[2004] VSC 346
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Victoria
2004-09-14
TEAGUE J
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2004] VSC 346
WILLS - Probate and administration - lack of testamentary capacity - testatrix excluded her only daughter - testatrix suffered severe chronic schizophrenia - daughter persisted in measures to overcome mother's lifelong rejection - testatrix found not to have a sound disposing mind - unable to consider and give effect to the claims of her daughter
"It is essential to the exercise of (testamentary) power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made."
"...psychiatric knowledge has developed a great deal since those early formulations of the relevant legal principles. There is a degree of artificiality in seeking to force all manifestations of "insanity" under the rubric of delusion... The attention paid to delusions is understandable, but the law must be sufficiently flexible to take account of developments in psychiatric understanding. The critical question...concerns mental capacity to comprehend and appreciate the claims upon one's bounty."
"The authorities have used the term "inofficious" ... to refer to a will "in which natural affection and the claims of near relationship have been disregarded" ... The case confronted the trial judge with the difficulty of distinguishing between a "harsh, unreasonable judgment of character" which is not, on that account alone, inconsistent with a sound disposing mind, and a "morbid aberration" which so affects a testatrix's judgment of a person with a natural claim on her bounty as to warrant the conclusion that she lacked the capacity to make a valid will ...Where the evidence in a suit for probate raises a doubt as to testamentary capacity, there rests upon the plaintiff the burden of satisfying the conscience of the court that the testatrix had such capacity at the relevant time. If, following a vigilant examination of the whole of the evidence, the doubt is felt to be substantial enough to preclude a belief that the testatrix was of sound mind, memory and understanding at the time of execution of the will, probate will not be granted... This formulation of the onus of proof, well established by authority ... invites caution. The power freely to dispose of one's assets by will is an important right, and a determination that a person lacked (or, has not been shown to have possessed) a sound disposing mind, memory and understanding is a grave matter. Where a testatrix exhibits florid symptoms of psychotic disturbance, such a conclusion may be reached relatively easily... difficult though its application may be in individual cases, the law treats as critical the distinction between mere antipathy, albeit unreasonable, towards one who has a claim, and a judgment which is affected by a disorder of the mind...Testamentary capacity is not reserved for people who are wise, or fair, or reasonable, or whose values conform to generally accepted community standards. A person may disinherit a child for reasons that would shock the conscience of most ordinary members of the community, but that does not make the will invalid...great care needs to be exercised before concluding that a harsh or unreasonable judgment of another amounts to a delusion."
"...in our society, the law recognises and upholds freedom of testamentary disposition... the basic principle of testamentary freedom remains...It is reflected in the expectation of testators that, ordinarily their wills will be observed unless the law, for very good reason, provides otherwise....The freedom of testamentary disposition includes a freedom to be unfair, unwise or harsh with one's own property. As one can be in one's lifetime, so, by law, a testator can be at death...A duly executed will, rational on its face, is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary to be that of a person of competent understanding. Sanity is presumed until the contrary is shown...In judging the question of testamentary capacity the courts do not overlook the fact that many wills are made by people of advanced years. In such people, slowness, illness, feebleness and eccentricity will sometimes be apparent - more so than in most persons of younger age. But these are not ordinarily sufficient, if proved, to disentitle the testator of the right to dispose of his or her property by will...Nor will partial unsoundness of mind, which does not operate on the relevant capacities to appreciate the extent of and dispose of the estate, necessarily deprive the testator of testamentary capacity if it is shown that the will was signed during a lucid interval... Were the rule to be otherwise, so many wills would be liable to be set aside for want of testamentary capacity that the fundamental principle of our law would be undermined and the expectations of testators unreasonably destroyed."
1 The grant of probate made on 4 September 2002 of the will of Joan Margaret Bishop who died on 6th December 2001 is revoked. 2 Subject to the requirements of the Registrar of Probates being satisfied, a grant of Letters of Administration of the intestate estate of Joan Margaret Bishop be made to Shirley Anne Flynn of 398 Grassmere Road, Grassmere, Victoria. 3 The costs of Vincent Mario Roccisano in obtaining the grant of probate, in administering the estate pursuant to the grant, and of these proceedings be paid out of the estate.
Flynn
Roccisano [2004] VSC 346
(1924) 34 CLR 558
(1941) 66 CLR 277
(1942) 66 CLR 295
(1988) 14 NSWLR 698