resulted in an unfair outcome for him.
(6) The applicant also referred to charges laid against him in 2013 involving his second ex-wife, who was at this stage his wife, because he found her in a compromising position with another man. He defended himself in the prosecution and the charges were dismissed.
(7) Finally, the applicant referred to the charges involving the assault of his son after he had disciplined him. The applicant notes that he believed he had been acting lawfully.
(8) The applicant concludes that many of the allegations and charges documented throughout the documents provided by the respondent were either dismissed or based on false accusations from his ex-wives. He denies assaulting his second ex-wife.
I firmly state that I did not abuse my son; Rather, I disciplined him within the boundaries set by the law. Therefore I should not have been found guilty.
104. Taking into account the aforementioned risk and protective factors, it is my assessment that [the applicant] poses an overall low risk of sexual recidivism. It is noted that his previous offending will mean that his risk rating will never drop below the low range. The only issue of note for him appears to be in his denial of the offences, which is consistent with his initial reports to police, with the applicant maintaining his innocence for the offence across the years.
105. Specifically in considering [the applicant'] risk to children, research suggests that it is better to look at other risk factors that may indicate risk of harm to children, including the presence of sexual deviancy, indicators of instability such as psychopathology or unstable personality structure, poor interpersonal boundaries, and the presence of prior allegations.
[The applicant] is a 54-year-old man who was refused a WWCC after being convicted for an indecent assault against his former wife in 1996. He has a criminal record reflecting dysfunction within his relationships, which have contributed to the implementation of AVO's, and convictions for breaching those orders. However, it is noted that many of those offences were either quashed, overturned on appeal, supporting [the applicant's] explanation of his former partners making vexatious complaints. He does, however, have a conviction for assaulting his son which he reported as being physical discipline rather than assault, which would again reflect his poor capacity in functioning in his relationships at the time.
In relation to his offending history, [the applicant] reported that the majority of his offences occurred within the context of his relationships. He accused both of his former wives of making a number of vexatious complaints, which have led to various legal challenges and a number of those charges being quashed or dismissed. It is also within the context of his relationship, that the allegation of indecent assault occurred, although it is noted that there is no other history of sexualized behaviour for the applicant across the lifespan. There is, however, some indication of physical abuse, however the evidence in that abuse is contradictory.
6. I also considered that the majority of the applicants subsequent offending history occurred within the context of his relationships, as he suggested that his former wives made a number of vexatious complaints against him, which were ultimately quashed or dismissed. I also considered that there was some indication of physical abuse between the applicant at his wives, however, the evidence in that abuse was contradictory and weighted accordingly.
7. Further, I considered that allegations that were made against the applicant which resulted in an investigation by DCJ and mandatory counselling to address possible "anger issues", the various DCJ and court documents; and to a lesser extent, the written support provided by [the applicant's] 17-year-old son [name omitted]. It was also noted that his son continued to live with him at present, with no indication of any current risks. Based on the assessment and materials provided there was no information to suggest that [the applicant] would present a broader risk of harm to children. Additionally, the assessment itself, did not reveal any potential risks to children by [the applicant] at present or that he would suggest that he would pose a risk to children in the future.
.. M v M contemplates finding the risk of abuse exists but that the possibility of it materialising can be mitigated by measures such as supervised access, with the result that the risk is not unacceptable and the appearance is not denied access. As I have observed, no such mechanism is proffered by the Working with Children Act. It is not concerned with "unacceptable risks" but "real and appreciable risks" (V supra). Further, in cases such as this the onus is upon the plaintiff. However, subject to those two matters in the about caveat about the applicability of Briginshaw noted at 29, the reasoning in M v M is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes. Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.
57. ......The task of the Tribunal is, to expand on what Beech-Jones J said in BKE, to determine, even if it is unable to be satisfied one way or the other as to the truth of all or any of the allegations, whether, by reason of the possibility that the alleged conduct occurred, the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. If so, the Tribunal must refuse to grant a clearance. Of course, in that process the Tribunal will give consideration to the strength of the evidence supporting the allegations and will, inevitably, reach conclusions about the truth or falsity of some. If it finds any allegation to be without foundation it will discard it from further consideration. If it is satisfied that the allegation is well founded, it will assign to it such weight as it sees fit, in the consideration (inter alia) of the circumstances listed in s 30. It is the allegations between those two extremes, those that are neither proved nor disproved, that the Tribunal must address in determining whether the applicant for a clearance poses a risk to children.
58. It is plain that in some cases this will be the cause of potential injustice to the applicant for a clearance. A person entirely innocent of any allegations may be refused a clearance because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that the allegations are without foundation and the inability to reach such a conclusion leaves open sufficient possibility that the risk exists. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Child Protection Act satisfies me that the legislature preferred the risk of injustice to an applicant to risk to the safety of children.
Period of time since those offences occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred (s 30(1)(b))
The age of the applicant at the time the offences occurred, his age now, the age of the victim, the age difference and any evidence about the vulnerability of the victim (ss 30(1)(c) to (g))
The seriousness of the applicant's criminal history and the conduct since the matters occurred (s 30(1)(h))
Likelihood of repetition and impact on children of such repetition (s 30(1)(i))
Any order of a court or Tribunal that is enforce in relation to the applicant (s 30(1)(i1))
Any information given by the applicant in relation to the application (s 30(1)(j))
Information obtained in relation to s 36A (s 30(1)(j1))
Any other matters the respondent considers necessary (s 30(1)(k))
(1) The Tribunal dismisses the application for an enabling order.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
FRU
Children's Guardian [2025] NSWCATAD 224;
(1988) 166 CLR 69