Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 14(2)(a), sch 1, pt C, cl 4(1)

Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (WA), r 45(1)

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

Foale v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 122

Frigger v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 159

Hutton v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 83

Mercanti v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 254

1. Anthony Paul Torre by an application dated 11 November 2025 applied for bail after conviction and pending a trial of the issues set down to commence on 19 January 2026 before me.
2. In support of the application, Mr Torre has filed affidavits from:
   1. Himself sworn 17 November 2025.
   2. His solicitor, Ashley Ivor William Watson sworn 11 November 2025.
   3. His mother, Armanda Torre sworn 18 November 2025.
3. The State opposes the application for bail.
4. The State has filed an affidavit of Federal Prosecutor, Nicholas Lystrup Camer-Pesci sworn 20 November 2025.
5. Both parties have filed written submissions. Mr Torre on 17 November 2025 and the State on 19 November 2025.

1. Mr Torre first appeared in the Perth Magistrates Court on 17 June 2022 and then faced 12 criminal charges of stealing and fraud. Mr Torre was granted bail.
2. A copy of the statement of material facts was sent to Mr Michael Tudori, Mr Torre's former solicitor on 20 June 2022. This statement of material facts dated 20 June 2022 is annexed to Mr Camer-Pesci's affidavit.
3. On 24 November 2022 a committal brief on a USB was delivered to Mr Torre's then solicitor, Ms McNally.
4. On 23 March 2023 a copy of the committal brief was then provided to Mr Torre's then solicitor, Ms Justine Fisher.
5. Mr Torre appeared before me and pleaded guilty to five counts on indictment 1270 of 2023 on 28 January 2025, with seven counts being discontinued by the State on 29 January 2025. Mr Torre's trial was due to commence on 28 January 2025 and was listed for five weeks.
6. Mr Torre was convicted on his pleas of guilty in the District Court on 28 January 2025 of:
   1. Count 1 - Stealing to the value of $100,000 from Philip and Linda Martinz.
   2. Count 5 - Stealing to the value of $130,000 from Golden Property Development Pty Ltd (Mr and Mr Goldsmith).
   3. Count 5 - Stealing to the value of $150,000 from Marco Meloni and Paola Lovi.
   4. Count 10 - Fraudulently obtained property from Gary and Susan Sheehan to the value of $500,000, who were each over 60 years old.
   5. Count 12 - Stealing to the value of $150,000 from Graeme Chalmers. This count was amended from an offence of fraud.
7. The pleas of guilty occurred after and in the context of negotiations with the State on the basis of the discontinuance of the first group of counts. On 29 January 2025 a notice of discontinuance in relation to the original indictment dated 9 August 2024, which had 12 counts, was presented to the court discontinuing counts 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11.
8. Mr Torre's criminal behaviour effectively involves eight personal victims and $1,050,000 worth of dishonesty. The offending behaviour occurred between 20 December 2011 to 4 October 2013.
9. At this stage, it is not clear to me which amounts have been recovered or repaid to the victims, if any.
10. Mr Torre was previously on bail since 17 June 2022 leading up to the scheduled trial date commencing on 28 January 2025. After entering pleas of guilty, his then counsel, Mr van Hatten, applied for bail pending an appearance the following day, 29 January 2025. The appearance on 29 January 2025 was for the purpose of allowing the discontinuances to be formally prepared and presented to the court. After hearing brief submissions, bail was varied by me on 28 January 2025, to 2.15 pm on 29 January 2025.
11. On 29 January 2025 Mr Torre applied for bail, pending sentence. Bail was refused by me at that hearing given the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood of imprisonment. At the time bail was refused, Mr Torre was living with his mother in Churchlands. A request for a psychiatric report was made by Mr Torre's counsel and I ordered one.
12. Mr Torre has been remanded in Hakea Prison since 29 January 2025.
13. On 4 March 2025 Mr Ashley Watson advised the court he had been retained as Mr Torre's solicitor, and he would be briefing counsel. Mr Watson in his affidavit sworn 11 November 2025 deposes that Mr Torre raised issues with him as to the statement of material facts for sentencing dated 24 January 2023 and started negotiating with the State.
14. On 16 April 2025 Mr Watson indicated to the court there would be no application for a change of pleas. The order for a psychiatric report was cancelled at Mr Watson's request.
15. On 28 April 2025 the matter was heard and adjourned by me to 27 May 2025 to allow the parties to indicate whether sentencing could proceed on 9 June 2025 and whether a trial of the issues was required.
16. On 27 May 2025 the matter was heard and the sentencing on 9 June 2025 was vacated. Sentencing was then listed on 1 August 2025.
17. On 1 August 2025 the facts on counts 1, 5, 8 and 12 were read in full and the trial of issues for count 10 was listed for four days commencing on 19 January 2026. Mr Torre's counsel, Mr Porter, identified what facts were in issue in relation to count 10.
18. The sentencing on counts 1, 5, 8 and 12 was deferred until a decision is handed down on the trial of issues in relation to count 10. Programming orders were made by me that the defence is to file any witness statement and any additional material it seeks to rely on at the trial of issues pursuant to r 45(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (WA) by 18 December 2025.
19. Mr Torre did not advise a trial of issues was required for count 10 until 1 August 2025. Approximately six months after he pleaded guilty to this count.
20. On 20 August 2025 the State served disclosure of a USB of an Australian Securities and Investments Commission's (ASIC) hard drive on Mr Watson which contained 9,344 emails. This material had previously been provided by Mr Torre to ASIC on 26 September 2018.
21. There has been no further disclosure of prosecution evidence since Mr Torre pleaded guilty on 28 January 2025.

1. Mr Torre submits his application for bail is made pursuant to s 14(2)(a) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA).
2. Mr Torre's application for bail is based on a submission that there has been a material change in his circumstances since bail was refused on 29 January 2025.
3. The changed circumstances are that Mr Torre is unable to adequately prepare for his trial of issues, in particular due to the number of documents and emails he is required to consider and to properly instruct his solicitor and barrister. He describes the prosecution brief as 'large and complex'. He claims that he has limited access to a computer in prison and is imprisoned in Hakea Prison under a restrictive and difficult regime. He claims his access to telephone calls and meeting with his solicitor have been restricted.
4. Mr Torre also wants to assist his mother who is aged 80 and lives by herself. He also wants to get his affairs and belongings in order.
5. Mr Torre also states he was assaulted on 26 October 2025 and received significant injuries. He required hospital treatment and surgery. No medical evidence has been provided as to the extent or impact of these injuries.
6. Mr Torre accepts he will receive a significant term of imprisonment upon sentence for the offences he has been convicted of. This is irrespective of the outcome of the trial of issues on count 10.
7. Mr Torre's mother's affidavit indicates she supports the application. She swears that Mr Torre could live at her home in Churchlands WA 6018 and is willing to provide surety of $500,000.

1. The State does not accept that there has been any material change in circumstances since bail was revoked on 29 January 2025. The request for a trial of issues on count 10 does not amount to a change in circumstances.
2. The State submits that it would have been clear to Mr Torre when he pleaded guilty on 29 January 2025 whether a trial of issues was required, in particular, as the matter had been listed to proceed to trial on 28 January 2025 for some time. A request for a trial of issues on 29 January 2025 would not have impacted on the court's discretion to revoke bail.
3. Delays in Mr Torre's sentencing and the trial of issues have only been caused by Mr Torre during 2025. Mr Torre has changed solicitor, counsel, withdrawn his request for a psychiatric report and only identified the need for a trial of issues in relation to count 10 in August 2025.
4. The State submits that even if there has been a change in circumstances, the exercise of the discretion to grant bail now that Mr Torre has been convicted, requires consideration by the court of sch 1, pt C, cl 4(1) of the Bail Act.
5. The State submits it is inevitable based on the seriousness of the offending, irrespective of the outcome of the trial of issues for count 10 that Mr Torre will be sentenced to a significant term of immediate imprisonment. The State notes Mr Torre accepts this. This is consistent generally with Court of Appeal decisions for similar offending behaviour.
6. The State accepts the prosecution brief and disclosed material is large and review of it may require some time, but the State refers to the following factors when considering these issues:

(b) there has been disclosure of the prosecution case to Mr Torre since 24 November 2022;

(c) the prosecution case has not changed significantly since disclosure of the prosecution brief and the serving of the original statement of material facts on Mr Torre;

(d) Mr Torre had the charges listed for trial on 28 January 2025, pleaded guilty close to his trial commencing and had significant time whilst on bail leading up to that date to prepare;

(e) Mr Torre has changed his solicitors and counsel a number of times since he was summonsed for the offences;

(f) the trial of issues is only required for one count; and

(g) there is nothing unusual in Mr Torre's situation of being remanded in custody prior to a court hearing and requiring access to a significant volume of material for the purpose of conducting his defence.

1. The State submits although Mr Torre has been assaulted in Hakea Prison, it is not apparent the risk to Mr Torre is an ongoing risk or different to the risk other people in custody are subject to.

1. The observations of the Court of Appeal in Frigger v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 159 (Frigger) demonstrate that in circumstances where a conviction has been recorded, a bail application pending sentence has been made and refused, and a further bail application is made, the source of the relevant test for bail is unclear.
2. It was accepted by the Court of Appeal in Frigger that even if there is no express statutory requirement for the appellant to demonstrate a material change in circumstances before a judge is required to consider a second application for bail under sch 1 pt C cl 4 of the Bail Act, such a requirement would be implicit in the terms of that provision: Frigger [88].
3. In the context of this application, however, the following observations made by the Court of Appeal in Frigger at [87] are relevant:

... provisions for the grant of bail should not be construed as entitling an offender to pepper a court with repeated bail applications in the absence of any material change in circumstances. Once the discretion under sch 1 pt C cl 4(1) of the Bail Act has been exercised, the court is not required to hear and consider further bail applications by an offender who has not demonstrated any material change in circumstances.

1. A material change in circumstances in the context of a refusal of bail is a matter that would have been likely, if known to the judge who previously refused bail, to alter the balance in favour of the grant of bail: Frigger [92], relying on Mercanti v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 254 [28].
2. Both parties accept that sch 1, pt C, cl 4(1) of the Bail Act applies to this bail application as Mr Torre seeks bail after he has been convicted. This section became law on 4 September 2022 and states:

(1) Subject to clauses 3A, 3C, 3D, 3E, 3F and 3G, the grant or refusal of bail to an accused, other than a child, who is in custody waiting to be sentenced or otherwise dealt with for an offence of which the accused has been convicted shall be at the discretion of the judicial officer in whom jurisdiction is vested, and that discretion must be exercised having regard to all of the following -

(a) the fact that the accused has been convicted of the offence;

(b) the probable method of dealing with the accused for that offence and for any pending offence;

(d) any other considerations that the judicial officer considers relevant.

1. This provision of the Bail Act acknowledges that the presumption of innocence no longer arises after conviction and the likely sentence should be a relevant consideration in an application for bail after conviction.
2. Even before sch 1, pt C, cl (4)(1) of the Bail Act was inserted, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have acknowledged that the considerations to grant bail after conviction are different to those before conviction.
3. In Hutton v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 83 Fiannaca J said the following:
   1. The proper approach under cl 4 was considered by Hall J in Jasevski v The Queen [2010] WASC 43. His Honour said:

The position now is that the discretion to be exercised regarding bail is not different in kind before or after conviction. It does not, however, follow from this that the recording of a conviction is irrelevant to whether bail should be granted. An accused person who has not been convicted is in a very different position to an offender who has admitted their conduct and is awaiting sentence.

The former faces only the risk of conviction and punishment whereas the latter knows the certainty of it. Depending upon the seriousness of the conduct and the likelihood of custodial sentence, the certainty of impending punishment may act as an incentive to abscond. If the person ever harboured hopes that they may be acquitted or that they may delay their case for a prolonged period, such hopes would have to be abandoned after conviction. Accordingly, whilst there is no presumption against bail following conviction, conviction for serious offences may justify the exercise of discretion to refuse bail pending sentence [9] - [10].

1. In my opinion, apart from the risk of flight, there is another matter that is a relevant consideration for the purposes of cl 4. As a matter of public policy, there would be an expectation that persons who are convicted of very serious offences, and will inevitably be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment, should be required, generally, to be met with the consequences of conviction and not be at large. The general entitlement to be at liberty that stems from the presumption of innocence is removed by the guilty verdicts. This does not mean that there is a presumption against bail following conviction, as was noted by Hall J in Jasevski, but it provides another factor, in my opinion, which needs to be weighed in the balance, for the purposes of cl 1, in considering whether there is a proper foundation for refusing bail.
2. What his Honour said above was accepted by the Court of Appeal by Safronoff AJA in the Court of Appeal in Foale v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 122.

1. I am satisfied this is an application for bail where Mr Torre is not required to show exceptional circumstances, but based on what the Court of Appeal has said in Frigger, a material change in circumstances is required to be established by Mr Torre.
2. I am not satisfied Mr Torre has shown a material change in his circumstances since I revoked his bail on 29 January 2025. When I consider the history of this matter as described in [6] - [12], [18] - [26], Mr Torre has been the main contributor to his delay in sentencing and trial of issues. The adjournment of Mr Torre's sentencing has resulted in the six-month period under s 16(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) being exceeded, but I note provision of s 16(3) of the Sentencing Act.
3. Mr Torre had bail from 17 June 2022 to 29 January 2025. His trial, including count 10 was listed for 12 months before he pleaded guilty. Other than changes in legal representation, Mr Torre should and would have done some trial preparation, including for count 10 well before January 2025.
4. The presumption of innocence no longer applies in the exercise of my discretion to grant or refuse bail.
5. Offences involving multiple charges of dishonesty including stealing, fraud or stealing as a servant generally, involve complex and large amounts of material. Often, people charged with those offences awaiting trial or awaiting sentence, do not have the benefit of bail.
6. When I consider the provisions of sch 1, pt C, cl 4(1)(a) and cl 4(1)(b) of the Bail Act, I accept it is inevitable Mr Torre will receive a significant sentence of imprisonment irrespective of the outcome of the trial of issues for count 10. The non-parole period of the sentence of imprisonment will most likely exceed the time Mr Torre has spent in remand custody. Mr Torre will be sentenced for serious offending that he has already been convicted of.
7. I make these above comments giving weight to the fact that I have not heard Mr Torre's plea in mitigation, the State sentencing submissions or seen any victim impact statements. These are comments about Mr Torre's probable sentence, not the actual sentence which will be imposed.
8. The fact that Mr Torre will receive a significant sentence of imprisonment for the offences, also raises the concern that Mr Torre may be a flight risk if granted bail. In my view, restrictive conditions on a bail grant will not sufficiently mitigate the risk that Mr Torre may fail to appear in court in accordance with a bail undertaking.
9. It is very concerning Mr Torre has been assaulted while in prison and suffered significant injuries. Prisoners no matter who they are or for whatever reason they are in prison are entitled to feel safe and protected in the prison environment. Unfortunately, the courts' experience is that conflict and assaults regularly occur within prisons in Western Australia, probably more often than the general public are aware of. The courts do regularly hear of prisoners being assaulted in prison during sentencing and bail hearings. Unfortunately, Mr Torre's circumstances are not unique. They should be.
10. The nature of the prison environment is that, often complaints are not made by victims, and witnesses are not found when prisoners engage in violent behaviour towards other prisoners.
11. Although the assault of Mr Torre occurred after I refused him bail on 29 January 2025, I do not consider this a material change in circumstances for me to release him on bail. I am obliged to consider all the matters in sch 1, pt C, cl 3A, cl 3C, cl 3D, cl 3E, cl 3F and cl 3G of the Bail Act including cl 4(1). The seriousness of the offending, the likely sentencing disposition and the risk of flight, act against me exercising my discretion to grant bail to Mr Torre, even on strict conditions.

1. Mr Torre's application for bail dated 11 November 2025 is refused.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.