FMM v Icare NSW

1. The Respondent made a disclosure to the Appellant of certain information on 15 November 2022.
2. That information had been contained in an email sent on 9 May 2022 to an insurance broker. The email had attached to it a spreadsheet containing personal information and health information about the Appellant and other persons.
3. The recipient of the email opened the email but realising that it had been sent in error, deleted it before reading the attachment.
4. The Appellant brought proceedings concerning the sending of the email on 9 May 2022 ("Earlier Proceedings"). The decision made determining those proceedings (FMM v Insurance and Care NSW [2023] NSWCATAD 114) is not the subject of the appeal in this matter.
5. A summons was issued in the Earlier Proceedings seeking production, among other things, of "a full unedited version of the original email that icare sent out to the incorrect employer/broker who received a Report with my personal and sensitive health information complete with attachments, inclusive of the message contained in the body of the email and also including the recipients and sender of this email".
6. On 15 November 2022, a solicitor at the NSW Crown Solicitor's Office sent the Appellant an email following receipt of the summons. Attached to that email was a fully unredacted copy of a spreadsheet entitled "Cost of Claims Report" ("CCR"). That spreadsheet contained the personal information and health information in issue about the Appellant and other persons.
7. A different version of the CCR had been provided to the Appellant as part of documents given under s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) in the Earlier Proceedings. That version of the CCR had been redacted to include only information about the Appellant.
8. Subsequently, at the request of the Crown Solicitor's Office, the evidence was that the Appellant deleted the relevant attachment. She confirmed that deletion by email dated 21 November 2022.
9. On 4 September 2023, the Appellant submitted an application for internal review in relation to the disclosure to her of the unredacted CCR sent to her on 15 November 2022.
10. On 3 November 2023, an internal reviewer found that the Respondent had not contravened privacy legislation and recommended that the Respondent take no further action in relation to the matter.
11. The Appellant then applied to the Tribunal for review of the internal decision made on 23 November 2023.
12. The Decision of the Tribunal made on 11 December 2023 is the subject of this appeal.

1. The Tribunal in the Decision, made at first instance, found that;

(1) the Appellant was not a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53 of the PPIP Act

(2) the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application as the Appellant was not a person relevantly "aggrieved" by the conduct in issue

(3) even if contrary to this finding, the Tribunal had jurisdiction, the conduct the subject of the application was not a breach of an information privacy principle under the PPIP Act or a health privacy principle under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) ("HRIP Act")

(4) in the absence of finding any breach, it followed that there was no need to consider what action, if any, should be taken under the PPIP Act.

1. The Tribunal said that under s 53(1) of the PPIP Act, the entitlement to seek review of the conduct of a public sector agency was limited to a person who was "aggrieved" by that conduct. It also said that under s 21 of the HRIP Act, review pursuant to the HRIP Act was also limited to a "person aggrieved" (paragraph [39] of the Decision). The question before the Tribunal at first instance was whether the Appellant was so "aggrieved". The Tribunal said that this was a jurisdictional precondition for making an application to the Tribunal (paragraph [43] of the Decision).
2. The internal reviewer had proceeded on the basis that the Appellant was a person "aggrieved". The Tribunal said that notwithstanding that the Respondent made an internal review decision finding that the Appellant was a person aggrieved, there can be no bar on the Respondent putting a different position before the Tribunal (paragraph [42] of the Decision). The Tribunal went on to reconsider the question of whether the Appellant answered the description of a person "aggrieved".
3. The Tribunal determined that the Appellant was not a person "aggrieved", whether for the purposes of the PPIP Act or the HRIP Act, insofar as the material disclosed to the Appellant by sending to her the email of 15 November 2022 concerned the Appellant herself (paragraph [60] of the Decision).
4. The Tribunal also found that the Appellant had not been prejudicially affected by the release to her of information about persons other than herself. It followed that the Appellant was not a person "aggrieved", for the purposes of breaches of s 18 of the PPIP Act and cl 11 of Schedule 1 of the HRIP Act (paragraph [73] of the Decision).
5. The Tribunal found that there was nothing that the Respondent could reasonably have done to protect the information that would have prevented its disclosure in the manner that occurred. The Tribunal, as a result, found that no breach of s 12 of the PPIP Act or cl 5 of Schedule 1 of the HRIP Act had occurred pursuant to the sending of the 15 November 2022 email (paragraph [74] of the Decision).
6. Having found that the Appellant was not a person "aggrieved" and even if she were, there was no relevant breach established, the Tribunal said that it was unnecessary to determine what if any action should be taken under the PPIP Act. The Tribunal went on to dismiss the Appellant's application for review.

1. Section 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ("NCAT Act") provides that a party may appeal as of right on a question of law and by leave on any other grounds, unless the decision is an interlocutory decision, in which case leave is required.

1. The Appellant relied on the following grounds of appeal:

(1) The Tribunal erred in law by determining that it did not have jurisdiction ("Jurisdiction Ground");

(2) The Tribunal erred in law in finding that it was necessary to re-examine the question of whether the Appellant was a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53 of the PPIP Act in order to establish jurisdiction ("Re-Opening ground");

(3) The Tribunal's treatment of the medical evidence erred in fact. The alleged error was the finding that it was not possible for the Appellant to establish a causative link between her adverse medical condition and her receipt of the 15 November 2022 email because she was suffering from a pre-existing medical condition at the time she received the 15 November 2022 email ("Medical Evidence Ground");

(4) The Tribunal's finding that no breach of the PPIP Act or HRIP Act had been established was an error of fact and law ("Contravention Ground");

(5) The Tribunal's decision to not make a finding as to appropriate action was also an error ("Remedial Action Ground").

1. Where a question of law is raised on an appeal, a right of appeal arises without the need for the grant of leave to appeal, other than in the case of an interlocutory decision. The Decision is not an "interlocutory decision" as defined in s 4 of the NCAT Act. This was not contested. Consequently, the Appellant has a right of appeal from the Decision on any question of law raised by her.
2. It is well established that the proper construction of a statute raises a question of law (Bianco Walling Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2020] FCAFC 50, at [66]). The Appeal Panel, following Bianco Walling, has said that whether "the construction of a statute or contract arrived at by the Tribunal at first instance was wrong in some identified way" raises a question of law (Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204, at [32]).
3. There is little doubt that the Jurisdiction Ground and Re-Opening Ground of appeal raise questions concerning the proper construction of provisions of a statute. These are questions of whether the Tribunal's construction of the PPIP Act was wrong, in both finding that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction and also in finding that s 55 of the PPIP Act required the Tribunal to determine for itself whether the jurisdictional precondition created by s 53(1) of the PPIP Act had been satisfied. We are satisfied that these matters raise questions of law, turning as they do, on what is the correct construction of ss 53 and 55 of the PPIP Act. That these were questions of law was not in dispute.
4. It follows that no leave is required to appeal on the Jurisdiction Ground and Re-opening Ground.
5. The Medical Evidence Ground was put to the Tribunal as an error of fact in the Appellant's amended grounds of appeal. To this extent, leave to appeal on this ground is required. We consider below whether errors of law also arise out of the Medical Evidence Ground.
6. We set out below our consideration of the Jurisdiction Ground and the Re-Opening Ground. We also consider whether leave to appeal should be granted on the Medical Evidence Ground. If the Appellant fails on these three grounds, there is no need to consider the remaining grounds of appeal.

1. The provisions of the PPIP Act relevant to the Jurisdiction Ground are set out in Part 5.
2. Section 53 relevantly provides for internal review in the following terms.

"53 Internal review by public sector agencies

(1) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a public sector agency is entitled to a review of that conduct.

........

(2) The review is to be undertaken by the public sector agency concerned.

(3) An application for such a review must -

(a) be in writing, and

(b) be addressed to the public sector agency concerned, and

(c) specify an address in Australia to which a notice under subsection (8) may be sent, and

(d) be lodged at an office of the public sector agency within 6 months (or such later date as the agency may allow) from the time the applicant first became aware of the conduct the subject of the application, and

(e) comply with such other requirements as may be prescribed by the regulations.

.......

(7) Following the completion of the review, the public sector agency whose conduct was the subject of the application may do any one or more of the following -

(a) take no further action on the matter,

(b) make a formal apology to the applicant,

(c) take such remedial action as it thinks appropriate (eg the payment of monetary compensation to the applicant),

(d) provide undertakings that the conduct will not occur again,

(e) implement administrative measures to ensure that the conduct will not occur again.

.......

(8) As soon as practicable (or in any event within 14 days) after the completion of the review, the public sector agency must notify the applicant in writing of -

(a) the findings of the review (and the reasons for those findings), and

(b) the action proposed to be taken by the agency (and the reasons for taking that action), and

(c) the right of the person to have those findings, and the agency's proposed action, administratively reviewed by the Tribunal".

1. Section 55 deals with review by the Tribunal in the following terms:

"55 Administrative review of conduct by Tribunal

(1) If a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53 is not satisfied with -

(a) the findings of the review, or

(b) the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application,

the person may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct that was the subject of the application under section 53.

......

(2) On reviewing the conduct of the public sector agency concerned, the Tribunal may decide not to take any action on the matter, or it may make any one or more of the following orders -

(a) subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an order requiring the public sector agency to pay to the applicant damages not exceeding $40,000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct,

(b) an order requiring the public sector agency to refrain from any conduct or action in contravention of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(c) an order requiring the performance of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(d) an order requiring personal information that has been disclosed to be corrected by the public sector agency,

(e) an order requiring the public sector agency to take specified steps to remedy any loss or damage suffered by the applicant,

(f) an order requiring the public sector agency not to disclose personal information contained in a public register,

(g) such ancillary orders as the Tribunal thinks appropriate.

(3) Nothing in this section limits any other powers that the Tribunal has under Division 3 of Part 3 of Chapter 3 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.

(4) The Tribunal may make an order under subsection (2) (a) only if -

(a) the application relates to conduct that occurs after the end of the 12 month period following the date on which Division 1 of Part 2 commences, and

(b) the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has suffered financial loss, or psychological or physical harm, because of the conduct of the public sector agency.

(4A) The Tribunal may not make an order under subsection (2) (a) if -

(a) the applicant is a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate or a spouse, partner (whether of the same or the opposite sex), relative, friend or an associate of a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and

(b) the application relates to conduct of a public sector agency in relation to the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and

(c) the conduct occurred while the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate, or relates to any period during which the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate.

(5) If, in the course of an administrative review, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the chief executive officer or an employee of the public sector agency concerned has failed to exercise in good faith a function conferred or imposed on the officer or employee by or under this Act (including by or under a privacy code of practice), the Tribunal may take such measures as it considers appropriate to bring the matter to the attention of the responsible Minister (if any) for the public sector agency.

(6) The Privacy Commissioner is to be notified by the Tribunal of any application for an administrative review. The Privacy Commissioner has a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to an administrative review.

(7) The Information Commissioner is to be notified by the Tribunal of any application for a review under this section that concerns the provision of government information by an agency (within the meaning of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009).

The Information Commissioner has a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to such a review".

1. The Appellant contended that there are three preconditions necessary to enliven s 55 of the PPIP Act; first, that the person must have applied for internal review under s 53; second, that the person must be dissatisfied by the findings of the review or the action taken by the agency; third, that the person must ask the Tribunal to review the conduct that was subject to the application for internal review. The Appellant's submission was that she had satisfied these requirements. As a consequence, the Appellant said that she had a right of review by the Tribunal.
2. The Respondent on the other hand said that s 55 was not to be read alone and that it had to be read in conjunction with s 53. Section 53 contained a requirement that the Appellant be a person "aggrieved". In the Respondent's submission, this requirement had to be satisfied before rights to internal review arose under s 53 and was also required to have been satisfied before any further rights of review arose under s 55.
3. It is well accepted that the provisions within a statute are not to be read in isolation but need to be read having regard to the context and the legislative purpose (Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41, at [4]). That context may include extrinsic materials but will obviously include the context supplied by other parts of a statute in which the provision is found. Ascertaining the legislative purpose of a provision also requires consideration of the other provisions found in the relevant statute.
4. The parties were in agreement that the Appellant needed to be a person described in s 55 in order to apply to the Tribunal for administrative review of the decision that had been previously made by the Respondent on internal review. Where the parties disagreed was on the question of whether or not the requirement in s 53 for the person to have been "aggrieved" also needed to have been engaged in order to allow the Appellant's application to be brought before the Tribunal under s 55. The Appellant did not think this was required. The Respondent said that it was required.
5. Section 55(1) gives a person rights of review if they satisfy the requirements set out in s 55(1). It describes the person entitled to such rights of review as "a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53". It must follow that unless a person has made application for internal review under s 53 within the meaning of that provision, they fail to meet the first requirement of 55, necessary to obtain a right of review under s 55. Section 55 in other words cannot have application to give rights of review, other than to a person who has first obtained an entitlement to review under s 53 and exercised that entitlement.
6. Only a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53 has an entitlement to make application for internal review under s 53. Consequently, a person who was not "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53 cannot fall within the description in s 55 of a "person who has made an application for internal review under section 53". It follows that unless a person seeking review under s 55 had previously been a person "aggrieved" under s 53, that person will have no rights of review under s 55.
7. The scheme of Part 5 of the PPIPA Act is clear. It contemplates a two-step review process. A person "aggrieved" by the conduct of a public sector agency is first entitled to internal review under s 53. If not satisfied with the findings of the review or the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to their application, the person may apply to the Tribunal for administrative review. It is not a scheme that allows a person to apply directly to the Tribunal for review, bypassing internal review under s 53. In other words, the aggrieved person, having exercised their entitlements to internal review under s 53, is given rights of further review under s 55. The scheme under Part 5 is not one that allows stand alone rights of review under s 55 to someone who was not a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53.
8. In NS v Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [2004] NSWADT 263, Judicial Member Higgins (as she then was), said, at [41] - [42]:

"In GR (at [53]), the Appeal Panel stated as follows:

"...In Privacy Act cases, the Tribunal undertakes a second review of the conduct in issue, the first being that conducted as an internal review by the agency. The difference is that the Tribunal is not engaged in review of the internal review outcome. But as is the case when decisions are being reviewed, the Tribunal is a second-stage reviewer of the original matter, here conduct rather than a decision whatever the proper characterisation of the Tribunal's role for the purposes of the Tribunal Act, qualitatively the function is one of review..."

Accordingly, the role of the Tribunal is to ascertain if the contravening conduct or alleged contravening conduct, the subject of the application under s.53, was in fact conduct that amounted to a breach by the respondent agency of one of the information protection principles in Part 2 of the PPIP Act or one of the other contraventions set out in s. 52. This will require an examination of the relevant acts and omissions and where the Tribunal is satisfied, on the evidence before it, that the agency engaged in the acts and omissions which amounted to a breach/contravention as set out in s. 52 (i.e. a contravention of one or more of the information protection principles), the Tribunal has a discretion, subject to the circumstances of the application and the evidence before it, to make one or more of the orders set out in s.55(2) of the PPIP Act".

1. The Appellant submits that the decision of Judicial Member Higgins is authority for the proposition that each of ss 53 and 55 "stands alone". This may be so to the extent that the role of the Tribunal is not one of reviewing the decision made on internal review but is one of a second-stage review of the conduct in issue. In doing so, the Tribunal is called upon to review that conduct independently of the internal review. However, this does not mean that the Tribunal has a "stand alone" power of review under s 55, available to someone who was not an aggrieved person within s 53. It is a power that can be exercised only after internal review has occurred following application by the person aggrieved, as part of the two-step review process allowed by the PPIP Act.
2. The purpose and object of the legislative scheme is self-evident, in that it contemplates that an "aggrieved" person is given rights of review under the two-step process it allows. That process is for internal review under s 53 and only after that internal review occurs, can the aggrieved person seek further review under s 55 of the PPIP Act.
3. Consequently, we find no error of law on the part of the Tribunal at first instance in its determination that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application, as the Appellant was not a person relevantly "aggrieved" by the conduct in issue. The Appellant fails on the Jurisdiction Ground as a ground for appeal.

1. The Re-Opening Ground is founded on the proposition that the Tribunal erred in law in finding it necessary to re-examine the question of whether the Appellant was an "aggrieved" person within the meaning of s 53 of the PPIP Act, in order to establish whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear claims under both the PPIP Act and the HRIP Act.
2. The submission of the Respondent is that the mere fact of determination of the internal review application by the Respondent could not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal where it otherwise does not exist. We agree with this submission. Whether jurisdiction exists or not is a matter for the Tribunal itself to determine. The Tribunal has both the duty to do so and also the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction (Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216; [2022] HCA 16, at [17]). It must do so having regard to the legislation regardless of what the maker of the administrative decision under review decided, as to whether or not there was jurisdiction. It was therefore for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that the Appellant was a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53 and not a matter for the internal reviewer to determine.
3. We find no error of law in the determination of the Tribunal that it needed to find that the Appellant was a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of s 53, in order to establish whether it had jurisdiction to hear the Appellant's application to the Tribunal under s 55. The Appellant therefore fails on the Re-Opening Ground.

1. The Medical Evidence Ground, as put to the Tribunal by the Appellant in her amended grounds of appeal, raises a question of law and a question of fact. Leave to appeal will be required, if the Appeal Panel is to hear the appeal on this ground.
2. The principles which govern the granting of leave to appeal by the Appeal Panel should generally be consistent with those which are applied by Courts when considering the question of whether to grant leave to appeal (Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, at [82]). Having considered the cases, the Appeal Panel said, at [84]:

"The general principles derived from these cases can be summarised as follows:

"(1) In order to be granted leave to appeal, the applicant must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong in the conclusion arrived at or that there was a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [19] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45];

(2) Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed,

BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [20] and the authorities cited there, SAB v SEM [2013] NSWSC 253 at [8] and [9] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45]...".

1. Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 has been followed countless times. As summarised in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 597; [2017] NSWCA 206, at [28]:

"Only if the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal will leave be granted. Ordinarily, it is only appropriate to grant leave where there is an issue of principle, a question of general public importance, or an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable. It is well established that it is not sufficient merely to show that the trial judge was arguably wrong." (Citations omitted)

1. As recently noted by the Appeal Panel in Houda v Seraphim [2025] NSWCATAP 135, at [32];

"Leave to appeal should only be granted when there are substantial reasons to warrant leave being granted. These reasons include the presence of an error of principle in the decision under appeal, resulting in substantial injustice. For leave to be granted, the decision under appeal must generally be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its consideration on appeal (see e.g. Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgus [2018] NSWCATAP 54 (Champion Homes) at [35]; FFO v Cumberland Council [2022] NSWCATAP 164 (FFO) at [9]; Bettington at [22])".

1. The Appellant's submission was that the Tribunal erred in fact by disregarding or failing to give sufficient weight to the "uncontested medical evidence" of the Appellant, testifying to the fact that she suffered harm by reason of her receipt of the 15 November 2022 email.
2. The Tribunal had referred to records of two medical practitioners before it. One described a pre-existing injury and "vicarious traumatic reaction ... suffered as ... a result of the circulation of personal information in November 2022" regarding the Appellant and other workers compensation recipients (at [31] of the Decision).
3. The Tribunal found that there was nothing in the records of the two medical practitioners prior to February 2024 that referred to events of 15 November 2022 and any exacerbation of a pre-existing injury nor to vicarious trauma that she had experienced as a result of seeing health information about people other than herself. The Tribunal found that it was only from February 2024 onwards that there was a reference, among other things, to the events of 15 November 2022 and that the Appellant's condition had been exacerbated by having seen the information of others that was disclosed to her in the CCR (paragraph [72] of the Decision).
4. The Tribunal went on to accept the Respondent's submission that what was said in the relevant medical reports was not supported by other probative evidence from which the Tribunal could find that the Appellant had been prejudicially affected by the release to her of the information about persons other than herself. It followed, in the Tribunal's opinion, that the Appellant was not a person aggrieved for the purpose of the alleged breaches (paragraph [73] of the Decision).
5. To the extent that the Medical Evidence Ground does not raise a question of law, leave to appeal may be granted if a factual error was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken or if the Tribunal had gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result, so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.
6. We do not consider that the way in which the Tribunal came to its findings was one which falls within any of these descriptions or otherwise gives rise to an injustice of a kind that may ground leave to appeal. The Tribunal reviewed the medical records available to it. Having done so, it reached its conclusions. It found that there was no evidence that viewing of the CCR in November 2022 prejudicially affected the Appellant and any evidence of such harm was found in records from more than a year later. The Tribunal found that these records made more than a year after the event, were insufficient to establish the prejudice claimed by the Appellant occurring in and after November 2022. We do not find anything in the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence, including the explanation provided as to the weight it gave to the medical evidence, allows us to conclude that it came to its findings unreasonably or was clearly mistaken, that its methods were unorthodox or there was some other relevant injustice.
7. The Appellant also submitted that there was an error of law. That alleged error of law was in what she claimed was the inferences the Tribunal at first instance drew from "secondary materials such as unexplained medical notes and correspondence". The Appellant submitted that the Tribunal had drawn inferences contrary to the medical evidence, in finding that the release of information to her on 15 November 2022 did not prejudicially affect the Appellant. This, the Appellant said, gave rise to an error of law.
8. We accept that whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. This is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion (Unique Commercial, at [32]).
9. The Decision, however, does not necessarily show that the Tribunal drew any particular inferences from the medical evidence, in that we cannot identify any specific inference by the Tribunal that the release of the information in issue did not prejudicially affect the Appellant. What the Tribunal found, having considered the evidence before it, was that the evidence was insufficient to establish the prejudice claimed. The consequence was that the claimed prejudice was not proved. This did not require drawing inferences of any kind but was a finding that the prejudice as alleged by the Appellant had not been proved to the requisite standard.
10. For the above reasons, we find no error of law in the Medical Evidence Ground nor any error of fact of such a kind as to justify leave to appeal.
11. The Appellant does not succeed on the Medical Evidence Ground.

1. In the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal, there is no need to consider the remaining grounds of appeal, as these are grounds that are of relevance only if the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. Nevertheless, we make the following observation on each of the remaining grounds.
2. The Contravention Ground is based on the submission the Tribunal erred in fact and law in finding that no breach had been established of either ss 18 or 12 of the PPIP Act or cl 5 or 11 of Schedule 1 of the HRIP Act.
3. We agree with the Tribunal's conclusion that there was nothing that the Respondent could reasonably have done to protect the information that would have prevented its disclosure in the manner that occurred.
4. Having found that the Tribunal was correct in determining that it had no jurisdiction, we do not need to make any finding as to what remedial action was required.

1. Having failed on the Jurisdiction Ground, the Re-Opening Ground and the Medical Evidence Ground, the Appellant's appeal must be dismissed.

(1) The appeal is dismissed.

(2) Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the disclosure of the name of the Appellant is prohibited.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.