FMI24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 877

1. Having assessed the applicant's claims, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee as defined by s 5H(1) of the Act. As such, the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The delegate also considered whether the applicant would face a real risk of suffering significant harm, as defined in s 36(2A) of the Act, from loan sharks if he returned to Malaysia. The delegate determined that the applicant could obtain protection from an authority in Malaysia - such that there was not a real risk that he would suffer significant harm as outlined in s 36(2B)(b) of the Act. On that basis, the delegate determined that there was no real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm and, as such, the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had any protection obligations as outlined in s36(2)(aa) of the Act (CB 40-41).
2. On 6 July 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 47-48). In that review application, the applicant asked that all correspondence be sent to him directly (as the "review applicant") and provided the Tribunal with the first nominated email address to enable the Tribunal to do so (CB 48).
3. On 7 May 2024, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing before it, scheduled to take place on 28 May 2024 (the "hearing invitation") (CB 53-56).
4. On 27 May 2024, the applicant advised the Tribunal that he would not participate in the hearing and consented to a decision being made on the papers (CB 58). He also advised the Tribunal that his previous email address "[did] not work anymore" and provided the Tribunal with completed "Response to hearing invitation" and "Change of Contact Details" forms. Both forms included a new email address for the applicant (the "second nominated email address") (CB 58-63).
5. On 1 July 2024, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (CB 67-74).
6. On 26 July 2025, the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in this Court. That application was made pursuant to s 476 of the Act.

1. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal's decision in this matter is eight pages long and spans 28 paragraphs (CB 67-74). The final three pages include extracts of legislative provisions (CB 72-74).
3. The Tribunal began by explaining that on 7 May 2024, it had written to the applicant advising that it had considered all of the material relating to his application but was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone (at [4]).
4. The Tribunal noted that in that correspondence, it had invited the applicant to appear before it, give evidence and present arguments at a hearing scheduled to take place on 28 May 2024 (at [4]).
5. The Tribunal further explained that on 27 May 2024, the applicant emailed a response to the hearing invitation which indicated that he would not attend the hearing and asked the Tribunal to "[p]lease decide [his] case based on the current evidence" (at [4]).
6. The Tribunal then outlined the legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, summarising the requirements of the refugee criterion outlined in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, the relevant definitional provisions in ss 5H(1)(a)-(b), 5J(1), 5J(2)-(6) and 5K-LA of the Act and the complementary protection criterion set out in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal also explained that, in assessing the applicant's protection claims, and in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 84 (made under s 499 of the Act), the Tribunal had had regard to the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines' prepared by the Department and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes (at [5]-[10]).
7. The Tribunal then explained that the issue before it was whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations. The Tribunal noted that Malaysia was the receiving country for the purpose of that assessment (at [11]-[12]).
8. The Tribunal then set out the information provided by the applicant in his protection visa application (lodged on 2 June 2019) in detail (at [14]).
9. The Tribunal then outlined evidence before it, noting as follows:
   1. The applicant lodged his application for review with the Tribunal on 6 July 2019.
   2. On 7 May 2024, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material relating to his application, but it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it and give evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 28 May 2024. On 27 May 2024, the applicant provided a response indicating he would not participate in the hearing, and the applicant consented to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers without taking further steps to allow him to appear.
10. The Tribunal continued:
    1. If the applicant had attended a hearing, he would have had an opportunity to clarify his claims and prospective concerns and provide further detailed information.
    2. The Tribunal has before it brief, vague, and sketchy details about his fears in relation to the loan sharks in Malaysia.
    3. The applicant did not provide details of the amount he guaranteed for his girlfriend's loan, and other relevant details such as the identity of the lender, the loan term, interest rate, and payment schedule. He did not provide specific details of the threats he claims were made against him, including the identities of those involved and the circumstances such as the places, times and dates involved. He did not detail his employment and earnings history in Australia, nor what, if any, payments he has made in relation to the loan since he has been in Australia. He did not explain what, if any, adverse action the loan sharks had taken against girlfriend or family in Malaysia since he has been in Australia. He has not provided an explanation about why the loan sharks would remain interested in a loan he was the guarantor for when he had been absent from Malaysia for some five years. He has not provided any supporting material in relation to his claims such as documentation to confirm his girlfriend's loan, his being the guarantor, demands made by the loan shark for him to pay the debt, and his payments or responses to the loan shark.
11. The Tribunal then noted that the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is 'well-founded' or that it is for the reason claimed. The Tribunal also emphasised that the fact that an applicant claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not establish that such a risk exists, or that the harm feared amounts to 'significant harm' (at [22]).
12. The Tribunal then explained that it was not required to make the applicant's case for them. Rather, it was the responsibility of the applicant to specify all particulars of the claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim (at [23]).
13. The Tribunal continued:
    1. On the limited available material, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant was threatened or otherwise suffered harm from a loan shark in relation to a loan to his girlfriend in Malaysia. It is not satisfied that he would face a real chance of harm, whether because of a loan shark or otherwise, if he were to return to Malaysia.
    2. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance the applicant would face serious harm for reason of his guaranteeing a loan for a girlfriend and/or from a loan shark, if he returned to Malaysia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant has not claimed, and there is nothing to suggest, that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for any other reason listed in s 5J(1).
    3. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons listed in s 5J(1). Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
14. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal then considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal determined that, based on the limited information before the Tribunal and the assessment of facts as considered by the Tribunal in relation to the refugee criterion, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Malaysia, there would be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (at [26]).
15. On the basis of the above, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (at [28]).

1. The application for judicial review (filed by the applicant on 26 July 2024) contained two grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. It's crucial to understand that in Malaysia, individuals unable to service a debt from a loan shark are at risk of physical threats. The police force in Malaysia is marred by corruption, and the authorities are unwilling to combat illegal money lending. These borrowers are left vulnerable to unlawful activities with no protection from the police. The Department should have considered these country-specific issues and my circumstances. I am unable to seek protection in Malaysia, as the authorities cannot provide it. Furthermore, Malaysia lacks appropriate criminal law, an effective police force, and an impartial judicial system.
   2. Despite my responsibility to provide all the necessary details and evidence for my claim, I have not received the guidance I need from the Department and the Tribunal. I face a language barrier and require assistance understanding the standard visa assessment procedure. The Department and the Tribunal have a duty to support and guide me in my case, which they have failed to fulfil.
2. With his application, the applicant also filed an affidavit (affirmed on 23 July 2024). That affidavit annexed a copy of the Tribunal's decision and related notification letter and information sheets. The affidavit also stated:
   1. I, [applicant's name omitted] of [applicant's address omitted], freelancer, affirm:

I am the Applicant.

1. As a vulnerable individual, I had to leave Malaysia after borrowing money from an underground bank, which I could not repay.
2. The underground bank's gangster physically assaulted my parents and me and damaged our property for failure to repay the debt.
3. The authorities in Malaysia are corrupt and colluding with the underground bank and associated gangs.
4. My return to Malaysia would mean facing the imminent threat of arrest, imprisonment, and even death at the hands of the authorities acting on behalf of the underground bank.

1. The issues raised in the applicant's affidavit reiterate his protection claims and do not otherwise raise any issue with the conduct of the Tribunal or its decision in this matter.
2. On 6 September 2024, procedural orders were made by Registrar Downing of this Court giving the applicant an opportunity to file an amended application, additional evidence and written submissions. Unfortunately, no additional documents were filed by or on behalf of the applicant.
3. The applicant appeared before this Court (on 10 April 2025) without legal representation but with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. The Court asked the applicant if he had received copies of the CB and the Minister's written submissions. He advised that he had received the CB but "did not receive the Minister's submissions". The Court noted that it had before it an affidavit of service of Ms Aatika Ismailjee affirmed and filed on 3 April 2025 (the "Ismailjee affidavit") which confirmed the Minister had served the submissions on the applicant (by express post and by email). The Ismailjee affidavit was taken as read and in evidence.
4. On the basis of the above, the Court was satisfied that the applicant had been properly served with the Minister's submissions. The applicant was given a hard copy of the Minister's submissions in Court (as well as a hard copy of the CB as the applicant had not brought his copy with him to the hearing) and the Minister's solicitor (Mr Benjamin Mayne from the Sparke Helmore) was asked to summarise the Minister's core assertions in oral submissions before the Court.
5. The materials before the Court thus include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 26 July 2024 (the applicant's affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing of this matter), a CB numbering 74 pages (marked as Exhibit 1 at the hearing of this matter), written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 1 April 2025 and the Ismailjee affidavit.
6. Noting that the applicant was not represented (and noting the remarks of the Federal Court in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review)), the Court gave the applicant an opportunity to outline orally what he thought the Tribunal "did wrong" in relation to his matter.
7. The Court explained that it can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court further explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap - stressing, however, that for migration decisions of this sort, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 ("Craig") at 198;

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24 at [207]- [208];

(e) where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant's claims (or integers of the claims) made: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317 at [111];

(f) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias_: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship_ [2013] FCAFC 80 ("SZRUI") at [2]; and

(g) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [33]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44].

1. The Court also explained that it cannot undertake merits review of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 ("Wu Shan Liang"). Importantly, the Court cannot grant the applicant the visa that he now seeks, even if the Court disagrees with the Tribunal's ultimate findings. Rather, the Court can only undertake an analysis of whether the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error of the sort outlined above.
2. Against this background, the applicant told the Court that he "thought that the Tribunal already had some subjective ideas". The Court sought clarification from the applicant as to whether he thought the Tribunal had "already made up its mind". The applicant confirmed that this was the impression he had.
3. The applicant also told the Court that he "did not have access to the email to receive the notice and the notice of hearing [he] received was to attend a hearing in New South Wales but [he] was already living in Western Australia".
4. The applicant's comments, to the extent that they point to any issue of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, will be addressed below.

1. Unfortunately, the applicant's grounds of review were not particularised, no written submissions were filed by the applicant and the applicant's oral submissions before this Court were somewhat vague.
2. This is not a criticism of the applicant. He was not legally represented and the Court recognises that Court proceedings can be intimidating and stressful.
3. In the circumstances, the Court will interpret the applicant's concerns as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392) and will itself review the Tribunal's decision for any possible jurisdictional error.

1. As outlined above, ground one provided as follows:
   1. It's crucial to understand that in Malaysia, individuals unable to service a debt from a loan shark are at risk of physical threats. The police force in Malaysia is marred by corruption, and the authorities are unwilling to combat illegal money lending. These borrowers are left vulnerable to unlawful activities with no protection from the police. The Department should have considered these country-specific issues and my circumstances. I am unable to seek protection in Malaysia, as the authorities cannot provide it. Furthermore, Malaysia lacks appropriate criminal law, an effective police force, and an impartial judicial system.
2. To the extent that the applicant raised concerns in relation to the Department's conduct, this Court has no jurisdiction to address those concerns or address any alleged oversight on the part of the Department or the Minister's delegate: ss 476(2)(a) of the Act; Wu Shan Liang at [31]).
3. If the applicant is concerned that the Tribunal failed to address whether he would be adequately protected in Malaysia should he return, it is accurate that the Tribunal did not do so here. However, the Tribunal was not required do so in circumstances where the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was at risk of harm from loan sharks or for any other reason.
4. In this matter, the Tribunal stressed that the applicant had chosen not to attend a hearing before it and that it had relied instead on the very limited written evidence before it. The Tribunal assessed that material and determined as follows:
   1. The Tribunal has before it brief, vague, and sketchy details about his fears in relation to the loan sharks in Malaysia.
   2. The applicant did not provide details of the amount he guaranteed for his girlfriend's loan, and other relevant details such as the identity of the lender, the loan term, interest rate, and payment schedule. He did not provide specific details of the threats he claims were made against him, including the identities of those involved and the circumstances such as the places, times and dates involved. He did not detail his employment and earnings history in Australia, nor what, if any, payments he has made in relation to the loan since he has been in Australia. He did not explain what, if any, adverse action the loan sharks had taken against girlfriend or family in Malaysia since he has been in Australia. He has not provided an explanation about why the loan sharks would remain interested in a loan he was the guarantor for when he had been absent from Malaysia for some five years. He has not provided any supporting material in relation to his claims such as documentation to confirm his girlfriend's loan, his being the guarantor, demands made by the loan shark for him to pay the debt, and his payments or responses to the loan shark.

...

1. On the limited available material, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant was threatened or otherwise suffered harm from a loan shark in relation to a loan to his girlfriend in Malaysia. It is not satisfied that he would face a real chance of harm, whether because of a loan shark or otherwise, if he were to return to Malaysia.
2. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance the applicant would face serious harm for reason of his guaranteeing a loan for a girlfriend and/or from a loan shark, if he returned to Malaysia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant has not claimed, and there is nothing to suggest, that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for any other reason listed in s 5J(1).
3. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons listed in s 5J(1). Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

1. As noted by the Court above, having concluded that the applicant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal then considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal determined that, based on the limited information before it and the assessment of facts as considered by it in relation to the refugee criterion, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Malaysia, there would be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (at [26]).
2. No error arises in this regard.
3. If the applicant was suggesting that the Tribunal should have undertaken further "investigation" of his claims (regardless of how those claims were presented by the applicant), the Court disagrees for the reasons that follow.
4. Section 5AAA of the Act provided as follows:

5AAA Non‑citizen's responsibility in relation to protection claims

(1) This section applies in relation to a non‑citizen who claims to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (however arising).

(2) For the purposes of this Act, it is the responsibility of the non‑citizen to specify all particulars of his or her claim to be such a person and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim.

(3) The purposes of this Act include:

(a) the purposes of a regulation or other instrument under this Act; and

(b) the purposes of any administrative process that occurs in relation to:

(i) this Act; or

(ii) a regulation or instrument under this Act.

(4) To remove doubt, the Minister does not have any responsibility or obligation to:

(a) specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the non‑citizen's claim; or

(b) establish, or assist in establishing, the claim.

1. It is not the Tribunal's responsibility to investigate an applicant's claims or to add to them: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 at [43]. That responsibility falls on the applicant alone.
2. This does not mean, of course, that the Tribunal can deny an applicant procedural fairness.
3. Having assessed the Tribunal's approach to this matter, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did what was required of it in this matter.
4. By way of background, the Court notes the following procedural history:

(a) on 10 July 2019, the applicant was advised that his application for review had been received by the Tribunal (CB 49-51);

(b) on 12 March 2024, the applicant was asked to complete a pre-hearing information form (CB 52);

(c) on 7 May 2024, the applicant was invited to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments (CB 54-55). The applicant was advised that he could provide any relevant documentation to the Tribunal and was asked to complete a "Response to hearing invitation" form (CB 55); and

(d) the applicant completed the "Response to hearing invitation" form (CB 58-61) and, relevantly, indicated in both a covering email to the Tribunal (CB 58) and the completed form itself that he would not participate at the hearing and consented to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers (without taking further steps to allow the applicant to appear) (CB 59);

(e) on 2 July 2024, the applicant was notified, via the second nominated email address (being the email address provided by the applicant to the Tribunal on 27 May 2024), that his application to the Tribunal had been considered but was not successful. It is clear that the applicant received that decision as he ultimately sought judicial review in this Court.

1. In light of the above, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal gave the applicant an opportunity to provide evidence in support of his case. The applicant did not avail himself of that opportunity. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was left to determine the matter before it on the basis of very limited information.
2. The Court is also satisfied that the applicant was afforded natural justice in this matter.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground one.

1. Ground two stated:
   1. Despite my responsibility to provide all the necessary details and evidence for my claim, I have not received the guidance I need from the Department and the Tribunal. I face a language barrier and require assistance understanding the standard visa assessment procedure. The Department and the Tribunal have a duty to support and guide me in my case, which they have failed to fulfil.
2. It is not clear what the applicant was suggesting in relation to ground two.
3. The Court is guided in this regard by the Minister's written submissions to this Court (filed on 1 April 2025), which, relevantly, provided as follows:
   1. Ground two is at odds with the applicant's review application because he recorded "No" to needing an interpreter, and "N/A" to the required language or dialect: CB 47-48. Further, at no point during the review did he inform the Tribunal of any language difficulties he was facing, and on 27 May 2024, he wrote to the Tribunal in English and advised that he did not want to participate in a hearing and consented to a decision being made on the current evidence: CB 58. In any event, the Tribunal does not have a duty to "support and guide" an applicant where they face a language barrier or to assist them in understanding the visa process. Its procedural fairness obligations under Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act are exhaustive, and the Tribunal in this case complied with those obligations for the following reasons.
   2. First, the Tribunal invited the applicant under s 425 of the Act, in compliance with s 425A, to attend a hearing scheduled for 28 May 2024. There was no error in the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision without conducting a hearing because the applicant had expressly consented to the review being decided on the papers. Once this consent had been given, the applicant was not entitled to appear at a hearing and the Tribunal could proceed without him appearing before it. The inevitable consequence of the applicant's consent to a decision being made on the papers was the Tribunal affirming the delegate's decision.
   3. Second, there was also no information that the Tribunal was required to put to the applicant for comment or response under s 424A of the Act. This is because the information it relied on when it affirmed the delegate's decision were his visa application and the country information before it, both of which fell within the exceptions in s 424A(3)(ba) and (a) respectively.
4. The Court agrees with the Minister in this regard.
5. As previously explained by this Court in ANE22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 67, Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to matters of this sort: s 422B of the Act.
6. Noting the Court's analysis above in relation to ground one, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did all that was required of it in this regard and the applicant was not denied natural justice or denied an opportunity to participate in his review.
7. No error arises in relation to ground two.

1. As outlined above, the applicant told the Court that he thought that the Tribunal had "some subjective ideas". It appears the applicant is concerned that the Tribunal member had already made up their mind and, as such, was biased.
2. As explained by this Court in CCU23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 616, an allegation of bias is one that must be distinctly made and clearly proven.
3. To prove bias, it is for the applicants to establish that:

(a) the Tribunal, in the case of actual bias, was so committed to a conclusion that regardless of the evidence or arguments presented that conclusion was not open to persuasion and incapable of alteration: Jia Legeng (2001) 178 ALR 421 at [71]-[72]; or

(b) the Tribunal, in the case of apprehended bias, conducted itself in a way that a fair-minded person might reasonably believe that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to deciding the applicant's case: SZRUI at [2] and Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 424 at [32].

1. There is no material before the Court that suggests that the Tribunal was not open to persuasion in this case or failed to actively engage with the very limited evidence presented by the applicant. The Tribunal engaged with the limited information before it but did not accept that the applicant was at risk of harm from loan sharks or for any other reason. Those findings were entirely open to the Tribunal on the limited evidence before it.
2. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.
3. The applicant also told the Court that he "did not have access to the email to receive the notice and the notice of hearing [he] received was to attend a hearing in New South Wales but [he] was already living in Western Australia".
4. Again, it is not clear what the applicant's concern is in this regard. All correspondence from the Tribunal was initially sent to the applicant at the first nominated email address provided in his protection visa application (CB 7) and his application for review of the delegate's decision (CB 48). The applicant's mailing address was, at all relevant times, an address in New South Wales.
5. On 27 May 2024, the applicant sent in a completed "Response to hearing invitation" form with a covering email. The applicant advised, in that correspondence, that his email address had changed, however, the applicant appeared to have received the hearing invitation sent to the first nominated email address as he was aware of the hearing and returned the "Response to hearing invitation" form provided therein. Following receipt of the applicant's advice in relation to his new email address, the Tribunal sent subsequent correspondence to the applicant at the second nominated email address - an approach that is entirely acceptable.
6. The correspondence (at CB 62) from the applicant did advise the Tribunal that the applicant has moved to Western Australia but the Court notes that all correspondence was sent to the by email (an acceptable means of transmission).
7. If the applicant is suggesting that his "change of mailing address" is to be interpreted as him signalling to the Tribunal that he wanted a face-to-face hearing before the Tribunal in Perth, that cannot be accepted on the material before the Court. At no time did the applicant indicate that he required a face-to-face hearing before the Tribunal. Rather, as noted by the Court above, the "change of address" details appeared in a "Response to hearing invitation" form and under cover of an email from the applicant in which the applicant specifically indicated that he would not appear before the Tribunal (CB 58-59).
8. Finally, as outlined above, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the applicant did not receive correspondence from the Tribunal. This is best evidenced by the fact that the applicant provided a completed "Response to hearing invitation" form and, ultimately, appealed the Tribunal's decision to this Court.
9. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.

1. The application for judicial review and supporting affidavit (both filed by the applicant on 26 July 2024) and the applicant's oral submissions to this Court have failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. This Court is otherwise unable to identify any error.
2. The application is, accordingly, dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-one (81) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kendall.