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Forrester Management Pty Ltd v AMI Tax Advisory Pty Ltd (trading as ANCO... [2026] NSWDC 13 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWDC

Forrester Management Pty Ltd v AMI Tax Advisory Pty Ltd (trading as ANCO Accounting Services)

[2026] NSWDC 13

District Court of NSW|2026-02-24|Before: Cole DCJ

View on NSW Caselaw

General information, not legal advice.

At a glance

Source facts

Court

District Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-02-24

Before

Cole DCJ

Catchwords

NEGLIGENCE — Breach — Standard of care — Professional
negligence – accountant advising on the entity to purchase
and hold a
principal place of residence – failure to advise on land tax and capital

Source

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Catchwords

NEGLIGENCE — Breach — Standard of care — Professionalnegligence – accountant advising on the entity to purchaseand hold aprincipal place of residence – failure to advise on land tax and capitalgains tax consequences of purchase in thename of a company as trustee of adiscretionary trust – damagesCONTRACTS — Breach of contract— Standards of contractual duty — Exercise of care, skill anddiligence – concurrentand parallel duty with duty under the law ofnegligence

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Forrester Management Pty Ltd v AMI Tax Advisory Pty Ltd (trading as ANCO Accounting Services) [2026] NSWDC 13

Hearing dates: 27–28 November 2025

Date of orders: 24 February 2026

Decision date: 24 February 2026

Jurisdiction: Civil

Before: Cole DCJ

In January 2020, Mr Forrester was in the process of purchasing a residential property for his family to live in (‘the property’). He discussed the prospective purchase with his mortgage broker, Mr Sevdalis. Mr Sevdalis told him that Mr Trovas, an accountant, could give Mr Forrester tax advice in relation to the purchase. At the time, it was Mr Forrester’s impression that Mr Sevdalis and Mr Forrester were working in the same office space. It was Mr Sevdalis’ evidence that he could not remember whether he was working in the same office building as Mr Trovas in January 2020. It is clear from Mr Sevdalis’ evidence that, at some time close to January 2020, he was working in the same office building as Mr Trovas. Mr Trovas said that Mr Sevdalis was not working in the same building at any relevant time. It is not necessary to resolve this controversy. Clearly, both Mr Sevdalis and Mr Trovas gave Mr Forrester the impression that they had a long-standing working relationship.
On or about 20 January 2020, Mr Forrester went to Mr Trovas’ office, on Princes Highway, Carlton, New South Wales. Mr Sevdalis met him there and introduced him to Mr Trovas. Mr Sevdalis then left the meeting.
Mr Forrester’s recollection of the meeting on or about 20 January 2020, in summary, is that he explained to Mr Trovas that he was purchasing the property to use as his family home. He asked Mr Trovas what the best “purchasing structure” would be in order to protect his family’s interests in the property, having regard to Mr Forrester’s position as a director of the FJ Group, which provides construction and maintenance services in Sydney and employs more than 25 staff. Mr Trovas advised him to incorporate a company which would become the registered owner of the property. Mr Trovas further advised Mr Forrester that he should instruct Mr Trovas to form the company and a family trust to benefit his family and protect the property as an asset of the trust. The company would be the trustee of the family trust. Accordingly, in reliance upon Mr Trovas’ advice, Mr Forrester instructed Mr Trovas to incorporate FM and to establish The Forrester Family Trust (‘the trust’).
In cross-examination, Mr Trovas denied that he knew that the purpose of the company and the trust was to hold Mr Trovas’ family home. I reject that evidence. It is contrary both to Mr Sevdalis’ evidence and to Mr Forrester’s evidence. It is also highly implausible that the nature and characteristics of the asset to be held would not be discussed at the meeting of 20 January 2020.
In cross-examination, Mr Trovas said that he had given Mr Forrester no advice. I reject that evidence. I believe Mr Forrester’s account of the meeting of 20 January 2020.
Mr Trovas did not advise Mr Forrester of the land tax consequences or the capital gain tax consequences of the ownership structure he proposed at the meeting on 20 January 2020 or at any subsequent time.
Mr Trovas says that Mr Sevdalis told him by telephone, prior to the meeting of 20 January 2020, that Mr Forrester wanted to set up a family trust. Mr Forrester denies that he had formed the view that he wanted a family trust prior to the meeting. He said that he relied upon Mr Trovas’ advice as to the appropriate way of holding the property.
Mr Trovas says that, in the meeting of 20 January 2020, Mr Forrester asked him to establish a family trust. Mr Trovas says that he asked Mr Forrester if he had an accountant, and Mr Forrester said that he did. Mr Trovas asked Mr Forrester if he wanted a new company to be the trustee of the trust, and Mr Forrester said that he did want a new company.
Mr Forrester gave his evidence in a clear and forthright way. His evidence is consistent with documentation provided and is also consistent with Mr Sevdalis’ account to Ms White, which Mr Sevdalis adopted in oral evidence. The steps taken by Mr Forrester subsequent to the meeting of 20 January 2020 with Mr Trovas are consistent with what Mr Forrester says occurred at that meeting. Where Mr Forrester’s account of the meeting differs from Mr Trovas’ account, I accept Mr Forrester’s account. Mr Trovas did not impress me as a frank and forthright witness. His evidence was crafted to be exculpatory rather than representing a straightforward account of the facts. I do not believe that Mr Trovas asked Mr Forrester if he had an accountant. Mr Trovas argued that Mr Forrester already had accountants and lawyers and therefore would not have asked him for tax advice, but there is no objective evidence of that, and, if it were true, it would be difficult to understand why Mr Forrester relied upon Mr Trovas to set up a company and a trust, which undeniably occurred.
It was Mr Trovas’ evidence that he only worked as an accountant “through” ANCO, which is a business name owned by AMI. I accept Mr Forrester’s evidence that he was never told, in his dealings with Mr Trovas, that Mr Trovas was acting on behalf of ANCO or AMI. Mr Forrester dealt with Mr Trovas on the basis that he was an accountant who could give advice about asset protection.
It was Mr Trovas’ evidence that, in January 2020, the electronic service that he used to obtain pro-forma documents for the registration of a new company and pro-forma trust deeds charged “about” $600 for the company registration documents and $225 for the pro-forma trust deed. Mr Trovas says that he asked Mr Forrester to reimburse him $800 “later”. Mr Trovas says that he told Mr Forrester that he would not charge any professional fees because Mr Sevdalis was a mutual friend.
On 22 January 2020, Mr Forrester sent $3,000 to Mr Sevdalis for him to forward to Mr Trovas. Mr Sevdalis told Mr Forrester that Mr Trovas’ fee was $3,000. The payment was made through Mr Sevdalis because Mr Sevdalis gave Mr Forrester his bank account details for that purpose. A text exchange on 22 January 2020, between Mr Forrester and Mr Sevdalis, in which Mr Sevdalis gave Mr Forrester his bank account details and Mr Trovas’ phone number, and Mr Forrester replied with the proof of transfer of $3,000, is annexed to Mr Forrester’s affidavit.
Mr Trovas says, in his affidavit, that he “could not find” a transfer of $3,000 from Mr Sevdalis in his personal bank records or in the bank records of ANCO. Mr Trovas said that Mr Sevdalis gave him $800 in cash to reimburse him for the purchase of the pro-forma documents when Mr Sevdalis collected the documents to give them to Mr Forrester. I do not accept that the amount given to Mr Trovas by Mr Sevdalis on account of Mr Forrester was specifically referrable to the purchase of pro forma documents. I find that the payment given to Mr Trovas was consideration for the giving of advice and the preparation of documents. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the amount given to Mr Trovas was either the full $3,000 or a lesser sum agreed between Mr Trovas and Mr Sevdalis without reference to Mr Forrester. It is unlikely, given their relationship, that Mr Sevdalis would have kept for himself money paid to him by Mr Forrester for Mr Trovas without Mr Trovas’ consent. Mr Trovas’ evidence about being given only $800 was designed to give the impression that he was paid for the cost of obtaining the documents only, and not for advice.
Mr Sevdalis, in the draft affidavit he adopted in the course of his evidence, says that he received funds in his bank account from Mr Forrester. He says “I withdraw [sic] that money. … I do not recall how much it was or when I paid it to Andrew” [ie, Mr Trovas]. I accept the evidence of Mr Forrester that the amount that he transferred to Mr Sevdalis to pass on to Mr Trovas was $3,000. This is because I believe Mr Forrester and because his evidence on this issue was substantiated by means of a copy of the transfer receipt which he texted to Mr Sevdalis as soon as the transfer had been effected. I accept that Mr Forrester gave the amount of $3,000 to Mr Sevdalis to give to Mr Trovas as consideration for the preparation of the documents and for advice. Mr Trovas admits that he was paid $800 by Mr Sevdalis on behalf of Mr Forrester. He says that he “could not find” any transfer, but he does not say that he did not receive any other payment from Mr Forrester via Mr Sevdalis.
On 23 January 2020, Mr Forrester returned to Mr Trovas’ office. Mr Forrester says that Mr Trovas had prepared the trust deed to establish the trust and the forms required for the incorporation of FM. Mr Forrester signed the documents under Mr Trovas’ guidance. FM was incorporated on the same day. Mr Trovas says that he obtained from Mr Forrester further information for the completion of the documents at this meeting, following which he ordered the documents from the electronic provider. Mr Trovas says that the documents were couriered to him on 24 January 2024. Mr Trovas says that he signed the trust deed as the settlor and arranged for Mr Sevdalis to collect the set of documents and give them to Mr Forrester. I note that the trust deed is dated 23 January 2020. The ASIC records annexed to Mr Forrester’s affidavit also show that FM was registered on 23 January 2020. This supports Mr Forrester’s account of events.
On 24 January 2020, FM, as trustee of the trust, exchanged contracts for the purchase of the property. Attempts were made, in the defendants’ case, to say that Mr Forrester was in a rush and under pressure to exchange contracts. I reject the notion that Mr Forrester was acting in haste. I accept his evidence that the vendor of the property had accepted his offer and there were no other competing buyers. I also reject the suggestion that Mr Forrester accepted Mr Sevdalis’ suggestion that he consult Mr Trovas because Mr Trovas could produce the documents to establish a trust very quickly. There is no evidence to support that gloss on the events. Mr Forrester denies it and I believe him.
Stamp duty of $209,572.00 was payable on the transfer of the property from the vendor to FM.
In December 2021, FM received a Land Tax Notice dated 29 November 2021 for $95,879.95.
Upon receipt of the Land Tax Notice, Mr Forrester telephoned Mr Trovas. Mr Forrester expressed his surprise at Mr Forrester receiving the Land Tax Notice. Mr Trovas said that it was an error. Mr Trovas said that the solution was to transfer the property from FM to Mrs Forrester for $50, which would have the effect that the property would no longer incur land tax liabilities.
On 18 January 2022, Mr Forrester met Mr Trovas in his office. Mr Trovas said that he would write to Revenue NSW to ensure that the property would be entitled to the principal residence exemption from land tax. Mr Trovas again advised Mr Forrester to bring about the transfer of the property to Mrs Forrester, saying that the transfer could be effected for $50 and that payment of the land tax the subject of the land tax notice would not be required. Mr Trovas told Mr Forrester, in relation to the land tax notice “don’t worry, these will just go away eventually”. Later the same day, Mr Forrester sent Mr Trovas a copy of the land tax notice by email. A copy of the email, dated 18 January 2022, is in evidence. It says:

From the email, it is clear that Mr Trovas and Mr Forrester had a cordial meeting on 18 January 2022 in which Mr Trovas undertook to take steps to help Mr Forrester with the land tax issue. Mr Trovas gave advice about a proposed solution to the land tax issue. This is consistent with Mr Forrester’s account that he had engaged Mr Trovas from the beginning to advise him on asset protection. It is not consistent with Mr Trovas’ account that he was simply engaged to provide documents to register a company and form a trust.
On 24 January 2022, Mr Forrester received a second land tax notice from Revenue NSW for land tax in the sum of $52,053.30 and a foreign purchaser surcharge of $65,066.65.
Mr Forrester telephoned Mr Trovas on 2 February 2022 to discuss the second land tax notice. Mr Forrester says that Mr Trovas repeated his previous advice that the property should be transferred to Mrs Forrester. Mr Trovas denies Mr Forrester’s account of this telephone conversation. Mr Trovas says that, in this telephone conversation, Mr Forrester told him that he had used FM as the trustee of the trust to purchase the property, that it was his principal place of residence, that land tax had been assessed on the property and that he wanted to transfer the property from FM to Mrs Forrester, but that a substantial stamp duty liability would result. Mr Trovas says that he told Mr Forrester that he had previously helped a client to transfer property out of a trust without paying stamp duty on the transfer, and that if he wished to explore that issue, he should come to Mr Trovas’ office with the relevant documentation and retain ANCO to advise him. For the reasons set out above, I do not accept Mr Trovas’ account of this conversation. I accept Mr Forrester’s account.
Mr Trovas said that, as Mr Forrester then did not take steps to retain ANCO, Mr Trovas took no further action with respect to the matter. In cross-examination, he agreed that his failure to inform Mr Forrester of his view meant that Mr Forrester was left with the false impression that Mr Trovas was going to help him. Mr Trovas also agreed that he took no steps to seek to have Mr Forrester sign a letter of engagement.
On 2 February 2022, Mr Forrester sent the following email to Mr Trovas, attaching the second land tax notice from Revenue NSW:

The terms of the email of 2 February 2022 are consistent with Mr Forrester having relied upon Mr Trovas as his advisor in relation to the preferable way to purchase and hold his principal place of residence. It is clear from the email that Mr Forrester is dealing with Mr Trovas as his accountant and tax advisor in relation to his family home. The terms of the email are consistent with Mr Forrester’s account of his telephone call with Mr Trovas on 2 February 2022. Upon reading the email, Mr Trovas can have been in no doubt that Mr Forrester was relying on him as a professional advisor and had done so since the beginning of their relationship. I reject Mr Trovas’ argument that Mr Forrester was not his client, or was not his client for the purposes of receiving tax advice in relation to the purchase of the property. In his evidence, Mr Forrester made it clear that, although his businesses had accountants and lawyers, those accountants and lawyers have never been involved in his personal affairs, including the purchase of the property. I accept that evidence. There is no evidence to the contrary.
Mr Forrester instructed Kelsi Krippner, of Topnotch Conveyancing, to begin the process of transferring the property to Mrs Forrester in accordance with Mr Trovas’ advice.
On 2 June 2022, Mr Forrester received notification from Revenue NSW that the transfer of the property to Mrs Forrester for no consideration was not eligible for the nominal duty of $50 pursuant to s 57 of the Duties Act 1997 (NSW). The reason given was that, under s 57(3), s 57 of the Duties Act 1997 applies only if the transferee was a beneficiary of the trust at the time at which duty became chargeable in respect of the declaration of trust. On the basis of the decision of Revenue NSW, the proposed transfer did not proceed. The conveyancing costs of this exercise were $3,304.10.
In evidence at the trial, Mr Trovas did not accept that his interpretation of s 57 of the Duties Act 1997 as it applied to the property was wrong.
On 21 October 2022, FM received a further tax assessment notice. This combined the first and second land tax notices with a further land tax notice and included interest. The foreign purchaser surcharge had been removed as a result of the intervention of HWL Ebsworth dealing with Revenue NSW on Mr Forrester’s instructions.
As at 9 September 2024 the amount owing in land tax was $116,382.66.
The property was transferred to Mrs Forrester in December 2022. The stamp duty incurred by Mrs Forrester on the transfer was $271,180.00.
By the time Mr Forrester swore his affidavit of 22 November 2024, the plaintiffs had incurred legal costs in the sum of $14,406.03 in obtaining advice on the tax status of the property.
Mr Forrester says that he relied entirely on Mr Trovas’ advice in arranging for the purchase of the property by FM. He says that Mr Trovas never advised him of the tax consequences of purchasing the property in FM’s name. I accept Mr Forrester’s evidence.

The defendants have argued, in this matter, that accounting advice was either not provided or was provided by AMI, trading as ANCO. I reject that argument. Mr Forrester arranged to see Mr Trovas because Mr Sevdalis recommended Mr Trovas. There was no mention of AMI or ANCO. The building in which Mr Trovas had an office had signage for ANCO (but not AMI) on its frontage, but that is insufficient to indicate to Mr Forrester that ANCO was involved with Mr Trovas or with the advice given in his matter, and there is no evidence that it did so. There is no evidence that Mr Forrester was told in any way that any entity other than Mr Trovas was giving him advice. Mr Forrester’s payment of $3,000 was meant for Mr Trovas. I find that Mr Trovas gave the advice to Mr Forrester, concerning the holding of the property in a trust of which FM would be the trustee, on 20 January 2020. Mr Trovas owed the plaintiffs a duty of care when giving his advice throughout his contact with Mr Forrester. Mr Trovas owed a duty of care to each of the plaintiffs because it was or should have been obvious to him that it was reasonably foreseeable that his advice, if it fell short of the applicable standard of care, posed a not insignificant risk of causing loss to each plaintiff.
I find that the scope of the work Mr Trovas undertook for Mr Forrester was to give accounting advice in relation to the best way to protect the property from creditors, including creditors of Mr Forrester’s businesses. Advice about the best way necessarily included advice about the tax consequences of the alternative practically available courses of action. I reject the argument that the scope of the work was confined to the incorporation of the company and the establishment of the trust, for the reasons set out above.
The scope of the work undertaken by Mr Trovas as a professional accountant also included the advice given on 18 January 2022 (see [42]-[43], above) and 2 February 2022 (see [45], above).
The statement of claim alleges that Mr Trovas breached his duty of care in numerous ways. I find that Mr Trovas breached his duty of care in the following ways:
By advising Mr Forrester that the property should be purchased by a company acting as the trustee of a discretionary trust without advising Mr Forrester that a consequence of this would be that, despite being the family’s principal place of residence, the property would not be eligible for the Principal Residence Exemption from land tax and the property would incur land tax annually.
By failing to advise Mr Forrester that a further consequence of the property being held in a trust, as opposed to being held by him or Mrs Forrester or both of them, would be that, if the property were sold, and a capital gain were realised on the sale, capital gains tax would apply to that capital gain.
By advising Mr Forrester that the property could be transferred to Mrs Forrester for nominal stamp duty under the Duties Act 1997 and failing to advise that such a transfer would generate a liability for substantial stamp duty, which should have been quantified.
I accept the evidence of Mr Yao that a competent accountant acting in conformity with standards and ethics applicable to professional accountants would have given the correct advice. A competent accountant would have known that a principal place of residence held in a trust would not be exempt from either land tax or capital gains tax. A competent accountant would have advised Mr Forrester that the use of a discretionary trust to purchase and hold the property would have the consequence that land tax would be levied and payable annually and that capital gains tax would be payable after sale if a capital gain were realised. Further, a competent accountant would know and advise that in the circumstances in existence by 18 January 2022, a transfer of the property to Mrs Forrester would trigger a liability to pay substantial stamp duty. In the event that the competent accountant, at any stage of the process, came to believe that they had insufficient information to advise competently, ethically and to the applicable standard, their obligation was to seek the information needed to advise in accordance with the applicable standard. A competent accountant would proactively advise on all of the tax implications of the structure they were suggesting be implemented and all other practical structures available for consideration.
The plaintiffs claim the following by way of damages for negligence (from the Plaintiff’s Schedule of Damages):