Fox v Burvill

The facts of the case may be shortly stated. The husband and wife, Mr. and Mrs. Fox, were married in 1930, and a daughter, Diana Elizabeth Fox, was born in 1931. In 1939 the wife, that is the present applicant, left her husband in circumstances which do not reflect upon her in any way. That is common ground. At the time of her leaving, a verbal arrangement was made between the two that she should be paid the sum of £7 10s. 0d. per week for herself and for the daughter, who went with her when she left her husband. The amount was to be reduced to £5 0s. 0d. per week on the daughter's attaining the age of eighteen years. The parties continued to live apart, and in 1946 the testator instituted proceedings for divorce. The ground on which he petitioned for divorce is that stated in s. 69 (6) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 as amended by the Supreme Court Act 1945. That sub-section provides that any married person domiciled in Western Australia may present a petition to the court praying that his or her marriage may be dissolved, and it shall be competent, subject to the next succeeding section, for the court to decree a dissolution thereof in the case where the husband and wife have lived separately and apart for a period of not less than five years immediately prior to the presentation of the petition and it is unlikely that co-habitation will be resumed. The next succeeding section has no relevance in the present case. The provision which I have read is subject to a proviso that the court in its absolute discretion may refuse to decree a dissolution of the marriage, and shall refuse a decree unless and until provision is made for such maintenance, as in the circumstances the court thinks proper, of the respondent and any children of the marriage. That proviso merely requires that the court, before granting a decree, must be satisfied with regard to the matters mentioned. It does not, directly at any rate, authorize the actual making of an order for maintenance.

The divorce proceedings were not defended, but the advisers of the husband and wife conferred, and agreement was reached as to what provision should be made for her. It was agreed that the same weekly amounts should be paid as had been agreed to be paid under the verbal agreement made in 1939, but that those amounts should be secured by creating a trust of 6,000 shares held by the husband in the Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. In addition, a lump sum of £1,000 was to be paid by the husband to the wife. On 16th August 1946 an agreement under seal was made between the husband and the wife and one Arthur Leonard Attewell as trustee. It recited the agreement for the weekly sums to be paid to the wife for herself and her daughter, and the husband by the deed covenanted with his wife, first, that he would within fourteen days pay to her the sum of £1,000, and, secondly, that he would, within one month after the date of the deed, transfer to the trustee 6,000 shares in the Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. to be held by the trustee on trust, first to pay the income to her during her life, until she should remarry, for her maintenance and benefit, and for the maintenance, education and benefit of the daughter until the daughter attained the age of eighteen years. It was provided that, in the event of the income exceeding in any year the weekly amounts payable, the excess should be held in trust for the husband, and that, in the event of the income being less in any year than the weekly amounts payable, the husband would pay the amount of any such deficiency to the wife. The wife covenanted that she accepted the income from the shares and the covenants of the husband contained in the deed "in full satisfaction and release of all claims which she now has or at any time hereafter may have against the husband." She also covenanted that she would not take any proceedings to obtain any other order or provision for the maintenance or support of herself or the child.

The petition for divorce came on for hearing before Walker J. It is evident that his Honour approved of the arrangement embodied in the deed of 16th August 1946, and regarded the provision made by it as satisfying the requirements of the proviso in s. 69 (6) of the Supreme Court Act. A decree nisi was accordingly granted. That decree nisi is dated 7th August 1946. It would seem that it ought to have been dated 16th August 1946 - or perhaps 19th August 1946. At any rate it would appear to have had only conditional operation until 16th August 1946. It recites that the petitioner has undertaken to abide by the terms of the settlement already agreed to and to be embodied in a formal deed to be executed and to be produced to the learned judge. It then grants a decree nisi for dissolution, and it orders "that the petitioner shall make such provisions for the maintenance of the respondent as set out in the said indenture as executed by the petitioner and the respondent respectively and dated the 16th day of August 1946." On 3rd September 1946 a deed was executed between the testator and Mr. Attewell as trustee. It is not necessary to read this deed or to refer in detail to its contents. It simply carries out the provisions of the earlier deed to which the wife was a party. The 6,000 shares in the Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. are to be transferred to Mr. Attewell, and he covenants to hold them on the trusts set out in that earlier deed. The covenant of the trustee to carry out the trusts is a covenant with the testator, but it could, of course, be enforced by the wife as beneficiary.

The sum of £1,000 was in due course paid to the wife, and the shares were in due course transferred by the testator to the trustee. These things having been done, the testator had done everything which he had undertaken to do apart from the promise to pay the amount of any deficiency if the dividends of the Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. were insufficient to pay the weekly sums payable to the wife, a promise which is enforceable against his estate during her life. It may be mentioned that there has never been any such deficiency. The testator had also, as it seems to us, completely carried out what the order of Walker J. required him to do. He had made all the "provisions" that the order required him to make when he executed the deed of trust of 3rd September 1946 and paid £1,000 to the wife and transferred the shares to the trustee. At least from 3rd September onwards the amounts receivable and received by the wife were not receivable or received by her from him, nor were they, in our opinion, receivable or received by her under an order of the court. They were received from the trustee under the terms of the deed of 3rd September. She received what she received, and she was entitled to receive what she was entitled to receive, not under any order of the court but under and by virtue of the deed, and it follows in our opinion that she was not within the extending definition of widow in s. 2 of the Testator's Family Maintenance Act.

The definition in s. 2 of that Act does not, we think, apply unless the death of the former husband occurred during a period in respect of which he was under an obligation imposed directly upon him by an order of the court to make periodical payments to the wife by way of permanent maintenance. That a case should fall within s. 2 it seems to us that the right to payments must subsist by direct force of the order itself. The view which we take is, we think, supported by general considerations of the policy of the Act and the probable intention of the legislature. The draftsman had in his mind, no doubt, the provisions of s. 96 of the Supreme Court Act 1935-1945. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, on any decree for dissolution of marriage, order the husband to secure to the wife such gross sum of money or annual sum of money for any term, not exceeding her life, as, having regard to her fortune, the court deems to be reasonable. Payments secured in pursuance of an order made under sub-s. (1) would not normally cease on the death of the husband in the lifetime of the wife, and there seems to be no reason why a divorced wife, for whom permanent provision has been made under this sub-section, should come within the Testator's Family Maintenance Act. Her needs may naturally be regarded as having been provided for once and for all. On the other hand, sub-s. (2) of s. 96, which came into force originally at a later date than sub-s. (1), provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, by order direct the husband to pay to the wife during the joint lives of the husband and wife such monthly or weekly sum for her maintenance and support as the court may think reasonable. This sub-section, unlike sub-s. (1), does not authorize the making of an order to operate after the death of the husband in the lifetime of the wife. There is, therefore, a clear reason for enabling a divorced wife, who has been in receipt of maintenance by virtue of an order made under sub-s. (2), to make an application under the Testator's Family Maintenance Act. We think it was a case where an order had been made under sub-s. (2) that the draftsman of s. 2 of the Testator's Family Maintenance Act had in mind, and not a case where an order had been made under sub-s. (1). The intention was to provide for cases in which payments which would cease with his death were being received by the wife from the husband at the date of his death, and the purpose of the definition was to ensure that in such cases the payments to the wife should not necessarily cease on his death. The order made by Walker J. in the present case, whether it is to be regarded as having been actually made under s. 96 or not, is of the nature of an order under s. 96 (1) and not of the nature of an order under s. 96 (2).

Mr. Durack, who, we think, has said everything it was possible to say on behalf of his client, has put two main arguments to the Court. He has said, in the first place, that the words "permanent maintenance" are just as apt to include an order of the kind that can be made under s. 96 (1) as an order of the kind which may be made under s. 96 (2). We think that in what we have already said the answer to that argument is to be found. Mr. Durack has also submitted that a wife is "entitled to receive" maintenance within the meaning of the Testator's Family Maintenance Act if the position is that she would be entitled to an order for maintenance if she made an application to the court in its divorce jurisdiction. We think that that construction is not really a possible construction. Nor is it clear that, even if it were adopted, it would help the present applicant.

For the above reasons we are of opinion that the appellant's application was rightly dismissed by Virtue J., although the ground on which we are deciding the case is not the ground on which his Honour decided it. It is not necessary, in the view which we take, to consider the reasons given by his Honour, and we express no opinion, nor have we formed any opinion, with regard to their validity.

In our opinion this appeal should be dismissed. We think that, in the circumstances of this case, the appellant should have her costs of the appeal out of the estate, and, since counsel for all parties, including counsel for the executors, consent, we are prepared to make an order that the costs of all parties appearing before us of the appeal be paid out of the estate. We must not be taken, however, as giving any countenance to the view that, in cases under the Testator's Family Maintenance Act, any beneficiary who chooses to be separately represented is entitled to receive, or should receive even by consent, costs out of the testator's estate.