Firuzibakhsh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

THE TRIBUNAL'S REASONS 18 In assessing the applicant's credibility the Tribunal acknowledged the difficulties faced by asylum seekers in presenting their claims and noted that applicants in those circumstances should be given the benefit of the doubt if they are generally credible but unable to substantiate their claims. Notwithstanding that observation, the Tribunal was not satisfied as to the truth of the applicant's claims. It rejected his claims to fear persecution in Iran and found that he would not in fact suffer persecution for a Convention reason should he return there. It found "a number of major inconsistencies and discrepancies" in his evidence. It said that "substantial enlargements of his claims during the review … indicated strongly that he was fabricating his claim to need protection from the Australian Government". 19 The Tribunal, in the course of reciting the applicant's claims and evidence, noted the evolution of those claims through a succession of interviews and communications. In sequence, they included: · arrival interview on 4 April 2000 · written statement of 27 June 2000 with his visa application · interview with the delegate of the respondent on 4 July 2000 · letter to applicant's migration agent dated 12 September 2000 · letter to applicant's migration agent dated 23 October 2000 · hearing before the Tribunal on 14 December 2000 · hearing before the Tribunal on 5 January 2001 · letter from applicant undated, but submitted through his migration agent on 18 January 2001 enclosing a letter dated 12 January 2001 in turn enclosing copies of a Revolutionary Court summons dated 5 February 2000 and an undated Temporary Identification Card for Trade Units · letter from applicant dated 17 May 2001. 20 The Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant had fabricated his claims was based upon the following findings: (1) The claim about the July 1999 demonstrations was, as the Tribunal said, a "key element" of the applicant's claims. It found his evidence with respect to his participation in the July 1999 university demonstrations was "internally inconsistent and most unconvincing". In particular, the applicant had failed to mention his involvement with that demonstration when asked at the outset of the hearing before the Tribunal what were the key things that he feared about going back to Iran and that he considered would lead to him being subjected to persecution. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's explanation for failing to mention the demonstration at that time. It found that he failed to mention that aspect of his claim "because it is an invention and was not a factor in his decision to leave Iran". (2) The applicant gave inconsistent evidence about the date on which he had ceased working in his motor cycle repair business. That inconsistency arose during answers to questions in his interview on 4 July 2000. He had first claimed that he ceased his work in January 1999, then changed his answer to July or August 1999 and later stated with some certainty that he left work in June 1999. He said that he fixed the date by reference to the date of the demonstration in July 1999. However, the Tribunal was: "…not satisfied that the applicant could have genuinely misstated the date on which he claims to have left work and gone into hiding when the date of the University student demonstrations was apparently so clear in his mind." (3) The Tribunal had difficulty understanding how the applicant could have left Iran legally on a passport in his own name, after having been identified by the Basij following the demonstrations. The applicant, at the interview on 4 July 2000, had explained in response to questioning that he had been identified by the Basij by appearance rather than by name, although his statement of 27 June 2000 claimed he had been identified by name. At that interview, when confronted with that claim, he explained that it was his former name of Boroujerdi which was on the airport blacklist. He gave the Tribunal three different reasons why that might be the case. It said: "They ranged from: his business name was definitely on the blacklist at Mehrahabad Airport; to what normally happens when a name is placed on a local Basij list to it eventually arriving on the airport blacklist; and finally; he was not sure but relied on his brother's advice that his name was not on the list". The Tribunal found those responses to be "significantly inconsistent and unconvincing" and rejected them as lacking any credibility. It was not satisfied with the applicant's evidence that he had been 'identified' and noted that it was not until later in the hearing that the applicant claimed that his 'identification' by the Basij had been by reference to his appearance rather than by reference to the name that appeared on his passport. (4) There was also a discrepancy between the information provided by the applicant at his arrival interview and the information in the statement that accompanied his visa application with respect to the use of a "contact" within the Basij to ascertain whether his name had been placed on the national airport black list. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had inconsistently claimed that he had learned his name was on a Basij wanted list from a friend who had a contact in the Basij and by himself directly contacting a friend in the Basij. In particular, the Tribunal found that the applicant had made claims that the contact was through his brother, through a relative as well as his brother, and through a friend. It did not accept his explanation of the discrepancy. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not truthful in his evidence on that issue. (5) The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had given truthful evidence about the name under which he was known by the Basij. At the hearing, he said that it was the name "Boroujerdi", but then acknowledged the 1989 arrest (more than 20 years after the family name change) was under his present name, 'Firuzibakhsh'. The applicant had then sought to maintain that the local Basij knew him according to his family's previous name, 'Ebrahim Boroujerdi' even though he was known in intelligence files under his present name. The Tribunal had "considerable difficulty" in accepting that if the 1989 shooting incident had taken place as he had claimed, the local Basij would not have become aware of the details of what took place, including the detail of the applicant's correct name. He also said there was no local Basij until the mid-nineties, but the Tribunal found that the applicant had used the term 'local Basij' when giving evidence on this aspect of his claim, even though he had later claimed that no local Basij existed in his area until the mid-nineties. It concluded: "The Tribunal considers his evidence on this issue to be implausible and most unconvincing and is not satisfied that the applicant's evidence is credible." (6) The applicant's claim to have been politically active in the 12 month period from 1998 to 1999 by writing letters to a reformist newspaper, and by distributing and displaying anti-government flyers, was found to be "a fabrication manufactured at a late stage in the review process". The Tribunal rejected the applicant's explanations for failing to make the claim earlier, including that he was not asked directly about it, that his broader statements as to "the lack of fairness and things like that" would accommodate and include his more particular claim of political activity, and that he had been answering questions on the understanding that he "had to talk about something that actually happened" to him, such as his arrest. The Tribunal took the same view about his claimed covert activities between 1989 and 1999. They had not been mentioned until the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had several adequate opportunities to raise the issue of his secret political activities. It continued: "The Tribunal's view on the falsity of the applicant's claim of being a political activist is reinforced by another new claim made by the applicant after the Tribunal hearing in an undated letter from him to his adviser, which his adviser forwarded to the Tribunal under cover of a letter dated 18 January 2001. He stated in that letter that he had been engaged in 'underground activities against the regime from 1989 till 99 in central part of Teheran. I was known as an anti-regime person'. The Tribunal rejects this new claim as a further late fabrication." (7) The medical reports provided by the doctor and nurse at the Detention Centre, were consistent with the applicant's claims. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the injuries the applicant had suffered in the past were occasioned for a reason relevant to a claim for protection under the Convention. That conclusion followed a finding that the applicant was evasive and unconvincing in explaining his reliance on them as a relevant issue in his claims. The Tribunal described the applicant's evidence as to what influenced him not to discuss his injuries at his arrivals interview as unsatisfactory. (8) The Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that the death of his fiancee was related to his claimed adverse political profile with the authorities. It found that his claim that the Religious Police had caused the accident because she had been wearing make-up and his claim that they had 'murdered' her were inconsistent, and concluded that the claim that she had been murdered was not genuine. It described his account as not "a consistent, credible account". (9) The Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claim to have been forced to pay bribes for eight years to operate his business because his adverse political profile prevented him from obtaining a work permit. That finding was based on the Temporary Identification Card for Trade Units provided by the applicant, indicating that he had been given approval to operate his business for the period of a year. It also rejected his claim to have been denied the opportunity to study at University by reason of his political opinion. It did not really set out any particular basis for that that conclusion, apart from its general disaffection with the applicant's credit. (10) The Tribunal was not convinced that the document provided to it on 22 January 2001, purporting to be a summons of the Revolutionary Court in the name of the applicant, was a genuine document. It was "unimpressed" with the applicant's "very tardy" production of the document, and his failure to mention the summons during his interview with a departmental officer on 4 July 2000 or prior to his letter of 23 October 2000. It rejected the applicant's explanation that his brother had concealed the existence of the summons (which existed before he left Iran) so as not to frighten the applicant prior to his departure from Iran. It concluded: "The Tribunal finds it most implausible, if a Revolutionary Court summons had genuinely been issued, that the applicant's brother would not have alerted the applicant to it while he was in Iran. The Tribunal notes that the applicant did not mention his brother's knowledge and actions in respect of the alleged summons in his statement of 27 June 2000 or in his departmental interview of 4 July 2000. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has belatedly arranged for this document to be created and supplied to the Tribunal solely for the purpose of bolstering his claims for protection." (11) The Tribunal also did not accept his claim, made only by letter of 17 May 2001, that his father had been arrested following the provision of information to the authorities by a friend. The applicant had not provided it with a copy of correspondence supporting the claim It accordingly rejected the claim as a "further fabrication" on the part of the applicant. 21 Having made those findings, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant "was not a wanted man" and was able to leave Iran without bribery and without difficulty and on his own passport and in his correct name. 22 On the basis of independent country information, it also found that the applicant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran if he were returned there by reason of his being a failed asylum seeker. It was not satisfied that the Iranian authorities would be aware of the claims he had made in seeking protection from the Australian Government on his return. 23 The Tribunal accepted the applicant's claim that he is a genuine Christian convert and that he has become a faithful member of a Christian group at the Detention Centre. However, it concluded that the applicant would not bring his conversion to the attention of the Iranian authorities on return to Iran or subsequently. On the basis of independent country information indicating "little prospect of problems with the authorities unless a returnee declares on return his new affiliation" the Tribunal found that the applicant's fear of persecution by reason of his religion was not well-founded. 24 The Tribunal concluded: "The Tribunal finds that it is unable to rely on the applicant as a witness to the truth on every important element of his claims and is not satisfied that he can be believed on any significant issue … In view of the Tribunal's adverse findings above on the applicant's credibility and its rejection of the key elements of his claims, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has been a political activist, nor that his family are known adversely to the Iranian authorities. The Tribunal does not accept that he participated in the university student demonstration in July 1999 nor that he left Iran as a fugitive." 25 Accordingly the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2) of the Act and affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

the grounds of review 26 The first ground of review is based upon s 476(1)(a) of the Act, namely that the Tribunal did not comply with procedures required by the Act to be followed in the making of its decision. There are three particular matters addressed by the Tribunal which, it is contended, reveal that error on its part. They are:

• the Tribunal's approach to its consideration of the document dated 5 February 2000, apparently a Revolutionary Court summons directed to the applicant,
• the Tribunal's approach to its consideration of the claims made in the applicant's letter of 17 May 2001 containing claims that a friend of the applicant, with whom he had been politically active, had been arrested by the authorities and that anti-government materials sourced to the applicant had been found there leading to the arrest and detention for a short time of the applicant's father, and
• the Tribunal's approach to its consideration of the possible consequences to the applicant of being returned to Iran, having converted to Christianity. In broad terms, it is contended that the Tribunal failed to comply with procedures prescribed by s 425(1)(b) and s 427(1)(d) of the Act by failing to consider whether to further investigate the genuineness of that document and of those claims, or by not further investigating them. 27 The second ground of review concerns the same three matters. It is alleged that the Tribunal erred in law, so as to enliven the ground of review in s 476(1)(e) of the Act. The alleged error of law is the way in which the Tribunal decided each of those matters, in particular by not making further inquiries concerning them. 28 The third ground of review also alleges error of law by the Tribunal, both in the interpretation of the law and in its application to the facts. 29 This ground of review firstly concerns the finding that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he returns to Iran by reason of his conversion to Christianity. It is contended that the Tribunal's finding was made without it having any regard to the evidence, including the independent country information which it expressly quoted. 30 Secondly, this ground of review concerns the finding that the Revolutionary Court summons was not genuine, but was created falsely to bolster the applicant's claim for a protection visa. It is contended that there was no evidence to support either of those findings. 31 The fourth ground of review attacks the findings of the Tribunal that: · the applicant was able to leave Iran simply because he was not wanted by the authorities, · the applicant had not participated in the demonstrations in July 1999, so his claim to fear persecution by having been identified as an active participant was an invention, · the Revolutionary Court summons was not genuine, but was falsely created to bolster his claim to a protection visa,
• it could not rely on the applicant as a witness of truth. The basis of the attack invokes both s 476(1)(a) and s 476(1)(g) of the Act. The attack based upon s 476(1)(a) in this regard can shortly be dealt with. It is contended that the Tribunal made those findings in contravention of s 420(2) of the Act, because it did not have regard to the substantial justice or the merits of the case. The obligation to comply with s 420(2) is said to amount to a procedure prescribed by the Act for the making of the decision. In my view, the decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 precludes an attack upon the findings of the Tribunal by that route. The attack based upon s 476(1)(g), namely there was no evidence or other material upon which the decision could be based, will need to be addressed. 32 Finally, the fifth ground of review alleges that the Tribunal's decision was induced or affected by actual bias so as to enliven the ground of review available under s 476(1)(f) of the Act. 33 The oral submissions by counsel on behalf of the applicant concentrated on the Tribunal's consideration of whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his conversion to Christianity. In essence it was contended that the Tribunal failed properly to address that claim. It was submitted that the Tribunal failed to address the claim that the applicant's conversion to Christianity has particular significance because he has converted from Islam to Christianity, and because in Iran he will be a member of a social group described as a "non-ethnic based Christian group". The Tribunal is further submitted to have erred in the application of the law to the facts by failing to ask whether the applicant's fear of persecution by reason of his conversion to Christianity is well-founded, but instead imposed some higher test or onus to determine whether he is a refugee for that reason.

consideration of contentions 34 It appears that the applicant's reliance on s 425(1)(b) of the Act is misconceived. After the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 (Cth) (the amending Act) s 425(1) provided: "The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review." The amending Act significantly amended Part 7 Div 4 of the Act, dealing with the conduct of reviews by the Tribunal. It appears that, in substance, s 425(1)(b) as previously in force was replaced by s 424(1) of the Act. Section 424(1) provides: "In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review." Section 424A-C were enacted prescribing what the Tribunal then must do if it obtains such information to ensure procedural fairness to the applicant. Section 425 deals only with what the Tribunal must do to provide an applicant for a protection visa with a hearing. 35 Section 427(1)(d) empowers the Tribunal, for the purpose of a review, to require the Secretary to arrange for the making of any investigation that the Tribunal thinks necessary with respect to the review. Section 427(1)(d) is permissive in its terms. It has been decided that s 427(1)(d) does not impose an obligation on the Tribunal to make inquiries of the nature suggested by the applicant, so as possibly to enliven s 476(1)(a) of the Act. The relevant authorities are reviewed by Katz J in Kabir v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 295 at 306-307; [2002] FCA 248 at [51]-[56]. I will not repeat them. I adopt with respect his Honour's analysis. It was not contended that those decisions are plainly wrong. I accordingly follow them. 36 The applicant's contentions do not seek to distinguish between the terms of s 427(1)(d) and s 424(1). They are both expressed in permissive terms. It was not contended that the terms of s 424(1) were such as to impose an obligation on the Tribunal in certain circumstances, even though s 427(1)(d) did not do so. 37 In any event, as s 424(1) is expressed in permissive terms, I have formed the view but without the benefit of argument that it does not do so. The power is granted to the Tribunal to get further information that it considers relevant. The Tribunal is not shown to have failed to consider whether to cause any investigations into the three matters identified in the first ground of review. It is not shown to have formed the view that it considered certain information to be relevant, but then to have declined to get that information. That circumstance might give rise to different considerations. In my view, the applicant's case in this respect goes no further than disagreeing with the views of the Tribunal about the need or desirability of pursuing further investigations to perform its review function. Of course, if relevant information were obtained under s 424(1) of the Act, whether or not the power contained in s 427(1) were exercised for the purpose of obtaining that information, the procedural obligations imposed by ss 424A-424C would have to be complied with. In this matter, the Tribunal did not proceed to obtain information under s 424(1) or the matters the subject of the first ground of review. I do not consider that it has thereby been shown to have failed to comply with a procedure required to be complied with for the purposes of making its decision, so as to enliven the ground of review available under s 476(1)(a) of the Act. 38 That is not to say that there are no circumstances in which the Tribunal's failure to carry out investigations concerning the genuineness of a document or in some other respect might give rise to reviewable error on its part. Indeed, the second ground of review invoking s 476(1)(e) asserts such circumstances. I turn to consider that ground of review. 39 In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said at 22 [84]: "If the tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material in such a way as affects the exercise of its powers, that will very often reveal that it has made an error in its understanding of the applicable law or has failed to apply that law correctly to the facts it found. If that is so, the ground in s 476(1)(e) is made out." 40 The contention in this matter appears to be that the Tribunal's failure to cause additional inquiries to be made on the three matters the subject of the submission discloses some error of law on its part. 41 The Tribunal concluded that the Revolutionary Court summons was created and supplied to the Tribunal to bolster the applicant's claims for a protection visa. It considered that his explanation for not learning of that document until 23 October 2000, namely his brother had kept it from him, to be unimpressive and implausible. If it were genuine, and known about by his brother, the Tribunal considered his brother would have alerted him to its existence. It was critical of the late disclosure of the document, especially as the applicant had been previously interviewed and had the assistance of a migration agent. The applicant first referred to that document in his letter of 23 October 2000 in laconic terms: "when I was out of the country my family informed me that the authority sent a summons to me to go to the Revolutionary Court". It was critical of the late presentation of the document, on 22 January 2001 after its hearing. 42 I do not consider that the Tribunal's reasons for its conclusion about the status of the document reveal any error of law on its part. The reasons are rational. It was appropriate for the Tribunal to address the issue. There was nothing to indicate that the applicant did not have time to assemble and present what he wanted to present to support the genuineness of the document. There was no investigation proposed by or requested by the applicant or his adviser which would readily reveal whether the document was genuine. It is not routinely the obligation of the Tribunal to verify the authenticity of such documents, particularly where the means of verification is not obvious: see e.g. per Hill J in Rahmur v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1096. As I have noted, the applicant did not claim that the means of verification was readily available: Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 151 ALR 505 at 548. It is also convenient at this point to deal with that part of the third ground of review dealing with the document. In my view, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the document is a fabrication. Its finding was based on reasons which were rational. It would be an exceptional circumstance that direct evidence of fabrication of such a document were available. Generally, a conclusion that a document is a fabrication is based on circumstantial evidence, matters such as its appearance, its context, its content, its timeliness, and the evidence surrounding its acquisition and presentation. The Tribunal has had regard to such circumstantial evidence as it considered relevant in the particular case. 43 The Tribunal placed no weight upon the contents of the applicant's letter of 17 May 2001. The letter referred to a letter from the applicant's family received on 4 May 2001, and purported to record "the text" of the letter from his family. It then asked the Tribunal to have regard to that information, and to notify the applicant or his migration agent if it wanted more information about the letter. The applicant's letter of 22 May 2001 was copied to his migration agent. The Tribunal said: " … the Applicant has not supplied the correspondence mentioned in that letter nor a translation of it. In the light of the Tribunal's findings on the Applicant's lack of credibility with respect to a political profile, the Tribunal is not satisfied that these recent claims are anything other than further fabrication on the part of the Applicant." 44 I do not think the Tribunal's approach discloses error of law on its part. It has apparently had regard to the letter of the applicant of 17 May 2001. It was not incumbent upon the Tribunal, having regard to the stage of its review process and previous communications, to respond further to the applicant. 45 The applicant could have presented the letter he had received on 4 May 2001, or he could have sought further time to have it translated or authenticated. He did not do so. The Tribunal, in my view, has put the applicant's letter of 17 May 2001 into the scales in assessing his claim, albeit only towards the end of its consideration and when it had formed an adverse view about his credibility. But that was because the Tribunal had completed its hearing and had, as it was required to do, formed a view about his credibility. Its findings about what had happened to the applicant in the past would or could inform its decision about whether, at the time of its decision, the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The belatedness of the letter of 17 May 2001, so that it was considered at that point in the Tribunal's process of consideration, was of the applicant's making. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal erred in law in the manner submitted. 46 The third matter said to involve an error of law was more fully developed in oral submissions. The contention is that the Tribunal failed to consider and investigate fully the "present position in Iran with respect to Muslim converts to Christianity and with respect to non-ethnic based Christian groups generally notwithstanding the indication of a worsening position regarding both such converts and such groups in later country information obtained by agencies of the United States and United Kingdom governments and notwithstanding other concerns of the Applicant's representative as to the datedness of the country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade". It overlaps with that part of the third ground of review concerning the applicant's conversion to Christianity, and the implications of his conversion if he were to return to Iran. It is convenient to deal with the issues variously raised on this general topic together. 47 The Tribunal said it had "closely examined the country information available", from which it noted there is: " … little prospect of problems with the authorities unless a returnee declares on return his new affiliation." It found that the applicant would not bring his conversion to the attention of Iranian authorities on his return to Iran or subsequently. 48 The applicant's counsel, in his detailed submission, referred to extensive independent country information concerning the treatment of male Islamic converts to Christianity and the treatment of non-ethnic based Christian groups in Iran. The reference to non-ethnic based Christian groups was used in distinction from Armenian or Assyro-Chaldean Christian groups in Iran. In oral submissions, there was also a focus upon the general treatment of Christians in an Islamic community such as Iran. 49 The Tribunal appears to have accepted that, if the applicant's conversion to Christianity might become known to the authorities in Iran, he would have a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned there. Its reasons for decision include reference to a number of sources of independent country information, relevantly for the purposes of its conclusion the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Profile on the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996 (the DFAT Report). 50 As noted above, the applicant only made his claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his religion following the hearing before the Tribunal. He wrote to his migration agent on the matter on 2 April 2001, and his migration agent passed on his letter on 3 April 2001. No detailed submission referring to independent country information was presented to the Tribunal. His letter said he feared persecution by reason of his change of religion. It made no claim that the applicant feared adverse treatment because he was neither an Armenian nor Assyro-Chaldean Christian, or for any more specific reason than being an Islamic person who had converted to Christianity. 51 The independent country information available to and generally referred to by the Tribunal included the United States Department of State: 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Under the heading "Freedom of Religion" it refers to Christianity as being one of the recognised religious minorities, so its members may vote but may suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in areas of employment, education and housing, and in the legal system. It noted that apostasy, specifically conversion from Islam, can be punishable by death. It noted further that non-ethnically based Christian groups report a greater degree of restriction on their activities, and that proselytising activities by evangelical Christians are actively discouraged. The United Kingdom Home Office Country Assessment - Iran, October 2000, carried similar information, in part at least derived from the US State Department report referred to. It attributed to that document the claim that a number of Iranian Christians who disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 are believed to be Muslim converts to Christianity. The US State Department Report attributes their reported deaths to evangelising at one point, and to being Muslim converts to Christianity at another point. The DFAT report reflected a similar picture. It noted that converts are generally tolerated so long as they maintain a very low profile, but converts working in Government and revolutionary organisations face harassment and even dismissal if it becomes known that they have converted. 52 It is clear that the applicant may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he returns to Iran, by reason of his Christianity, even though he has not been persecuted in the past for that reason and even though his vulnerability to persecution stems from his membership of a group identifiable by its Christian beliefs or practices. The Tribunal appears to have accepted that the applicant has such a subjective fear, but it was necessary also for the Tribunal to determine whether that fear is "well-founded" as explained in Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) CLR 559; Applicant A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225; and Chen Shi Hui v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293. 53 It was then appropriate for the Tribunal to address how the applicant might practise his Christian religion if he were to return to Iran. It found that he will not bring his conversion to the attention of the Iranian authorities. It made that finding on its assessment of the applicant and "his likely conduct" on return to Iran. There has been no attack on the finding, and there is nothing to suggest the Tribunal erred in making that finding. 54 The Tribunal positively found further that the applicant "would not" suffer harm because of his conversion if he returned to Iran, and that he "has no basis to fear return to Iran" for the reason of his conversion to Christianity. In my view, in terms of the Convention, the Tribunal thereby found that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his Christianity, or his conversion to Christianity, if he returns to Iran. Its findings are not expressed in the precise terms of the Convention, but they must not be construed with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. Its findings do not, in my view, amount to the Tribunal expressing itself in terms of the probabilities. It would be erroneous to do so, in respect of the ultimate question. I think they represent the Tribunal finding that there is no real chance that the applicant would disclose his Christianity upon his return to Iran in any way which would attract the attention of the authorities. The finding that the applicant has "no basis" to fear return to Iran points to that interpretation, even though the expression "would not" in the findings might otherwise be open to the interpretation "probably would not" as well as "no real chance that he would" face persecution. The Tribunal at the commencement of its reasons has referred to relevant authorities and has correctly interpreted the meaning of a "well-founded" fear of persecution. There is no reason to attribute to the Tribunal later in its reasons an approach which does not reflect that meaning, particularly where its words are consistent with that use and in one respect positively point to that use. 55 The Tribunal's finding was based essentially on the following passage in the DFAT Report: "Iranians who had based their asylum applications on their conversion from Islam to Christianity would, in almost all cases not suffer particular problems if returned, unless they declared to the authorities on return their new religious affiliation. Apostasy is widely reported as carrying a nominal death sentence. However there are only one or two cases (high profile Christian clergy) where this sentence has ever been imposed. Moreover, some senior and influential clerics have recently publicly questioned such an interpretation of Koranic law. The evidence is that those converts who go about their devotions quietly are generally not disturbed (it is either those who actively seek attention, or who are engaged in conspicuous proselytization, who have run into difficulties, usually with the local mosque rather than the State authorities. The last convert to be sentenced to death was Mehdi Dibaj, a high profile Christian pastor with a long history of proselytization. He was given a last minute reprieve in early 1992 but found murdered a year later. The Government blamed the MKO." It does not refer specifically to the points made elsewhere in that document and in other independent country information about the somewhat increased focus on non-ethnic Christian groups (to which presumably the applicant would belong), or upon the general attention given to Christian groups in Iran. The explanation is in part, no doubt, because the applicant made no detailed claim in regard to his "non-ethnicity". 56 I do not consider that the Tribunal committed reviewable error by failing to deal specifically with a claim that the applicant might face persecution because of increased attention of the authorities towards non-ethnic Chrisitian groups. Such a refined claim was not expressed. The focus of his letter of 2 April 2001 was that he feared persecution by the government for having changed his religion. The Tribunal addressed that claim. His letter also made no claim to fear persecution by reason of his practising his religion quietly and in a non-evangelical way. There is information that suggests that, in those circumstances, the applicant might be exposed to some detriments. The Tribunal did not expressly find whether there is a real chance that such behaviour might occur, or whether him going about his devotions quietly would or might attract attention. Nor did it address whether any such disturbance would be of sufficient seriousness as to amount to persecution under Art 1A(2) of the Convention. I think it did not do so because it was not called upon to do so by the way the applicant presented this aspect of his claims. The Tribunal is not required to speculate about the subjective fears of an applicant for a protection visa. Those fears should be identified by the visa applicant, although of course the expression of the subjective fears may not be in terms directly referrable to the language of Art 1A(2) of the Convention. However, once the claimed subjective fears are identified, it is for the Tribunal to determine whether they are truly held and if so whether they are well-founded. That is not to invite the Tribunal to treat the expression of the claims as a form of pleading. Applicants for a protection visa are often at a disadvantage by language, education, or personal circumstances. In such circumstances the Tribunal's role includes ensuring that the visa applicant has the opportunity to explain the reasons for the claimed subjective fear of persecution. But here the Tribunal had the benefit of the hearing, and the applicant had the assistance of a migration agent. The reason that the claim as now expressed was not appreciated, and addressed by the Tribunal was because the Tribunal understandably and correctly proceeded from its consideration of the material submitted to it. 57 In this matter, in my view, the Tribunal correctly understood the subjective fear of the applicant as identified by him as identified by him of what might happen to him in Iran by reason of his conversion to Christianity. It addressed that claim according to law. I am not persuaded, therefore, that the Tribunal fell into reviewable error. I am not therefore persuaded that the Tribunal misapplied the law when it came to consider whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his religion or his conversion to the Christian religion. 58 The fourth ground of review, in my view, involves in reality an attempt to challenge findings of fact of the Tribunal on the merits. For the applicant to succeed under s 476(1)(g), that is to show that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision, it is necessary that he bring himself within s 476(4)(a) or (b). It is unnecessary to address whether the conditions specified in either s 476(4)(a) or (b), if satisfied, are a sufficient basis for the ground of review under s 476(1)(g) to be made out: cf Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2002] FCA 181; (2001) 64 ALD 1. 59 It is accepted that the applicant left Iran without bribery and without difficulty on his own passport in his own name. It also appears to have been accepted by the applicant, by reason of the contact that he claimed with the security forces in Iran, that his name would have been on an airport blacklist. There was ample independent evidence to support that finding of the Tribunal. The applicant's claim was that his name as blacklisted was "Boroujerdi". The reference to the evidence and to the Tribunal's assessment of it in [20] above indicates why the Tribunal did not accept that claim. Once it was rejected, it followed that his correct or current name would have been the blacklisted name, if cause for blacklisting had occurred. His ability to leave Iran without difficulty, once that step was taken, clearly supported the Tribunal's inference that when he left Iran the applicant was "not a wanted man". 60 The absence of country information that the Basij directly played a part in the compilation of the airport blacklist, or that being identified as a participant of the student demonstrations of July 1999 would have resulted in his name being blacklisted, does not demonstrate the non-existence of the fact that the applicant would have been blacklisted if he had been exposed to the security forces as he claimed. It is only material which might be relevant to that fact. In my view, the Tribunal's view that, if the applicant's claims were correct, he would have been blacklisted on the airport security checklist is a matter which was open to it, even assuming its view is a particular fact within the meaning of s 476(4)(b) of the Act. 61 Similarly, the attack upon the finding that the applicant did not participate in the student demonstrations in July 1999 is really an attempt to reargue the merits of the finding. The applicant said he did participate. The Tribunal was not obliged to accept his evidence. It rejected his evidence. Its reasons explain why it did so. Those reasons demonstrate why its rejection of his evidence was not itself based on the existence of a particular fact or facts which themselves did not exist. 62 The attack upon the finding about the status of the Revolutionary Court summons also falls into the same category. The Tribunal found it was not genuine. That conclusion was based upon a series of particular facts, and inferences the Tribunal drew from those facts, as well as its assessment of the applicant's credibility. It has not been shown that any of those particular facts did not exist. 63 The challenge to the overall assessment of the applicant's reliability as a witness was also based in fact upon a series of particular facts as to what the applicant claimed from time to time, as well as what he said at the hearing, and the Tribunal's overall assessment of him. None of those particular facts has been shown not to exist. 64 Consequently, in my judgment, the attack based upon s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4)(b) fails. The attack upon the Tribunal's reasons based upon s 476(1)(g) and s 476(4)(a) must also fail. In the sense required by s 476(4)(a), the Tribunal was not required by law to reach its decision only if the matters identified or some of them were made out : see Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212. In addition, for reasons already given, in my view it has not been shown that any of those conclusional findings of the Tribunal were made without evidence from which the Tribunal could reasonably be satisfied that those findings were established. 65 The final ground of review involves showing that the Tribunal's decision was induced or affected by actual bias. The nature of actual bias was explained in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71. It is not in issue. 66 In my judgment the applicant has failed to show that the Tribunal's consideration of the applicant's claims was infected with a mind closed to acceptance of them. I have had regard to the several matters to which counsel for the applicant referred: the use of the expression "claims", the bases for rejecting the applicant as an unreliable witness, the extent and nature of the Tribunal's reference to independent country information, the fact that the Tribunal did not conduct further investigations into certain matters, and the Tribunal's perceptions of inconsistency in the applicant's claims. To the contrary, whilst it may be rationally possible to disagree with certain of the Tribunal's steps in its reasons for its conclusions, overall I think its reasons and its conduct of the hearing shows that it addressed the applicant's claims with a mind open to persuasion. Where it was concerned about a particular matter, it invited the applicant to respond. It has set out fully and fairly the nature of the applicant's claims and his evidence. It is not sufficient to show that another mind may not have treated each of the pieces of information dealt with by the applicant as having the significance which the Tribunal ascribed to them. That is a matter for the Tribunal's judgment. 67 For those reasons, I do not consider that the applicant has made out any ground of review under s 476(1) of the Act. The application is therefore dismissed. I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.

Solicitor for the Applicant: Jeremy Moore & Associates