(2) However, an application cannot be made for expedited determination of -

(a) a question about the redemption of a liability; and

(b) a matter of a class excluded by regulation from the ambit of this section.

(3) An application for expedited decision of a matter cannot be made until at least 14 days after the day the matter was placed before the decision-maker whose decision is required.

Constitution of Tribunal for proceedings under this Part

97A. For the purpose of proceedings under this Part, the Tribunal may be constituted of a presidential member or a conciliation and arbitration officer.

97B. (1) On an application for expedited decision of a matter, the Tribunal may -

(a) give directions the Tribunal considers necessary to expedite the determination of the matter; or

(2) A person to whom a direction is given by the Tribunal under subsection (1) must comply with the direction.

(3) If the Tribunal decides a claim under this section, the decision -

(a) is to be treated as a decision of the relevant compensating authority; and

Upon the lodgement of the Application for Expedited Decision the matter came to be referred to a Conciliation and Arbitration Officer. FAI Workers Compensation (SA) Pty Ltd (FAI), who were handling this claim on behalf of the WorkCover Corporation (who were at the relevant time the employer of the applicant), were advised that the application had been scheduled for consideration on 12 September 1996 and that in accordance with Rule 20 of the Workers Compensation Tribunal Rules 1996, it was required to provide to the Tribunal with all documents in its possession that were relevant to the claim. The applicant's adviser, Mr. Mayers-Browne, was similarly advised of the time that had been set aside on that day for a consideration of the matter.

On 12 September 1996 the parties duly attended before the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer. The Corporation was represented by a solicitor and by a representative of FAI. The applicant was represented by Mr. Mayers-Browne. The matter was then adjourned until Tuesday 10 December 1996.

There was much debate before me as to precisely what transpired when the parties attended before the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer on that day. Mr. Mayers-Browne contended that the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer made an order directing the compensating authority to make a determination on or before 31 January 1997. Mr. Fountain contended that no such order was made and that all that did happen was that FAI intimated that it expected to have made a determination by that time. For the reasons which I will explain shortly it is not necessary for me to resolve this conflict.

What is clear is that on 3 February 1997 the applicant was advised by FAI that his claim had been rejected; that on 5 February 1997 Mr. Mayers-Browne was advised by the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer that in view of that fact she did not propose to take any further action; and that by letter dated 7 February 1997 Mr. Mayers-Browne was formally advised by the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer that she would not be exercising any further jurisdiction in this matter as a result of the determination.

The applicant brings this application before me contending that the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer was in error in determining that she would no longer exercise jurisdiction in this matter. It was contended, that on the basis that an order had been made that a determination be made on or before 31 January 1997, and on the basis that there had been breach of that order, the duty of the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer was to proceed to determine the matter for herself and to ignore the purported determination of FAI of 3 February 1997.

The Workers Compensation Tribunal is established by the Act and its powers and those of its officers and members comprise of and are limited to those conferred upon them by statute.

That being the case I, sitting as presidential member of the Tribunal, can only entertain the application before me if I have the power to provide the applicant with the relief that he seeks.

In the context of this case I could only have that power if one or other of the following propositions were true. Either, that I have the power to regulate the conduct of conciliation and arbitration officers in the manner sought; or that I have the power of the type generally exercised by a forum exercising an appeal jurisdiction over an inferior forum there by enabling me to correct a decision made by a conciliation and arbitration officer.

Having carefully considered the Act, it is my view, that there is no general power enabling me to regulate the conduct of conciliation and arbitration officers in the manner sought.

As to the alternate source of power, it is clearly established that the right to appeal is a right which requires legislative authority: Attorney General v. Sillem (1864) H.L. Cas 708 at 702 per Lord Westbury; Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Dignan (1931) 64 C.L.R. 73 at 108 per Dixon J (as he then was). Again, having carefully considered the Act, it is my view that no such right of appeal from decisions of conciliation and arbitration officer can be said to expressly or impliedly exist.

In reaching this conclusion I have not overlooked the fact that a decision of a conciliation and arbitration officer deciding the fate of a claim which is the subject of an Application of Expedited Decision is a reviewable decision: Section 97B(3)(a). Nor have I overlooked the fact that a decision of an arbitration officer can be the subject of a judicial determination if a party is dissatisfied with it: Section 94(b). But in my opinion, quite aside from the fact that the processes provided by these provisions could not be described as an appeal, neither of these provisions are relevant here, because the decision of the Conciliation and Arbitration Officer cannot be categorised as a decision on a claim nor can it be said to be the result of an arbitration.

Accordingly it is my opinion that I do not possess the power to provide the applicant with the relief that he seeks. I therefore dismiss this application.

Parties are advised that if a party wishes to appeal against any part of this decision which raises a question of law such appeal must be filed with the Registrar in accordance with Form 11 within 14 days of the delivery of this decision and must be served on all parties.