In accordance with Division 7.6 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017, the Personal Injury Commission's assessment is:

1. For the purposes of s 3.37(2)(a) of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017, statutory benefits are payable to the claimant because he was acquitted of a serious driving offence charged that was related to the motor accident.

A statement setting out the Commission's reasons for the assessment is included with this certificate.

1. This dispute concerns the application of the serious driving offence exclusion in s 3.37 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) (the MAI Act) to the claimant, Jesse Flanagan.
2. The claimant sustained injuries in a motor accident on 5 February 2022.
3. In December 2024, the criminal proceedings were finalised in the District Court of New South Wales on four charges arising from one continuous episode: a police-pursuit charge under s 51B Crimes Act 1900; two counts of causing bodily harm by misconduct in charge of a motor vehicle under s 53 of that Act; and a summary charge under s 117(2) of the Road Transport Act 2013 (RTA). Each of those provisions is listed in Schedule 4 to the RTA as a "major offence" and thus a "serious driving offence" for the purposes of s 3.37(5) of the MAI Act. Each charge related to the claimant's driving of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
4. In respect of the three indictable offences, the Court entered special verdicts of "act proven but not criminally responsible" pursuant to s 30 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (MHCI Act). The Court accepted unchallenged psychiatric evidence that, at the time of the offending conduct, the claimant was suffering from a manic psychotic episode associated with bipolar affective disorder, such that he lacked criminal responsibility in law.
5. The remaining charge, being the summary offence under s 117(2) of the RTA could not be disposed of by way of a special verdict under the mental health legislation. Instead, on the same facts, the Court found the offence proved but dismissed it without conviction pursuant to s 10(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (CSP Act), having regard to the same psychiatric evidence and the claimant's mental state at the time of the conduct.
6. No conviction was recorded in respect of any charge. All criminal proceedings were thereby brought to an end.
7. Following the commencement of the criminal proceedings, the insurer determined that the claimant was disentitled to statutory benefits pursuant to s 3.37 of the MAI Act, on the basis that he had been charged with serious driving offences related to the motor accident. That position was maintained after internal review. The insurer relies on the contention that none of the outcomes in the criminal proceedings falls within the exceptions in s 3.37(2) of the MAI Act, which permit the payment of statutory benefits where a person is acquitted of the offence charged or where proceedings are discontinued.
8. The claimant disputes that determination. He submits that the special verdicts of not criminally responsible are, in substance and effect, acquittals for the purposes of s 3.37(2), and that the dismissal of the summary offence under s 10(1)(a), entered on the same mental health basis, should be treated in the same way. He further contends that a contrary construction would attribute criminal culpability to conduct which the criminal law has expressly determined to be non-culpable, and would give rise to serious questions of consistency with Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation.
9. The insurer relies, in particular, on the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Insurance Australia Ltd v Hulse [2024] NSWSC 142 (Hulse), to contend that the exceptions in s 3.37(2) are exhaustive and that a dismissal under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act does not constitute either an acquittal of the offence charged or a discontinuance of the proceedings.
10. It is against that factual and procedural background that the present Miscellaneous Claims Assessment falls to be determined.

1. The insurer submits that s 3.37 of the MAI Act operates according to its terms to disentitle the claimant from statutory benefits. It contends that each of the offences with which the claimant was charged constitutes a "serious driving offence" within the meaning of s 3.37(5), and that the disentitlement in s 3.37(1) was therefore enlivened upon the commencement of the criminal proceedings.
2. The insurer accepts that three of the charges were ultimately resolved by special verdicts of "act proven but not criminally responsible" under the MHCI Act, and that the remaining charge was dismissed without conviction under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act. However, it submits that neither outcome falls within the exceptions in s 3.37(2). The insurer argues that a special verdict is not an acquittal, because it involves proof of the act constituting the offence, and that a dismissal under s 10(1)(a) is likewise not an acquittal or a discontinuance, because it proceeds on a finding that the offence has been proved.
3. In support of that construction, the insurer relies upon Hulse. It submits that Hulse establishes that the exceptions in s 3.37(2) are exhaustive, and that outcomes short of a formal acquittal or prosecutorial discontinuance do not restore entitlement to statutory benefits. The insurer contends that any extension of those concepts would involve an impermissible rewriting of the statute.
4. The insurer further submits that the mental health findings made in the criminal proceedings are irrelevant to the operation of s 3.37. It argues that the provision is concerned with the fact of charge and the formal outcome of criminal proceedings, not with culpability or moral blameworthiness. On that view, the legislative choice reflected in s 3.37 is to prioritise the protection of the statutory scheme over individual circumstances, even where criminal responsibility is absent.
5. The claimant submits that the insurer's construction of s 3.37 is unduly narrow and divorced from the purpose of the provision. He contends that s 3.37 is directed to excluding from the statutory benefits scheme those whose injuries are sustained in the course of culpable criminal driving, not those who have been found not criminally responsible by operation of law.
6. The claimant submits that the special verdicts of "act proven but not criminally responsible" constitute acquittals in substance and effect. He emphasises that those verdicts finally determined the criminal proceedings without conviction and without attribution of criminal responsibility. He submits that to treat such verdicts less favourably than acquittals for the purposes of s 3.37(2) would be incoherent and contrary to legislative purpose.
7. In relation to the summary offence, the claimant submits that the dismissal under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act was entered because the offence could not be disposed of by a special verdict under the mental health legislation. He argues that the different procedural route reflects the limits of the statutory framework, not any difference in culpability. On that basis, he submits that the s 10 dismissal should be treated as the functional equivalent of a mental-health exculpation and therefore as a discontinuance, or analogous outcome, for the purposes of s 3.37(2).
8. The claimant further submits that a construction of s 3.37 which permanently disentitles persons found not criminally responsible would give rise to serious questions of consistency with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act). He contends that the administration of statutory benefits constitutes the provision of a service, and that denying access to those benefits by reference to mental illness would amount to discrimination on the ground of disability. While accepting that no discrimination claim is before the Commission, he submits that those considerations inform the proper construction of s 3.37 and reinforce the need to prefer a construction that avoids such inconsistency.

1. The dispute turns on the interaction between three statutory schemes: the MAI Act, the MHCI Act, and the CSP Act. Consideration is also given to the DD Act insofar as it informs the proper construction of the State legislation.

The Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW)

1. Part 3 of the MAI Act establishes a statutory scheme for the payment of benefits to persons injured in motor accidents, without the need to establish fault. Section 3.37 creates an exception to that scheme.
2. Section 3.37(1) provides that statutory benefits are not payable to an injured person after the person has been charged with or convicted of a serious driving offence that was related to the motor accident. Section 3.37(4) explains that a person is considered to have been charged with a serious driving offence while proceedings for such an offence are pending, and that the person is considered to have been charged when those proceedings are commenced.
3. Section 3.37(2) qualifies the exclusion. It provides that the section does not prevent the payment of statutory benefits if the person is acquitted of the offence charged or if the proceedings are discontinued (otherwise than in circumstances involving a plea of guilty to another serious driving offence that contributed to the person's injury). Where that occurs, statutory benefits are payable from the date the person was charged.
4. The definition of "serious driving offence" in s 3.37(5) includes an offence that is a "major offence" under the RTA. It is not in dispute that each of the offences charged against the claimant falls within that definition.

The Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW)

1. At common law, the defence of mental illness was governed by the principles articulated in M'Naghten's Case and applied in Australia in cases such as R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182 (R v Porter). Where the defence succeeded, the verdict returned was traditionally expressed as "not guilty by reason of mental illness". That verdict reflected the common-law position that, although the physical act was proved, the accused lacked the capacity to be held criminally responsible and was therefore not guilty in law.
2. The MHCI Act replaced that common-law framework with a comprehensive statutory code. Part 3 of the Act was expressly intended to modernise and restate the law relating to criminal responsibility and mental impairment. In the Second Reading Speech, the Attorney General explained that the defence provided in what became s 28 was designed to "closely mirror" the common law M'Naghten test, but with updated terminology, and that the Act would replace the existing common-law and statutory arrangements with a single, coherent scheme.
3. Section 28 now provides that a person is not criminally responsible for an offence if, at the time of carrying out the conduct, the person had a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment and, because of that impairment, did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did not know that the act was wrong. That formulation restates, in modern language, the substance of the common-law test. It does not narrow the defence; it legislates it.
4. Crucially, the MHCI Act also reformulated the verdict that follows from the successful establishment of the defence. Section 30 requires the court to return a special verdict of "act proven but not criminally responsible". That verdict replaces the former verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness". The change in terminology was deliberate. It was intended to separate more clearly the factual finding that the physical act occurred from the legal conclusion that criminal responsibility is absent. The new verdict avoids the linguistic tension inherent in describing a person as "not guilty" where the act is proved, while preserving the same legal consequence as the former common-law verdict.
5. The legislative history makes clear that this was a reformulation, not a re-characterisation. The special verdict under s 30 performs the same juridical function as the former verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness. It records that the prosecution has failed to establish an essential element of criminal liability, namely, criminal responsibility, and that the accused is therefore not guilty in law. The accused is discharged from the charge and cannot be convicted or punished. What follows is not sentencing, but the operation of a separate protective regime concerned with treatment, supervision or care.
6. For that reason, authorities concerned with the common-law defence of mental illness, including R v Porter, continue to have relevance in understanding the operation and effect of s 28. The statutory defence replaces the common law as a source of authority, but it does not alter the underlying principle: where mental impairment negates criminal responsibility, the offence is not proved in law. The special verdict mandated by s 30 is the statutory successor to the common-law verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, and it carries the same exculpatory effect.
7. Accordingly, when a court returns a verdict of "act proven but not criminally responsible" under s 30, it has determined, as a matter of fact and law, that the accused is not criminally responsible and not guilty of the offence charged, notwithstanding proof of the physical act. The accused is thereby acquitted of the offence charged in law and discharged from the criminal charge, even though the form of the verdict differs from the historical common-law expression.

The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

1. Section 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act empowers a court, after finding an offence proved, to dismiss the charge without proceeding to conviction. The provision permits the court to do so having regard to matters including the offender's character, antecedents, age, health and the circumstances of the offence.
2. A dismissal under s 10(1)(a) records that the offence is proved but does not result in a conviction being recorded, the charge is instead dismissed. The provision operates within the sentencing discretion of the court and may be invoked where the court considers that the interests of justice do not require the recording of a conviction.

The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

1. The DD Act primarily implements the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Ratified by Australia in 2008, the CRPD is an international treaty aimed at ensuring people with disabilities enjoy full equality, dignity, and human rights. The DD Act prohibits discrimination on the ground of disability in a range of areas, including the provision of goods, services and facilities. "Disability" is defined broadly in s 4 and includes a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person's thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behaviour and includes a manifestation of that disability.
2. Section 14(1) provides that the DD Act binds the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and of each State. Section 24 makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of disability in the provision of services. Section 47(2) creates a limited exemption for conduct done in direct compliance with a "prescribed law". The MAI Act is not a prescribed law for the purposes of that provision.
3. The statutory definition of "services" in the DD Act is inclusive, not exhaustive. It proceeds by way of exemplification, not limitation. Of particular relevance are services relating to insurance and finance, and services of the kind provided by a government or a government authority. Those categories are expressed in deliberately broad terms and are apt to encompass a wide range of activities undertaken pursuant to statutory authority.
4. The meaning of the word "services" in anti-discrimination legislation has been considered on numerous occasions over the past several decades.
5. The most authoritative consideration is that of the High Court in IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1 (IW v City of Perth). In that case, the Court considered the meaning of "services" in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA). Although the Western Australian definition differed in its precise wording from s 4 of the DD Act, it was similarly expressed in inclusive terms and, relevantly, extended to services of a governmental or public authority kind. The differences in drafting do not detract from the guidance provided by the reasoning in IW v City of Perth for present purposes.
6. The principal question before the High Court was whether a municipal council, in determining an application for planning approval, was providing a "service" within the meaning of the anti-discrimination legislation. To resolve that question, it was necessary to characterise the nature of the council's activity in determining such applications.
7. A majority of the Court (Dawson, Gaudron, Toohey, Gummow and Kirby JJ) concluded that the relevant activities of the City of Perth did constitute the provision of a service. Dawson and Gaudron JJ emphasised that "services" is a word of complete generality which should not be given a narrow construction unless compelled by definition or context. Toohey J observed that the word should be given its ordinary and wide meaning, and that whether there has been a refusal to provide a service is a question of fact. Kirby J described the concept of "services" as "extremely wide".
8. Of particular significance for present purposes are the reasons of Gummow J, who addressed directly the contention that the exercise of statutory functions precludes characterisation as a service. His Honour rejected any such dichotomy. The fact that a public authority exercises statutory powers or performs statutory duties does not, of itself, deny the possibility that it is also engaged in the provision of services to those who invoke the exercise of those powers. The question is one of characterisation, informed by the purposes of the respective statutes. There is no reason in logic or good sense to deny that a public authority may be providing services not only to the community at large, but also to individual applicants who seek the exercise of statutory powers in their favour.
9. Two members of the Court (Brennan CJ and McHugh J) reached a different conclusion. Their Honours accepted that the term "services" has a wide meaning and that, if capable of applying to an activity consistently with the objects of the Act, it should be so applied. However, they considered that certain governmental activities particularly those properly characterised as legislative or quasi-judicial in nature, fall outside the scope of the concept. In their view, where a public authority is acting as a deliberative body or exercising a quasi-judicial function that requires consideration of the public interest, it may be inappropriate to characterise that activity as the provision of a service, even if the outcome confers or withholds a benefit to an individual.
10. Two points may be made about that minority reasoning. First, it did not command the support of the majority. Second, the limits proposed by Brennan CJ and McHugh J were confined to activities of a legislative or quasi-judicial character. They do not deny that operational decision-making, undertaken pursuant to statutory authority and directed to the administration or delivery of benefits, may constitute the provision of services.
11. In light of IW v City of Perth, the concept of "services" is to be approached as one of broad application, informed by the statutory context and the character of the activity in question. The exercise of statutory power is not, of itself, determinative. The critical inquiry is whether the activity is properly characterised as part of an organised system for the provision of benefits, facilities or assistance to individuals or a class of persons, even where that activity is undertaken in the public interest and subject to evaluative judgment.
12. The payment and administration of statutory benefits under the motor accidents scheme involve the conferral of a tangible benefit upon an injured person, following an evaluative process carried out by an insurer acting within a legislative framework. The Commission in determining a miscellaneous application fulfils a role no different to the insurer in that respect. The benefit conferred by that decision making is not merely incidental to the scheme; it is the very object of it. The injured person engages with the scheme for the purpose of obtaining income support, treatment expenses and related financial assistance. That engagement is mediated through decision-making processes which determine eligibility, duration, cessation and reinstatement of payments.
13. Although those decisions are made pursuant to statute, that circumstance does not deny their character as services. The definition expressly contemplates services of a governmental kind. Nor is it necessary that the service be contractual, commercial, or voluntarily assumed. What matters is that an activity is directed to the provision of assistance, benefit or advantage to a person or class of persons, and that it is administered through an organised system designed to deliver that benefit.
14. The fact that the decision-maker must take into account broader statutory considerations, or that the decision may be adverse to the individual in a particular case, does not deprive the activity of its character as a service. Professional services frequently involve evaluative judgments, the imposition of conditions, or the refusal of an application, yet they remain services nonetheless. The statutory context does not create a dichotomy between the discharge of public functions and the provision of services to individuals who invoke those functions.
15. Nor is the relevant inquiry confined to identifying a single beneficiary. A statutory scheme may simultaneously serve the interests of the community, the integrity of the scheme, and the individual applicant. That multiplicity of purpose does not negate the existence of a service relationship between the decision-maker and the person seeking the benefit. The same activity may constitute a service to more than one class of persons.
16. For present purposes, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to determine conclusively whether the administration of statutory benefits constitutes the provision of "services" within the meaning of the DD Act. It is sufficient that such a characterisation is reasonably open on the language of that Act, and that it informs the construction of section 3.37. A construction of s 3.37 which would operate to deny or withhold statutory benefits in circumstances where criminal responsibility has been negatived as a matter of fact - by treating a person less favourably, because of mental impairment, than a person without that impairment whose conduct was not criminally culpable - would subject the person to a detriment by reason of disability. Such a construction, which would attribute criminal culpability to conduct that the criminal law has determined to be non-culpable and would impose adverse legal consequences because of the manifestation of disability, is not to be preferred absent clear and unmistakable statutory language authorising that result.

1. One of the four charges laid against the claimant was the offence of driving recklessly, furiously or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public, contrary to s 117(2) of the RTA. Unlike the remaining charges, that offence is a summary offence. Its summary character is of present significance.
2. Pursuant to s 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), that summary offence was heard and determined together with the indictable offences, all arising out of the same set of circumstances. Although the matter was therefore dealt with in the District Court as part of a single criminal proceeding, the offence did not lose its summary character by reason of that statutory joinder.
3. The MHCI Act draws a clear institutional and procedural distinction. Part 2 of the Act applies to summary proceedings before a Magistrate. The term "Magistrate" is defined by reference to the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) and includes a Magistrate or Children's Magistrate of the Local Court. It does not extend to a Judge of the District Court, who holds a distinct judicial commission under the District Court Act 1973 (NSW).
4. Part 3 of the MHCI Act, which establishes the defence of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment and mandates the special verdict of "act proven but not criminally responsible", by virtue of s 27 applies to "criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court (including criminal proceedings within the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) and the District Court". It does not apply to summary offences as such, and nothing in the MHCI Act confers power on a District Court judge to apply the Part 2 summary-disposal mechanisms, which are expressly confined to Magistrates.
5. The MHCI Act operates as a closed and exhaustive code in respect of criminal responsibility by reason of mental illness. Where its threshold criteria are met, the court is constrained to deal with the accused exclusively under that statutory regime. The Act codifies the M'Naghten defence and displaces the common law in that field, but it does not codify other doctrines of non-responsibility, such as sane automatism. The consequence is that classification at the threshold is determinative: if a case falls within the regime, no alternative form of disposition is available; if it falls outside it, the common law applies.
6. The reasoning of the Court cf Criminal Appeal in R v DB [2022] NSWCCA 87; (2022) 108 NSWLR 51 underscores that proposition. The Court's reasoning proceeds on the premise that, if the statutory threshold were met, the court would be confined to the machinery of the MHCI Act, with no residual scope to resort to common law outcomes. The decision therefore turns not on any flexibility within the regime, but on a prior conclusion that the accused did not fall within it at all. In that way, the case confirms that the MHCI Act operates as a closed code in respect of mental-impairment-based non-responsibility: once engaged, it displaces alternative modes of disposition, and it is precisely to avoid that consequence that the threshold question assumes such decisive importance.
7. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the summary offence arose out of the same episode of conduct as the indictable offences, and notwithstanding that the District Court accepted the same psychiatric evidence in relation to the claimant's mental state at the relevant time, the District Court lacked power to dispose of the summary count either by a special verdict under Part 3 or by a mental-health dismissal under Part 2. The procedural route by which the offence came before the District Court did not enlarge the range of substantive dispositions available under the mental health legislation.
8. In those circumstances, the only mechanism available by which a Judge of the District Court could lawfully determine the summary charge, while reflecting the absence of criminal responsibility established on the evidence, was the exercise of the sentencing discretion under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act. The resulting dismissal without conviction was not the product of ordinary leniency, nor of a discretionary assessment of reduced culpability. It was the consequence of a statutory structure which afforded no other juridical means, in relation to a summary offence before the District Court, to give effect to the conclusion compelled by the psychiatric evidence: that the claimant's conduct was the product of mental impairment and that criminal responsibility was absent. The different form of disposition reflects the limits of the legislative framework, not any difference in the substantive assessment of culpability.

1. The decision in Hulse was concerned with a narrow question of statutory construction arising from a particular procedural outcome in the criminal proceedings. The claimant in that case had been charged with a serious driving offence and had entered a plea of guilty. The offence was proved. The Local Court, having found the claimant guilty, exercised the discretion under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act to dismiss the charge without proceeding to conviction.
2. Before the Personal Injury Commission, the Member reasoned that because the charge had been dismissed without a conviction having been recorded and proceedings were no longer pending, the claimant was no longer "charged" for the purposes of s 3.37(1) of the MAI Act. On that footing, the Member concluded that s 3.37(1) was not engaged and that the disentitlement provision did not apply.
3. On judicial review, Harrison AsJ rejected that reasoning. Her Honour held that s 3.37(1) is engaged by the historical fact that a person "has been charged" with a serious driving offence, and that a dismissal under s 10(1)(a) following a finding of guilt does not negate that fact. The disentitlement imposed by s 3.37(1) therefore arose upon the laying of the charge and continued unless relieved in accordance with s 3.37(2).
4. It was common ground in Hulse that the claimant had not been "convicted" within the meaning of s 3.37(1), and it was also common ground that the proceedings had not been "discontinued". The claimant had pleaded guilty, the offence had been proved, and the proceedings had culminated in an exercise of sentencing leniency. In those circumstances, neither limb of s 3.37(2) was engaged. Relief from disentitlement was therefore unavailable on the facts of that case.
5. The Court was not required to determine, and did not determine, the meaning of "acquitted of the offence charged" in s 3.37(2), nor the scope of that term beyond its application to the facts before it. The case proceeded throughout on the footing that criminal responsibility had been established and that the only issue was the effect, for the purposes of s 3.37, of a dismissal without conviction following admitted, and thereby, proved, guilt.
6. Properly understood, Hulse stands for the proposition that a dismissal under s 10(1)(a) following a finding of guilt does not remove the operation of s 3.37(1), and that relief from disentitlement depends upon satisfaction of the criteria in s 3.37(2). It does not resolve, and does not foreclose, the distinct constructional question which arises where criminal responsibility has been negatived as a matter of fact and/or law.

1. The determination of this matter turns on the proper construction of s 3.37 of the MAI Act. The task of statutory construction must begin with the text of the provision. As the plurality explained in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47], the language actually employed by Parliament is the surest guide to legislative intention. That text, however, is not construed in isolation. From the outset, it must be read in its context and by reference to the purpose and policy of the provision, including the mischief it was intended to remedy.
2. Section 3.37(1) provides that statutory benefits are not payable to an injured person after the person has been charged with or convicted of a serious driving offence related to the motor accident. Section 3.37(4) explains that a person is considered to have been charged while proceedings are pending, and that the person is taken to have been charged when those proceedings are commenced. Section 3.37(2) qualifies the exclusion, providing that the section does not prevent the payment of statutory benefits if the person is acquitted of the offence charged or the proceedings are discontinued. Where that occurs, statutory benefits are payable from the date the person was charged.
3. Read as a whole, the provision establishes a temporary suspension of statutory benefits during the pendency of criminal proceedings for serious driving offences, with restoration of entitlement where those proceedings conclude, relevantly, with an "acquittal of the offence charged".
4. Section 3.37 presents a constructional choice which is properly characterised as a choice between competing meanings that are each linguistically open. The term "acquitted of the offence charged" is not defined. It is capable of a narrow construction confined to formal verdicts of not guilty. It is also capable of a broader construction which looks to the substance and legal effect of the criminal disposition, namely, whether the proceedings have been finally determined without attribution of criminal responsibility for the offence charged.
5. The constructional choice in this case is also informed by the principle of legality as it operates to protect fundamental human rights recognised by Australian law: Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304; Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 18; Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 436-437; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543 at 553 [11], 562-563 [43], 578 [93]-[94], 592-593 [134]; Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) (2003) 214 CLR 496 at 513 [45]; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at 271 [58]; Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1 at 46 [43]. Freedom from discrimination before the law, including discrimination on the ground of disability, is a right of that character. It is reflected in long-standing common law principles of equality before the law and has been given specific statutory expression by the DD Act. The principle of legality proceeds on the assumption that Parliament does not intend, without unmistakable and irresistibly clear language, to abrogate or curtail such fundamental rights or to authorise their impairment by indirect means.
6. Where s 3.37 admits of a construction that would avoid treating a person less favourably, or subjecting them to a detriment, because of conduct that is inseparable from the manifestation of a disability and which the criminal law has determined to be non-culpable, that construction is to be preferred. Absent clear words of plain intention, s 3.37 should not be construed as authorising an outcome that would deny access to statutory benefits by reason of disability, or that would undermine the fundamental right to equality before the law which the DD Act seeks to protect.
7. The broader construction does not require any departure from the ordinary meaning of the words Parliament has chosen. In criminal law, an acquittal of the offence charged is not confined to the formal return of a verdict of "not guilty" by a jury. At its core, an acquittal connotes a judicial outcome by which an accused person is relieved of criminal liability because the prosecution has failed, in law, to establish guilt. That failure may arise in several ways. For example, it may result from a jury verdict or judge-alone finding of not guilty; it may follow a directed verdict where there is no case to answer; it may occur upon the quashing of a conviction on appeal; it may arise by operation of law where an essential element of the offence charged is not proved, whether by reason of evidentiary deficiency or because the charge is misconceived in law; or it may arise for jurisdictional reasons (see, for example, Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531).
8. The constructional task presented by s 3.37 requires attention to substance rather than label. Just as, in another statutory context, the existence of a judgment debt is not conclusive if the statute requires satisfaction that there is, in truth and reality, a debt still owing (see eg. Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; (2017) 261 CLR 132 dealing with s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)), so too here the phrase "acquitted of the offence charged" is concerned with the juridical reality that the criminal process has concluded in favour of the accused by reason of a finding that the accused was not criminally responsible for the offence as charged, as a matter of law. That is, the inquiry is directed to legal effect: whether the criminal proceedings have been finally determined without the establishment of criminal responsibility for the offence as charged.
9. What unites the various modes by which an accused person may be acquitted from an offence as charged is therefore not their procedural form but their legal consequence. Each represents a final judicial determination that the prosecution has failed, in law, to establish guilt; whether because the act was not voluntary, because an essential mental element was not proved, or because criminal responsibility has been negatived by operation of law. In each case, the accused is discharged from the charge and relieved from penal consequences. That does not mean that the underlying conduct cannot later found civil liability: the absence of criminal guilt does not preclude civil proceedings arising out of the same facts, which proceed by different principles, on the balance of probabilities, and within distinct statutory regimes.
10. Historically and doctrinally, that is the broader sense in which "acquittal" has always operated in criminal law. It denotes the termination of the criminal process in favour of the accused and engages the protection against further prosecution for the same offence. It follows that outcomes other than a conventional verdict of "not guilty" may, depending on their legal effect, amount to an acquittal in substance and in law. Where a court determines that an essential element of criminal liability has not been established, the accused is acquitted in law, even if the disposition is expressed in language other than the traditional verdict.
11. Special verdicts of "act proven but not criminally responsible" fall squarely within that conception. Although the physical act is found to have occurred, the criminal court determines, as a matter of fact and law, that criminal responsibility is absent. The prosecution therefore fails to prove the offence in law. The verdict is exculpatory, not mitigatory. It is a judicial deliverance from guilt and from criminal liability, and it finally determines the charge in favour of the accused.
12. So too does an order made under s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act which dismisses the charge without conviction. Although procedurally distinct, such an order likewise brings the criminal proceedings to a final conclusion without the imposition of criminal liability. The operative inquiry is not the formal description of the disposition, but its legal effect. Where, as here, the dismissal reflects a judicial determination that the offence is not made out in law, because an essential element of criminal responsibility is absent, the outcome is exculpatory in substance. It operates as a final resolution of the charge in favour of the accused, not as a mitigated finding of guilt.
13. To construe section 3.37 by reference to labels rather than legal reality would elevate form over substance. Just as the existence of a judgment does not conclude the statutory inquiry where the statute requires satisfaction that there is, in truth and reality, a debt owing, the presence or absence of the word "acquittal" is not determinative where the criminal process has concluded without criminal responsibility being established. What matters is the juridical fact that the prosecution has failed to secure a conviction and that the accused has been finally discharged from criminal liability.
14. Against that background, the phrase "acquitted of the offence charged" in s 3.37(2) is not to be read narrowly or technically by reference only to the label attached to a particular criminal outcome. It is to be understood in its ordinary legal sense, as encompassing final judicial determinations by which an accused is relieved of the charge because criminal liability has not been established. To construe it otherwise would be to attribute to Parliament an intention to draw distinctions based on procedural form rather than on the presence or absence of guilt, without clear words to that effect.
15. Further, and in that context, where s 3.37 is capable of being construed in a manner that preserves entitlement to statutory benefits in circumstances where criminal responsibility has been negatived as a matter of fact by reason of mental impairment or disability, that construction is to be preferred over one which would place the State, or those acting on its behalf in the administration of a statutory benefits scheme, in a position of potentially abrogating or detracting from protections afforded under Commonwealth disability discrimination law. The principle of legality directs against construing State legislation so as to impose adverse legal consequences by reason of disability, or to expose the State to the risk of acting inconsistently with or detracting from the effect of Commonwealth law, in the absence of clear words of plain intention. No such clear words appear in s 3.37 of the MAI Act.
16. That construction accords with the purpose of the provision. Section 3.37 is directed to excluding from the statutory benefits scheme those whose injuries are sustained in the course of culpable criminal conduct. It is not directed to imposing a permanent disentitlement on persons whom the criminal law has declared to be non-culpable by reason of mental disability. To construe the provision as turning on formal labels rather than substantive responsibility would extend the exclusion beyond the mischief it was enacted to address.
17. Nothing in the text or structure of s 3.37 compels such a result. Subsection (2) reflects a legislative judgment that the exclusion is provisional and that entitlement is restored where criminal proceedings conclude without a finding of criminal responsibility. A construction which gives effect to that judgment in cases of mental health exculpation falls comfortably within the range of meanings open on the text, respects the language Parliament has chosen, and avoids attributing criminal culpability where the criminal law has expressly denied it.

1. Applying the construction of s 3.37 set out above, the claimant is not disentitled to statutory benefits.
2. On the construction adopted, the criminal proceedings against the claimant concluded without criminal responsibility being imposed and without conviction. Accordingly, s 3.37(2) of the MAI Act applies. The claimant was in substance and, for the purposes of s 3.37(2), acquitted of the serious driving offences charged. The temporary suspension of statutory benefits during the pendency of the criminal proceedings therefore came to an end when those proceedings were finalised.
3. It follows that s 3.37 does not operate to disentitle the claimant from statutory benefits. Statutory benefits are payable from the date on which the claimant was charged, in accordance with s 3.37(2)(a).