FRIGGER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2026] WASCA 23 (18 February 2026)

(1) An accused who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with the requirement of his bail undertaking mentioned in section 28(2)(a) commits an offence.

(2) An accused who fails to comply with the requirement of his bail undertaking mentioned in section 28(2)(b) commits an offence.

...

(6) A person who is convicted of an offence against subsection (1), (2) or (2a) is liable to a fine not exceeding $10 000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, or both.

1. Section 28 of the Bail Act provides as follows:

(1) An accused shall not be released on bail for an appearance in court unless the accused has entered into a bail undertaking for that appearance or is deemed to have done so under section 31(3).

(2) A bail undertaking is an undertaking in writing by an accused in the prescribed form -

(a) that the accused will appear at a time and place specified, or deemed by section 31(3) to be specified, in the undertaking; and

(b) that if the accused fails to appear at that time and place the accused will, as soon as is practicable, appear at the court at which the accused was required to appear, when that court is sitting; and

(c) that the accused will comply with such conditions as may be imposed on the accused under Schedule 1 Part D clause 2; and

(d) that the accused will comply with any home detention condition that may be imposed as a condition on a grant of bail to the accused under Schedule 1 Part D clause 3; and

(e) that the accused will comply with any electronic monitoring condition that must be imposed as a condition on a grant of bail to the accused under Schedule 1 Part E clause 1,

and containing any agreement as to forfeiture of money by the accused which may be required pursuant to clause 1 of Part D.

(3) A bail undertaking for any appearance may be entered into in respect of more than one offence.

(4) The undertakings mentioned in subsection (2)(a) and (b) are, subject to section 34, enforceable under sections 51, 57 and 58.

1. Section 29 provides that a bail undertaking does not need to be entered into before the judicial officer or authorised officer who granted the bail, but may be entered into before a number of different persons. These include an associate of a Judge of the District Court: s 29(d).
2. Section 30 prescribes certain duties which apply to a person who is authorised to administer a bail undertaking. This provision is in the following terms:

(1) The person before whom a bail undertaking is to be entered into by an accused shall before it is entered into ‑

(a) either ‑

(i) read it to the accused; or

(ii) be informed by the accused that the accused has read it; or

(iii) if necessary, have it translated to the accused;

(b) ensure that all conditions which are to be complied with before the release of the accused have been complied with.

(2) The person before whom a bail undertaking is entered into by an accused shall give to him, or cause to be given to him ‑

(a) a copy of the bail undertaking as duly completed; and

(b) a notice in writing in the approved form showing ‑

(i) his obligations pursuant to the undertaking; and

(ii) the consequences of his failure to comply with them.

(3) The person before whom a bail undertaking is entered into by an accused shall enquire of the accused whether he requires the notice referred to in subsection (2)(b) to be read or translated to him and shall take such steps as are necessary to comply with any such requirement of the accused.

1. The circumstances in which the appellant was subject to a bail undertaking need some explanation.
2. On Tuesday, 4 June 2024 the appellant (who is now 72 years old) was convicted of one count of knowingly making a false statement in an affidavit, after a trial by jury before Gething DCJ (as his Honour then was). The jury returned to give its verdict just after 5.00 pm on that day.
3. While the jury was out of court considering its verdict, the appellant asked Gething DCJ when he proposed to conduct a sentencing hearing if she was convicted. Gething DCJ informed her that this would occur on Friday, 7 June 2024. The appellant asked whether written submissions would be required, and Gething DCJ said that they would not be required if it would mean that the sentencing could not occur on Friday. The appellant said that she already had written submissions 'from the last time'. Gething DCJ said that he would accept any written submissions by 1.00 pm on Thursday, 6 June 2024.[1]
4. The appellant then said that she would like to have two weeks before any prison sentence commenced, because she was self‑represented and would like to be able to go to the Court of Appeal and file appeal documents which she had already prepared. She also said that she would seek bail pending the appeal. Gething DCJ said that he would not be prepared to allow her two weeks before any prison sentence commenced.[2]
5. The appellant had been on bail during the course of the trial. She was self‑represented. After the appellant was convicted, Gething DCJ indicated that he proposed to sentence the appellant later in the week. The appellant, seemingly assuming that she would be granted bail until sentencing, asked that the sentencing be on Monday instead, to give her an opportunity to file appeal documents. She also said:[3]

... it will give my husband and I an opportunity to arrange our affairs because it's going to be a very difficult time for us. If you ‑ I don't ‑ I don't know what your ‑ your ‑ your thinking is at the moment. And it would give me an opportunity to arrange our affairs appropriately. So just a couple of extra days to ‑ to do that.

I haven't never come to court or ‑ or disobeyed the bail conditions et cetera. I don't believe I am any risk of escaping from ‑ from Perth and, in those circumstances, I'd ask for just an extra couple of days to get our affairs in order for that ‑ for that purpose.

1. The prosecutor submitted that the appropriate order was to remand the appellant in custody until her sentencing date. However, in response to the appellant's request, Gething DCJ said:[4]

Okay. Ms Frigger, this is what I'm going to do. I'm going to sentence on Friday. I'm going to grant you bail overnight. I'm going to bring you back in at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. When you're back in at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, I'm going to make a suite of orders. I want you to surrender your passport ‑ I want you to surrender all passports, and I'm going to make some flight risk orders.

The evidence and materials before me suggest that there's some assets ‑ or there's some connections overseas. As I said in my ‑ [the prosecutor's] position is quite correct, that that's the usual order, and it's not one that it's a sort of exception for that, but I am prepared to give you that exception but till Friday.

So the current bail conditions ‑ you'll have to re‑sign your bail. I'll increase the bail. So the bail amount is $50,000, the surety amount is $50,000. The surety to be provided by [the appellant's husband]. To reside at [the appellant's home address]. To remain at that address overnight, and not leave save for emergencies.

Now, I'm not going to make you surrender your passport tonight, because I don't want you in prison overnight just because you haven't surrendered your passport. So I'm going to adjourn the matter to 9 o'clock ‑ 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You can expect at that time I'll make an order requiring you to surrender your passport, so you need to bring all your passports with you, any European ones and also your ‑ any current Australian passport. And I'll also make orders in relation to approaching airports.

Yes. Okay. So, Ms Frigger, I am granting you bail; personal bail $50,000, surety $50,000. To reside at [the appellant's home address], to remain at that address overnight, and not leave save for emergency. You need to be back in the court precinct by 9.30 tomorrow morning, reporting in to the custody centre.

1. The court was then adjourned, and the associate to Gething DCJ prepared the bail and surety documents, which were signed by the appellant and her husband.
2. The surety documents were signed first. The associate to Gething DCJ then arranged for the bail documents to be signed. The bail undertaking was in the following form:[6]

District Court of Western Australia, District Court Building. 500 Hay Street PERTH WA 6000

On Wednesday the 05th of June 2024 at 09:15 AM.

Conditions to be observed during bail:

Bail $50,000.00; Surety $50,000.00; Personal undertaking in the amount of $50,000.; Surety in the amount of $50,000 to be provided by [the appellant's husband].; The accused is to reside at [the appellant's home address].; The accused is to remain at this address overnight and not leave save for an emergency.

UNDERTAKING

I, the abovenamed accused ‑

(a) to appear at the time and place and to comply with the conditions set out above;

(b) that if I am notified by a judicial officer or court official of a different time, or a different time and place, for my appearance, I will appear at the time, or at the time and place, so notified;

(c) that if I fail to appear in court as required I will as soon as is practicable appear at the court when it is sitting;

(1)AGREE to forfeit $50,000.00 to the State if I am convicted of the offence of failing to appear as required

Signed ...[appellant's signature]...

ACCUSED

1. The precise events which occurred were the subject of testimony by the associate at the subsequent trial of the appellant before Lonsdale DCJ in October 2025 for breach of her bail undertaking.
2. In his evidence‑in‑chief, the associate explained why the time of 9.15 am appeared on the bail undertaking:[7]

To the best of my recollection, the system generates a time 45 minutes before the court hearing, which requires that person to attend court for that time. In this instance, it appears that I've entered 10 am, which then, to allow for 45 minutes, registers as 9.15 am on the bail paperwork.

1. In cross‑examination, the associate said that, when he was speaking to the appellant, he had pointed at the words in bold and had reminded her that she needed to be in the District Court building on Wednesday, 5 June 2024 at 9.15 am.[8] Gething DCJ had specified a 9.30 am arrival time in the building for the appellant to surrender herself to security while the bail undertaking specified 9.15 am.[9] Nothing turns on the 15 minute difference.
2. The associate attested to seeing the appellant sign the bail undertaking. The associate was shown the bail undertaking and gave the following evidence‑in‑chief:[10]

Now, again, this was a document that has parts of [it] that are pre‑populated, like you've said, in relation to the surety documents? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

And that goes to the accused's details, charges, matter number and the date required ‑ ‑ ‑? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes

‑ ‑ ‑ for her to appear and the time? ‑ ‑ ‑ That's right.

Now, there's an undertaking in the middle of the page that states what Mrs ‑ or what the accused is undertaking to do. Did you see the accused sign this document? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

And the accused is Mrs Frigger? ‑ ‑ ‑ That's correct.

And we see certificate as to undertaking. There's a signature there, and the official ‑ official designation 'clerk of arraigns' again. Is that your signature? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

And you signed this document? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes, I did.

And ‑ and there is ‑ under your signature, there is also an acknowledgement section that says:

I acknowledge that I have been given a copy of the ‑ of bail undertaking and the form notice to accuse[d] attached to or on the reverse of the copy.

And there's a signature? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

Did you see her sign that? ‑ ‑ ‑ I did.

And when you signed the document, this was on 4 June 2024? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes, it was.

And that's the date that's handwritten there? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

And that was by you? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

And the notice to accuse[d], which is on this copy, is that just a ‑ a form that you provide to accused persons when they're giving a bail undertaking? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes, that's correct.

And that's just a ‑ a normal form that's provided? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

1. The associate was cross‑examined by the appellant. The relevant passage of cross‑examination was as follows:[11]

Okay. In - in paragraph 8 of your witness statement, you say:

Mrs Frigger did not make any comment, other than to intimate that she understood the terms of the bail undertaking.

? ‑ ‑ ‑ Yes.

What do you mean by that? ‑ ‑ ‑ I explained the requirement for you to attend the District Court at the ‑ at the certain time and date that is listed in bold. I gave you the opportunity to read the bail undertaking and I asked if you had any other questions, and you didn't, and so from that, I ‑ having been in court at the time that his Honour Judge Gething read the bail conditions, together with the fact that there were no other questions from yourself, formed the position that you understood the bail undertaking, and you went on to sign, which then gave me that confidence.

...

But you said:

How ‑ how does intimating to you when somebody is silent ‑ ‑ ‑

...

So you say that I simply kept silent when you gave me the bail undertaking to sign. Is that your evidence? ‑ ‑ ‑ To the best of my recollection, yes.

1. On 5 June 2024, Ms Frigger failed to attend court. Ms Frigger was called in court and outside the court in the court's waiting area by the usher to Gething DCJ, but there was no response. This occurred at 10.08 am. As well, Gething DCJ checked with the security officer in court and was informed that the appellant had not reported to security that morning.[12]
2. Subsequently, evidence obtained for the purpose of the alleged breach of bail offence showed that Ms Frigger had left Australia on 5 June 2024. The trial judge, Lonsdale DCJ, found that CCTV footage obtained from the Perth Airport, and an accompanying still photograph, showed a woman fitting the description of the appellant arriving at 3.16 am on 5 June 2024 at the airport in a silver Toyota Camry registered in the appellant's name and to an address matching the address on her bail undertaking.[13]
3. As well, passenger movement records obtained from the Australian Border Force revealed that the appellant departed from Australia on flight SQ 224 to Singapore on 5 June 2024, and did not return to Australia until 23 July 2024.[14] These records also show that she travelled under the name Angela Reid, rather than Angela Frigger.
4. As a result of this evidence, Lonsdale DCJ found that the appellant had 'fled the country' and could not have attended the District Court at 9.15 am or 10.00 am on 5 June 2024.[15]

1. At trial, the appellant indicated that she intended to both testify and call evidence. The evidence which she proposed to call was that of clinical and counselling psychologist, Ms Michelle Allinson, to give evidence in relation to her report dated 23 April 2025.
2. It emerged at the hearing of the appeal that there were two versions of the report, one dated 23 April 2025 while the other was dated 13 August 2025.[16] The major difference between the two versions is that the April version refers to Ms Frigger 'fleeing Australia', 'fleeing to Singapore' and departing from Australia, whereas the August version ‑ more neutrally ‑ refers to Ms Frigger breaching her bail undertaking.
3. As well, the conclusion in the April version contained the following opinion:[17]

In summary, the psychological burden of a wrongful conviction significantly impaired M[r]s Frigger's decision‑making and contributed to a crisis response in which fleeing the country felt like the only viable means of ensuring a fair process.

By contrast, the conclusion in the August version was in the following terms, with the underlined words added:[18]

In summary, the psychological burden of a wrongful conviction (from her perspective) appears that it may have significantly impaired Ms Frigger's decision‑making and contributed to a crisis response in which breaching bail felt like the only viable means of ensuring a fair process.

1. Apart from the matters which we have just mentioned, the April and August versions of Ms Allinson's report are materially identical.
2. The April version is the version which was considered and rejected by the trial judge, whereas the August version was attached to an affidavit which the court provisionally received for filing from the appellant at the appeal hearing. The appellant said that she had provided the August version to the trial judge. She asserted that she had provided the April version to the State on a without prejudice basis and that the State had improperly provided the April version to the trial judge.[19]
3. Ultimately, the minor differences between the April and August versions of Ms Allinson's report do not make any difference as to the admissibility of the report and whether it was correctly excluded from evidence. However, we can well understand why the appellant may have preferred to have the August version in evidence, as it did not contain any admissions that the appellant had left the jurisdiction or make reference to her 'fleeing' from Western Australia.
4. It is helpful to reproduce the whole substance of the report, which is brief. We have reproduced the April version, with the words changed or omitted by the August version underlined and the new words added by the August version in square brackets:

I am a Clinical and Counselling Psychologist with a professional background spanning over 23 years in both forensic and clinical settings. My experience includes working extensively within correctional facilities, where I facilitated group therapy programs addressing issues such as substance misuse, general violence, and domestic and family violence. In addition to my forensic work, I have practi[s]ed in a private psychiatric hospital setting, providing psychological assessment and therapeutic interventions across a range of mental health presentations. I currently work in private practice at the address listed above, where I provide clinical and forensics psychological services, including assessments and expert reports.

Purpose of Report

This report has been prepared to provide an opinion on the psychological impact of a guilty verdict, on Ms Frigger's decision-making, as well as her belief that fleeing Australia [not attending Court on 5th June 2024] was the only course of action available to protect her legal interests.

Background and Context

Ms Frigger was found guilty of an offence on 4th June 2024, which she asserted during our interview that she did not commit. She was ordered to return to Court on 5th June 2024, where she believed immediate imprisonment would be imposed. At that time, Ms Frigger had not yet secured the necessary documentation in order to support her in sentencing or an appeal.

Feeling overwhelmed by the situation, Ms Frigger fled to Singapore on 5th June 2024 without the Court's permission [did not attend Court on 5th June 2024 contrary to her undertaking to do so]. She reported that her intention was to obtain the documentation necessary to mount a proper defence and prepare an appeal. To her credit, [she appointed a lawyer on 11th June 2024 to represent her and later voluntarily attended Court on 23rd July 2024] she later voluntarily returned to Perth to resume engagement with the legal process.

Psychological Impact of Conviction on Decision-Making

In my professional opinion, the psychological impact of receiving a guilty verdict for an offence Ms Frigger believes she did not commit significantly impaired her decision‑making capacity. Ms Frigger presented with high levels of distress during our interview when discussing this period of time and her resultant incarceration. The experience of perceived injustice ‑ coupled with the despair and fear of being imprisoned without adequate opportunity to present mitigating evidence or appeal the decision ‑ contributed to a state of psychological crisis.

This perceived injustice likely triggered a heightened stress response, including cognitive narrowing and impaired judgement, which are common in acute anxiety states. In such states, individuals are prone to make impulsive decisions based on perceived survival needs, rather than reasoned legal analysis. For Ms Frigger, the immediate goal was not to evade justice, but to preserve the opportunity to seek justice through fair legal representation.

Belief That Fleeing Was the Only Option

Ms Frigger articulated a genuine and firmly held belief that fleeing to Singapore [breaching her bail undertaking to attend Court on 5th June 2024] was the only option available to her under the circumstances. She believed that immediate imprisonment would result in irreversible harm to her case, including the inability to:

 Engage legal counsel of her choosing;

 Secure expert reports supporting mental impairment;

 Develop appropriate submissions for sentencing;

 Lodge an appeal based on her claim of wrongful conviction.

In this context, Ms Frigger's actions, although legally impermissible, appear to have been motivated by a deeply held belief that she was acting to protect her rights and avoid what she perceived as a traumatic event ‑ namely, being imprisoned without the opportunity to defend herself properly. She appeared to view her departure from Australia [breach of bail undertaking] not as an act of defiance, but as a desperate effort to ensure the integrity of her defence.

Her later return to Perth [Court] further suggests a continued commitment to facing legal proceedings, rather than an attempt to permanently abscond [breach bail].

Conclusion

In summary, the psychological burden of a wrongful conviction [(from her perspective) appears that it may have] significantly impaired Ms Frigger's decision‑making and contributed to a crisis response in which fleeing the country [breaching bail] felt like the only viable means of ensuring a fair process. Her actions were not consistent [do not seem consistent] with criminal intent or avoidance, but rather with a sincere - albeit flawed - attempt to secure justice under intense psychological distress.

1. The appellant wished to rely upon the August Report to demonstrate that she had reasonable cause for failing to comply with the conditions of her bail. The trial judge ruled that the April version of the report was inadmissible. That was because the trial judge considered that the opinion:[20]

does not fall into the category of expert opinion evidence, because an ordinary person is just as capable of forming a correct view on Mrs Frigger's state of mind. This is not a subject about which, without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience, I would be unable to form a sound judgment.

In any event, [Ms Allinson's] report does not state the basis upon which her opinion was formed, other than to state, in cursory terms, that the accused had been convicted and failed to turn up to court, because she was concerned about her inability to pursue her legal right of appeal. There is no evidence that, apart from suffering the expected stress and strain of being convicted and facing a prison term, Mrs Frigger was suffering from any psychological disorder.

Further, the report lacks sufficient detail for me to conclude that the psychologist, [Ms Allinson], is sufficiently qualified to express an opinion, nor does the opinion identify [a] recognised field of study or specialist knowledge upon which the opinion was based, nor does it state the facts and assumptions upon which the opinion was based. So for these reasons, also, [Ms Allinson's] opinion would be inadmissible.

1. Ultimately, the appellant did not testify and Ms Allinson was not called.

1. At the hearing of the appeal on 20 January 2026, the court ordered for the State to file supplementary submissions concerning the proper construction of s 30 of the Bail Act, the admissibility of Ms Allinson's report and certain other matters related to this report. The appellant was given leave to file responsive submissions. The appellant's submissions went well beyond what was properly responsive. We have disregarded them to the extent that they travelled into non‑responsive areas.

Grounds of appeal - conviction appeal (CACR 127 of 2025)

1. The appellant pursues four grounds of appeal in her appeal against conviction.
2. Ground 1 is:

The learned trial judge erred in law by finding element 2 of the charge was proven beyond reasonable doubt [86] because the appellant signed Exhibit 5:

(a) Mere signing of Form 6 does not constitute entering a Bail Undertaking within the meaning of s 28(2) Bail Act 1982

(b) The mandatory duties in s 30 Bail Act 1982 must be performed by a person named in s 29 Bail Act 1982, before the undertaking is entered by an accused.

(c) [The associate], by admission in sworn oral evidence, failed to perform the duties in s 30 Bail Act 1982

(d) Consequently, the appellant did not enter a bail undertaking.

The learned trial judge erred in law by convicting the appellant on a charge under s 51(1) Bail Act 1982:

(a) Pursuant to s 28 Bail Act 1982 the undertaking must be read as a whole because of the word 'and' between subsections 28(2)(a) Bail Act 1982 and 28(2)(b) Bail Act 1982

(b) The appellant complied with the Second Option to Appear as soon as practicable when the court was sitting, pursuant to section 28(2)(b) Bail Act 1982

(c) There was no challenge by the respondent to the Second Option to Appear

(d) The Second Option to Appear was not conditional on a reasonable cause for failing to appear on 5 June 2024, pursuant to section 28(2)(a) Bail Act 1982

(e) Consequently, if there was a bail undertaking by the appellant, she did not breach it.

The learned trial judge erred at law by finding [105], [111], the appellant had no reasonable cause for failing to comply with the undertaking:

(a) [The associate] gave evidence the appellant was silent throughout the bail process;

(b) Clinical psychologist Michelle Allinson, B.Psych, M. Psych, found the appellant suffered mental impairment on 4 and 5 June 2024, rendering the appellant incapable of representing herself;

(c) The appellant obtained legal representation on 5 June 2024, and Dr Gerhard Janssen filed a Notice of Acting on 11 June 2024.

(d) The above constitutes reasonable ground.

The learned trial judge erred in law by ruling admissible Perth Airport CCTV footage [60]:

(a) WA Police Officers Lynn Barbour and Kevin Beard informed Jason Haines, Perth Airport security staff, that the appellant had been ordered to surrender her passport and the appellant and her husband had committed crimes at Perth Airport;

(b) The information provided to Jason Haines was false;

(c) Relying on those false statements, Jason Haines released CCTV footage of the appellant and her husband arriving at Perth Airport;

(d) Despite [the] appellant's written request to cross examine Lynn Barbour and Kevin Beard, those witnesses were not called by the respondent;

(e) Pursuant to s 154 Criminal Investigation Act CCTV footage was prima facie inadmissible;

(f) The appellant was not required to prove reasonable cause pursuant to the Second Option to Appear and in those circumstances, CCTV footage was irrelevant.

1. The gravamen of this ground concerns whether a failure by the person before whom a bail undertaking is entered, to discharge the statutory duties referred to in s 30 of the Bail Act, means that the bail undertaking is legally invalid or, as the appellant contends, void ab initio.
2. To the extent that this ground also particularises matters relating to a surety, those matters should be disregarded. They have no effect in respect of the legal validity of the bail undertaking.
3. Even if the surety undertaking was not validly entered, for some procedural reason, the appellant was released pursuant to her bail undertaking. If the invalidity of the surety undertaking also meant that the bail undertaking was invalid, the appellant would not be subject to any requirement to appear at the time and place specified in her bail undertaking. We do not consider that this was the intention of the legislature. There is no reason why the invalidity of the surety undertaking should mean that the bail undertaking would not be legally effective. They are different undertakings, entered by different people and in different circumstances. No language in the Bail Act compels or even suggests that the legal validity of the bail undertaking depends upon the legal validity of a surety undertaking.
4. Returning to the primary question, there is a threshold issue about whether the duties imposed by s 30 were in fact properly discharged by Gething DCJ's associate at the time when the appellant entered her bail undertaking on 4 June 2024.
5. There is no suggestion that the associate read the bail undertaking to the appellant. Further, there is no suggestion that the appellant expressly informed the associate that the appellant had read the bail undertaking. There is also nothing to show that the bail undertaking was translated for the appellant but, as the appellant concedes,[22] this was not necessary. It is apparent from the transcript of the trial that the appellant is articulate and able to read English competently.
6. Essentially, Lonsdale DCJ considered that the duties applicable to the associate, as contained in s 30(1), had been properly discharged upon the basis of compliance with s 30(1)(a)(ii). That is, the trial judge was satisfied that the appellant had informed the associate, by her words and conduct, that she had read the bail undertaking.
7. The trial judge said:[23]

[The associate's] evidence was that the accused had 'intimated' that she understood the terms of the bail undertaking. [The associate] said that he gave the accused the opportunity to read the bail undertaking and asked her if she had any other questions but she did not. Having been in court at the time that his Honour had read her the bail conditions, together with the fact that the accused had no other questions of him, [the associate] formed the view that the accused had understood the bail undertaking. [The associate] further said that when she went on to sign the undertaking, that 'gave him confidence' that she had read the bail undertaking. (footnotes omitted)

1. In our view, the trial judge was incorrect to consider that the duty contained in s 30(1)(a)(ii) had been satisfied upon the basis just stated. We have previously set out the relevant passages of transcript about what occurred when the appellant signed the bail undertaking. The evidence goes no higher than demonstrating that the appellant was given an opportunity to read the bail undertaking, was asked if she had any questions and that in response the appellant remained silent, and signed the undertaking. There is no evidence that the associate actually saw the appellant read the undertaking, or received any tangible sign from the appellant that she had read the bail undertaking.
2. In our view, the action by the appellant, in signing the bail undertaking after having been asked whether she had any questions about it, was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of s 30(1)(a)(ii). This requirement had to be satisfied 'before [a bail undertaking] is entered into'. Consequently, we do not consider that this requirement might be satisfied by the act of signing the bail undertaking. The act of signing the bail undertaking constituted the entry into that undertaking, and therefore is not something which can occur 'before' the bail undertaking is entered into.
3. Nevertheless, we do not consider that the failure by the associate to adequately discharge the duties set out in s 30(1) meant that the bail undertaking was legally invalid, or void ab initio.
4. It is plain that the bail undertaking is the written document, as signed by the person entering into that undertaking: s 28(2). Section 28(4) expressly provides that, subject to s 34,[24] that undertaking is enforceable under s 51, s 57 and s 58. The statute does not make the enforceability of a bail undertaking subject to s 30. That is a strong indication that a failure to comply with s 30(1) does not invalidate the legal effect of a bail undertaking.
5. Moreover, the purpose of s 30(1) is to prescribe certain steps that must be followed, to ensure that a person entering a bail undertaking understands the nature of the undertaking. Where the steps prescribed in s 30(1) have been carefully followed, the prospect of a person entering a bail undertaking without understanding it are greatly reduced. Nevertheless, we do not consider that satisfaction of the duties in s 30(1) was intended to pre‑condition the legal validity of a signed bail undertaking. It is entirely conceivable that a person entering a bail undertaking might nevertheless understand the nature of that undertaking, without those steps being followed. The present case is a good example.
6. We have no doubt that the appellant well understood the nature of the bail undertaking, having regard to the comments which she made when asking for the sentencing to be delayed, on the apparent assumption that she would be released on bail until she was sentenced. She specifically referred to the fact that she was not a flight risk, because she had always complied with her bail requirements previously.[25] Moreover, we are in no doubt that she also well understood that she was not to leave the country, having regard to the comments made by Gething DCJ at the time of extending bail after the conviction of the appellant. Gething DCJ specifically referred to the requirement that the appellant would have to surrender her passports the following morning, and made it a condition of the grant of bail to the next day that she was to remain at her home address overnight and not leave save for emergencies.[26]
7. There is no basis for the appellant's assertion in her written submissions that she was 'catatonic' during the process of signing the bail undertaking.[27] Her articulate interaction with Gething DCJ when seeking the postponement of the sentencing following her conviction belies any suggestion that she was in such a state. Further, while she was silent when signing her own bail undertaking, the associate gave unchallenged evidence that, when the appellant's husband was interacting with him during the signing of the surety undertaking, the appellant told her husband to 'calm down'.[28]
8. The appellant also submits that there was no evidence to the effect that the appellant was in fact provided with a copy of the duly completed bail undertaking, as required by s 30(2)(a),[29] or a notice in conformity with the requirements of s 30(2)(b).
9. In written submissions filed after the appeal hearing, the appellant conceded that any failure to comply with the requirements of s 30(2) would not invalidate a bail undertaking.[30] This concession was rightly made.
10. The requirements contained in s 30(2) apply after the bail undertaking has been signed. That is evident from the first requirement contained in s 30(2)(a), which requires the person signing the undertaking to be given a copy of the undertaking 'as duly completed'. In these circumstances, the requirements in s 30(2) could never pre‑condition the legal validity of the bail undertaking being duly completed. Nevertheless, at a practical level, if the requirements of s 30(2) are satisfied, this will again greatly reduce the prospects of an accused undertaking bail not understanding their obligations or later claiming to have not understood them.
11. Of course, if a person before whom a bail undertaking was entered fails to comply with any duties contained in s 30(1) or s 30(2) of the Bail Act, and this can be shown to have caused the person granted bail not to have properly understood the nature of the undertaking, so that the person granted bail did not understand that they were required to attend at the specified place or time, this may constitute a reasonable cause for a person failing to comply with the bail undertaking.
12. However, as we have said, we have no doubt that the appellant understood that she was required to attend court at 9.15 am on 5 June 2024 for a hearing at 10.00 am. This is despite the appellant's protestations that she thought that she had the 'option' of attending at a time after 5 June 2024, as soon as it was reasonably practicable to do so, without being in breach of her bail. We do not accept that any reasonable misunderstanding of this obligation could have occurred in this instance, by reason of any failure of the judge's associate to adequately perform the duties imposed upon him by s 30(1) and s 30(2). Furthermore, the appellant did not give evidence to the effect that she did not understand she was required to attend court at 9.15 am on 5 June 2024. Indeed, it appears that, had the appellant given evidence to provide the factual foundation for the expert report, her evidence would have been to the effect that she decided not to attend court on that day in order to preserve her legal position.
13. For these reasons, while we would grant leave to appeal on ground 1, it should be dismissed.

1. Essentially, the main point of this ground is the contention that there is only one offence against s 51(1) of the Bail Act which is based upon reading s 28(2)(a) and s 28(2)(b) together. The appellant contends that that offence is constituted by the failure of a person who has entered a bail undertaking to appear at the time and place specified in the undertaking; and then also failing to appear at the specified court when it is sitting as soon as practicable thereafter.
2. This ground must be rejected. As a matter of statutory construction, it is evident that s 51(1) creates an offence based upon a failure to comply with a bail requirement contained in s 28(2)(a). Section 51(2) creates a separate and different offence based upon a failure to comply with a bail requirement which operates by force of s 28(2)(b).
3. The appellant has placed some reliance upon the conjunctive use of the word 'and' between s 28(2)(a) and s 28(2)(b). However, s 28(2) contains a list of various conditions of a bail undertaking, so it is entirely appropriate for each condition in that list to be separated by the word 'and'. All of the conditions are to be contained in a bail undertaking.
4. Moreover, it is plain that the purpose of the requirement imposed under s 28(2)(b) is to create an ongoing duty requiring a person who has been bailed to attend at court, notwithstanding that this person may have failed to comply with their primary duty under s 28(2)(a) to attend at the specified time and place. Otherwise, the person bailed might contend that, having breached their first duty, or having a reasonable excuse for not complying with the first duty, there was no ongoing requirement to appear at court after the particular date and time specified for appearing had passed.
5. Given the two separate duties which we have just described, it makes logical sense for there to be two separate offences based upon breaches of the separate duties as contained in s 51(1).
6. The appellant placed significant reliance upon the decision of McGrath J in King v Nash.[31] There is nothing in that decision which suggests that the legal analysis advanced by the appellant in this case has any merit. Moreover, that case was concerned with an offence against s 51(2) of the Bail Act, rather than an offence against s 51(1).
7. Further, while not relevant to the appeal, the appellant submits that she appeared as soon as practicable in compliance with her bail undertaking by instructing a lawyer to appear on her behalf. A bail undertaking is a personal undertaking to appear, which permits the release of an accused from custody: s 28(1). Instructing a lawyer to appear could not satisfy the terms of a bail undertaking.
8. For these reasons, we would refuse leave to appeal on ground 2.

1. The trial judge ruled that the expert evidence was inadmissible, because it did not state the facts and assumptions on which it was based, or establish a specialised field of expertise enabling Ms Allinson to assess the effect of a conviction upon Ms Frigger's ability to choose to comply with court orders. The trial judge relied upon the oft‑cited principles stated in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles.[32]
2. In our view, the trial judge correctly concluded that the April version of the report did not identify the facts and assumptions on which it was based. It was important for the report to identify what led Ms Allinson to the conclusion that the appellant was suffering an 'acute anxiety state', and how the existence of such a state would lead to a 'cognitive narrowing' and 'impaired judgement'. Indeed, it would be essential to understand precisely what those terms signified, so as to understand the postulated medical or psychological condition which connected the acute anxiety state, and the cognitive narrowing and impaired judgement. Unless this connection could be understood, the trial judge correctly recognised that the appellant may have experienced nothing more than a common reaction to the prospect of being imprisoned, and that there was no relevant specialised field of expertise. Expert evidence is not admissible in relation to matters of ordinary human experience: Kelly v The State of Western Australia.[33]
3. In these circumstances, we consider that the trial judge correctly excluded the expert report.
4. The appellant, notwithstanding this, contends that the evidence of Ms Allinson should have been admitted to establish a reasonable cause for the appellant failing to attend court on 5 June 2024, and that the appellant should have been allowed to testify as to the foundation for the expert evidence.
5. It appears that the deficiencies in the expert report were pointed out to the appellant by the State, twice, in correspondence well prior to the trial, although the appellant denied the same. However, it does not appear that Lonsdale DCJ explained to the appellant the deficiencies in the report, or the conditions which must be met before expert evidence will be admissible and of weight. No doubt, this was because her Honour accepted that the deficiencies had been pointed out to the appellant by the State, and her Honour could see that the appellant was an articulate and confident litigant. Nevertheless, it would have been better had her Honour explained these matters to the appellant to ensure that she did understand, and to ensure that she could not later assert that she did not. However, even if such a course had been taken, and even if her Honour had adjourned the trial to enable the appellant to serve the expert with a subpoena in time to secure her attendance, we do not consider that this would have assisted the appellant in establishing a reasonable cause for her failure to attend court on 5 June 2024.
6. The Bail Act establishes, among other things, a framework under which accused persons may be released on bail pending the resolution of the criminal proceedings against them, without unduly imperilling the courts' ability to efficiently deal with criminal proceedings.
7. Section 51(1) and (2) of the Bail Act seek to ensure that accused persons attend court as required by their bail undertakings, by criminalising a failure to appear as required. However, the provisions recognise that circumstances may arise which would justify an accused failing to do so. Accordingly, an accused who fails to attend as required will not commit an offence against s 51(1) if he or she has 'reasonable cause' for failing to attend, and will not commit an offence against s 51(2) if he or she attends as soon as is practicable after that time.
8. The expression 'reasonable cause' in s 51(1) raises an objective test. To establish a 'reasonable cause' for a failure to appear in court as required by a bail undertaking, an accused must establish on the balance of probabilities[34] that the cause was objectively reasonable.
9. What will constitute a reasonable cause is to be considered in light of the purpose of s 51(2). Plainly, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that accused persons comply with their bail undertakings. Equally plainly, the provision recognises that it will not always be reasonably possible for an accused person to do so, and that, in that event, the person should not be liable to conviction.
10. In assessing whether the expert report in this case was capable of establishing a reasonable cause for the appellant's failure to attend court, it is necessary to put aside numerous obstacles to such a conclusion. These include that the appellant may have found it difficult to establish the factual foundation of the expert report, in the face of the objective evidence of the appellant's exchanges with Gething DCJ while waiting for the jury to deliver its verdict. The appellant sought that the commencement of any term of imprisonment be delayed if she was convicted.
11. Further, the appellant's conduct after her conviction is contrary to any factual foundation for the report being based upon the appellant experiencing a 'heightened stress response'. This subsequent conduct includes the appellant's further exchanges with Gething DCJ in which she sought to delay the sentencing and promised that she was not a flight risk, the appellant's remark to her husband to 'calm down', the appellant's apparent calmness in the CCTV footage from the airport, and the appellant's ability to successfully board an international flight as a solo traveller.
12. Ignoring these obstacles, and assuming the deficiencies in the expert report were rectified by a further report or oral evidence from the psychologist, and the factual foundation was established by evidence from the appellant, the evidence could have, if accepted, and at its highest, established the following:
    1. the appellant, believing she had been wrongfully convicted, suffered a heightened stress response, which caused cognitive narrowing and impaired her judgment, and made her prone to impulsive decisions;
    2. she believed that, if she was imprisoned, it would irreparably harm her ability to make sentencing submissions and conduct an appeal; and
    3. therefore, the appellant believed that she needed to flee the jurisdiction to avoid being imprisoned, to avoid that irreparable harm.
13. In our view, even if each of these assertions were established, there would not have been an objectively reasonable cause for the appellant's failure to appear.
14. The appellant knew she was required to attend court on 5 June 2024. Even if she believed that she had to flee the country to avoid harming her ability to defend herself in the sentencing and on appeal, this could not objectively justify her choosing her ability to defend herself in legal proceedings over her undertaking to attend court, regardless of any effects of the alleged heightened stress response. If the choice was impulsive, or if the choice was influenced by a perception of a threat to her ability to defend herself in legal proceedings, or both, it was still a choice.
15. Such a choice could not be reasonable. Parliament could not have intended to excuse a person who prioritised their legal interests over their obligations to comply with their bail undertaking.
16. Accordingly, the expert report was incapable of establishing that there was a reasonable cause for the appellant's failure to appear.
17. For these reasons, while we would grant leave to appeal on ground 3, it should be dismissed. We should also say that these reasons apply equally to the April and August versions of the report. Indeed, they apply more strongly to the August version, which expresses a conclusion about the effect of the psychological burden of a wrongful conviction upon the appellant much more tentatively than the April version of the report.

1. The appellant alleges that evidence of the CCTV footage showing the appellant arrive at Perth Airport on the morning of 5 June 2024 should have been ruled inadmissible, due to having been obtained by false representations made by investigating officers to Mr Jayson Haines of Perth Airport.
2. The appellant refers to what she considers was a false statement in the witness statement of Officer Lynn Barbour claiming that Gething DCJ had ordered the appellant to surrender her passport to the court on 5 June 2024.[35] The witness statement only goes so far as to say that, on 5 June 2024 she had been advised that, on 4 June 2024, the appellant had been ordered to surrender her passport on 5 June 2024.[36] The difference between the appellant having been ordered on 4 June 2024 to surrender her passport on 5 June 2024, and Gething DCJ having told the appellant on 4 June 2024 to bring all of her passports to court on 5 June 2024, because his Honour would be ordering the surrender of them that same day, was so slight as to be immaterial in the consideration of this appeal. There is no basis for finding that Officer Barbour's statement about what she had been told was false. Importantly, Officer Barbour does not say that she repeated this statement to obtain access to the CCTV footage. Nor was there any evidence that Mr Haines was told this, or that this was why he had released the CCTV footage.[37]
3. The appellant also refers to a false statement allegedly made to Mr Haines by Officer Barbour or Officer Kevin Beard to the effect that the appellant and her husband had 'committed crimes at Perth Airport'.[38] However, there is no evidence that such a statement was made to Mr Haines. Neither Officer Barbour nor Officer Beard testified. Mr Haines did not say that such a statement was made. The emails tendered in evidence did not include such a statement.[39] The basis for the claim that such a statement was made is not explained in the appellant's submissions.
4. In an email chain between Western Australian Police and Perth Airport, Mr Haines was informed by Officer Beard that the CCTV footage police sought would provide 'evidence as to whether or not convicted offender Angela FRIGGER was assisted to leave the country in breach of District Court Bail, by the person who signed a surety undertaking for her'.[40] In our view, there is nothing objectionable or false about that statement. It is not a representation, but an explanation of the purpose of an investigation. Moreover, it is entirely consistent with what was in fact being investigated.
5. We are satisfied that the CCTV footage was released pursuant to a standard request form, which formed part of the procedures agreed between the Perth Airport and the Western Australian Police.[41]
6. Further, the CCTV footage was a video taken of the appellant in a public place. It was handed to police upon their request for release. Although the appellant has referred to concepts of privacy and related legislation, including the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), the appellant has not articulated in any precise or comprehensible way why this would be a breach of any statute. In particular, the Surveillance Devices Act does not purport to regulate the use of optical surveillance devices to record public activity.[42] The appellant has not identified any basis on which it could be concluded that the CCTV footage was illegally obtained evidence and should not have been admitted into evidence.
7. In any event, this issue is immaterial. That is because the appellant does not deny that she was at the Perth Airport or that she failed to appear at court on 5 June 2024.[43] Further, there is no issue that has been raised on this appeal about the passenger movement records, which establish that the appellant left Australia on 5 June 2024 and returned on 23 July 2024.[44]
8. Consequently, even if the CCTV footage should have been excluded (and we do not think there is any proper basis to have done so), it was admitted that the appellant was at Perth Airport on 5 June 2024, and it was established by passenger movement records that she left the country on that day, only to return approximately seven weeks later. As a result, nothing turns on this ground of appeal, and we would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.

Grounds of appeal - sentence appeal (CACR 126 of 2025)

1. The appellant has identified three grounds of appeal regarding her sentence appeal.
2. Ground 1 is:

The learned trial judge erred in law when she ordered the appellant to forfeit $50,000 to the State: [T.64]:

(a) The appellant agreed to forfeit $50,000 to the State if she was convicted of the offence of failing to appear as required.

(b) The appellant was required to appear:

(i) on 5 June 2024,

(ii) on a different date if notified by the court,

(iii) if she failed to appear as required, as soon as practicable when the court was sitting,

(iv) which constituted the options available to the appellant 'to appear as required'.

(c) The forfeiture order was ultra vires and contrary to the agreement between the appellant and the State.

The learned trial judge erred in law by sentencing the appellant to 10 months' imprisonment for wilfully disobeying orders made by Judge Gething on 4 June 2024 [T.59]:

(a) Other than the agreement to forfeit $50,000, the appellant was not notified she was liable to imprisonment for failing to appear as required;

(b) The appellant was not charged or convicted of wilfully disobeying court orders made on 4 June 2024;

(c) No court orders were made on 4 June 2024;

(d) The Undertaking to appear in court is not a court order;

(e) In the above circumstances the sentence of 10 months' imprisonment was ultra vires.

The learned trial judge erred in law when she misdirected herself in the sentencing discretion by imposing a prison sentence [of] 10 months' [T.65]:

(a) The sentence is manifestly excessive and disproportionate to the period during which the appellant failed to answer bail of either 4 days or 7 weeks;

(b) The sentence fails the totality principle.

(c) Mitigating factors were acknowledge[d] but given no weight, including: age (72 years), first offender status, voluntary return, exemplary parole compliance, and low risk of reoffending.

1. The appellant maintains that the forfeiture order was ultra vires, effectively for the same reasons as she advanced in respect of ground 2 of her conviction appeal. That is, the appellant maintains that, if she did not appear on 5 June 2024, she did not commit any offence if she appeared as soon as practicable thereafter, and that she did so appear by instructing counsel to appear on her behalf while she was overseas.
2. For reasons which we have explained in relation to her conviction appeal, the appellant was properly convicted of an offence against s 51(1) of the Bail Act. In these circumstances, the undertaking which she signed is activated. As set out previously, by that undertaking the appellant agreed to forfeit $50,000 to the State 'if I am convicted of the offence of failing to appear as required'.[45]
3. The full amount agreed to be forfeited pursuant to the bail undertaking must be forfeited, unless the accused has satisfied the judicial officer that, by reason of a change in circumstances since the bail undertaking was entered into, an order for forfeiture would cause excessive hardship: s 57 of the Bail Act. The appellant was represented by counsel in the sentencing proceedings before the trial judge and her counsel expressly declined to present evidence of hardship.[46]
4. Hence, we would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.

1. The appellant contends that there was an error in principle made by the sentencing judge, based upon the misapprehension that the appellant was being sentenced for a contempt of court constituted by breaching orders made by Gething DCJ on 4 June 2024.
2. The appellant points to comments made by the sentencing judge that she had 'wilfully disobeyed'[47] the orders made by Gething DCJ on 4 June 2024, that her offending was 'deliberate and calculated to defeat'[48] the orders made by Gething DCJ on 4 June 2024 and that she needed to understand the consequences of 'disobeying an order of a court'.[49]
3. The appellant further submits that she did not breach orders made by Gething DCJ on 4 June 2024, but instead breached the requirements of her bail undertaking by failing to appear on 5 June 2024. The appellant says that she was sentenced for effectively committing a contempt of court, rather than for the offence of breaching bail conditions.
4. It is incorrect to say that the appellant did not breach any order made by Gething DCJ by failing to appear on 5 June 2024. His Honour made the orders granting the appellant bail upon the conditions which were subsequently incorporated into the bail undertaking. No bail undertaking could have been prepared and executed without orders granting bail, specifying the relevant conditions. As a result, the comments made by the sentencing judge were perfectly correct in the sense that the appellant wilfully and deliberately breached the terms of the bail conditions, which were set by orders made by Gething DCJ. The appellant knew that she was required to surrender her passport on 5 June 2024, and instead flew out of the country in the early hours of that morning. This was not a case of an accused person failing to attend through oversight, disorganisation, or inertia. The deliberate and calculated nature of the appellant's conduct aggravated the seriousness of the offence, and was properly noted by the sentencing judge.
5. Moreover, we do not consider that there is any substance in the suggestion by the appellant that the sentencing judge misunderstood the nature of the offence for which her Honour was imposing a penalty, and somehow confused it with the offence of a contempt of court. The sentencing judge had conducted a lengthy trial, and delivered judgment, in respect of the commission of an offence contrary to s 51(1) of the Bail Act.
6. We would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.

1. The appellant submits that a term of 10 months' immediate imprisonment is manifestly excessive, and should be set aside upon the basis of the principles enunciated in House v The King.[50]
2. The appellant contends that, in several respects, the sentencing judge acted upon a wrong principle, justifying the intervention of this court. Those matters are that the term of imprisonment infringed the first limb of the totality principle, the sentencing judge mistakenly considered that there were two previous offences rather than one, and that the sentencing judge did not consider the attempt by the appellant to instruct her lawyer to appear on her behalf was relevant.
3. The appellant also says that appellate intervention is justified because it may be inferred that there was an error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, because the result of 10 months' imprisonment is so unreasonable or plainly unjust.
4. The sentencing judge specifically mentioned the totality principle as a relevant consideration. There was no error in principle by omitting this matter from her consideration. Her Honour said:[51]

I also take into account the fact that you have served the non‑parole period of the sentence imposed by his Honour Judge Gething, and have also served 11 days of time which you would otherwise have spent on parole. Totality is a relevant consideration, and so the sentence that I'm going to impose will be less than what I would otherwise have imposed.

1. As the appellant accepts, the trial judge was corrected about the number of prior convictions which had been recorded against the appellant, and proceeded upon the basis that there had only been one offence. Hence, there was no error of principle influencing the ultimate sentencing discretion.
2. The appellant also says that it was erroneous not to consider her endeavour to have a lawyer appear on her behalf. However, for reasons which we have already elaborated, a bail undertaking is a personal undertaking, and the attempts by the appellant to instruct a lawyer to appear on her behalf were of no legal significance in terms of answering her bail.
3. Whether the ultimate sentence of 10 months' imprisonment is unreasonable or plainly unjust must be considered in the context that there is no tariff which applies for offences of breach of bail.[52] That is because the circumstances under which a breach of bail may occur can vary significantly.[53] This means that the attempt by the appellant to draw a comparison between her case and the circumstances which applied to the appellant in Etheridge v The Queen is not a legitimate exercise. Moreover, leave to appeal was not granted in Etheridge.[54] Consequently, it was not arguable that the sentence in that instance was manifestly excessive. The sentence imposed in Etheridge therefore does not provide any marker as to the upper limits of the proper exercise of discretion.[55]
4. Not only can we not see any basis for appellate intervention in respect of the sentence which has been imposed, according to the principles in House v The King, we are satisfied that the sentence which was applied to the appellant was entirely appropriate.
5. If this court had been sentencing the appellant, we would have given particular weight to the fact that she had specifically sought an extension of bail expressly upon the basis that she was not a flight risk, but then proceeded to leave the jurisdiction for an international destination within 24 hours of having obtained an extension of her bail. While the sentencing judge did not find that the appellant had lied to Gething DCJ in giving the assurance that she was not a flight risk,[56] her intention to leave the jurisdiction, despite her assurance, clearly arose shortly afterwards. This was in the context of having been informed by the trial judge that she would be required to surrender her passports the following morning when she responded to her bail.
6. While the circumstances of the breach of bail were very serious, they were less serious than if, for example, the appellant had been one of several accused on trial for high‑level drug dealing and had absconded mid‑trial causing the trial to abort, or continue without her. Nevertheless, the appellant's breach of bail was considerably more serious than if she had been a person living a chaotic and disadvantaged lifestyle, who simply failed to appear at an early mention of a minor summary offence.
7. Having been convicted of an indictable offence for which the likely outcome was a term of imprisonment, the appellant sought to evade punishment by absconding, and did so after being given the courtesy of bail overnight in order to bring her passports to court the next day so that they could be surrendered. The offending was only mitigated to a small extent by the voluntary return of the appellant nearly seven weeks later. However, the trial judge found that the appellant's return was likely motivated by the fact that Gething DCJ had refused to accept a notice of acting on behalf of lawyers who had sought to file papers on her behalf.[57] Further, no explanation has ever been provided as to where the appellant went, and what she did, in the additional time while she was outside of Australia.
8. We would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.

1. A consideration of ground 1 in the conviction appeal has led us to identify an error made by the trial judge, but ultimately we are of the view that this error does not mean that the appeal should be allowed. Nevertheless, we would grant leave to appeal on ground 1 of the conviction appeal. We would also grant leave to appeal on ground 3.
2. In our view, there is no merit to any of the other grounds in either the conviction or sentence appeals. We would not grant leave to appeal on any of these grounds.
3. We would dismiss both of the appeals.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] BGAB 731 ‑ 732; Transcript, The State of Western Australia v Angela Cecilia Theresa Frigger, District Court of Western Australia, 4 June 2024 (June 2024 trial ts), 2402 ‑ 2403.

[2] BGAB 732 ‑ 733; June 2024 trial ts 2403 ‑ 2404.

[6] BGAB 747 (Signed bail undertaking dated 4 June 2024).

[7] BGAB 58; Transcript, The State of Western Australia v Angela Cecilia Theresa Frigger, District Court of Western Australia, 7 October 2025 (October 2025 trial ts), 2707.

[8] BGAB 88; October 2025 trial ts 2737.

[10] BGAB 68 ‑ 69; October 2025 trial ts 2717 ‑ 2718.

[11] BGAB 89 ‑ 90; October 2025 trial ts 2738 ‑ 2739.

[12] BGAB 753; June 2024 trial ts 2411.

[13] BGAB 16, 20; The State of Western Australia v Frigger [No 3] [2025] WADC 82 (Reasons) [57], [80].

[14] BGAB 16, 20; Reasons [61], [65], [81] ‑ [83].

[17] Michelle Allinson, Psychological Report for Ms Angela Frigger, 23 April 2025, 3 (April Report).

[18] Michelle Allinson, Psychological Report for Ms Angela Frigger, 13 August 2025, 3 (August Report).

[20] BGAB 478; October 2025 trial ts 3114.

[21] BGAB 478 - 479; October 2025 trial ts 3114 ‑ 3115.

[22] WAB 11 (Appellant's Submissions (Conviction appeal) [9(c)]).

[24] Section 34 sets out the circumstances in which a bail undertaking ceases to have effect, none of which applied here.

[25] BGAB 737; June 2024 trial ts 2408.

[26] BGAB 738; June 2024 trial ts 2409.

[27] WAB 17 (Appellant's Submissions (Conviction appeal) [37]).

[28] BGAB 67; October 2025 trial ts 2716.

[29] Although the trial judge found that this had occurred: Reasons [48].

[30] Appellant's Further Written Submissions, 29 January 2026 [12] (Appellant's Further Submissions).

[31] WAB 21 (Appellant's Submissions (Conviction appeal) [5] ‑ [10]); King v Nash [2022] WASC 102.

[32] Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 [64], [85]. See, for example, in this State: Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 116 [182].

[34] See Bail Act, s 52(2) and s 52(4) and the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 78(3).

[35] WAB 32 (Appellant's submissions (Conviction appeal) [3]).

[36] BGAB 767 (Witness statement of Lynn Burns Barbour 12 June 2025 [4]).

[37] See BGAB 145 ‑ 146; October 2025 trial ts 2794 ‑ 2795.

[38] WAB 32 ‑ 33 (Appellant's Submissions (Conviction appeal) [3]).

[40] Exhibit 13, p 4. See BGAB 758; October 2025 trial ts 2793.

[41] See Exhibit 11; BGAB 124, 136 ‑ 137, 140 ‑ 142; October 2025 trial ts 2773, 2785 ‑ 2786, 2789 ‑ 2791.

[42] See Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), s 6.

[43] WAB 39 (Appellant's Submissions (Conviction appeal) [36]); BGAB 537, 543, 577, 578; October 2025 trial ts 3170, 3176; Transcript, The State of Western Australia v Angela Cecilia Theresa Frigger, District Court of Western Australia, 27 October 2025, 30 ‑ 31 (October 2025 Sentencing ts).

[46] BGAB 595, October 2025 Sentencing ts 48.

[47] BGAB 606; October 2025 Sentencing ts 59.

[48] BGAB 607; October 2025 Sentencing ts 60.

[49] BGAB 610 ‑ 611; October 2025 trial ts 63 ‑ 64.

[50] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.

[51] BGAB 611; October 2025 Sentencing ts 64.

[52] Etheridge v The Queen [2004] WASCA 152 [20].

[53] Anderson v Townsend [2020] WASC 456 [44].

[55] GUE v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 121 [59].

[56] BGAB 605 ‑ 606; October 2025 Sentencing ts 59.

[57] BGAB 607; October 2025 Sentencing ts 60.