Flow [2025] QBCCMCmr 398 (11 November 2025)

REASONABLENESS - whether the body corporate acted reasonably in denying the respondent's request to make a change to the external appearance of the lot

Act, ss 94 and 100

• 1.1 The scheme
• [1] Flow CTS 37560 is a community titles scheme located in West End. It comprises 81 lots[1] within two building towers, and common property.
• [2] Lot 44 is relevant to this dispute, as shall be explained below. This lot is located on Level C of one of the building towers i.e., Tower B. Lot 44 includes a courtyard of an area of 34m2.
• [3] Most other lots at the scheme have similar courtyards or balconies.
• [4] The scheme is regulated under the Act and the Accommodation Module.

• [5] This dispute is primarily about a purported contravention of the scheme's by-laws by the owner of Lot 44.
• [6] The applicant in this case, is the body corporate. The respondent, Ammar Mousali, is the said owner of Lot 44.
• [7] On or about January 2023, the respondent replaced a broken white ceiling-fan in the courtyard within his lot, with a rattan (light-brown) coloured one. The applicant body corporate states that the ceiling-fans originally installed within courtyards and balconies at the scheme were white in colour.
• [8] Approximately eighteen months later on 2 July 2024, the applicant body corporate raised the matter with the respondent requesting that the original fan be reinstalled or for an application for approval of the new fan to be made in terms of By-law 18(a) - which essentially requires a lot owner to obtain the written approval of the committee when making a change to the external appearance of the lot.
• [9] Having not heard from the respondent, the applicant body corporate issued a contravention notice on 1 November 2024 citing a contravention of By-law 18(a).

• [10] The applicant body corporate claims in the application that the following by-laws have been contravened by the respondent in this regard:

An owner or occupier of a Lot must not, without the written approval of the Committee make a change to the external appearance of the Lot.

The operation of this By-law is subject to the operation of all other By-laws.

(c) By-law 19 on 'window and window coverings' which states:

(a) An owner or occupier of a lot must keep the windows of the lot and promptly replace with glass of the same kind, colour and weight any that are broken or cracked.

(b) Subject to any other by-law no shutters, awnings or other window covers may be affixed externally to the building or be visible from the exterior of the building.

(c) An owner or occupier of a lot must not:

(i) Hang curtains visible from outside the lot unless those curtains have a white backing or the colour and design have been approved by the committee; or

(ii) Installed, renovate or replace a curtain backing or window treatment unless the colour and design have been approved by the committee; or

(iii) Install window tinting without having the colour and design of it approved by the committee.

(d) In giving such approvals, the committee must ensure, so far as is practicable, that curtain backings and window treatments are in colours sympathetic to the tones of improvements in the Scheme Land and are aesthetically pleasing when viewed from the common property or another lot.

(e) By-Law 19(b) does not apply to security screens, but they may only be attached to lots with the prior written consent of the Committee, which may in its discretion give or refuse consent or give consent subject to conditions.

(f) By way of guidance as to the type of security screens that will be approved:

(i) Only those similar in appearance to insect screens (with flat screening material and which to all intents and purposes would be viewed as an insect screen, so as not to detract from the overall appearance of the building while still offering sufficient security) will be approved; and

(ii) Screens of diamond mesh, grills and the like will not be approved.

1.2.2 Reasons for denial of the request for the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan

• [11] On 2 April 2025, the respondent sought retrospective approval of the committee of the applicant body corporate for the installed rattan-coloured ceiling-fan.
• [12] On 17 April 2025, the committee rejected this request and provided the following reasons for its decision:
  • The installed fan does not meet the criteria outlined in By-law 18 (a) & (g) when applied in conjunction with By-law 19 (c) (i).
  • By-Law 19 (c) (i) specifies that window coverings (blinds/curtains) must be white in colour to maintain the overall visual appearance of the building. Although there is no specific by-law regarding the colour or style of fan fittings, the committee uses this colour scheme as a guideline to ensure consistency in the building's appearance.
  • The installed fan is not in keeping with the overall visual appearance of the building's colour scheme, fixtures, and fittings.
  • By-law 19 (d) requires that any approvals given by the committee must ensure that colours are sympathetic to the tones of the improvements of the scheme.
• [13] In a nutshell, the applicant body corporate rejected the respondent's request for retrospective approval on two bases:

(a) Firstly, the installation is non-compliant with By-laws 18(a), 18(g), 19(c)(i) and 19(d)[2]; and

(b) Secondly, the installation is inconsistent with the buildings' colour scheme and not sympathetic to the tones of the improvements thereon.

• [14] The respondent states that the committee objected to the fan, eighteen months following its installation. He states that it is a retaliatory measure, upon the respondent having raised governance issues with the applicant body corporate. He is of the view that there are no genuine concerns associated with the appearance of the scheme.
• [15] The respondent also states that he formally requested copies of any approval records for fixtures affecting the external appearance of other lots including a black Victorian style garden lamp post and fountain, an orange gate panel, a spotlight style bollard, a black pendant light, a dark brown swing-arm wall light, a large black mesh animal cage and more. He states this request was made in terms of section 205(2) of the Act. He adds that the applicant body corporate produced no records, implying that there are none.
• [16] In these circumstances, the respondent argues that there is no uniformity in appearance in the lots across the scheme or any consistent visual theme. Accordingly, he is of the view that the by-laws are being selectively and unreasonably enforced.
• [17] He also states that the by-laws do not require fittings and fixtures in the courtyards and balconies to be white in colour. He states that it is arbitrary for the committee to insist upon this.

• [18] In these circumstances, the applicant body corporate seeks the following orders:

(a) An order confirming that the committee decision dated 17 April 2025 rejecting the respondent's application for the installed fan is valid and enforceable on the basis on non-compliance with By-laws 18(a), 18(g), 19(c)(i) and 19(d);

(b) An order requiring the respondent to remove the non-compliant fan within 14 days and replace it with a fan that is either the same as that originally installed or one that is white and streamlined, consistent with other installations and the scheme buildings' visual standards;

(c) An order that the respondent must comply with all future by-law requirements and obtain prior written approval from the committee before making any alterations to the external appearance of the lot.

• [19] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[3] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[4] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[5] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [6]
• [20] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of sections 276(1)(a) and (b) of the Act (read together with section 227(1)(b) of the Act).

• [21] This dispute was the subject of department conciliation which concluded on 21 March 2025 with the parties having reached an agreement.
• [22] The dispute however persisted.
• [23] This application for department adjudication was then lodged on 11 August 2025.
• [24] On 19 August 2025, the Commissioner's delegate sought further information from the applicant body corporate under section 240 of the Act.
• [25] On 3 September 2025, the applicant body corporate provided the information sought.
• [26] Subsequently, on 4 September 2025, the Commissioner provided a copy of the application and invited the respondent and all other lot owners to make submissions.
• [27] The owners of Lots 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 30, 74 and 82, and the respondent made submissions.
• [28] The applicant body corporate did not obtain a copy of or inspect the submissions made. Accordingly, it made no reply.
• [29] I have investigated the dispute by reviewing the application and submissions in terms of section 271 of the Act.

• [30] Whilst I have not set out every aspect of the application and submissions, they have been duly considered.
• [31] I will consider each of the three orders sought by the applicant body corporate below.

• [32] I am not satisfied that the committee's decision dated 17 April 2025 is valid, for reasons explained below.

3.1.1 Did the respondent contravene the by-laws?

• [33] The applicant body corporate claims that the respondent contravened By-laws 18(a), 18(g), 19(c)(i) and 19(d).

• [34] The evidence indicates that the respondent did indeed make a change to the external appearance of the lot without the written consent of the committee by installing the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan. This is not in dispute.
• [35] Accordingly, until 2 April 2025 this by-law had been contravened by the respondent.
• [36] However, the respondent subsequently attempted to regularise this contravention by formally seeking retrospective committee approval.
• [37] If the committee's rejection of this request is unreasonable or unlawful for any other reason, then the respondent may resist an action brought against him on the basis that he contravened By-law 18(a).

• [38] By-law 19(c)(i) states that an owner must not hang curtains visible from outside the lot unless those curtains have a white backing or the colour and design have been approved by the committee.
• [39] By-law 19(d) states that in giving such approval, the committee must ensure that curtain backings and window treatments are in colours sympathetic to the tones of improvements on scheme land and are aesthetically pleasing when viewed from common property or other lots.
• [40] The applicant body corporate states that whilst these by-laws do not expressly apply to ceiling-fans, the colour scheme specified applies to all visible fixtures in a lot.
• [41] Respectfully, I do not entirely agree with that view. Whilst community living in Queensland, especially in apartment buildings, is often highly regulated, it is also important to bear in mind that an owner of a lot in a community titles scheme owns that lot in fee simple. One of the rights that flow from such freehold ownership is the right to make improvements or changes to the lot subject to applicable law and the CMS (which includes the scheme's by-laws). When a body corporate seeks to curtail that right by way of its CMS - regardless of how reasonable it may be to do so in the circumstances - it must be done explicitly thereunder.
• [42] In this case, where the applicant body corporate alleges that the by-laws require all fixtures and fittings in a lot courtyard that are visible from another lot or common property to be white, the by-laws must be explicit to that effect.
• [43] By-law 19 is limited to windows and window coverings. Its wording does not in any manner capture ceiling-fans specifically, or the category of fixtures and fittings generally.
• [44] The applicant body corporate may in the circumstances rely on this by-law to demonstrate that the colour white is part of the buildings' colour scheme or profile, but no more. It cannot on that basis successfully claim that the respondent contravened By-law 19.
• [45] Accordingly, I cannot find on any basis whatsoever, that the respondent has contravened By-laws 19(c)(i) or 19(d) either standalone or when read together with By-law 18.

• [46] This by-law states that By-law 18 is subject to the operation of all other by-laws.
• [47] The applicant body corporate states that this by-law outlines the requirements for maintaining the appearance and integrity of the building. I presume that it interprets By-law 18(g) in that manner when read in conjunction with By-law 19 as purportedly applying to ceiling-fans.
• [48] I reiterate that By-law 19 has no application in the circumstances of this dispute.
• [49] Regardless, By-law 18(g) is declaratory in nature and is not specifically one capable of being contravened by the respondent in his capacity as an owner or occupier of a lot.
• [50] Accordingly, I cannot find that the respondent contravened By-law 18(g).

• [51] Central to the question whether the committee's decision dated 17 April 2025 is valid, is whether it was made reasonably.
• [52] There is a general requirement under section 94 of the Act that a body corporate must act reasonably in among other things, enforcing its CMS (including the by-laws), carrying out its functions under the Act and CMS and making or not making any related decisions.[7]
• [53] Similarly, under section 100(5) of the Act, the committee is required to act reasonably in making a decision. (Further, section 100(1) of the Act states that a decision of the committee is a decision of the body corporate.)
• [54] In the event this does not occur, an adjudicator may intervene to make an order that is just and equitable to resolve a dispute.
• [55] The question of whether a body corporate has acted reasonably is not a straightforward one. What is reasonable is a question of fact, based on a consideration of all relevant matters in the circumstances of the particular case.
• [56] There is generally no onus on a body corporate to satisfy an adjudicator that it acted reasonably.[8] (In this case however, I note that it is the body corporate that seeks a declaration that its decision is valid).
• [57] In addition to the duty to act reasonably, bodies corporate and their committees are subject to mandatory general law duties such as:

(a) The duty to act in good faith; and

(b) The duty to make fully considered, rational and reasonable decisions that are not conflicted, arbitrary, patently absurd or plainly unjust.[9]

• [58] The test of reasonableness was considered by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT') in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall[10] ('Beaches') which held as follows:

(a) 'Reasonable action is evidence-based and rational';[11]

(b) 'A finding that a decision or action in issue is "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" does not necessarily mean it is a reasonable one';[12]

(c) Whether an action is contaminated by unreasonableness is a finding or inference of fact.

• [59] A legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong'.[13] Accordingly, it is not sufficient to find that the body corporate could have made a better or more reasonable decision, or that a different body corporate could reasonably have come to a different decision.[14] It is not the adjudicator's role to substitute his/her own view as to what would be the preferable decision by the body corporate.[15]
• [60] QCAT also held in Beaches that legal unreasonableness encompasses decision-making errors such as irrelevance, adding that decision-making in practice requires that 'all relevant matters [be] taken into consideration and irrelevant ones left out'.[16] It held:

A decision will offend the relevancy doctrine where it was made without considering something that the decision maker was bound by the law to take account of or, conversely, acting on a factor that had no logical role to play in resolving the issues.[17]

• [61] Where the body corporate has considered irrelevant factors in making a decision, an adjudicator in my view is unlikely to invalidate the decision unless the irrelevant factors were determinative of the decision.[18] It was held in Hilltop Villas at Sunshine[19] that 'a finding that the body corporate did not properly consider the relevant factors does not necessarily mean an order deeming the motion passed is appropriate or warranted'.[20]
• [62] I note the relevant view posited by the late Sir Neil MacCormick[21]:

In such cases on the relevancy of grounds of decision, it obviously makes sense to say that among the plurality of grounds offered, each may "severally co-operate" with every other in favour of the decision made and as showing it to be relevantly grounded. Yet the attack made upon the decision will seek to isolate some one or more of the grounds as having been both irrelevant and determinative of the decision. If a dominant motive for a decision is a wrong one, that may be fatal to it even though there are, or might be, perfectly acceptable other reasons for the same decision. [citing Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968]]. While "reasonableness" may arise from a plurality of grounds, it may be that the presence of a single improper or irrelevant consideration is sufficient to "tilt the balance" the other way.

• [63] Whilst it is clear that it is not the adjudicator's role to weigh up and balance competing factors and effectively re-determine the decision of the body corporate[22], if it is demonstrated that the body corporate apportioned sufficient weight to an irrelevant consideration to tilt the balance the other way, the decision is at risk of invalidation or intervention by an adjudicator.
• [64] The application of this law would be no different if a body corporate considered irrelevant factors or did not properly consider relevant factors on account of bias on its part.

3.1.3 Can the committee deny the respondent's request for the rattan-coloured ceiling fan

on the basis of non-compliance with the by-laws?

• [65] The applicant body corporate or its committee cannot in the circumstances lawfully deny a request for approval made in terms of By-law 18(a), on the basis of a contravention of By-laws 18(g), 19(c)(i) and 19(d). This is because, (as explained above) these by-laws were not in fact contravened by the respondent in any manner.
• [66] I also note that the contravention notice issued on 1 November 2024 contains no reference to these by-laws, save for By-law 18(a).
• [67] More importantly, I note that the applicant body corporate has rejected the request for approval of the ceiling-fan - which was made by the respondent pursuant to By-law 18(a) - on the grounds that the respondent has contravened that same By-law 18(a).
• [68] I must admit I am unsure as to the rationale for such a contention.
• [69] By-law 18(a) does no more that require the respondent to obtain committee approval. It does not prohibit an owner or occupier of a lot from making any change to the external appearance of their lots. Rather, it contemplates that such changes can indeed be made, albeit with committee approval. Accordingly, this by-law should not be interpreted as having a prohibitive effect. To do so would be unreasonable and contrary to the express wording of the by-law.
• [70] A committee cannot then deny a request made under By-law 18(a) on the basis that either a request was previously not made or that a request was not made sooner, or that a request has been made for retrospective approval. In other words, it cannot deny the request on the basis that the respondent had previously contravened By-law 18(a). To do so would constitute unreasonable decision making - more specifically, it would mean that the committee considered an irrelevant factor which as explained above, has the capacity to infect the lawfulness of a decision.
• [71] When considering the respondent's request for approval of the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan, the following (among other things) are some relevant considerations:

(a) The appearance of the fan, including its colour;

(b) The appearance of fans installed within other courtyards or balconies at the scheme;

(c) Any consistent visual theme or uniform colour profile across the scheme buildings considering all fixtures and fittings in courtyards and balconies;

(d) Any specific colours noted in the scheme's by-laws as being part of the scheme buildings' colour profile.

• [72] Similarly, the following (among other things) constitute irrelevant factors when considering the respondent's request:

(a) A misinterpretation of the by-laws;

(b) The respondent's history of non-compliance with the scheme's by-laws, if any;

(c) The fact that the respondent did not seek approval prior to the installation of the ceiling fan;

(d) The fact that the respondent is seeking retrospective approval.

• [73] Accordingly, I find that for the committee to deny the respondent's request on the grounds of a contravention of By-laws 18(g), 19(c)(i) and 19(d), was incorrect given my finding that these by-laws had not in fact been contravened or even triggered. Accordingly, this was an irrelevant consideration for the committee.
• [74] Further, I find that the prior contravention of By-law 18(a) by the respondent was also an irrelevant consideration when determining the respondent's request for the approval of the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan.
• [75] Moreover, based on the evidence, I am satisfied that the committee apportioned sufficient weight to these irrelevant factors, to the extent that it was determinative of the decision made and was a dominant motive for it. This is apparent simply upon a reading of the first order sought by way of this application. In doing so, I find that the applicant body corporate contravened sections 100(5) and 94(2) of the Act.
• [76] Accordingly, I cannot grant the first order sought. Further, it would be prudent for the applicant body corporate to reconsider the respondent's request for the ceiling-fan.

3.1.4 Would it have been unlawful or unreasonable for the committee to deny the

respondent's request solely on the grounds that the rattan-colour does not align with

• [77] In this case, if the applicant body corporate had reasonably ascertained the colour profile of the scheme buildings, and was satisfied that the rattan-colour of the ceiling-fan installed in the respondent's lot was not sympathetic to the existing colour profile (devoid of any determinative irrelevant considerations), that decision prima facie would not have been unreasonable.
• [78] For e.g., if all fixtures and fittings in the courtyards and the balconies at a scheme are black, white and grey, and a lot owner requests approval to install a large neon-pink pendant light, the body corporate may under a by-law such as By-law 18(a) reasonably reject the lot owner's request on the basis that the proposed installation does not align with the building's colour profile.
• [79] Consider a further example and scenario where courtyards and balconies in lots at a scheme originally contained large black pendant lights, and the body corporate has under a by-law such as By-law 18(a) permitted lot owners to replace them with white pendant lights. Similarly, ceiling-fans in the same courtyards and balconies were originally black. However, the body corporate does not permit lot owners to replace them with white ceiling-fans on the basis that it is not in keeping with the building's colour profile. In such an instance, where the colour profile clearly includes the colours black and white, it may not prima facie be reasonable to reject the installation of a white fixture.
• [80] In this case, the respondent has provided various photographs of improvements made to the courtyards and balconies of other lots, which suggests a colour profile that is not limited to white. I have not investigated this aspect of this dispute given I am already satisfied that the lawfulness of the committee's decision dated 17 April 2025 was contaminated by determinative irrelevant factors (as explained further above).
• [81] Accordingly, it would be prudent for the applicant body corporate to consider the evidence provided by the respondent in this regard, and ascertain whether it would be reasonable in the circumstances to insist on a white ceiling-fan. I have provided the applicant body corporate with a copy of the respondent's submission at no cost in the interests of natural justice. I am also hopeful that the perusal of this submission will assist the applicant body corporate in any determination of the reasonableness on insisting on a white ceiling-fan.

3.2 Should the respondent be ordered to remove the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan?

• [82] The second order sought by the applicant body corporate is to require the respondent to remove the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan within 14 days from the date of this decision and replace it with a fan that is either the same as that originally installed or one that is white and streamlined.
• [83] I am of the view that it would not be just and equitable to make this order given:

(a) My finding that the applicant body corporate acted unreasonably in rejecting the respondent's request for approval of the rattan-coloured ceiling fan by considering irrelevant determinative factors; and

(b) My recommendation that the applicant body corporate redetermine the respondent's application for approval of the ceiling-fan.

• [84] I understand that while my decision in this regard does not provide immediate finality to the resolution of this dispute as the parties would have hoped, it is my view that it nevertheless takes cognisance of the autonomy of the applicant body corporate - a hallmark of the concept of self-management enshrined in the legislation.

3.3 Should the respondent be ordered to obey the by-laws in future?

• [85] The third order sought by the applicant body corporate is to require the respondent in the future to comply with the scheme's by-laws for the time being in force, especially the prevailing By-law 18(a).
• [86] While I am satisfied that By-law 18(a) is a reasonable one, I am not persuaded that an adjudicator's order is required to give it force and effect.
• [87] Section 59(2)(b) of the Act states that a scheme's CMS which includes the by-laws is binding on each member of the body corporate (i.e., lot owners). In other words, the legislation requires the respondent to comply with the by-laws.
• [88] Accordingly, an adjudicator's order to that same effect would be superfluous.
• [89] In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the third order sought is required.

• [90] I find that the respondent had previously, until 2 April 2025, contravened By-law 18(a), given he did indeed make a change to the external appearance of his lot without the written consent of the committee. However, he subsequently attempted to regularise this contravention by formally seeking retrospective committee approval for the installation of the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan. If the committee's rejection of this request is unlawful then the respondent may resist by-law enforcement action brought against him (on the basis of By-law 18(a)).
• [91] By-law 19 has no application to the dispute in question given it pertains to windows and window coverings.
• [92] By-law 18(g) is declaratory in nature and is not a by-law capable of being contravened by the respondent in his capacity as a lot owner or occupier.
• [93] Accordingly, the applicant body corporate acted unreasonably in making its decision dated 17 April 2025 whereupon it based the same on the contravention of the said by-laws. I am satisfied that this was determinative of its decision.
• [94] In these circumstances, I urge the applicant body corporate to redetermine the respondent's request for the approval of the rattan-coloured ceiling-fan.
• [95] For these reasons, I cannot grant the first and second order sought.
• [96] Further, I am not satisfied that the third order sought would have any utility given the legislation already requires the respondent to comply with the scheme's by-laws.
• [97] Accordingly, I dismiss this application.

[1] Note: The lots at this scheme are not numbered in perfect chronology. For e.g., whilst there are only 81 lots, there are lots bearing numbers 82 and 83. This is not unusual.

[2] The applicant body corporate alleges the contravention of an additional by-law, i.e., By-law 19(d), under the orders sought

[3] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws

[4] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act

[6] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]

[7] Section 100 of the Act

[8] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[9] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [35]

[10] [2016] QCATA 177

[11] SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 [15] - [16] as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [23]

[12] McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [60] (Hayne J) as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [24]

[13] Woden Valley Glass v Psaila (1993) 122 ALR 378, 391 as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47]

[14] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[16] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [36] and [42]

[18] Crown Towers [2021] QBCCMCmr 372 at [149] and [177]; Bowen Terrace Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 33 at [5], [6] and [29].

[19] [2024] QBCCMCmr 68 at [48]

[20] This is also consistent with the decision of the High Court of Australia in Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 regarding ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affected the exercise of power. (See also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317)

[21] Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1575 (1999)

[22] See Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [33] and [105]