Fitzwater v Fitzwater

(a) The mother is to provide to the father (via his lawyers) details to facilitate such call (such as a Teams or Zoom link) no less than 72 hours prior to the scheduled call.

(b) The mother is to positively encourage the child to speak with his father.

(c) The mother is to provide the child with privacy during such calls, including:

(i) not to be within 10 meters of the child for the duration of the time;

(ii) not to be within the same room as the child for the duration of the time;

(iii) not allowing anyone else to be within 10 meters of the child or in the same room as the child for the duration of the time;

(iv) not recording such calls or allowing anyone else to do so.

1. The father is permitted to have either or both of his parents Mr S, born 1951, and Ms T, born 1956 ("the paternal grandparents") participate in one call per fortnight.
2. Subject to Order 5 below, the child spend supervised time with the father in Canberra, Australia on dates to be agreed between the parties, but failing agreement as follows:

(a) On 5, 6 and 7 December 2025 each day from 12 noon to 5:00pm, and on 9 and 10 December 2025 from 3.30pm until 6.30pm, provided:

(i) The first two visits are supervised by a professional supervision agency in accordance with Order 5(a)(ii) below; and

(ii) For the balance of the visits both of the paternal grandparents remain with the child at all times.

1. Thereafter, in the event the father travels to Canberra and on the condition the father provides at least 21 days' notice of his intended travel to the mother through his lawyers, the child spend supervised time with the father in accordance with Order 5 for three occasions per week for a duration of up to five hours per occasion as nominated by the father taking into account the supervisor's availability; and where possible, the time is to occur outside of school hours.
2. For the purpose of the supervision for time pursuant to Orders 3 and 4:

(a) The supervisor will be one of the following:

(i) provided they remain with the child at all times, either, or both, of the paternal grandparents; or if the grandparents are both unavailable;

(ii) a representative from D Family Services or another service as agreed by the parents and the ICL.

(b) That prior to supervising any visit each of the grandparents give and file an undertaking in the terms identified at Notation A of these orders.

1. The costs of the supervision service(s) (if any) shall be paid by the father.
2. For the purpose of changeovers for time pursuant to Order 3 and Order 4:

(a) At the commencement of the father's time with the child and at the conclusion of the father's time with the child, changeover will occur with the mother delivering and collecting the child to and from the supervisor at the entrance of Venue U in Canberra or D Family Services (if applicable), or at such other public location as agreed between the parties in writing; and

(b) During the father's time with the child, he is at liberty to spend time with the child at any public location within Region Q provided such can be facilitated by the supervisor.

Leave to provide mother's September affidavit to third parties

1. The father have leave to provide a copy of the mother's September affidavit (Exhibit F1) to the Australian Federal Police and to the Region Q Magistrates Court and/or tender it in proceedings in relation to the Family Violence proceedings between the parties (FVO [...]/2024) and allegations made by the mother against the father.
2. The father have leave to provide a copy of the mother's September affidavit (Exhibit F1) to:

(a) Lawyers advising him in relation to the child, including but not limited to lawyers in Country C, Country E and Country L; and

(b) Courts, police and other investigative bodies in other jurisdictions, including but not limited to those located in Country C, Country E and Country L, where such proceedings or investigations relate to the child, and/or to allegations made against the father by the mother.

1. Pursuant to Rule 7.04 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, Mr V, or such other expert with equivalent qualifications as agreed between the parties ("the immigration expert"), is appointed as a single expert (paid in the first instance by the father, but subject to a further application in respect of costs) for the purpose of providing to the Court a report in relation to:

(a) the immigration and visa status of the mother and the child, including:

(i) the pathway available to the mother to immediately reinstate her and X's bridging visas and the likely timeframe for that process;

(ii) the prospects of any review application lodged by the mother, and the likely timeframe for that process;

(iii) if the mother is unsuccessful, the timeframe within which the mother and the child must leave Australia;

(b) the impact on the father and any visa he needs to enter Australia, of a Family Violence Order.

1. For the purpose of the preceding Order, the parties will instruct the immigration expert by sending a joint letter of instruction on or before 30 January 2026 or as otherwise agreed between the parties.
2. The parents and the ICL have liberty to relist the matter on short notice.

1. Order 22 made on 9 October 2025 is vacated.
2. Orders 34-37 proposed by the father in his Outline of Case dated 8 October 2025 are to be:

(a) determined on the papers, with each party to file and serve any affidavit material (limited to 10 pages and five annexes) and submissions (limited to six pages) they wish to rely on by 3 November 2025.

1. The case management listing on 5 November 2025 is vacated.

1. The terms of the Undertaking of the paternal grandparents are as follows:

(1) I agree to supervise the time between Mr Kristoffersen ("the father") and X.

(2) I am aware that it is alleged that the father has behaved in a psychologically and / or sexually abusive manner towards X.

(3) I have read and understand the 'Should I Supervise Contact' factsheet prepared by the South Australian Legal Services Commission.

(4) I will be present at all times while X is with the father during the periods when I have agreed to supervise, except when I go to the bathroom.

(5) I understand that the purpose of supervision is to keep X safe and to protect X from harm.

(6) I will intervene and/or end X's time with the father and make arrangements for X to be returned to the mother if at any time the father's behaviour or communication with X is unsafe or inappropriate.

(7) I agree to notify the mother's lawyers of any incidents in accordance with my obligations contained in this undertaking.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This judgment concerns interim arrangements for the child of the relationship, X, in circumstances where he has not had contact with the father, who lives in Country L, since September 2023. The consideration of the arrangements follows an earlier interim judgment that, with the assistance of a family report, determined that X should not have contact with his father.
2. The need for reconsideration of that position arises from the mother's filing of an affidavit in which she recanted certain aspects of her previous evidence, identified further below.
3. This aspect of the proceedings was conducted across two hearings, with evidence taken from a Court Child Expert as to the manner and prospects for a reintroduction and with additional evidence being filed by each of the parties to address issues that arose in the first part of the hearing.
4. That evidence included evidence given under a s 128 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) certificate by the mother in relation to her communications with X about threats that she had previously falsely alleged against the father.
5. The judgment also concerns the preparation of the matter for an urgent trial and deals with various other matters arising as a consequence of the mother's previous fabrication of evidence that in short, involved the mother fabricating orders made by a Country C Court, inventing a psychiatrist, and fabricating threats that she attributed to the father. Those falsehoods were relied upon by the mother in the proceedings in this court, in the Region Q Magistrates Court, as well as in communications with various agencies, including the Australian Federal Police and the local welfare authority. By an affidavit filed on 18 September 2025 the mother identified those falsehoods to the court.
6. Although a previous interim hearing that was conducted prior to the mother's admissions resulted in orders on 27 March 2025 that provided for the father to have no contact with X, the proposal to reinstate time was not, at least in broad scope, controversial between the parties. Although there was agreement as to commencing X's time with the father, there was dispute as to the nature of the supervision of that time.
7. The parties largely agreed to X's continuing engagement with a therapist, and with that therapist being involved in the provision of a letter to X from the father, and with X having video communication with the father.

1. The paramount consideration in determining what parenting orders should be made is, pursuant to s 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), the best interests of X.
2. The recently amended s 60CC of the Act sets out the considerations that, where applicable to the case, are to be examined and weighed to determine best interests.[1] In this case, it is the considerations at s 60CC(2) that have general application. They are in the following terms:

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

1. As described in the Explanatory Memorandum, the various considerations are designed to be non-hierarchical, non-exhaustive, able to allow different weight to be applied as appropriate to the individual child and, whilst guiding a court, permit flexible adaptation to each child's specific circumstances.[2]
2. By their nature the considerations overlap and are entwined with each other. For example, issues of safety referred to at s 60CC(2)(a) can impact upon the capacity of a parent to provide for a child's psychological needs (s 60CC(2)(d)), and in turn impact upon the benefits of having a relationship with that parent (s 60CC(2)(e)). Similarly, the views expressed by a child at s 60CC(2)(b) can be indicative of the emotional needs of the child (s 60CC(2)(c)).
3. The considerations may point in different directions. It is the synthesis of all of the applicable considerations that will determine the outcome. In determining that outcome, s 60CG further provides that, to the extent that it is possible to do so in a manner consistent with a child's best interests, orders are to be made consistent with a Family Violence Order that is in place, and in a manner that does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
4. Given the interim nature of the proceedings, there are significant limitations in determining factual matters that bear upon s 60CC. Such limitations were identified by the Full Court in cases such as Salah & Salah (2016) FLC 93-713 at [37], where it was observed that "it is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial". Reflecting the earlier case of Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286, it was accepted that the Court in interim proceedings should avoid being drawn into (at [68]):[3]

...issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute...

1. The Court is also to look to those matters that are supported by corroborative evidence, particularly from what may be considered independent sources.
2. Importantly, however, and consistent with the need pursuant to s 60CC(2)(a) to consider arrangements to promote the safety of the child and the child's carers, Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104; (2015) FLC 93-654 identified at [18] that such an approach "does not mean that merely because the facts are in dispute the evidence on the topic must be disregarded, and the case determined solely by reference to the agreed facts".
3. That is the Court, despite the limitations on testing the evidence and the inability to make concrete findings, is still required to give consideration to issues raised, such as those of risk and, as SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 identified at [100]:

...weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.

1. In the context of interim proceedings, and the inability of the Court to test evidence and reach ultimate factual conclusions, it is important to recognise the nature of the court's assessment of safety and risk. In Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092 at [50] the approach to risk was adopted from Fitzwater v Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251; (2019) 60 Fam LR 212 ("Fitzwater") at [138] as:

...a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm...

(Emphasis in original)

1. It was accepted that this is an exercise to be undertaken even where the underlying facts cannot necessarily be determined one way or another. For example, the court accepted from Fitzwater that:[4]

It cannot be correct that the unacceptable risk of a child's sufferance of harm through future sexual abuse can only ever be established if it is proven a fact, on the balance of probabilities, that the child (or another) has already been sexually abused in the past. Depending upon the strength of the evidence placed before the court, the possibility of past sexual abuse may of itself be sufficient to establish the chance of future sexual abuse. That has long been accepted as true (Nikolakis v Nikolakis [2010] FamCAFC 52 at [41], [44], [49]-[53], [96]; Partington (aka Bande) v Cade (No 2) (2009) 42 Fam LR 401; (2009) FLC 93-422; [2009] FamCAFC 230 at [56]-[61]; Johnson v Page [2007] FamCA 1235; (2007) FLC 93-344 at 81,888-9; [2007] FamCA 1235 at [68], [71], [76], [77]).

(Emphasis in original)

1. It can be seen that this approach to the assessment of safety and risk is well adapted to the character of interim proceedings where controversial underlying facts are unable to be determined.

1. The general background to this case was set out in the judgment of 27 March 2025. At that stage a prominent issue was X's comments as made to the local welfare agency, described in that judgment as follows:[5]

[X] participated in what was described as a "free narrative account" with an officer of the agency, describing the father as having engaged in "weird stuff" constituted by watching [X] shower, putting his hands down the front of [X's] underpants in his genital region, and expressing that the father had caused him significant distress and fear.

1. In the context of the other contested matters that were presented by the parties, including the mother's evidence as to the conduct of the Country C proceedings, of X's reports to a Dr W, and corresponding diagnosis, of allegations as to threats being sent by the father, and of reports that X purportedly made to the mother, it was determined that there should not, at that stage, be any time ordered between X and the father, even supervised, as such could not be considered to offer adequate protection for X from exposure to trauma, or other physical risk.
2. This was in the further context that on the father's part:[6]

There is reasonable evidence pointing to, as asserted by the father, a warm, important and appropriate relationship between the father and [X], exemplified during the period of retention in Europe.

There is evidence suggestive that the father otherwise poses a risk to the mother and her family, evidenced by purported threats.

1. It may be observed that by her affidavit filed 18 September 2025 the mother has conceded, as alleged by the father in the previous hearing, that she falsified the Country C court orders, falsified Dr W, and falsified the written threats that she alleged against the father.

1. The key issue in each parties' case related to risk of harm to X.
2. The father asserts that he has previously had a positive relationship with X, but that the mother is undermining that relationship in a manner psychologically harmful to X.
3. The mother asserts that the father has been abusive to X, particularly psychologically and sexually.
4. Any reintroduction of X to the father takes place in the further context that X has not had contact with the father since 10 September 2023.
5. The evidence of the Court Child Expert identified that the prospects of a reintroduction to the father being a positive experience for X relied upon a number of factors. Prominent amongst those factors is X's actual previous experience of the father. If that experience was abusive, then the risk of X being exposed to trauma on reintroduction to the father was elevated. If that was not his actual previous experience of the father, then the prospects for a successful reintroduction improved.
6. What may further improve those prospects was identified to be the manner in which the mother engaged with the issue. If the mother was supportive, the prospects improved. This issue fell within the specific circumstances of the mother's falsifications in the case. One of the matters falsified was as to a number of specific threats that she accused the father of, that she has now resiled from, without resiling from her overall case that the father has been abusive. This limits the prospects for the mother's positive engagement with reintroduction.
7. X's perspective on threats posed by the father remains a significant issue.
8. The issue of the mother's falsehoods, and their correction to X, was identified by the Court Child Expert to be best undertaken by person who X trusts, noting that there may be an undermining of that trust if such a topic is engaged.
9. At present neither party suggests a mechanism to engage directly with this issue, and the orders proposed by them do not require it.
10. The mother denies having spoken to X about those falsified threats. This sits poorly with assertions made to the Court Child Expert, firstly by the mother where she described that X had seen the threats on letters provided by the father.[8] It sits poorly with X's account to the report writer that the father "wrote (that he was coming to kill [X's] family) to me in a letter."[9]
11. Exhibit F4 records the mother having told X's General Practitioner that X had seen the letter from the father and was now seeing an online psychiatrist (the fictitious Dr W).
12. While none of these directly attribute a conversation on the topic between X and the mother, they indicate circumstances redolent of such discussion.
13. Accordingly, although the mother agrees to orders that scaffold a reintroduction to the father through X's therapist, with the mother present, it remains unclear how the falsified threats may be dealt with, and there can be little confidence that the mother, despite that consent, is in reality supportive of the reintroduction.
14. It is important to give consideration to X's conversation with the welfare agency. The recording of the conversation by the welfare agency gives some cogency to the conversation taking place. Despite a level of ambiguity, X's comments raise the potential of a sexual abuse risk. Those comments made by X were apparently made in the presence of the mother who, by virtue of the exposure of X to the falsified threats, may be taken to have already exercised significant influence over X's views of his father. While that does not necessarily negate X's comments, it provides strong reason to exercise caution about them when assessing risk.
15. Together these indicate that there is psychological risk to X even with a reintroduction to the father being scaffolded by his therapist (it should be noted that the therapist agrees to such a role).
16. Against that, the Court Child Expert observed in the family report that severing X's relationships with the paternal family "could have a significant impact on [X's] sense of self and identity."[10] If the claims by the mother in respect of the father are false, this was identified to carry the potential of the future undermining of X's relationship with his mother, and relationships for X in general. She further observed that if it was the case that the mother exposed X to falsified threats, such "would suggest a disregard for [X's] psychological safety and an extreme level of manipulation."[11] The Court Child Expert observed that:[12]

(p)urposefully damaging [X's] perception of his father and instilling an extreme level of fear in [X] would have far-reaching consequences for [X's] psychological wellbeing, trust in others, and his self-identity. These behaviours appear entirely incongruent with safe and supportive parenting practices.

1. It may be seen that there are risks both with a reintroduction and without one. It is against this that the parties' general agreement for a scheme of reintroduction should be measured. It should be noted that the agreement also featured a letter written by the father to be given to X. Following the assessment by the Court Child Expert of the father's previous version, the amended version, as approved by the parties, is appropriate to provide to X.
2. Assessing whether and how to effect a reintroduction of X to the father involves a weighing of the s 60CC considerations. Although there is a potential for psychological harm for X in exposure to the father, particularly if there has been abuse of X, the risk of harm to X in not being reintroduced to the father weighs heavily, particularly in its long-term implications for X.
3. There is good reason to be wary of the underlying risks raised by the mother, or raised by X while under the potential influence of the mother. This is particularly so not only in the context of the mother's recanting, but also in the contrast between X's presentation when under the care of the father and now. The apparently warm relationship sits poorly with X's current presentation, although it should be accepted that there may be legitimate explanations for why that may be so. However, when seen in the context of the mother's exercise of influence, there is strong reason to be wary of X's current presentation and comments reflecting the true position.
4. The mother sought that contact between X and the father be contingent upon the advice of the therapist. Given the importance attributed to the therapist by the Court Child Expert, as a trusted and qualified person to assist X through these issues, it is important to give the therapist some agency in how these matters may unfold, noting that the therapist will not himself be the subject of obligations under the orders.
5. However, acceding to the mother's proposal that the contact with the father effectively be subject to advice is not an appropriate mechanism to achieve this effect. It impermissibly renders uncertain the obligations cast by the orders and clothes the therapist with the authority of the court.
6. Instead, under circumstances where it is anticipated that the therapist will provide updates to the Independent Children's Lawyer ("the ICL"), the orders will permit an urgent relisting, if required, prior to video communication commencing, being a mechanism that would allow the therapist to identify if, in his view, the communication should not take place. It would then be a matter for the court to weigh whether to release the mother from any obligation imposed by the order.
7. Given the parties' and ICL's general agreement as to scaffolding the reintroduction with X's therapist, and a capacity to relist the matter to revisit the scheme of reintroduction should the therapist identify a sufficient obstacle, on balance the risk of reintroduction is outweighed by the risk of not taking such a step.

1. The father sought an order providing for the mother to make payment to the single expert. During the hearing the mother's solicitors advised that the Women's Legal Centre had caused the payment to be made, removing the need for the order.

1. Although there was agreement as to face-to-face time with the father and his parents in December 2025 when they will travel to Australia, there was disagreement about whether professional supervision was required. The agreed position, in circumstances where the father and his parents will travel internationally to be able to spend time with X in Australia in December, is that there will be five periods of time spent with X over six days. The father proposes that the supervision be by a professional supervision service (D Family Services) or his parents, and indicates that they will give a relevant undertaking in respect of the supervision.
2. The mother says that the supervision should only be by D Family Services.
3. The evidence indicated that although D Family Services was available for weekend visits, there was no indication that they might otherwise be available.
4. A number of issues arise. The first is as to the need for supervision to keep X safe. That issue of safety occurs in the context of the father having previously retained X, and in respect of the allegations now made regarding the father.
5. As to a retention risk, it should be observed that although the father retained X, he not only attended court in Country C as required, but produced X to the mother in advance of a further court order that he do so. At that point the mother did not return X to the father but herself retained him. Without suggesting that the mother was not entitled then to do so, the fact of the father's production of X and his attendance in court qualify his actions in retaining X previously. Further, whilst X remains on the Watch List, and the father and his parents are both foreign citizens and reside overseas, the practical risk of retention in Australia appears minimal.
6. Observing further that the paternal grandmother was trusted to care significantly for X during the relationship, the presence of the father's parents is an adequate protection against the matters raised by the mother or X.
7. However, a further issue arises, which flows from X's fears as expressed to the Court Child Expert. That issue is attempting to give X confidence that he will be safe in the father's presence, and that whatever takes place may be subject to neutral evidence if some sort of factual conflict arises about the manner of in which X's time with the father and his parents takes place.
8. For that reason the first two periods identified in the proposed orders should be the subject of professional supervision, either by D Family Services if available or by another agency if not.

1. The father seeks liberty to produce the affidavit in which the mother admits that she has fabricated various matters. He seeks to be able to use such with various authorities, including the Australian Federal Police ("the AFP") and the Department of Home Affairs, in proceedings in the Region Q Magistrates Court, and with his lawyers and courts in Europe.
2. The mother resists such, asserting that the affidavit should not be used outside these proceedings, and further producing a Notice of Discontinuance for her application for a Family Violence Order in the Magistrates Court.
3. However, it is apparent that the mother has prosecuted claims against the father, alleging serious misconduct against him to the AFP and the Region Q Magistrates Court, and made claims that may impact the father to Home Affairs. The extent to which the admitted fabrications may be relevant to any other proceedings and investigations is not yet apparent, but may arise.
4. As the affidavit has been tendered in proceedings, there is reason to consider that the parties are no longer bound by a Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125 restriction. However, in order to provide clarity, orders should be made confirming that the father is at liberty to use the recanting affidavit. Given the deceptive conduct there admitted as engaged in by the mother, including as to the making of serious allegations against the father, the administration of justice calls for the father to be able to identify to any relevant authority or court such conduct on the part of the mother. Although the mother has prepared a Notice of Discontinuance in the Magistrates Court, the father should be independently armed to answer allegations brought by the mother, and not reliant upon her withdrawal of complaints against him.
5. The father should receive the liberty he seeks to use the mother's recanting affidavit.

1. The parties are at odds over the appointment of a single expert in relation to visa related issues. The mother asserts that it is a matter for the father, and that he should fund any such expert.
2. That assertion is in the acknowledged context that neither the mother nor X currently hold relevant visas, and their ability to remain in Australia is thereby uncertain. It occurs further in the context of the need for the father to be able to travel to Australia in the context that the mother has pursued family violence orders against him.
3. The mother further contends that in the event that a visa is not forthcoming, that she will not be moving to Country L (where the father lives) and that the visa evidence is not necessary.
4. However, the questions as to visa availability are important matters bearing upon X's circumstances, including whether he will be able to live in the same country as his siblings. Evidence as to the prospects and pathways and timing of visas is an important matter in this case and warrants the appointment of an expert.
5. The proposed expert, Mr V, has provided a letter of consent and identified the material he will require, along with a curriculum vitae, each of which demonstrates appropriate expertise on his part. He has identified a likely cost in the range of $4,400 - $6,600.
6. The mother self describes as impecunious. Her financial statement indicates a shortfall of income against expenditure, but does so in a manner that gives little clarity as to the mother's true financial position in the context of her current relationship. It may be accepted that the mother will experience difficulty in meeting a share of the fees associated with a further single expert.
7. The father has indicated that he will be self-represented as he has depleted his savings. However, his recently completed Financial Statement shows retained savings of almost $50,000 that he describes as depleting in the context of his undertaking of further training to enable him to work in the aviation industry in Country L. Given the urgency of the hearing, and of the obtaining of the expert evidence, and given that the husband currently holds the necessary funds while the wife does not, at first instance the fees for Mr V will be met by the husband, subject to any costs application he may make at the end of the proceedings.

1. Costs in relation to a handwriting expert previously engaged in the proceedings, and in relation to costs accrued following the mother's reliance upon the falsified documents were adjourned to the final hearing.
2. The father asks that those costs be heard promptly in the context of limited finances being available to funds the proceedings. Although the husband currently holds almost $50,000 in savings, costs incurred to date, a portion of which remain unpaid, and an estimate as to future costs, point to the need to promptly consider costs for the proceedings to date, in the context of the mother's recanting affidavit, in order to potentially ameliorate prejudice caused by delay of consideration of the costs issue.
3. An order will be made for the costs matter to be considered on the papers as proposed by the father.

1. Orders 1 -7 as proposed by the father were made on 21 October 2025. The reasons for making such orders are disclosed in these reasons. Orders as otherwise proposed by the father will be made subject to variations as identified above.

I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill.

[1] Phillips & Hansford (No 2) (2019) FLC 93-917 at [43]; Jollie & Dysart [2014] FamCAFC 149 at [45].

[2] Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth).

[3] Salah at [37] citing Goode at [68].

[4] Isles & Nelissen at [50] citing Fitzwater at [140].

[5] Kristoffersen & Sticamas (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 203 at [55].

[6] Kristoffersen & Sticamas (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 203 at [72].

[7] Kristoffersen & Sticamas (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 203 at [74].

[8] Family Report dated 11 June 2025, paragraph 11.

[9] Family Report dated 11 June 2025, paragraph 53.

[10] Family Report dated 11 June 2025, paragraph 75.

[11] Family Report dated 11 June 2025, paragraph 66.

[12] Family Report dated 11 June 2025, paragraph 66.