© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2005] QSC 86
defendant. The application for leave to amend the defence was dismissed.
The Supreme Court of Queensland refused an insurance company's application to change its defence on the day of trial. The insurer had a practice of not hiring a barrister until after a trial date was set, to save money. This meant the barrister only reviewed the case shortly before trial and found the defence needed significant changes. The judge found this practice was against the court rules, which require early preparation for trial. The judge said insurers cannot put injured plaintiffs through extra delay and cost just to save themselves money. Because the delay was caused by a deliberate business practice rather than a simple mistake, and because changing the defence now would require adjourning the trial and causing prejudice to the plaintiff, the application was refused.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
The application for leave is opposed. Two issues arise: the
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
question of any prejudice to the defendant and the explanation
for the delay. As to prejudice, Mr Hannay, the managing clerk
who has had something to do with the file, gave evidence of
his understanding of the position. It should be borne in mind
that Mr Hannay is only a managing clerk and has firm
instructions that he must get guidance from a solicitor or
consultant solicitor before taking any step in proceedings.
He perused the proposed amended defence but did not send it to
counsel until late yesterday or today. He was unable to
consult his principal because that gentleman is personally
engaged in defending himself in professional integrity
His experience allowed him to say in the witness box that he
considered that further medical reports might be necessary in
regard to the issues raised by paragraphs (c) and (e) of the
proposed amended paragraph 3A. When he gave that evidence,
counsel for the defendant intimated to the Court that those
paragraphs would be withdrawn from the material which it was
sought to insert into the defence by way of amendment.
For the plaintiff, Mr Di Carlo submitted that there was a need
for further consideration of the medical position. That arose
from the fact that he had only received the amended defence
very belatedly and had not obtained proper instructions or
even given the amended defence proper consideration. There is
no explanation of his failure to receive it last week. He
wished, he said, to consider it, give advice to the client and
receive instructions from the client. That is not an
unreasonable position. It seems to me that it does mean that
an adjournment of the trial would be necessary. Without at
this point embarking on any question of costs of an
adjournment, I simply say that an adjournment would be
necessary if the matter were to proceed due to fault on both
sides. I do not propose at this point to try to allocate that
The effect of an adjournment is necessarily to prejudice the
plaintiff. That is particularly galling in a personal
injuries case. There is no other evidence of prejudice apart
from what I have discussed which could not be dealt with by an
order for costs on an indemnity basis, but as I say, that
question would have to be considered in the light of the
relative degrees of fault. It is not possible to allow the
short adjournment which Mr Di Carlo sought due to the Court
arrangements and the matter would have to be restored to the
callover list. That may create a difficulty in that in the
second half of this year it is expected that trial dates will
In summary, the question of prejudice to the plaintiff is
significant but is it is not in my judgment the determining
factor in this application. I turn to the question of the
Counsel submitted that the delay was due to inadvertence (I
infer he meant inadvertence on behalf of the solicitors for
the defendant) and that this inadvertence led to the failure to give notice earlier. It seems to me that to explain the delay which has occurred as inadvertence is really a half-truth. It is true that the practitioner handling the file on behalf of the solicitors for the defendant, Mr Gurry could have reviewed the pleadings before signing the Request for Trial Date. It is not clear on the evidence exactly what would have happened had he done so. More importantly, pleadings are not primarily his responsibility if counsel is to be engaged. Counsel has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that pleadings reflect the case which he is to run. That is a responsibility to the Court, as well as to the client.
In my judgment, the major reason for the delay in this case
was the client's instruction that ordinarily counsel was not
to be briefed before a Request for Trial Date was signed.
Mr Gurry gave evidence that although no specific instruction
had been given to counsel to review the pleadings in this
case, he would expect it to be done as part of an advice on
He said, in cross-examination in answer to Mr Di Carlo:
"Is it not the case that you have dealt with counsel,
perhaps including my learned friend, that when you ask
for an advice on evidence, not only does counsel give you
advice in respect of what doctors may be required, what
further evidence you need, but often it's the case, is it
not, that they visit the format of the pleadings and
advise you of any inadequacies or any amendments that
need to be made? You'd agree with that, wouldn't you?--
Well, I think as a general rule counsel would if they saw
anything in - as a matter of just general policy with
counsel, irrespective of this matter, would normally
identify to their instructing solicitor any issues that
Well, I think you admitted to his Honour that as part of
what your expectations were when you deliver a request
for an advice on evidence, one of the issues and that is
the state of the pleadings?-- That is correct, if -
well, exactly. I think I said to his Honour that we
would generally see that counsel would consider if there
was anything that required attention in relation to a
Including the pleadings?-- Well, that would be included
In this view I think Mr Gurry was quite correct. It is
ordinary practice and quite to be expected that counsel would
review the pleadings in the course of a brief to advise on
In the present case, the position was that the defendant, a
motor accident insurer, instructed its solicitors that counsel
ordinarily was not to be briefed. Mr Gurry gave the following
"Do you have any procedure for getting an advice on
evidence before signing the certificate in any case in
your office?-- It would depend entirely on the client's
Has it given you instructions not to obtain an advice on
And did you understand those instructions to carry over
your Honour, that we will seek the instructions of the
And did they give those instructions in this case?-- They
Mr Gurry went on to say that he did not himself consider
getting counsel's advice in relation to the pleadings before
he signed the Request for Trial Date. His practice, he said,
was to have a conference with the client after the Request
instructions from my client to sign the request for
trial, then my client has a procedure whereby after the
signing of a request for trial but before trial, we
confer and review the file for the purposes of trial. As
a result of that conference, instructions were provided
counsel should give an advice of evidence and quantum for
I am satisfied that it was at that conference that the
The adequacy of pleadings and evidence at trial are matters
which must be the subject of advice from trial counsel. It
must have been obvious to the defendant from the time of the
second mediation that this case had a real prospect of
proceeding to trial. Its normal practice, as I have just
described it, is in my judgment anathema to the spirit and
terms of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. Failure to get
advice on evidence before a request for trial date is signed
is asking for trouble. It is likely that pleading and
evidentiary issues will arise when counsel is briefed. This
causes cost and delay as is apparent in the present case. The Rules, and the practice of this Court, proceed on the basis that such issues will ordinarily be resolved before the Request is signed. To obtain a date for trial at a callover while they are still outstanding is unacceptable.
The evidence was that the defendant's practice was adopted to
save money, depending on the amount at stake. The effect of
the practice is potentially to place an undue burden on
plaintiffs where the action proceeds to trial. The burden
consists of delay and if costs are not awarded to the client
on an indemnity basis any costs by which the plaintiff is
The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules are intended to achieve
expedition by requiring early preparation for trial. It
ill-behoves insurers to save money by delaying preparation
until a conference is held some time after a Request for Trial
Date is signed. They do not have a right to disregard the
rules for their own convenience. It is no answer for repeat
litigators like insurers to say that by adopting such
practices they save money in the end because many cases settle
anyway. Plaintiffs have only one case. Insurers should not
put plaintiffs at risk of delay and additional cost by a
practice designed to save themselves money in the bulk of
This case, typical of its kind, has been through the hoops of
the Motor Accident Insurance Act. It has twice been to
mediation. By the time the second mediation was concluded it
should have been assumed that it would not settle and
preparation for trial should have begun accordingly. Had that
occurred the problem in the defence would have become apparent
The Court endeavours to allocate early credible trial dates.
Regular litigants must cooperate by complying with the rules
in spirit and in letter. In deciding to prepare for trial
after the Request was filed and only a week before it was set
down at the callover the defendant was not demonstrating such
compliance. It could have begun steps to prepare for trial in
In my view no satisfactory explanation for the failure to
apply for an amendment at an appropriately early stage has
been advanced. This is not a case of inadvertence but the
result of a procedure deliberately adopted by the defendant.
I am not satisfied by the explanation advanced for the delay.
Two other matters should be mentioned. I have not overlooked
the decision of the High Court in State of Queensland v. J L Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 1; (1997) 189 CLR 146. In that case the Judge did accept the explanation for delay. Moreover, the application for amendment was made six months before the trial, not on the day of trial. The position was quite different from the present case.
Second, I draw attention to the position of the solicitor. A
solicitor is in a difficult position if a client gives
instructions which risk non-compliance with the rules. I do
not criticise Mr Gurry. As a witness he had no chance to put
his personal position, and the full position between him and
his client has not been explored. However the case shows the
care which solicitors must exercise in accepting instructions
(1997) 189 CLR 146
The application for leave to amend the defence was dismissed.