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[2007] VSC 109
Supreme Court of Victoria
2007-04-20
GILLARD J
Original judgment source is linked above.
DEFAMATION - Libel - Eight articles in newspapers - Some in same edition - Connected and repeated - The two articles in same edition should be one cause of action - Necessity to read whole article to determine defamatory imputations - May determine damages on global basis - Articles defamatory of person - Claim by company - Articles not defamatory of trading company - Defence of justification established by defendants - Plaintiffs fail - Observations on damages - Claim for loss of income - Necessity of proper pleading and proof - Evidence inadequate and speculative - Evidence - Use of evidence of conduct showing lack of faith in case - Circumstantial evidence.
1 A proceeding instituted by writ, in which two plaintiffs seek damages for defamation arising out of the publication of eight articles in the Herald Sun newspaper in this State.
Parties
2 The first plaintiff, Ms Abbie Li ("Ms Li"), is a 48 year old Chinese woman, formerly a registered Chinese herbal medicine practitioner, who carried on practice at Level 4, 24 Collins Street, Melbourne from early 2000 to early 2006.
3 The second plaintiff, By Forever Young Pty Ltd ("Forever Young"), is a company registered in June 2001, which carried on business at the same premises as Ms Li. Forever Young employed Ms Li, who conducted the company's business of Chinese natural therapy, including acupuncture and selling herbal remedies and "Forever Young" capsules.
4 The first defendant, The Herald and Weekly Times Pty Ltd ("The Herald"), is and was at all relevant times the proprietor of the daily newspaper the Herald Sun, which is widely distributed and read throughout the State of Victoria.
5 The second defendant, Keith Moor ("Mr Moor"), was at all relevant times an experienced journalist employed as Insight Editor by The Herald and acting in the course and scope of his employment.
Basic Facts and Defamatory Articles
6 Ms Li had been conducting her practice of Chinese natural therapy from premises situated at 24 Collins Street, Melbourne from early 2000. She was born in Shanghai, raised and educated in Beijing and arrived in this country in 1990. She is now an Australian citizen. She first commenced practising Chinese therapy medicine in Victoria in 1993, and in about 1995 practised from 20 Collins Street, Melbourne. In early 2000 she moved the practice to a suite of rooms on Level 4, 24 Collins Street, Melbourne. In 1996, Ms Li registered a business name "C.N.T. Chinese Natural Therapy" and thereafter practised under that name. The business name was noted in the list of tenants on the ground floor of the building at 24 Collins Street and on the door of the premises where the business was carried on. Beneath the business name on the door of the premises was the telephone number and the words:
"ACUPUNCTURE
HERB
REMEDIAL MASSAGE"
7 Inside the business premises appeared the statement "Chinese Natural Therapy" on a wall in the reception room and underneath that appeared the words:
8 From some time in 2001 until recently, Ms Li called herself Dr Li. The business conducted at Level 4, 24 Collins Street, Melbourne was known as Chinese Natural Therapy. She was entitled to call herself Dr Li provided it was made clear that she was a doctor of traditional Chinese medicine. When her registration under the Chinese Medicine Registration Act 2000 lapsed in mid-2006, her entitlement to call herself a doctor ceased.
9 On 14 June 2001, the company was registered. Ms Li was the sole director and shareholder of the company. The evidence revealed some confusion as to the particular business being operated by the company Forever Young. It is clear that the company was the manufacturer and distributor of capsules known as "Forever Young", which were designed and sold as pills that would keep the consumer healthy and feeling young. Ms Li was employed by the company from the date of its registration and was paid a salary. Evidence, scanty as it was, led to the conclusion that the company took over the business that had been operated by Ms Li. This was evident from the copy tax returns of both Ms Li and the company for the years ending 30 June 2002 and following, and the Business Activity Statements lodged on behalf of the business from 1 July 2001. No evidence was produced concerning the acquisition of the business by the company, final company accounts for each year, annual returns or the memorandum and articles of the company. Some receipts of the business were tendered in evidence and the originals did bear the stamp of the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd. The company's causes of action allege that it had suffered damage to its trading reputation and that it claimed economic loss as a result. The initial particulars which referred to an accountant's report claimed a substantial loss of business by the company, allegedly as a result of the publication of the defamatory articles. The case was opened on that basis, namely, that Forever Young operated the business from 1 July 2001 and that Ms Li during all relevant times was employed by the company on an annual salary of $36,400. The tax returns provided some evidence of that trading situation.
10 The Chinese Medicine Registration Act 2000 ("the Act") was enacted in the year 2000. The majority of the Act came into operation on 1 January 2002. The Act had a number of purposes, one of which was to register persons as Chinese herbal medicine practitioners and another of which was to regulate the sale of Chinese herbal medicine. The sections of the Act dealing with the registration of natural persons as Chinese herbal medicine practitioners and acupuncturists came into operation on 1 January 2002. Ms Li made application and was registered as a Chinese herbal medicine practitioner and an acupuncturist at the beginning of January 2002. The company Forever Young was not registered under that Act. By reason of s.4, only a natural person can be registered under the Act. The evidence revealed that the company Forever Young conducted the Chinese natural therapy business from 1 July 2001 through to when Ms Li's registration under the Act lapsed in mid-2006. This is despite the fact that she had registered herself as the proprietor of the business in 1996. Questions were asked of both Ms Li and her accountant, Mr Dunstan, as to the existence of any documentation relating to the acquisition of the business by the company, but none was forthcoming.
11 Section 61 of the Act makes it an offence for a person, including a company, who is not registered to take or use the title of a registered Chinese practitioner or "any other title, whether in English or any other language, calculated to induce a belief that the person is registered as a practitioner under this Act."[1]
12 Section 61(1)(c) makes it an offence "to carry out any act which is required to be carried out by or under an Act by a person registered as a practitioner under this Act." It is also an offence for a person not registered, and this would include a company, to claim to be qualified to practise as a Chinese medicine practitioner. See s.61(1)(d). Section 61(2) makes it an offence for a person, including a company, who is not registered to use the title "Chinese medicine practitioner" or "Oriental medicine practitioner". Section 61(3) makes it an offence for a person, including a company, who is not registered as a Chinese herbal medicine practitioner or as an acupuncturist to use a title to suggest that he, she or it is. There is no doubt that s.61 applies to a body corporate. This is clear from s.61(10), which provides that if a body corporate contravenes sub-s.(1), any person involved in the contravention is guilty of an offence. Section 63 deals with advertising and a person, which would include a company, must not advertise a Chinese medicine practice or Chinese medicine services in a manner which is intended to be misleading or deceptive or refers to or uses or quotes from testimonials or purported testimonials. It is clear from s.63(2) that the sub-section applies to a company because any person involved in the commission of the offence on behalf of the company is liable to a penalty.
13 During Ms Li's evidence, the Court drew attention to the Act and raised the question whether the company was permitted to conduct the business of Chinese natural therapy. Counsel for the plaintiffs appeared to accept that it was not so permitted and as a result the alleged pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the publications was then claimed by Ms Li and not the company. The accountant who was called on behalf of the plaintiffs prepared a new report, in which the bulk of the economic loss was claimed by Ms Li. This change of approach created a number of problems for the plaintiffs. The fact was that the business during the relevant period was conducted by the company Forever Young. What was sought by the change in approach was to re-write the nature of the business activities and who was conducting the business. No mention was made of lodging amended taxation returns with the Australian Taxation Office.
14 The evidence revealed that on the dates of all the publications complained of, the business known as Chinese Natural Therapy was owned and operated by the company Forever Young and Ms Li was an employee.
15 On 26 May 2003, an article concerning Dr Li and referring to her running the business Forever Young was published in the Herald Sun newspaper of that day. At the bottom of page 1 appeared the following words:
"MEDI-BONK - REVEALED: The dodgy Collins Street doctor charging sex massages to your health insurance, EXCLUSIVE REPORT PAGE 3."
A small photograph of Dr LI appeared between the words "MEDI-BONK" and "REVEALED".
16 The heading on page 3 was:
"INSIGHT HEALTH INSURANCE FRAUD
Doctor admits Medi claim for
Medi-bonk: the
sex cheat Doc."
17 The article took up most of page 3 and contained two photographs of Dr Abbie Li and a photograph of the ground floor entrance to the premises at 24 Collins Street, Melbourne. One of the photographs showed Dr Abbie Li in front of the sign "Forever Young". There is no doubt that the article critically attacks Dr Li, who is the subject of it, and the reference to "Forever Young" is in a context that Dr Li was running that business.
18 Ms Abbie Li and the company Forever Young claim that they were defamed by the words appearing on page 1 and the article on page 3 ("1st article").
19 Attached to these reasons and marked with "A" is a copy of the front page and page 3 of the newspaper.
20 The article which appeared on page 3 noted at the end of the fifth column, the following:
"BROTHEL aids
medi fraud, Page 23."
21 An article appeared on page 23 of the same newspaper under the heading:
22 Immediately below that was a smaller heading, which stated:
"An illegal brothel on ritzy Collins Street is providing sex
services with false receipts that can be claimed on
private health insurance. KEITH MOOR reports."
23 Included in the article is another photograph of Dr Abbie Li, who is said to be a "brothel operator", and a photograph showing two packets of pills, two receipts and a business card of By Forever Young Pty Ltd with the name "Dr Abbie Li TCM". Much of the article repeats what was said in the first article.
24 Both plaintiffs claim that this article also defames each of them ("2nd article").
25 Attached to these reasons and marked "B" is a copy of the article.
26 On the following day, 27 May 2003, The Herald published an article on page 10 under the heading:
"Powers pounce
on sex frauds
Medi-bonk: the
sex cheat doc.
Yesterday's Herald Sun."
27 This article included a photograph of Dr Abbie Li said to be "weeping", and it repeated much of what had been said the previous day and noted that there was a likely three-way investigation into the activities of Dr Abbie Li.
28 The first plaintiff, Ms Li, claims that the article defamed her ("3rd article").
29 Attached to these reasons and marked "C" is a copy of the article.
30 Nearly two months later, on 14 July 2003, in an early edition of the Herald Sun published and distributed that day appeared an article under the heading:
"HBA bans
'Medi-bonk'
herbalist"
31 This article included a small photograph of Abbie Li and it was noted that she had been struck off HBA's list of recognised service providers. Again, the allegations that had been revealed in May were repeated and it was noted that there were a number of bodies investigating Ms Li's activities.
32 Both plaintiffs claim that the article defamed them ("4th article").
33 Attached to these reasons and marked "D" is a copy of the article.
34 On the same day, in a later publication of the paper, The Herald published an article under the heading:
"HBA bans
'Medibonk'
Herbalist"
35 This article is a condensed form of the article which appeared earlier that day, and it repeats the same serious allegations against Ms Li.
36 Both plaintiffs claim that they were defamed by this article ("5th article").
37 Attached to these reasons and marked "E" is a copy of the article.
38 Soon after the first article was published, a conman, Michael Williams, made contact with Ms Li and offered his assistance. She stated in evidence that she thought he was a lawyer. She provided certain information to him, including documents relating to the business. Some time around July 2003, Ms Li engaged a firm of solicitors, Coadys, in relation to the defamatory articles. The firm wrote a letter of demand to the defendants, whose solicitors responded by denying any liability. No proceeding was instituted on behalf of either plaintiff at that stage. Coadys ceased to act for the plaintiffs. Ms Li continued to have substantial contact with the conman Williams and during the months of September and October spent many days with him, giving him instructions and also documents. Williams died at the end of October 2003.
39 In early February 2004, Mr Moor attended on Ms Li at the Collins Street premises and asked her to listen to a tape recording which he had obtained from the conman Williams. The tape purported to contain recorded conversations between the conman and Ms Li. The conversations covered alleged sexual relationships with a former Federal politician and a Melbourne barrister. The evidence revealed that Ms Li, after listening to the tape, admitted her voice was recorded on the tape, became extremely annoyed with Mr Moor and refused to talk to him. On 20 February 2004, a proceeding was instituted in this Court by the plaintiffs' present solicitors, the plaintiff at that time being By Forever Young Pty Ltd, which sought damages against The Herald and Mr Moor for the publication of defamatory articles in the previous year. Ms Li was not joined as a party. The statement of claim is carefully drawn. It is asserted that the company was carrying on business at Suite 1, Level 4, 24 Collins Street, Melbourne and that the articles published on 26 May 2003, 27 May 2003 and 14 July 2003 were defamatory of the company and disparaged its business. The particulars of the alleged defamatory imputations asserted that "the plaintiff through its director Dr Li" was intentionally committing fraud on health insurers, operating an illegal brothel, issuing receipts for acupuncture when she did not perform such treatment, issuing receipts for remedial massages when she did not provide such treatment, providing sexual services to a customer, and a number of other alleged defamatory imputations. It is noted that the alleged defamatory imputations involved the conduct of Dr Li. Whether the writ was served before the next article was not clarified in evidence.
40 On 23 February 2004, The Herald published in the newspaper an article concerning Ms Li. At the top of page 1 appeared the words:
"BLACKMAIL
REVEALED:
THE FEDERAL MP,
THE LAWYER & THE CONMAN - Page 5"
Appearing to the right of this headline is a photograph of the conman Williams.
41 On page 5 appeared an article under the heading:
"The conman, the federal
MP and the lawyer
Blackmail"
42 The article was also written by Mr Moor. It contained three photographs. The top photograph showed the sign on the door of Dr Li's business, which contained the words "Chinese Natural Therapy", the business telephone number and the services provided. There was a photograph of Dr Li with the statement underneath that she "ran an illegal brothel from her natural therapy business." There was also a large photograph of the conman Michael Williams.
43 The article in the main dealt with the conman Williams, but nevertheless contained a number of serious allegations made against Dr Li.
44 Ms Li claims that the front page and article defamed her ("6th article").
45 Attached to these reasons and marked with "F" is a copy of the front page and the article.
46 The article on page 5 took up the whole page and at the foot of the seventh column appeared the words:
47 In the same edition of the Herald Sun at page 12, appeared an article under the heading:
"Case of the missing tape
Mystery unsolved as contact died"
48 This article took up most of page 12. It contained a photograph of the front of the building at 24 Collins Street, Melbourne. It repeated much of what was said in the earlier article, although it did add further allegations.
49 Ms Li claims that the article defamed her ("7th article").
50 Attached to these reasons and marked "G" is a copy of the article.
51 The writ issued on behalf of the company Forever Young was served sometime in February 2004 and the defendants entered an appearance on 26 February 2004.
52 On 17 June 2004, The Herald published an article in the newspaper on page 15 under the heading:
53 The article contained two photographs of Dr Li, one taken in the year 2003, and another taken when she was arrested on the previous day, 16 June 2004. The article noted that detectives took her in for questioning after executing a search warrant on her business, and it went on to repeat some of the serious matters that had been alleged against her in previous articles.
54 Ms Li claims that the article defamed her ("8th article").
55 Attached to these reasons and marked "H" is a copy of the article.
56 On 29 April 2004, a summons was issued by the plaintiff's solicitors seeking orders, inter alia, that the proceeding be entered in the Major Torts list and Ms Li be added as a plaintiff in the proceeding. On 25 June 2004, Bongiorno J ordered that the proceeding be entered into the Major Torts list and the summons was otherwise adjourned to 17 September 2004. On that day, it was adjourned to 24 September 2004. It was adjourned again. On 23 November 2004, the plaintiff company changed solicitors. On 10 December 2004, Ms Li was joined as a party to the proceeding. This was some 18 months after the first publication complained of. Ms Li was granted leave to file an amended statement of claim. Ms Li pleaded eight causes of action in libel and sought general damages and also damages for a significant loss of custom suffered by her. The second plaintiff, the company Forever Young, also sought damages.
57 The author of each of the publications complained of was the second defendant, Mr Moor.
The Issues
58 Ms Li claims she was defamed in each of the articles and accordingly has eight causes of action in libel against the defendants. The company Forever Young claims that it was defamed in the first, second, fourth and fifth articles.
59 The Defamation Act 2005 came into operation on 1 January 2006. The new Act does not apply to this proceeding.[2] Accordingly, this proceeding is to be considered and determined in accordance with the common law.
60 Ms Li has the burden of proving the following elements in each cause of action in libel on the balance of probabilities:
(a) that the words were published of and concerning her;
(b) that the words were in a permanent form;
(c) that the words were published to a third person;
(d) that the words were published by the named defendants;
(e) that the words were defamatory of her.
61 As The Herald is the proprietor of the newspaper Herald Sun and responsible for its publication, it is unnecessary for Ms Li to prove that Mr Moor, its employee, was acting in the course and scope of his employment with The Herald. However, in any event, it has been admitted.
62 Subject to the defendants establishing any defence to the prima facie case, Ms Li is entitled to recover an award of damages if she establishes the above elements of proof. Damages are presumed and she is not required to prove any actual damage. Ms Li has pleaded that she suffered a significant psychiatric reaction to the articles and continues to suffer from a psychiatric condition. In addition, she claims that she has suffered significant loss of custom and economic loss. Accordingly, if she establishes her case and the defendants fail to establish any defence to her case, she has to prove those matters if she wishes to claim damages in respect economic loss.
63 In each of Ms Li's causes of action the alleged defamatory imputations are said to arise on the normal meaning of words, that is, she relies on the false innuendo. Whether the words are defamatory is a question of fact and involves two issues. They are, what do the words mean, and are the imputations defamatory? The intention of the defamer is not relevant to the question of liability. Whether or not the words are defamatory is a matter for the tribunal of fact, namely, myself as a judge sitting alone, and no evidence can be called to establish what the words mean or whether they were defamatory. In Reader's Digest Services v Lamb,[3] Brennan J, speaking for the Court, said:[4]
"Where no true innuendo is pleaded and the published words clearly related to the plaintiff, the issue of libel or no libel can be determined by asking whether hypothetical referees - Lord Selborne's reasonable men ... or Lord Atkin's right thinking members of society generally or Lord Reid's ordinary men not avid for scandal ... - would understand the published words in a defamatory sense. That simple question embraces two elements of the cause of action: the meaning of the words used (the imputation) and the defamatory character of the imputation. Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of that imputation."
(Emphasis added).
64 In considering the issues it is necessary to take into account what the reasonable, average reader would think when he or she reads the article. It does involve a matter of impression and, to an extent, a degree of loose thinking. It is accepted that the average person has a greater capacity to draw an inference than a lawyer. The average reader relies upon his general knowledge, experience of human affairs and common sense.[5]
65 Whether or not the words are defamatory depends upon whether the words lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people generally. Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch, [6] speaking for the House of Lords, stated the test as follows:
"The question, then, is whether the words in their ordinary signification are capable of being defamatory. Judges and textbook writer alike have found difficulty in defining with precision the word 'defamatory'. The conventional phrase exposing the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule and contempt is probably too narrow. The question is complicated by having to consider the person or class of persons whose reaction to the publication is the test of the wrongful character of the words used. I do not intend to ask your Lordships to lay down a formal definition, but after collating the opinions of many authorities I propose in the present case the test: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?"
66 His Lordship's test has been often quoted, and always with approval, and is regularly applied in the cases in determining whether or not the words complained of are defamatory of the plaintiff.
67 The defendants in their defence have raised a number of issues. They do not dispute that the words were published of and concerning Ms Li, that the words were in permanent form and published to readers of the paper, and that the defendants were responsible for the publication. However, they put in issue the element of proof whether the words were defamatory of Ms Li. They also put in issue the question of damages, including the allegation of mental injury and the claim for monetary loss.
68 It is well established law that in considering and determining the question whether the words complained of are defamatory, the context in which the words are used must be considered. As a general rule, the defendant publisher is entitled to have the whole of the publication in which the words complained of appear before the Court, in order to determine whether the words, taken in context and after considering the article as a whole, defame the plaintiff. It is not open to the plaintiff to seek to exclude other parts of the article. The other parts may qualify the meaning of the words complained of. In the old case of Chalmers v Payne,[7] Alderson B at ER p.68 said:
"In one part of this publication, something disreputable to the plaintiff is stated, but that is removed by the conclusion; the bane and the antidote must be taken together."
69 That principle has been applied often. See Gatley on Libel and Slander[8] and John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin.[9]
70 Another principle of law, which is well established and cannot be ignored, is that the words in the end have but one meaning.[10] The natural and ordinary meaning is that meaning which is reasonably understood by the ordinary reader using his or her general knowledge, experience of life and common sense.
71 Articles 1 and 2 were printed on the same day and in the same newspaper. The first article comprises the headline which appeared on page 1 and the article which appeared on p.3, and the second article appeared at page 23. Both articles dealt with the same material, the first article referred to the second article and the alleged defamatory imputations are the same or very similar. In my opinion, the two articles should not have been the subject of separate causes of action.
72 The first article referred to the second. The second article repeated much of what the first had to say. The articles appeared in the same newspaper, separated by 20 pages. It is a reasonable inference that the reasonable reader would have read both articles within a space of minutes. To divide the publication into two separate causes of action cuts across the rule that the defendant publisher is entitled to have the whole article considered and the words complained of construed in context and after taking into account the words as a whole.
73 It is important from the publisher's point of view to have the whole article considered on the issue of whether the words are defamatory. The circumstances of the publication, the words used and the context may have an effect upon the imputation conveyed to the reasonable reader. The rule that the publication must be taken as a whole has been the law for many years. In Thornton v Stephen,[11] it was held that in an action for a libel contained in a newspaper, the publisher had the right to have read as part of the plaintiff's case another part of the same newspaper referred to in the libel complained of. This was to determine the meaning of the words and whether they were defamatory. The general rule may have to be qualified where a plaintiff only sues in respect to a distinct and severable charge without the common sting. That is not the position in the present case. See also Hedley v Barlow.[12]
74 In Gordon v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd,[13] Hunt J said:[14]
"Where the publication sued upon is in written form, a plaintiff is obliged to include within his pleading every passage which materially alters or qualifies the complexity of the imputation complained of ... the justification of that rule is the principle that the effect of the matter complained of must be taken from the whole of what has been published."
"Where the matter complained of contained in a newspaper refers to other material in the same newspaper, the plaintiff may be required to tender that other material in his case: [authorities referred to] provided that such other material is capable of affecting the sense of the matter complained of: [authorities referred to]. Where there are two separate publications by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to (or may be obliged to) have them considered together in order to determine the sense in which either was understood, provided that they are sufficiently connected and identified with each other [authorities referred to]."
"42. There may be cases where reasonably-minded people could consider either classification valid, so that it is prima facie open for a plaintiff to plead parts as individual publications, and also plead their combination as a publication, but nevertheless where this should not be permitted because it introduces confusion and complexities into the case wholly unwarranted by any advantage to the plaintiff, and thus can be considered embarrassing. ...
43. The question then is, is the material as published in The Age such that the only view reasonably open is that this was one publication? In my opinion, plainly not. No part of the second section of The Age material appeared on page 1; and the first section on page 1 did not indicate that what was on page 13 was to be read together with what was on page 1 as part of the same whole. ... Reasonable readers could well read what appeared on page 1 of The Age and not read what appeared on page 13. In my opinion, this was a case where reasonably-minded people could regard the two sections as separate publications, and could also regard them as part of a whole: that is, they could regard both possible classifications as being valid."
78 His Honour went on to observe that it was not a case where pleading the two sections separately introduced such complexity or confusion that it should not be permitted. It is noted that his Honour's observations were made in relation to a pleading summons and, secondly, his Honour's observations were in respect to a proceeding in New South Wales subject to the Defamation Act 1974.
79 Nevertheless, in my respectful opinion, the observations made by Hunt J do apply to the present proceeding. In my opinion, it is open to the defendants to require the Court in considering the question of whether the words complained of were defamatory of Ms Li to consider both articles which appeared in the same newspaper.
80 The approach of dividing up the cause of action also creates some difficulties in relation to damages. This is because a plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages in respect to each separate cause of action. Fortunately, this is a difficulty that can be overcome. In Barber v Pigden,[20] the jury was directed to consider three separate slanders as one for the purpose of determining the quantum of damages. The Court of Appeal held that there was nothing in the Judicature Act or Rules of the Court which specified that separate verdicts and judgments were invariably necessary in respect of separate causes of action contained in the same writ. The question whether one or more causes of action could be included in one verdict or judgment depended upon the exercise of a trial judge's judicial discretion in all the circumstances of the case. In that case, there was no objection to the course taken at trial. The case stands for the proposition that in appropriate cases, one may consider separate causes of action as one for the purpose of determining the total damages. This may overcome the problem of the separate causes of action in respect to the one newspaper publication. However, there may be problems relating to the making of offers of compromise if it is left to trial the question whether the Court should assess a global sum for two or more causes of action. However, I would think that in the circumstances, the Court could take into account on the question of costs whether offers were made and the effect of same.
81 In my opinion, in this case the articles which appeared in the same edition of the newspaper should have formed one cause of action. That is, articles 1 and 2, and articles 6 and 7. They were connected, they dealt with much the same subject matter, and the alleged defamatory imputations were similar. Articles 4 and 5 appeared in separate editions of the newspaper on 14 April 2003 and the second article was an abridged version of the first, and I think in those circumstances it was appropriate to treat them as separate causes of action.
82 However, no objection was taken to dividing up the articles into separate causes of action and the case was presented, conducted and concluded on that basis. Accordingly, the Court will treat each article as a separate cause of action and consider and determine each cause of action separately. However, in my opinion, the defendant is entitled to rely upon both articles in the publications on 26 May 2003 and on 23 February 2004 to determine whether the words complained of in each article were defamatory and in what sense.
83 The defendants relied upon three defences. The onus of proof rests upon each defendant. The standard is on the balance of probabilities.
84 In accordance with the modern practice, Ms Li pleaded the defamatory imputations which she relies upon in each article. However, she is not strictly bound by the pleaded imputations. In the end, the meaning of the words and their defamatory nature is a question for the tribunal of fact, in this case myself, as the judge sitting alone.[21] On the other hand, the pleaded imputations delineate the issues with respect to the meanings and whilst the Court would permit a degree of variation of the pleaded imputations, in the sense that the tribunal of fact may not necessarily accept the imputation as pleaded, the plaintiff, Ms Li, is bound by those imputations. The defendants have pleaded justification to the imputations pleaded by Ms Li. However, the defence specified which particular imputations the defence of justification meets. It is the contention of each defendant that the imputations which are not the subject of the plea of justification are not defamatory imputations.
85 The law presumes that the defamatory words complained of are false and Ms Li does not have to prove that they are untrue. The defence is concerned with meeting the sting of the defamation, that is, the defamatory imputations as found by the tribunal of fact. The publisher must not only prove the truth of the words complained of in their literal meaning, but also the truth of the defamatory sting. The defence must meet the sting of the matter complained of. In Howden v The Truth and Sportsman Ltd,[22] Dixon J said:[23]
"The defence depends upon the substantial truth of the defamatory meanings conveyed by a libel. Every material part of the imputations upon the plaintiff contained in the words complained of must be true; otherwise the justification fails as an answer to the action."
(Emphases added).
86 At common law it is not necessary for the defendants in this proceeding to prove the truth of every detail of the words established as defamatory. In the very early case of Edwards v Bell,[24] decided in 1824, Burrough J said:
"As much must be justified as meets the sting of the charge, and if anything be contained in the charge, which does not add to the sting of it, that need not be justified."
"It remains to be considered what are the conditions and breadth of a plea of justification on the ground of truth. The plea must not be considered in a meticulous sense. It is that the words employed were true in substance and in fact. I view with great satisfaction the charge of the Lord Chief Justice when he made this point perfectly clear to the jury, that all that was required to affirm that plea was that the jury should be satisfied that the sting of the libel or, if there were more than one, the stings of the libel should be made out. To which I may add that there may be mistakes here and there in what has been said which would make no substantial difference to the quality of the alleged libel or in the justification pleaded for it."
(Emphases added).
88 It is open to the defendant to prove partial justification of the defamatory words complained of. This can arise where the words complained of contain more than one defamatory imputation or are severable in some way. In those circumstances, the defendant may justify part only of the defamatory words. This is not a defence. At common law the defendant remained liable to pay damages in respect to the part not justified.
89 More recently in Plato Films Ltd v Speidel,[27] Lord Denning said:[28]
"Although the newspaper cannot justify in whole it can justify in part. It can plead that, in so far as the words meant that he had been convicted twice, they were true and thus bring the two convictions before a jury ... This rule is based on sound sense. Seeing that the law does not permit a defendant, in mitigation of damages to produce evidence which tends to justification, it must permit him to adduce the self same evidence when pleaded in partial justification ... if it were not so, the plaintiff would recover damages for a character which he did not possess or deserve; and this the law will not permit."
90 In addition to the justification defence, the defendants have pleaded what is known as a Polly Peck defence.[29] The progenitor to the Polly Peck decision was an earlier decision of Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd.[30] In that case, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant publisher who sought to plead justification to meanings different but similar to those relied upon by the plaintiff, was bound to plead those meanings. The defence is well established law in England and is available in Australia, although some criticism has been made by two members of the High Court in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd.[31]
91 In Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic,[32] I discussed the defence at pp.62 et seq. At page 67, I said:
"In my opinion, the Polly Peck defence is appropriate where first the plaintiff does not plead the proper imputations arising from the words complained of and forming the basis of the plaintiff's case, and secondly, where there is a common sting which is not separate and distinct from the way the plaintiff has pleaded his case. Justice and fairness to both parties require a Polly Peck defence where a defendant proposes to plead justification in relation to meanings which are conveyed by the words complained of forming the basis of the plaintiff's case. But the defence is not available as a partial justification and is not available where there is a separate and distinct defamatory imputation not relied upon by the plaintiff which is not inextricably bound up with the way the plaintiff has pleaded the imputations. The Court must be vigilant to ensure that what is pleaded as a Polly Peck defence is a proper and permissible one."
92 The defendants have pleaded a Polly Peck defence in relation to the front page headline and the first article when read together, and the third, fourth and fifth articles, and have pleaded what the words meant and were understood to mean. Particulars have been given.
93 Finally, the defendants have relied upon the defence of fair comment upon a matter of public interest. Like the other two defences, the defendants have the burden of proof. In the Popovic case, I discussed the defence of fair comment at pp.53 et seq. I adopted what Lord Nicholls said in Cheng v Tsey Chun Paul,[33] when his Lordship was sitting as a member of the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. In order to prove the defence, His Lordship said it was necessary to prove:
"First, the comment must be on a matter of public interest. Public interest is not to be confined within narrow limits today.
Second, the comment must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact ...
Third, the comment must be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege ... if the facts on which the comment purports to be founded are not proved to be true or published on a privileged occasion, the defence of fair comment is not available.
Next, the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, what are the facts on which the comment is being made. The reader or hearer should be in a position to judge for himself how far the comment was well founded.
Finally, the comment must be one which could have been made by an honest person however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views."
94 Whether the matter is a matter of public interest is a question of law. The other elements of proof are questions of fact.
95 The plaintiffs have not delivered a reply to the defences.
96 The issues can therefore be summarised as follows:
(i) Were the words complained of defamatory in the meanings stated by the Ms Li?
(ii) Have the defendants established their defence of justification?
(iii) In the alternative, have the defendants proven the Polly Peck defence?
(iv) In the alternative, if the defendants have failed to prove the defence of justification, have they proven fair comment?
97 Turning to the claim by the company Forever Young, it is noted that it is a body corporate. A corporation has only a limited right to protection from the publication of defamatory words. The general rule is that a trading corporation may bring an action in respect of the publication of a defamatory matter which affects its business or trading reputation. For example, an allegation which attacks the honesty of the business methods employed by the corporation.[34] Other examples may be an attack upon the financial position of a trading company and a critical appraisal suggesting inefficiency. On the other hand, a corporation cannot be injured in its feelings, which means that allegations that would be actionable at the suit of an individual would not be defamatory of a corporation.
98 The present proceeding is complicated by the fact that in the articles there is no reference to a company By Forever Young Pty Ltd but there is a reference to a trading name "Forever Young". A trading firm - and this would include a trading business name - could be defamed in its trading name. In the South Hetton Coal case,[35] Lord Esher MR said:
"With regard to a firm or a company, it is impossible to lay down an exhaustive rule as to what would be a libel on them. But the same rule is applicable to a statement made with regard to them. Statements may be made with regard to their mode of carrying on business, such as to lead people of ordinary sense to the opinion that they conduct their business badly and inefficiently. If so, the law will be the same in their case as in that of an individual, and the statement will be libellous."
99 However, a firm and a business name are not legal entities. By reason of the Rules of Court, it is open to sue in the name of a firm. However, where a person trades as a business name, it is necessary to sue in the name of the person. It is well-established that the partners in a firm may bring a proceeding jointly in respect of words published which are defamatory of the firm as a whole. There are complications in the present proceeding because the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd has sued on the basis that the words complained of conveyed to the reasonable reader that the company had been libelled in a business sense. But as earlier stated, that company, although it purported to conduct the business of Chinese natural therapy, was not permitted to operate a business as a Chinese herbal medicine practitioner or an acupuncturist.
100 In order for a trading corporation to establish a case in libel, it is necessary for the company to prove the following:
(a) That the words complained of were published of and concerning it;
(b) That the said words concerned its business or trading reputation;
(c) That the words were in a permanent form;
(d) That the words were published to a third person;
(e) That the words were published by the named defendants;
(f) That the words were defamatory of it in its business or trading reputation.
101 No claim has been made by any legal entity alleged to be trading as the name "Forever Young".
102 The defendants' defence put in issue whether the words complained of were defamatory of the trading reputation of the company, and also whether the words were published of and concerning the company. Otherwise, the other elements of proof were admitted.
103 The defendants also rely upon the defences of truth and fair comment against the company Forever Young. Accordingly, the issues are:
(i) Did the company Forever Young have a business trading reputation?
(ii) Were the words complained of published of and concerning the company?
(iii) Are the words complained of defamatory of the trading or business reputation of the company Forever Young?
(iv) If the words complained of were defamatory of the trading reputation of the company, have the defendants proven the truth of the defamatory imputations?
(v) In the alternative, have the defendants proven the defence of fair comment?
104 A matter that must be considered in relation to the claim brought by the company Forever Young is that the company is not named in the articles and the context in which the name "Forever Young" was used is stated, that is, that Dr Li traded as Forever Young. What the reasonable reader understood by the words used and what they conveyed, are matters that will have to be considered and determined. As published, the articles refer to what is a business name. The articles convey that the business name was operated by Dr Li. But the articles deal with Dr Li's conduct in operating the business. These matters will have to be further considered.
Plaintiffs' Proofs
105 Ms Li claims that each of the eight articles was defamatory of her. The company Forever Young claims that it was defamed in the first, second, fourth and fifth articles published on 26 May 2003 (two articles) and 14 July 2003 (two articles). It is necessary to consider each article and to determine the meaning of the words complained of and whether they were defamatory.
106 A person communicates his or her thoughts and intentions by his or her native language. We are dealing with the publication of a number of articles in Australian English. What the writer may have intended to convey may not be properly expressed. On the other hand, the person who reads the words may arrive at a different conclusion than that intended by the writer. There is no doubt, and it is a trite observation, that different minds may come to different conclusions upon reading the same words. As has been said many times, Australian English is at best an imperfect means of expressing one's thoughts, hopes and intentions. The language may be ambiguous, obscure or uncertain, or the reader may not possess a particularly good knowledge of language and may understand the words in a completely different way to that intended by the writer. As Diplock LJ said in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd:[36]
"Everyone outside a court of law recognises that words are imprecise instruments for communicating the thoughts of one man to another."
107 This trial is by judge alone. The meaning of the words complained of and whether they are defamatory of and concerning the plaintiff are questions best answered by a jury. When a judge has to decide the questions, the judge has to be careful that he or she does not approach the questions in a formal way, such as the manner in which one might approach the interpretation of a will. Hence, an overly meticulous approach to the question does not accord with the process that the average reader of a newspaper such as the Herald Sun engages in.
108 The average person reads the article usually only once, may be attracted to the article by the headline, and gains at best an impression of what is being conveyed by the language.
109 I respectfully agree with what Callinan J said in John Fairfax Publications v Rivkin,[37] where his Honour said:
"It is true that an article has to be read as a whole. But that does not mean that matters that have been emphasised should be treated as if they have only the same impact or significance as matters which are treated differently. A headline, for example, expressed pithily, and necessarily incompletely, but designed to catch the eye and give the reader a predisposition about what follows, may well assume more importance than the latter. ... The order in which matters are dealt with can be significant. The capacity of the first paragraph of an article, the 'intro', to excite the reader's attention is a matter upon which editors place store. The language employed is also of relevance. ...
True it may be that readers may take an article or articles on impression, but the fact that they may do so is likely to have the consequence that ideas and meanings conveyed by graphic language will create the strongest impressions. Of course publishers are entitled to use colourful and seductive language, but in using it they may run the risk of seducing readers into believing only what is colourful and on occasions scandalous, rather than the facts conveyed by straight reportage."
110 The principles which guide the tribunal of fact to determine what the words mean and whether they are defamatory of and concerning the plaintiff have been discussed in a variety of cases. It has been accepted by the courts that the average reader is more likely to read into words matters that on a strict analysis of the words used would not be conveyed. The average person is more likely to find that particular words are defamatory than a lawyer or judge.
111 Lord Reid in Lewis v Daily Telegraph[38] said:
"The ordinary man does not live in an ivory tower and is not inhibited by the knowledge of the rules of construction. So he can and does read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs."
112 Following on from what his Lordship said in that case, he stated in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd:[39]
"If we are to follow Lewis' case ... and take the ordinary man as our guide then we must accept a certain amount of loose thinking. The ordinary reader does not formulate reasons in his own mind: he gets a general impression and one can expect him to look again before coming to a conclusion and acting upon it. But formulated reasons are very often an afterthought.
The publishers of newspapers must know the habits of mind of their readers and I see no injustice in holding them liable if readers, behaving as they normally do, honestly reach conclusions which they might be expected to reach. If one were to adopt a stricter standard it would be too easy for purveyors of gossip to disguise their defamatory matter so that the judge would have to say that there is insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to go to trial on the question of whether that matter refers to him, but the ordinary reader with perhaps more worldly wisdom would see the connection and identify the plaintiff with consequent damage to his reputation for which the law would have to refuse him reparation."
113 In approaching these questions, it is necessary to take into account the whole article.
114 It is well established that not only must the words complained of be taken in context, but also the particular article must be considered as a whole. Hence, innocent words may by reference to the balance of the article be defamatory, and words which may appear to be defamatory, when read in context and taking into account the publication as a whole, may not convey to the reasonable reader a defamatory imputation.[40]
115 Nevertheless, although one must consider the words in context and taking into account the whole article, it does not follow that the tribunal of fact must treat each part of the words complained of as having equal impact. The location of the words, the words used, and any particular emphasis, may all lead to a conclusion that the words, taken in context and after considering the article as a whole, are defamatory.
116 It follows that although part of an article may convey a defamatory meaning, that defamatory meaning may be excluded by a consideration of the whole article.
117 Another principle of law which has been well established, and which is apposite in considering the later articles, concerns words which publish views of a defamatory nature of a third party. It is no defence to repeat what others have said, whether it be rumour or assertion, and say that the publisher is not liable for the publication. The law stated in the 4th edition of Gatley on Libel and Slander[41] was endorsed by the Privy Council in "Truth" (NZ) Ltd v Holloway[42] as follows:
"Every re-publication of a libel is a new libel, and each publisher is answerable for his act to the same extent as if the calumny originated with him."
118 Of course, again, one must not overlook the basic principle that one must consider the words in context and after taking into account the full publication. It is no defence for a publisher to say that he was merely repeating what another person has said and therefore it is no more than an allegation or suspicion. Whether or not it does convey the defamatory imputation is a question of fact and the publisher is not excused by merely stating a rumour. This is made clear by what Lord Devlin said in Rubber Improvement Limited v Daily Telegraph Ltd,[43] where his Lordship stated that one cannot escape liability for defamation by making some observation that "I have been told that" or "It is rumoured" and saying "Well, it is true, that is what has been rumoured or has been asserted." That is correct as a general proposition. However, in considering the words complained of, it is necessary to consider the context. The surrounding words or circumstances may lead to a different conclusion. In Wake v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd,[44] the Court said:
"There can be little doubt that the nature and quality of the defamatory publication may vary, dependent on whether it is a report of what another has said and whether it is adopted, repudiated or discounted. The purpose of the re-publication will also have a significant bearing."
119 The Court quoted what Griffith CJ stated in Ronald v Harper,[45] where his Honour said:
"It is said that when a person repeats a slander he adopts it as his own. This is a very good general rule, but I decline to adopt it as a rule of invariable application. Words injurious to another may be used under such circumstances as to show that the person who has repeated them gives them his own authority. It is entirely a matter of fact, and I do not think that, in a case such as this, the jury, in finding the defendant used these words, intended to find that he meant to reaffirm the charge."
120 The Court of Appeal pointed out that the Chief Justice was not purporting to exhaustively state the law on the topic, and it then stated what I have set out above.
121 In the end, of course, it is a question of considering the words in context, after taking into account the whole of the words used in the article and whether in the circumstances the words do convey a defamatory sting.
122 Headlines loom large in this proceeding and it is necessary to say something about them.
123 In Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd,[46] the House of Lords was concerned with a case where the plaintiffs, well-known actors in "Neighbours", were portrayed by headlines, photographs and captions as being involved in sexual activities. However, it was clear upon reading the whole article that it was not being suggested that they had. As Lord Bridge said:[47]
"The plaintiffs must have found this publication deeply offensive and insulting. Many people will not only deplore this kind of gutter journalism but will think that the law ought to give some redress to the plaintiffs against the publication of such degrading faked photographs irrespective of what the accompanying text may have said. I have considerable sympathy for this point of view."
124 It was noted that the issue in the proceeding was whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed because certain parts considered in isolation were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, although the whole article was not considered to be defamatory. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said:[48]
"At first sight one would expect the law to recognise that some newspaper readers will have seen only the banner headline and glanced at the picture. They will not have read the text of the accompanying article. In the minds of these readers, the reputation of the person who is the subject of the defamatory headline and picture will have suffered. He has been defamed to these readers. The newspaper could have no cause for complaint if it were held liable accordingly. It has chosen, for its own purposes, to produce a headline which is defamatory. It cannot be heard to say that the article must be read as a whole when it knows that not all readers will read the whole article.
To anyone unversed in the law of defamation, that, I venture to think, would appear to be the common sense of the matter. Long ago, however, the law of defamation headed firmly in a different direction. The law adopts a single standard for determining whether a newspaper article is defamatory: the ordinary reader of that newspaper. I leave aside cases where some readers may have special knowledge of facts which would cause them to give the words a different meaning.
In principle this is a crude yardstick, because readers of mass circulation newspapers vary enormously in the way they read articles and the way they interpret what they read. It is, indeed, in this very consideration that the law finds justification for its single standard. The consequence is that, in the case of some publications, there may be many readers who understand in a defamatory sense words which, by the single standard of the ordinary reader, were not defamatory. In respect of those readers the plaintiff has no remedy. The converse is equally true. So a newspaper may find itself paying damages for libel assessed by reference to a readership many of whose members did not read the words in a defamatory sense.
I do not see how, consistently with this single standard, it is possible to carve the readership of one article into different groups: those who will have read only the headlines, and those who will have read further. The question, defamatory or no, must always be answered by reference to the response of the ordinary reader to the publication.
This is not to say that words in the text of an article will always be efficacious to cure a defamatory headline. It all depends on the context, one element of which is the layout of the article. Those who print defamatory headlines are playing with fire. The ordinary reader might not be expected to notice curative words tucked away further away down in the article. The more so, if the words are on a continuation page to which the reader is directed. The standard of the ordinary reader gives a jury adequate scope to return a verdict meeting the justice of the case."
(Emphases added).
125 Another principle, which was reaffirmed in the Charlston case, is the principle that in the end, the tribunal of fact must arrive at one and only one meaning, even though common sense states that different readers may reach different conclusions as to what the words were conveying. The House of Lords approved what Diplock LJ (as he then was) said in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd,[49] where his Lordship said:
"Where, as in the present case, words are published to the millions of readers of a popular newspaper, the chances are that if the words are reasonably capable of being understood as bearing more than one meaning, some readers will have understood them as bearing one of those meanings and some will have understood them as bearing others of those meanings. But none of this matters. What does matter is what the adjudicator at the trial thinks is the one and only meaning that the readers as reasonable men should have collectively understood the words to bear. That is 'the natural and ordinary meaning of words in an action for libel'."
"Juries, in theory, must be unanimous upon every issue upon which they have to adjudicate; and since the damages that they award must depend upon the defamatory meaning that they attribute to the words, they must all agree upon a single meaning as being the 'right' meaning. And so the unexpressed major premise, that any particular combination of words can bear but a single 'natural and ordinary meaning' which is 'right', survived the transfer from judge to jury of a function of adjudicating upon the meaning of words in civil actions for libel."
127 Lord Nicholls, in the Charleston case,[51] after making reference to what he described as the "single standard" observed:
"I do not see how, consistently with this single standard, it is possible to carve the readership of one article into different groups: those who will have read only the headlines, and those who will have read further. The question, defamatory or no, must always be answered by reference to the response of the ordinary reader to the publication.
This is not to say that words in the text of an article will always be efficacious to cure a defamatory headline. It all depends on the context, one element in which is the layout of the article. Those who print defamatory headlines are playing with fire. The ordinary reader might not be expected to notice curative words tucked away further down in the article. The more so, if the words are on a continuation page to which a reader is direct. The standard of the ordinary reader gives the jury adequate scope to return a verdict meeting the justice of the case."
128 In the end, it is a question of what the reasonable reader would understand the words to mean in their normal and natural meaning.
129 With those principles in mind, I now consider each of the articles.
Ms Li's Proofs
130 Each of the articles refer to Ms Li. I am satisfied that she has proven on the balance of probabilities elements (a) - (d) (inclusive) of each of her causes of action, that is, the words complained of were published of and concerning her, they were in permanent form, they were published to readers of the newspaper, and were published by the defendants. No argument was advanced to the contrary.
131 The remaining issue in each of her cases is - do the words complained of defame her? In accordance with the modern practice, Ms Li has pleaded in her amended statement of claim the defamatory imputations upon which she relies. She pleads what is known as the false innuendo, that is, that the defamatory meanings are found in the words complained of and do not rely upon proof of extrinsic facts. As the tribunal of fact, the Court is not bound by the plaintiff's imputations and in the end, the decisions as to what the words mean, whether the words complained of are defamatory and if so, in what sense, are matters for the Court.
132 This is a trial by judge sitting alone. The parties have conducted the case on the basis of the pleaded imputations. It is convenient to consider the meaning of the words complained of and the pleaded defamatory imputations, but the Court is not bound by the exact wording of the imputations pleaded. Nevertheless, I will proceed on the basis that the pleaded imputations identify what Ms Li asserts the words mean in a defamatory sense.
133 Once the Court has determined what the words complained of mean, the question is, do they defame the plaintiff?
134 I now turn to consider each article.
1. Article 1
135 The words complained of in Article 1 are found on the front page and page 3 of the Herald Sun published on 26 May 2004.
136 The front page of the paper deals with an important incident in the history of this country, namely, the resignation of the Governor-General. Across the base of the front page in bold capital letters is the following: "MEDI-BONK"
137 Next to that is a small photograph of Ms Li and next to the photograph is a reference to the revelation of the "dodgy Collins Street doctor charging sex massages to your health insurance." Turning to page 3, there is a bold heading asserting "INSIGHT" and a reference to "HEALTH INSURANCE FRAUD". It is then noted that the doctor admitted the fake receipts and that there was a Medi claim for brothel service, and the phrase "Medi-bonk: the sex cheat Doc" appears. There are two photographs of Ms Li.
138 The article takes up most of page 3 and is a hard-hitting article attacking Ms Li which would attract the attention of the average reader of the paper.
139 At the bottom of the last column of the article published on page 3 appeared the words -
140 On page 23 appeared the second article published in the Herald Sun on 26 May 2003. Much of what appeared on page 3 is repeated. Although the plaintiffs have pleaded the articles as separate causes of action, in my opinion the Court must consider both articles to determine whether the words complained of are defamatory of Ms Li.
141 In her pleading, Ms Li has pleaded nine separate defamatory imputations in the first article. The defendants do not dispute the majority of the pleaded imputations. However, they dispute the imputations alleging Ms Li indulged in sexual intercourse with her patients and that she held herself out as a legitimate Chinese medical practitioner when she was a prostitute. It is convenient to deal first with the non-contentious matters. In my opinion, the words convey to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That she operated an illegal brothel in Collins Street;
(b) That she was a prostitute in the sense of receiving money for the provision of sexual services;
(c) That she was a dishonest person who was prepared to permit her patients to defraud the health insurance system by providing fake receipts to them after providing herbal products and sexual services which were not claimable on their health insurance;
(d) That she performed sexual services for reward on a person whom the Herald Sun arranged to visit her business premises and gave him a receipt for a remedial massage which would be claimable from some private health insurers, including Medibank Private;
(e) That she provided fake medical receipts to patients so that they could claim the cost of the sexual services at her illegal brothel from their health insurer;
(f) That she had dishonestly supplied herbal medicines to patients and provided other services which were not claimable on health funds and provided fake receipts for claimable services which had not been provided, to enable the patients to make fraudulent claims upon their health insurers; and
(g) That she provided fake receipts to enable her clients to claim on their private health insurers.
142 Imputations (c), (f) and (g) cover much the same ground. Ms Li pleaded further defamatory imputations which the defendants deny.
143 It was pleaded that as an alternative to imputation (d) referred to above, Ms Li had unlawfully engaged in sexual intercourse with a person whom the Herald Sun had arranged to visit the premises and gave him a fake receipt for remedial massage. A variation of this imputation was pleaded that she had engaged in sexual intercourse for reward and provided fake medical receipts so that the patients could claim the cost on Medibank and HBA. The defendants deny that the imputations were conveyed by the article.
144 In support of the submission that the words conveyed those imputations, Mr Selimi of Counsel, who appeared on behalf of Ms Li, relied upon the word "Medi-bonk" appearing at the bottom of page 1 and in the headline on page 3. He submitted that the word "bonk" was a slang expression which meant sexual intercourse. Reference to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles published in 1950 fails to reveal a word known in the English language as "bonk". However, the Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edition, being the Australian edition published in 1988, reveals the word "bonk" as meaning first "to hit", and secondly, "to have sexual intercourse (with)".
145 My understanding, based upon general knowledge and experience of life, leads me to the same conclusion as to the use of the word "bonk". It does mean to hit but it also means to have sexual intercourse. Mr Selimi submitted that the references to clients claiming for sex, to Ms Li running an illegal brothel, and to Ms Li providing a person with a sexual service and giving him a receipt for an $80 remedial massage, all lead to the conclusion that the phrase "Medi-bonk" means that the sexual services were in fact sexual intercourse. Another word that is a slang expression for sexual intercourse is a four letter word beginning with "f". In common parlance, to be described as "effed" in a certain context means being placed in a position of being taken advantage of or deceived. In my view, in considering the article as a whole and in particular the reference to "sex massages" on the first page, I do not accept that the phrase "Medi-bonk" conveys to the reasonable reader that the sex and the sexual services were in fact sexual intercourse. In my view, "Medi-bonk" means in the context of the article that the Medibank insurer was deceived and accordingly was "shafted" in the sense of being cheated. I do not accept that the pleaded imputations are to be found on a reasonable reading of the two headlines and the article. The whole thrust of the article concerns massages, although it cannot be denied that the phrase "a sexual service" could cover sexual intercourse. But on a fair reading of the headlines and the whole article, the inference that is open to the reasonable reader is that the sexual services were involved in the massage.
146 My conclusion is reinforced by a number of other matters. First, on page 3, the article describes what the representative of the legal brothel industry received at Ms Li's premises. It stated that she had provided him with a sexual service and given him a receipt for an $80 remedial massage. In the second article published the same day the "sexual service" is amplified. The article stated:
"He didn't get Linda or Suzanne, but Dr Li herself did oil his body and provide a massage, which included a sexual service."
147 The article went on to quote a portion of a statutory declaration made by the representative. The article stated:
"'Dr Li instructed me to lie on my back. Dr Li removed and dropped the towel that had covered my buttocks,' his statutory declaration says.
It then goes into graphic detail about the sexual services provided by Dr Li."
148 Further, the imputations when first pleaded did not plead any imputation that the article conveyed that Ms Li was unlawfully engaged in sexual intercourse. This imputation was first pleaded nearly three years after the publication of the first article.
149 Another imputation pleaded and in dispute was that Ms Li gave a "fake receipt for a remedial massage" to the representative of the brothel industry. In my opinion, the first article did not impute that Ms Li gave the representative of the brothel industry "a fake receipt for remedial massage". Again, combining the first and second articles, in my opinion what is conveyed to the reasonable reader is that he was given a receipt for an $80 remedial massage, the "full cost of which is refundable by some health insurance funds including Medibank Private". The article certainly asserted that Ms Li was providing fake medical receipts so clients could claim sexual services on their private insurers. But in my view, the article was not asserting that she gave a false receipt to the representative of the brothel industry. The topic is further amplified in the second article, which quotes part of the statutory declaration of the representative in these terms:
"'We had a conversation about the issue of a receipt for the money paid for the service' the statutory declaration says.
Dr Li stated her services were fully deductible from private health funds such as Medibank Private.
The legal brothel industry representative gave Dr Li $80 for the 45 minute service and was provided with a receipt containing an item number recognised by health funds as being for a remedial massage."
150 In my opinion, what is being conveyed to the reasonable reader is that Ms Li provided a remedial massage which included a sexual service, and provided a receipt to enable the patient to claim a refund from a private insurer such as Medibank Private. Nevertheless, if I am wrong in that conclusion, I will consider whether the defendants have proven the truth of the imputation claimed by Ms Li.
151 The other imputation which was contested was that Ms Li held herself out as a legitimate Chinese medical practitioner when in fact she was a prostitute. In my opinion, on a reasonable reading of the article, what was being conveyed was that Ms Li, whilst conducting a Chinese natural therapy business, was also conducting a business as a prostitute.
152 Mr Selimi on behalf of Ms Li submitted that the article conveyed the imputation that Ms Li defrauded the health insurance system. In my opinion, the article conveyed to the reasonable reader that Ms Li provided fake medical receipts to enable her patients to defraud the private health insurance system.
153 In my opinion, the words complained of, which I have found reflect on her reputation, and the imputation that she was conducting the business as a prostitute, were defamatory.
2. Article 2
154 In the same edition of the newspaper published 26 May 2003, there was a second article under the heading "Brothel aids medi fraud". This article appeared at page 23 and at the bottom of the article on page 3 is a reference to that article at page 23. It is a separate cause of action but must be read in the context of the first article. In my opinion, the words conveyed to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That she operated an illegal brothel in Collins Street;
(b) That she provided illegal sexual services to her patients;
(c) That she was a prostitute;
(d) That she was a dishonest person who fraudulently permitted her clients to claim the cost of sexual services from their health insurer;
(e) That she unlawfully performed sexual services for reward on a person whom the Herald Sun arranged to visit her premises; and
(f) That she had supplied tablets for which she gave a receipt which fraudulently provided that acupuncture had occurred rather than the provision of pills, which would enable the cost to be claimed on the health insurance.
155 I am satisfied that each of the imputations were defamatory of Ms Li.
3. Article 3
156 Article 3 was published on page 10 of the Herald Sun on 27 May 2003. The heading is "Powers pounce on sex frauds", and a reference is made in the heading to the phrase "Medi-bonk: the sex cheat Doc" which was stated in the previous day's paper. There is a photograph of Ms Li. In my opinion, the words convey to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That Ms Li operated an illegal brothel;
(b) That she was a dishonest person who provided medical receipts so that the clients could claim the cost of sexual services from their health funds;
(c) That she was a prostitute;
(d) That Ms Li whilst conducting a Chinese natural therapy business was also conducting a business as a prostitute;
(e) That she supplied herbal medicines but gave a false receipt stating the service was acupuncture so customers could apply for refunds from their private health funds.
157 It was argued that the article conveyed that she held herself out as a legitimate Chinese medical practitioner when in fact she was a prostitute. However, for reasons which I have stated in relation to article 1, in my opinion the proper imputation is that set out above.
158 I am satisfied that each of the imputations is defamatory of Ms Li.
4. Article 4
159 Article 4 was published in the newspaper some two months later, on 14 July 2003 on page 8, and carries the headline:
"HBA bans
'Medi-bonk'
herbalist"
160 The article was published in the early edition of the Herald Sun that day. It details much of what had gone before, save that it was noted that a customer with a guilty conscience returned $47 to a health fund and that the Victoria Police Major Fraud Squad was examining the claims made by Ms Li's clients on their private health insurance fund. It was also noted that HBA had deregistered Ms Li.
161 In my opinion, the words conveyed to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That Ms Li ran an illegal brothel in Collins Street;
(b) That she was a prostitute;
(c) That Ms Li was a dishonest person who provided fake medical receipts to patients so that patients could claim the cost of sexual services from their health insurer;
(d) That she had unlawfully performed sexual services for reward for a person whom the Herald Sun arranged to visit her premises and provided him with a receipt for a remedial massage;
(e) That Ms Li whilst conducting a Chinese natural therapy business was also conducting a business as a prostitute; and
(f) That she supplied herbal medicines to clients and gave them receipts stating that she had provided acupuncture so the patient could make a fraudulent claim on their private insurer.
162 Mr Selimi submitted that there were two other imputations reasonably open, namely, that Ms Li had engaged in sexual intercourse for reward with patients at the clinic and provided fake medical receipts so that the patients could claim the cost of sex from their health fund and, further, that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with a person who had been sent to the premises by the Herald Sun and gave him a fake receipt for remedial massage. Again, Mr Selimi relies upon the reference to the word "Medi-bonk". For the reasons stated in respect to article one, I am not persuaded that on a proper reading of the article, it conveyed to the reasonable reader that Ms Li had provided a sexual service in the form of sexual intercourse. It is noted in the article that the emphasis is on remedial massage. The reference to the representative of the brothel industry was that he had received a remedial massage. I do not accept, for reasons advanced in relation to the first article, that it conveyed that the representative of the brothel industry was given a fake receipt for a remedial massage. What the article clearly states is that he was given "a receipt for an $80 remedial massage - the full cost of which is refundable by some health insurance funds." Mr Selimi also submitted that the fourth article contained the imputation that Ms Li had held herself out as a legitimate medical practitioner when in fact she was a prostitute. In my opinion, the article conveyed the imputation which I have set out above.
163 I am satisfied that the imputations that I have found are defamatory of Ms Li.
5. Article 5
164 Article 5 was published in the Herald Sun in the later edition which was available on 14 July 2003. The article carries the same headline as article 4, although the word "Medibonk" is no longer divided by a hyphen. The fifth article did not contain a photograph of Ms Li (as did article 4) and is a condensed version of the article published earlier that day. Ms Li has pleaded eight separate imputations. In my opinion, the words convey to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That Ms Li ran an illegal brothel in Collins Street;
(b) That she was a prostitute;
(c) That she was a dishonest person who provided fake medical receipts to patients so that they could claim the cost of sexual services from their health insurer;
(d) That Ms Li had unlawfully performed sexual services for reward on a person whom the newspaper arranged to visit her premises;
(e) That Ms Li whilst conducting a Chinese natural therapy business was also conducting a business as a prostitute; and
(f) That she supplied herbal medicines to patients which were not claimable on health funds and provided fake receipts for acupuncture services to enable the patient to make a fraudulent claim upon the health insurer.
165 In addition, further imputations pleaded on her behalf were that Ms Li had engaged in sexual intercourse for reward rather than providing a sexual service, and that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with the person whom the Herald Sun had arranged to visit her. The basis for this contention is what is stated in the headline, namely, "Medibonk". I have already considered this submission. On a fair reading of the article, I do not accept that it is conveying to the reasonable reader that the sexual service was sexual intercourse. It was also submitted on her behalf that the article imputes that she held herself out as a legitimate medical practitioner when in fact she was a prostitute. For the reasons I have already stated, in my opinion the article was conveying what I set out above.
166 I am satisfied that the imputations that I have found are defamatory of Ms Li.
6. Article 6
167 Article 6 was published some seven months later on 23 February 2004. The words complained of are published on the front page of the Herald Sun and page 5 of the paper published that day. The front page states:
"BLACKMAIL
REVEALED: THE FEDERAL MP,
THE LAWYER & THE CONMAN"
and there was a reference to "page 5" and a photograph of the conman, Michael Williams. The heading on page 5 contains similar words and has three photographs: a large one of the conman Michael Williams, a photograph of the sign on the door of Ms Li's business, namely - "CHINESE NATURAL THERAPY" and a photograph of Ms Li which had appeared in the earlier articles. Almost all of page 5 is devoted to the article, although there is an article at the bottom of the page which dealt with the conman Michael Williams.
168 At the bottom of the last column on page 5 appear the words:
169 The article appearing on page 12 is the seventh article and is pleaded as a separate cause of action. For reasons which I have stated in respect to articles 1 and 2, in my opinion the articles must be read together. They are treated as separate causes of action. However, in my opinion, the reasonable reader would have read both articles. Indeed, both articles would have been read within a matter of minutes of each other by the reasonable reader. Much of what is contained in the second article is a repeat of the first article on that day. Many of the imputations pleaded in respect to both articles are the same.
170 In her pleading, Ms Li has pleaded five separate imputations in respect to article 6. In my opinion, the words convey to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That Ms Li operated an illegal brothel near Parliament and The Melbourne Club;
(b) That Ms Li was a prostitute;
(c) That she was providing fake medical receipts so her clients could claim the cost of sexual services on their private health insurance; and
(d) That Ms Li whilst conducting a Chinese natural therapy business was also conducting a business as a prostitute.
171 It was submitted that the article conveyed the imputation that she had falsely held herself out as a legitimate Chinese medical practitioner when she was a prostitute. For reasons which I have already stated, in my opinion the particular imputation was that conveyed as set out in (d) above.
172 It was submitted on her behalf that the article conveyed two additional imputations, namely, that she had performed illegal sexual services at her premises for a barrister and a federal politician, who were her clients, and that they forced her to perform sexual services for them. The article refers to a barrister and a federal politician, although the article does not name them. In considering the meaning of the words used, it is necessary to consider the whole article and in addition the wording of the article appearing on page 12 of the same edition of the newspaper.
173 The article on page 5 starts out by informing the reader that the conman had died while attempting to blackmail a federal politician and a barrister over their visits to a herbal doctor who ran an illegal brothel. There is no doubt that the reference to the herbal doctor is to Ms Li, and the article repeats that she had been conducting an illegal brothel. The article then concentrates on what the conman was seeking to do, namely, to extort from the married men after he discovered they were clients of Ms Li. It is important to note that the first column of the article stated that both the politician and the barrister confirmed to the Herald Sun they had been clients of Ms Li but were visiting her as a Chinese medical doctor and she had been treating them for genuine complaints. In particular, they denied taking part in any sexual activity with Ms Li. Having made that very clear to the reader, the article stated that the conman had contacted the Herald Sun and had claimed he had incriminating evidence involving the politician and a person he described as a "Chinese prostitute". He had alleged the politician rang Ms Li wanting to know what it was all about. Williams said he had a video tape showing both men having sex with Ms Li at different times. Then appears the following:
"It appears his intention was to get money from the Herald Sun as well as cash from the two men - but he died before finishing what he started."
The article stated that Williams died of natural causes, and that Ms Li attended the funeral in November 2003. The article stated that the Herald Sun saw no evidence of any video tape but that Williams did provide an audio tape in which Ms Li claimed she had consensual sex in her clinic with the politician and was forced to commit sexual acts by the barrister. The article continued to discuss what the conman did, namely, that in taped conversations he named the men concerned, who were regular visitors to Ms Li's clinic, and that a video camera had been installed and recorded footage of the men having sex with Ms Li. The reader was informed that there was no evidence that any video tape existed.
174 The article then dealt with the audio tape that was played to Ms Li. She admitted it was her voice on the tape. Returning to the men concerned, it was reported that both had said that an anonymous man had contacted them and made various allegations and that they assumed it was Williams. The barrister stated that he had been warned by the person that there was incriminating evidence. The barrister said he had attempted to meet the man with the view to having him charged, and that the conman played the audio tape over the telephone him but it was inaudible. The article then stated that Williams played the audio tape over the telephone to the Herald Sun and that it was inaudible. He gave a copy of the tape to the paper. The article stated that:
"Dr Li claims on the audiotape that the barrister forced her to commit sex acts on him, that he still owes her money.
She also claims on tape to have had consensual sex with the federal politician over several years."
175 Reference was then made to the unsigned statutory declaration that the conman claimed Dr Li had made with him. It was then stated that certain allegations were made in that document. It was also asserted that Ms Li claimed on the audio tape that she regularly massaged the barrister and that he would always ask for something extra. Reference was again made to the unsigned statutory declaration by Williams, in which he claimed that Ms Li had alleged that the politician and the barrister both forced her to provide sexual services.
176 The article concludes by stating that Williams had a criminal background, that he had spent 28 years behind bars mostly for deception offences, and that he was a well-known blackmailing conman.
177 Immediately under that article, which took up two-thirds of page 5 of the newspaper, was another article which carried the headline:
178 This article, also written by the second defendant, Mr Moor, details some of the activities of Williams which demonstrated he was a career criminal who specialised in deception. In my opinion, the reasonable reader reading both articles would come to the view that anything Williams said or did was unlikely to be accurate or truthful. It is observed that both the politician and the barrister denied any sexual activity involving Ms Li and, further, that the claims made by Ms Li were those stated by her on an audio tape supplied by Williams. The article does not state that Ms Li was involved in any consensual sex with the barrister or that she was forced by both to provide sexual services. The article conveys to the reasonable reader that claims and allegations had been made but the production of the so-called evidence was by a fraudulent conman, Williams.
179 The seventh article, appearing on page 12 of the same edition of the Herald Sun on that day repeats much of what the sixth article stated and pleaded similar defamatory imputations. The question is, having read both articles, what did article six convey to the reasonable reader? In particular, what did it convey in relation to the imputations relied upon by Ms Li, namely, that she had performed illegal sexual services at her premises for a barrister and a Federal politician and that she was forced to perform sexual acts on them? The seventh article noted that allegations had been made that Ms Li had been forced to perform sexual acts on both men and that they had been secretly filmed. The seventh article went on to talk about the conman Williams summoning the Herald Sun to a meeting in a clandestine way, and stated that his home had been broken into and his video collection ransacked. The article definitely conveyed to the reasonable reader that the Herald Sun was of the view that he did not have any video tape. It was stated that the audio tape had Ms Li claiming the barrister had forced her to perform sexual acts and that she had had consensual sex with the politician over several years. Reference was also made again to the unsigned statutory declaration. Thereafter, the article stated that Williams expressed a fear for his safety at another meeting and then some nine days later he died from natural causes. He had in the last meeting promised to produce the video tape. No video tape was forthcoming. The article stated that Ms Li had met with the Herald Sun and read the unsigned statutory declaration but refused to confirm it, and that she eventually conceded, having listened to the audio tape, that her voice was recorded on it.
180 Returning to article six, in my opinion, taking into account the denials by both men and the fact that the article clearly conveys to the reasonable reader, reinforced by the article which appeared underneath it on page 5, that anything the conman Williams said should not be believed and that the contents of the audio tape amounted to nothing more than claims made by Ms Li, the reasonable reader would not infer that she had performed illegal sexual services at her premises for a barrister and a Federal politician who were her clients or that they had forced her to perform sexual acts. There is no doubt that the article conveyed that Ms Li had claimed or admitted on the audio tape provided to the Herald Sun that she had consensual sex with the politician and was forced to perform sexual acts with the barrister. However, the statements made were claims by her and in my view the fact that she claimed these things had happened means the statements were not defamatory of her. In my opinion, the wording of article seven reinforces the conclusions I have reached. If I am wrong, and the publication of the claims made by her were defamatory of her, I will consider the defence of justification in respect to the claims made. I find that the article conveyed the defamatory imputations which I have set out above.
7. Article 7
181 In the same edition of the newspaper published 23 February 2004 appeared a second article published on page 12. Ms Li pleads five defamatory imputations in relation to this article. The article is a continuation of the first article and was pleaded as a separate cause of action. However, in considering whether the article defames Ms Li, in my opinion it is necessary to consider the article in the context of the reasonable reader reading the first article. It is clearly connected to the first article. In my opinion, the words conveyed to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That Ms Li ran an illegal brothel from her Collins Street clinic;
(b) That she was a dishonest person who provided fake receipts to patients so they could claim the cost of sexual services on their health insurance;
(c) That Ms Li conducted herself in a way that it was appropriate that the police should investigate to see whether Ms Li was involved in either a blackmail attempt or in making false allegation s against the politician and the barrister.
182 In addition, two other imputations were pleaded, namely, that she had falsely held herself out as a legitimate Chinese medical practitioner when in fact she was a prostitute, and that she was forced to perform sex acts on a federal politician and a Melbourne barrister. In my opinion, there is nothing in the article which states that she falsely held herself out as conducting a Chinese medical therapy business and also conducting a business as a prostitute.
183 The article does state that there were "allegations Dr Li had been forced to perform sex acts on a federal politician and a Melbourne barrister". The statement was to the effect that the allegations have been made. If the reasonable reader had read the earlier article in the paper that day, he or she would have appreciated what was being said, that is, that they were allegations made on an audio tape by Ms Li, in a context where both men denied the allegations and in a story concerning a conman Williams who was not believable. In my opinion, the reasonable reader of article 7, having read both articles or only article 7, would not have inferred from the article that Ms Li had in fact been forced to perform sexual acts on a Federal politician and a Melbourne barrister. Article 7 noted that they were allegations and if the reasonable reader confined himself to that article and not the earlier article, in my opinion, taken in context, they remain throughout allegations and nothing more. If, on the other hand, the reasonable reader had read both articles, not only would he or she have noted they were merely allegations, but further that they were allegations which depended upon claims made by Ms Li on a questionable audio tape.
184 I am satisfied that the imputations (a) and (b) set out above were defamatory of Ms Li. If I am wrong in my conclusion as to whether the article conveyed to the reasonable reader that she had been forced to perform sexual acts on a politician and barrister, in my opinion the imputation, if so conveyed, was not defamatory of her. Ms Li is portrayed as an innocent victim in those allegations which were said to be claims made by her. I do not believe that the reasonable person would have thought less of her if in fact she was forced to perform these sexual acts. Further, if the imputation was conveyed, then taken in context, I do not believe that a reasonable person would think less of her in the context of Ms Li operating a brothel.
185 At most, in relation to the allegations concerning the performance of sexual acts by force, the article conveys that they were claims made by Ms Li in an audio tape recording. In my opinion, that would not be defamatory of Ms Li, especially in the context of Ms Li operating a brothel. However, if I am wrong, I will consider the defence of justification in respect to the claims made in the article allegedly by Ms Li in the recorded conversation.
186 That brings me to imputation (c). Confining the reasonable reader to article 7, the article is predominantly concerned with conman Williams and his attempt to deceive and blackmail two men. Reference back to article 6 by the reasonable reader would put what appears at the end of article 7 in a context where the reasonable reader would have additional information. Article 7 concluded with the following paragraphs:
"A Victoria Police detective investigating the earlier allegations against Dr Li will be given the unsigned statutory declaration and the audio tape of the interview between Dr Li and Mr Williams.
He is expected to try to determine if Dr Li was involved in either a blackmail attempt or in making false allegations against the politician and the barrister."
187 In my opinion, the imputation I set out in paragraph (c) above is what is conveyed to the reasonable reader. The question is whether that is defamatory.
188 The imputation pleaded by Ms Li was that she had conducted herself in such a way "that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation into attempting to blackmail a federal politician and a Melbourne barrister and in making false allegations against them."
189 In my opinion, the words in the article taken in context would not convey to the reasonable reader that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation. All that is being conveyed is that information was provided to Victoria Police and the investigating officer was expected to try and determine if Ms Li was involved in the blackmail attempt or in making false allegations against the politician and the barrister.
190 In my opinion, the words complained of are conveying no more than that the police are looking into the matter. The article does not go on to state that the police had formed the opinion on reasonable grounds for a police investigation. The newspaper report does not impute that Ms Li has committed a criminal offence.
191 In the case of Mirror Newspapers Limited v Harrison,[52] the High Court was concerned with a report that said that a person was arrested and had been charged with an offence. The issue in the appeal was whether a newspaper report stating that the plaintiff had been arrested and charged or would be arrested for a criminal offence was capable of bearing the imputation that the plaintiff was guilty of the offence. Mason J wrote the leading judgment. After noting that the ordinary reasonable reader was aware of the presumption of innocence, that the question of guilt was a matter for a court and that sometimes a person charged was acquitted, his Honour went on to observe:[53]
"In this situation the reader will view the plaintiff with suspicion, concluding that he is a person suspected by the police of having committed the offence and that they have grounds for laying a charge against him. But this does not warrant the conclusion that by reporting the fact of arrest and charge a newspaper is imputing that the person concerned is guilty. A distinction needs to be drawn between the reader's understanding of what the newspaper is saying and judgments or conclusions which he may reach as a result of his own beliefs and prejudices. It is one thing to say that a statement is capable of bearing an imputation defamatory of the plaintiff because the ordinary reasonable reader would understand it in that sense, drawing on his own knowledge and experience of human affairs in order to reach that result. It is quite another thing to say that a statement was capable of bearing such an imputation merely because it excites in some readers a belief or prejudice from which they proceed to arrive at a conclusion unfavourable to the plaintiff. The defamatory quality of the published material is to be determined by the first, not by the second, proposition. Its importance for present purposes is that it focuses attention on what is conveyed by the published material in the mind of the ordinary reasonable reader."
192 It is to be observed that although the decision of the High Court was that the article concerned did not convey that the plaintiff was guilty or probably guilty of the offence, nevertheless the wording of an article may go further and impute guilt. Sometimes the words do convey that a suspicion is well-founded.
193 In my opinion, the words in article 7 convey nothing more than an imputation that the police would look into the question of blackmail and Ms Li's conduct in respect to the allegation. The article did not convey either that there were reasonable grounds for the investigation or any defamatory imputation. In reaching that conclusion, I do not overlook what Lord Devlin observed in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd,[54] where his Lordship said:
"... It is the broad impression conveyed by the libel that has to be considered and not the meaning of each word under analysis. A man who wants to talk at large about smoke may have to pick his words very carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also fire; but it can be done. One always gets back to the fundamental question: what is the meaning that the words convey to the ordinary man: you cannot make a rule about that. They can convey a meaning of suspicion short of guilt: but loose talk about suspicion can very easily convey the impression that it is a suspicion that is well-founded."
194 I do not accept that the words convey that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation. But even assuming the words do convey that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation, those words do not, in my opinion, defame Ms Li. They are well short of imputing any criminal conduct on her part or any other conduct such that the reasonable reader would think less of her. However, in the event I may be wrong, I will consider the defence of justification to the pleaded imputation.
8. Article 8
195 Article 8 was published some months later. The article appeared on page 15 of the Herald Sun published on 17 June 2004. By this time, the writ had been issued in this proceeding, although the only plaintiff was the company Forever Young. At that stage, an application had been filed to join Ms Li as a party but had not been heard.
196 The headline is:
197 There are two photographs of Ms Li printed in the article. One was taken the previous year and the other showed Ms Li with her arm held up, seeking to cover her face. The photograph was evidently taken on the previous day, when she was arrested. In my opinion, the words of the article conveyed to the reasonable reader the following imputations reflecting on the reputation of Ms Li:
(a) That she was the owner of an illegal brothel;
(b) That Ms Li was a dishonest person who provided fake medical receipts so that her clients could claim the cost of sexual and other services from health insurance;
(c) That she was a prostitute; and
(d) That she had conducted a business of Chinese natural therapist and also a business as a prostitute.
198 I am satisfied that each of the imputations was defamatory of Ms Li.
Ms Li's Prima Facie Case
199 I am satisfied in relation to each of her eight causes of action that Ms Li has proven that each of the articles were defamatory of her. It follows that she is entitled to recover damages unless the defendants establish one of their defences.
By Forever Young Pty Ltd's Proofs
200 The company claims it was defamed in the first, second, fourth and fifth articles. Two issues arise for consideration and determination. The first is whether the company Forever Young was identified in any of the words complained of. The second is whether the words were defamatory of the trading or business reputation of the company.
1. Article 1
201 The words complained of are found on the front page and on page 3 of the newspaper published on 26 May 2004.
202 The company claims that the first article contained four defamatory imputations, namely, that it operated an illegal brothel, that it provided fake medical receipts, that it held itself out as the operator of a legitimate medical clinic when in fact it was an illegal brothel, and that it provided herbal medicines to customers and provided fake receipts to enable the customers to make fraudulent claims upon their health insurers.
203 It is important to note that the legal entity which asserts that it has been defamed is the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd, the second plaintiff. There is no claim pleaded that a trading name, known as "Forever Young", has been defamed.
204 The words complained of must be read in context. The context would include the second article published in the same edition of the newspaper. Looking at the first article, the reference to "Forever Young" is a reference to a trading name and not to the company, and is in the context that Ms Li had been running "Forever Young" since June 2001 at the premises at 24 Collins Street, Melbourne. In column three it was noted that Ms Li advertised in newspapers that certain women would be offering certain massages and, the article went on to state, "from her Collins Street premises, where she trades under the names Forever Young and Chinese Natural Therapy." There is also a photograph of Ms Li in front of a wall which shows in large letters the words - "FOREVER YOUNG".
205 The subject of article 1 is Ms Li. It is her conduct which is revealed in the article. The grave allegations that are made are made against her. The grave allegations are not made against what appears to the reasonable reader to be a business name called "Forever Young". The unlawful conduct is conveyed to the reasonable reader as being that of the proprietor of the business. The business is identified as providing massage, the sale of herbal medicines, and Chinese natural therapy. The latter included acupuncture. No trading organisation, whether it be a company, a partnership or a business name, can bring a proceeding for libel for words which do not reflect upon it but reflect instead upon its members or employees only. With respect to a business name, the proper party to bring the proceeding must be a legal person and if the legal person is the sole proprietor, then the proceeding must be brought in the name of the sole proprietor.
206 In my opinion, the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd was not defamed in article 1. First of all, it is not named and the reasonable reader would not identify the company in the words of article 1 referring to "Forever Young". Two references are specifically made and they are in the context that Dr Li had been running Forever Young at her premises. The reasonable reader would infer that Dr Li was trading under the name of "Forever Young". Secondly, in my opinion, the business name "Forever Young" has not been defamed in the way of its business or trading reputation. The attack is upon Ms Li, who purports to trade under that business name. The words do not reflect upon the business name. Thirdly, if I am wrong in my conclusions, and the business name "Forever Young" has been defamed, the proper plaintiff is its proprietor. No claim has been made that the business name has been defamed. Further, there is no evidence before the Court as to the proprietor of any alleged business name "Forever Young".
2. Article 2
207 The second article again repeats the words "Dr Abbie Li's operation, which trades under the names Forever Young and Chinese Natural Therapy." The article also states "Dr Li also sells Chinese herbal medicines at Forever Young. Health funds do not refund the costs of such medicines." There as a photograph depicting two boxes of pills and a business card referring to the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd above the name "Dr Abbie Li (CNT)".
208 This article, whether read with the first article or considered separately, does not in any way change my opinion that there is no attack upon the trading or business reputation of the business name. The words complained of reflect not on the business or trading reputation of the business name, but upon Ms Li. Further, the words complained of do not defame the business or trading reputation of the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd, which has made the claim as a party to the proceeding. There is no evidence that the company itself ever traded as "Forever Young".
209 In my opinion, the company has not established that it was defamed in its business or trading reputation by the words complained of in article 2.
3. Article 4
210 This article was published on 14 July 2003. The company pleads three defamatory imputations. Again, the reference is to Ms Li operating the business. In the first column of the article appears the following:
"She is still operating her herbal medicine and Chinese natural therapy practice, Forever Young, at 24-28 Collins Street, which also houses the headquarters of the National Party and the Victorian Farmers Federation."
211 The article does not refer to the company By Forever Young Pty Ltd. It conveys to the reasonable reader that Ms Li is trading as "Forever Young" in conducting a herbal medicine and Chinese natural therapy business. The article throughout is dealing with Ms Li's activities. It does not reflect upon the trading or business reputation of a business name "Forever Young". For reasons that I have already stated in respect to articles 1 and 2, the company has not established that its business or trading reputation was defamed by the article. The attack is upon Ms Li.
4. Article 5
212 This article appeared in the afternoon edition of the newspaper dated 14 July 2003. The article is a condensed version of the article published earlier that day. The same paragraph appears in that article, namely, that Ms Li was operating the business "Forever Young". Again, the balance of the article was dealing with Ms Li's activities. It was said that there were three defamatory imputations concerning the company, namely, that it was running an illegal brothel, provided fake medical receipts for sex and the provision of herbal medicines.
213 Again, for the same reasons in respect to the articles 1, 2 and 4, in my opinion the article does not convey to the reasonable reader that the company, which is a legal entity, was operating the business. The clear thrust of the article is that Ms Li was operating a business under a business name of "Forever Young". The attack is upon her and not the business name "Forever Young". If the words had defamed the business name, the company has not established that it traded as that business name.
214 The company has failed to prove that the words defamed it in its business or trading reputation.
Company's causes of action
215 The second plaintiff is a corporation, By Forever Young Pty Ltd. It can only sue in defamation if the words complained of defame its business or trading reputation in the way the business is conducted. It would be libellous to assert that its business was insolvent or to use words imputing dishonesty in the conduct of its business and mismanagement in the conduct of its affairs. But an attack upon individual members or officials of a particular company does not necessarily reflect upon its trading or business reputation. See The Mayor et cetera of Manchester v Williams.[55]
216 It is well established that a company cannot maintain an action for words which reflect not upon itself but solely upon the individual officers or members. See Gatley on Libel and Slander,[56] quoted with approval by Browne J in Bognor Regis U.D.C. v Campion.[57] Although that decision was overruled, his Lordship's observations were not criticised. In my opinion, the words complained of by the company in the present case reflected solely upon the unlawful conduct of Ms Li and not upon its trading reputation or that of a so-called business name "Forever Young".
217 However, if I am wrong in my conclusions, and if the defence of truth succeeds against Ms Li, then it must follow that the defence of truth succeeds against the company.
The Defences
218 The defendants have pleaded three defences in answer to Ms Li's claims. They have pleaded justification and fair comment against the company's claims. They carry the burden of proof.
219 It is a complete defence to a claim in libel if the publisher proves that the defamatory words are true. Once a plaintiff proves the publication to a third person in permanent form of words defamatory of and concerning him, the law presumes that the defamatory words are false. The publisher must prove the words are true in substance and in fact. This means proof of truth of all the defamatory imputations and not part of the imputations only. This involves justifying the defamatory charges levelled at the plaintiff.
220 However, these general principles of law are apt to mislead and must be qualified. If the gist of the defamatory words comprises a specific charge of wrongdoing, the defence must establish the specific charge, but would not fail if some incidental fact asserted was not proven to be true. Hence, if an inaccurate fact is expressed and not proven the defendant will not fail if the substance of the defamatory imputation is proven. The point was made in Alexander v The North Eastern Railway Co.[58] In that case, a libel was published of the plaintiff that he was charged before magistrates for riding in a train without paying the fare. It was published that he was convicted and fined a penalty of [sterling]9 - 1 - 10 including costs, or in default three weeks' imprisonment. The fact was that the period of imprisonment was 14 days. The defendant relied upon truth and replied that the conviction was described with substantial accuracy and truth. It was held on a demurrer that the difference between the actual conviction and the published statement did not deprive the publisher of its defence of justification. It was a question for the jury whether the statement of the conviction was substantially true.
221 It is a question of degree. It is a question of fact. The publisher will not fail if he fails to prove the truth of every detail in the words complained of. He must prove facts which meet the sting of the libel.
222 Where a plaintiff contends and pleads an innuendo which gives the words a secondary meaning different from their literal meaning, and the tribunal of fact finds that the plaintiff has proven the words in the secondary meaning, in order for the publisher to succeed in his defence of truth, he must prove the sting of the libel in all senses found by the tribunal of fact. It is open to a defendant to plead that the words do bear a particular meaning, and to raise the defence of justification to the words in that meaning. However, the plaintiff is in control of his proceeding and pleads the words he complains of and any particular imputations which it is contended the words bear. The defendant is not permitted to justify an imputation which is separate from the plaintiff's complaint. It is different where the plaintiff pleads a wide innuendo, for example, where the publication is that the plaintiff had been arrested and charged with fraud and the plaintiff pleads the innuendo that the words meant that he was a dishonest person. In Maisel v Financial Times Ltd,[59] the House of Lords held that the width of the innuendo extended the scope of the particulars of justification so as to admit evidence by the publisher of all sorts of dishonesty.
223 In London Computer Training v BPC,[60] Lord Denning MR, after referring to that House of Lords case, observed:[61]
"In this case, where an innuendo has not been pleaded, we look to see the full width of the meanings which the jury might reasonably put on the words. The greater the conceivable width the greater the scope of the particulars of justification."
"In a plea of justification the defence that a matter of opinion or inference is true is not that the defendant truly made that inference, or truly held that opinion, but is that the opinion and inference are both of them true."
225 The principles relating to the defence of truth where the defamatory words contain both fact and opinion are particularly important when dealing with a headline which is defamatory and in the nature of an expression of opinion. A defendant must go further than merely showing that the facts stated in the article were true in order to establish the defence of truth, and must prove also that the headline was true. It is noted, however, that a plea of fair comment may be open in such circumstances. Of course, the publisher would have to prove the defence of fair comment.
226 A matter of some importance in the present proceeding was the effect of the cross-examination of Ms Li. She was cross-examined on a number of matters which suggested, among other things, that she was conducting a brothel at her premises. The thrust of most of the articles was that she was in fact conducting a brothel at her premises and the particulars given in the defence in support of the pleading of justification revealed a number of specific matters relied upon. However, her answers in cross-examination led to the conclusion that there was other evidence supporting the allegation. In my opinion, the defendants were not confined to the particulars of justification pleaded in their defence. They were confined in relation to calling evidence relating to those particulars but were entitled to cross-examine to elicit other evidence in support of their plea of justification. Once the plaintiff gets into the witness box and is cross-examined, the evidence adduced is admitted for all purposes, unless the Court directs otherwise.
227 It has been recognised that where acts occur within a reasonable period after the date of publication of the libel, which bear on the truth of the imputation pleaded, the evidence is admissible.[64]
228 In my opinion, although a defendant is confined to his particulars of justification at trial, it is open to the defendant to adduce evidence from the plaintiff, and indeed any other witnesses called by the plaintiff, which bears upon the defence of justification.
229 Another matter of importance is that if the published charge be understood by the reasonable reader as asserting that a plaintiff is of general bad conduct, the defence will fail if the defendant does not prove the truth that that person bears that general reputation. Proof of a single act of, say, dishonesty, would not be sufficient. The point was made in Penton v Calwell,[65] where Latham CJ and Williams J said, after noting that the judge at first instance had held that the defamatory imputation was that the plaintiff was an habitual liar:
"Such a charge can be established only by an accumulation of instances."
230 The older cases support that approach. In Wakley v Cooke,[66] it was held that one instance of a plaintiff recovering damages for libel against a newspaper was no justification of the publication of words that the proprietor of a newspaper was a "libellous journalist". Parke B noted that the phrase conveyed the view that the proprietor had been guilty of gross misconduct as a journalist by the habit of libelling others. Proof of one finding that the journalist had been held liable for the publication of a libel was not a defence to the defamatory imputation.
231 But like all questions in a defamation proceeding, whether or not the defamatory words convey a specific charge or a general charge depends upon the words used, their context and a consideration of the whole article.
The Articles and Justification
(i) Credibility
232 The main charges that were levelled at Ms Li by the articles can be summarised as follows:
(a) That she operated an illegal brothel in Collins Street in that she was providing sexual services for money;
(b) That she was a prostitute in that she provided sexual services for money;
(c) that she dishonestly issued medical receipts to her patients in respect of the provision of herbal products and sexual services to enable them to fraudulently claim on their health insurance.
233 The credibility of Ms Li looms large in the resolution of the factual issues in this case. She gave evidence in which she sought to deny that she was running a brothel, that she was providing sexual services for money, and that she gave fake receipts. Two witnesses were called by the defendants who gave evidence that they had been given false receipts. Another witness gave direct evidence of receiving a sexual service for which he paid money and received a receipt for a "remedial massage". Further, he gave evidence that the receipt contained a Medibank provider number which would have enabled him to make a claim on Medibank for the services provided, which included a sexual service. The two other witnesses gave evidence that they had been provided with pills and given fake receipts. Before considering the defence of justification, it is necessary to state my conclusions as to the credibility of Ms Li and the three witnesses and to state my findings of facts in relation to the incidents deposed to by them.
234 Ms Li gave evidence-in-chief over a period in excess of two days and was cross-examined for approximately three days.
235 Ms Li came to Australia from mainland China in 1990. She has resided in this country ever since and is an Australian citizen. She is 48 years old. In June 1991, she became a remedial massage therapist and a Member of the Association of Massage Therapists. She commenced to conduct a Chinese medicine therapy business from about 1995 and continued to do so up to late 2005. The bulk of her patients or clients were English speaking persons and it was necessary for her to communicate with them in English. This involved on occasions taking notes of medical complaints. In the period up to May 2003, she arranged for advertising material to be distributed on behalf of the business and she wrote a book, which was published in English. It was noted that there were a number of English and grammatical errors in the book, which dealt with dietary matters that, it was claimed, had consequences in relation to beauty, age, weight loss et cetera.
236 English is Ms Li's second language. An interpreter was available during the course of her evidence for some six days, and the number of times she resorted to the interpreter was less than ten. I am satisfied that her understanding of English was good and she spoke English well, but far from perfectly. It was apparent to me that on some occasions she did not understand a question and her answer was non-responsive. On occasions when she got flustered or agitated, she had real difficulty in communicating her thoughts. Accordingly, it is necessary to closely scrutinise her evidence and make allowances for the fact that English is her second language. She was given an opportunity when it arose to correct anything that she had said. On occasion, her counsel demanded of her that she listen to his question.
237 A number of recordings of conversations between persons were tendered in evidence. It was alleged Ms Li was a participant in the recordings. Two of the conversations are recordings over the telephone. One recording was a conversation between Ms Li and Mr Moor, the second defendant and the journalist who wrote the articles. I have little doubt that Ms Li was at a disadvantage when it came to conversations over the telephone and accordingly it is necessary to closely scrutinise what she said. I also take into account that Mr Moor had an interest in seeking to obtain admissions from her. I approach the question of any admissions made during the telephone conversation between them with considerable care. There was also a conversation recorded between the conman, Michael Williams, and Ms Li. It was very apparent that the conman was carefully asking questions to obtain certain responses from Ms Li and one has to approach the recording with considerable scepticism. There was another recording of a telephone conversation between the conman and a female. Ms Li denied that it was her voice on the recording. An expert on voice recognition, Mr Peter Garde, was called and he expressed the opinion that the female voice was most likely that of Ms Li. I have listened to the conversation and taking into account what I heard, my observations of Ms Li whilst giving evidence, the context of what is in the recording, and, finally, the view I take of Ms Li as a dishonest witness, I am satisfied that her voice is recorded on the recording. Again, however, because it is a conversation over the telephone and with the conman, Mr Williams, it is necessary to very carefully consider the conversation, in particular any alleged admissions made by her, and whether what Ms Li said has any evidentiary effect. In regard to the two recordings involving Mr Williams, another matter that the Court must be alert to is the possibility of Mr Williams altering the recording in some way. The face to face recording which Ms Li admits is between Williams and herself, according to Mr Garde has six separate segments in it, and what is at the end of each segment of recording and the beginning of the next has to be approached with considerable care because of what may have been left out between the segments. However, Mr Garde pointed out, and I accept his evidence, that in the telephone recording with Mr Williams, there was a substantial part of the recording which has not been interrupted and accordingly one could place some reliance on the authenticity of that segment of the recording. However, whether or not anything said by Ms Li on the recordings should be accepted as an admission by her depends upon whether the Court is satisfied that she understood the question and truly and accurately responded to it.
238 Making all due allowances for Ms Li, she is one of those witnesses who falls into the category of a witness who should not be believed unless the evidence concerns non-contentious matters, is corroborated by some other credible evidence or is admitted by the defendants. I am satisfied that the affirmation she made meant nothing to her. It was observed that she had previously sworn answers to interrogatories and an affidavit, which were tendered in evidence during the trial. However, when she came to give evidence in Court she made an affirmation. On three occasions, it was necessary for the Court to remind her that she had made an affirmation to tell the truth and that if she did not tell the truth, she could be prosecuted for perjury. She was warned on the third day of evidence early in her cross-examination, once in the following day, and also on the fifth day. The Court warned her because, in my opinion, she was making up the evidence as she was speaking. It was very apparent to the Court that she was lying in respect to the particular matters which were the subject of cross-examination. In addition, she was cross-examined about an affidavit which she swore on 17 October 2006. The trial of the proceeding commenced in February last year and was aborted. She was ordered to pay costs. Application was made later that year by the defendants to stay the proceeding until the costs were paid. She swore an affidavit on 17 October 2006. The thrust of her response to the application was that she was not in a position to pay the costs and it would be unjust if she was not permitted to continue the proceeding. Her affidavit failed to reveal that she owned a piece of real estate. She deposed to the fact that she did own one property, which was in the name of Abbie Li, but failed to disclose an East Melbourne property in the name of Cui Li, which is her Chinese name. She was asked about this omission and her evidence was far from satisfactory. The Court again had to remind her that when she swore an affidavit, she was bound to tell the truth. Again, she appeared to the Court to have some difficulty with this concept. In my view, the omission in that affidavit reflects upon her credibility. She was cross-examined about it and initially tried to suggest that she did not mention it because she had no equity in the property but later in re-examination she admitted she did have equity in that property.
239 In addition to the observation made that Ms Li on occasions was making up the evidence as she went, she indulged in prevarication, evasiveness and obfuscation during cross-examination. She changed her version of events on a number of occasions. I came to the conclusion that Ms Li was not motivated by any sense of duty to tell the truth, but by a desire and willingness to tell what she thought would assist her case, even if untrue, and contest the defendants' case. The real issue in this case concerned the defence of justification. That could not have been lost upon her prior to coming to Court. It was apparent that she had worked out prior to trial a version of events to meet the contentions of the three witnesses who were to be called by the defendants to give evidence on the defence of justification. She had been prosecuted in the Magistrates' Court last year on charges arising out of the facts stated in the articles. Two of the witnesses had given evidence in that proceeding. In addition, the third witness, who for the purposes of this proceeding was called "Bill", had provided a statutory declaration, which had been discovered, of the events and circumstances concerning the remedial massage which included masturbation for money, and also an affidavit of the same events sworn late last year, which was also made available to Ms Li. Before she got in the witness box, she had available to her full knowledge of the case that was going to be put against her.
240 I now propose to briefly identify parts of Ms Li's evidence which, in my view, were untruthful. In considering these examples, it must be borne in mind that the real area of dispute was raised by the defence of justification. The factual issues between the parties were that the defendants contended she provided sexual services to men in the form of relief massage for money, that she had conducted an illegal brothel at her premises, and that she had on a number of occasions supplied false receipts for alleged services and the supply of herbal products, to enable her clients to obtain refunds by fraud from their private medical insurers. These in general terms were the factual issues. I formed the opinion that Ms Li gave false evidence in respect to the following topics of evidence:
• She claimed in her advertising material concerning her business that she was a qualified medical practitioner from the internationally accredited Beijing University. This claim was on one of Ms Li's brochures in which she is named as a Chinese natural therapist. She believes she distributed about 2,000 copies of this brochure. The brochure represented that it was "the very last weight loss program you will ever need." Not only did the document assert that Ms Li was a medical practitioner, it also asserted that she had 15 - 25 years' experience in Chinese natural therapies. Another document that was distributed in 2001 made the same claim, namely, that the practitioners, which included Ms Li, had over 15 to 25 years' experience in Chinese natural therapies. She was cross-examined at length on these representations. The time it took to eventually extract the truth from her is one of a number of reasons why this trial took so long. She had a variety of explanations. She produced documents that she said supported the representation. She stated that she was a medical practitioner. She produced an application to become a registered nurse in this country in the early 1990s. That application had been rejected. She prevaricated about whether she was a student at Beijing University. Ultimately, she accepted that she did not attend Beijing University and was not a medical practitioner and, importantly, did not have 15 to 25 years' experience in Chinese natural therapies. Whilst one can understand a degree of puffery in advertisements, her advertisements contained fraudulent statements of fact and her attempt to explain the misrepresentations away was nothing short of obfuscation on a grand scale. Ultimately, in cross-examination she admitted the representations were false.
• Ms Li gave evidence that she had worked at the Beijing General Hospital. Again, she was cross-examined at length on the Beijing General Hospital, its location and where she had worked. This statement was also untrue. She had worked at an army hospital.
• On occasion, when backed into a corner in cross-examination, Ms Li was quick to blame others for errors. She claimed that the brochures which contained misrepresentations were the responsibility of those who had printed them. I do not accept that explanation. She blamed the accountant, Mr Mark Dunstan, for the failure to lodge tax returns and Business Activity Statements on time over many years. At the time when she said that, the Court had been informed that he was not to be called as a witness. He was later called as a witness. His evidence, to put it mildly, was also unsatisfactory. He did accept the blame but no satisfactory explanation was given. But it is difficult to comprehend just who was responsible for the failure to lodge the company's and her personal tax returns and Business Activity Statements within time. They were lodged many years after the due date. She also said on occasions that she was confused and did not understand the questions. This occurred often in the course of her cross-examination. Whilst I accept that on occasions she was confused, often it was a ploy to give her time to answer and to divert cross-examining counsel.
• Ms Li gave evidence that no action had been taken against her in respect to the matters raised in the articles other than a criminal proceeding, which had been dismissed in 2006. This turned out to be incorrect. It later emerged that in late 2006, the Chinese Medicine Registration Board of Victoria laid charges against her for breaches of the Act. The first hearing took place on 12 December 2006. On that occasion she was represented by counsel. She was not present at the hearing. The Board was informed that she was unfit to attend. The Board asked for medical evidence. In fact, the evidence before me showed that she was at work at the Hyatt Hotel. The evidence also revealed that she was in the County Court the previous day with Mr Selimi observing a criminal proceeding. Her evidence that there was no other proceeding was false. Ms Li's instructions to her lawyers that she was unfit to attend the hearing before the Board were untrue. She was at work on that day providing massage services to guests.
• Ms Li gave evidence that the reason why she ceased her employment at the Hyatt Hotel at the end of 2006 was because a journalist had informed the Chinese Medicine Registration Board that she was working at the Hyatt, and that as a result the Hyatt was informed and her employment was terminated. She described what happened. She stated the Board came to the Hyatt Hotel, brought police and they kicked her out. This was untrue. The real reason why her employment was terminated was that she allowed her registration as a Chinese herbal medicine practitioner and an acupuncturist to lapse around September 2006. At the time she was working as a Chinese medical practitioner at the Grand Hyatt City Club. When her employer ascertained that her registration had lapsed, her employment was terminated. Her evidence given in chief as to her termination was false.
• She omitted to reveal in her affidavit sworn 17 October 2006 that she owned another property. I have already adverted to this. I was satisfied on the evidence that she deliberately omitted to reveal the property.
• Ms Li gave evidence that she had registered a trademark "Forever Young". Some of her advertising material disclosed to the reader of same that "Forever Young" had a trademark by the addition of the letters "TM" at the end of the word "Young". She gave evidence that she was entitled to the trademark. When documents were tendered in evidence, it was apparent from their contents that she did not have a trademark. A provisional trademark was provided to her subject to any objections. It was necessary to pay a fee to obtain the trademark. The Court raised the question whether there was any trademark. The thrust of her evidence was that she believed she had a trademark. I interpolate to observe that one of the claims for damages concerned the loss of the value of a trademark asserted to be in excess of $2 million and later reduced to just over $1 million. Ms Li was cross-examined about this alleged trademark. First, she said that she could not remember whether she paid the fee, but then she stated that she believed she had. When pressed, she then stated that she did pay the bill. When pressed again she said that maybe she did not. he denied she was a cheat, a liar, a dishonest person or a fraud. She denied ever providing any sexual services for a patient, and denied she had ever masturbated a client or a patient. These denials have to be considered in the light of the evidence given by Messrs Moor, "Bill" and Millar. I will address this issue later.
• One of her advertising brochures was printed in colour and advertised the Forever Young capsules. It contained what were described as "references" from seven persons who allegedly had taken the capsules. In fact the references purported to be testimonials. It is an offence under s.63(1)(e) of the Act to publish testimonials. That part of the Act came into operation on 1 January 2002. Ms Li prevaricated and was extremely evasive about when she actually published and distributed the brochure. She gave evidence-in-chief that she appeared on a television show, "Today Tonight", on 4 May 2002. She stated that she believed the brochure was distributed after that television show in 2002. If this was so, then someone may have breached the Act. When cross-examined, she first of all stated that it may have been around the end of 2001 and then later suggested it was earlier. Of course, it would have been an offence after 1 January 2002 to quote a testimonial in any form of advertising of Chinese medicine practice, services or herbal dispensing services. The brochure asserted that the capsules were "general well-being capsules" and on the back of the brochure appeared the words:
"Doctor TCM/Health Fund Rebates
General Health Maintenance"
Health fund rebates would not be available for the sale of the capsules.
• Ms Li was also very vague about whether she distributed the brochure around Melbourne or whether she left it for clients to pick up. In addition, some of the testimonials were difficult to accept as true, although perhaps the gullible might accept them. She was extremely vague about the identity of the persons who purported to give the testimonials, except that she asserted they were her clients. She said she had records of their treatment and was challenged to produce them. She did not do so. On the rear of the brochure appeared the following:
"The Chinese appreciate that food and medicine are from one source and must compliment each other. Developed over 25 years of clinical experience, and manufactured using modern technology, Forever Young is a proven and effective tool for improving your health and well being."
The reference to "Forever Young" was to the capsules that Ms Li stated she manufactured. To assert that the capsules were developed over 25 years of clinical experience was untrue.
• As set out above, the document referred to a "Doctor" with the letters "TCM" next to the word. The latter referred to "Traditional Chinese Medicine". If in fact this brochure was printed in the year 2001, Ms Li had no right to call herself a doctor. Her right to do so arguably occurred after 1 January 2002. The brochure referred to "health fund rebates". This was also an inaccurate and deceptive statement. There was no possibility of health fund rebate for the purchaser of the capsules. Her response to searching questions whether a patient or customer could get health fund rebates was that she did not know. She said then that it would depend upon the patient or consumer and their private health fund. She was unable to suggest any health fund rebate for the purchase of the capsules. There were a number of pieces of advertising material tendered in evidence. Parts of the material were exaggerated and also had a capacity to mislead. Ms Li did not seem to be phased by the suggestion that the advertising was misleading. She took the view that it was all par for the course. In other words, puffery was acceptable, even if it was grossly deceptive.
• Ms Li was cross-examined about a series of advertisements in April/May 2003 in both the Herald Sun and the Melbourne Weekly Times. The latter is a magazine which is widely distributed in the Melbourne area. The advertisements in the Weekly Times were surrounded by advertisements for prostitutes, escort agencies and massage parlours. Her advertisements in that publication were along the lines of:
"NEW IN MELBOURNE
Thai, Swedish massage in CBD.
Call Lisa or Suzan on 9650 7978."
This advertisement appeared in the Melbourne Weekly Times published on 9 April 2003. A similar advertisement appeared on 14 and 21 May 2003. An advertisement was published in the health and fitness section of the Herald Sun on Monday, 28 April 2003 as follows:
"New in Melbourne Thai & Swedish
therapy, body management, soft tissue, deep tissue and
relaxation. In CBD Call Linda or Suzanne on 9650
7978"
• Similar advertisements appeared on 5 and 12 May 2003. These advertisements appeared in the papers during the period leading up to the publication of the first article. It was noted that the telephone number was not Ms Li's business number. Her explanation as to why she had two telephone numbers was less than convincing.
• Ms Li was cross-examined at length as to the particular girls who were working in the premises. To say the least, her evidence was evasive, inconsistent, prevaricating and obstructive. She was unable to give the surnames of the girls involved or tell the Court much about their background. One girl had a variety of names. Ms Li was asked the basis upon which they worked in the premises. It was difficult from her evidence to determine precisely the relationship between Ms Li and three young women called Suzan, who was of Thai origin, Linda, also known as Aimee and Helen, who was also of Thai origin, and a woman known as Nadine, also known as Nada, who Ms Li described as a westerner. In addition, there was another woman known as Lisa, who according to Ms Li came from Sydney and was interviewed, but did not work at the premises. In the end, after a long cross-examination, Ms Li's evidence was to the effect that the women hired a room from her for which they paid $40 per half day. There was some evidence that it was $50. There was also evidence that they paid $100 for the whole day. Her evidence as to why she had two telephone numbers varied from the necessity of having a separate line for the Internet or facsimile equipment, to the women having their own line for their appointments. Ms Li evidently paid for the telephone line. The evidence relating to these women, what they were doing and their relationship to Ms Li was unsatisfactory, and the Court was left with the distinct impression that Ms Li had not told the truth about the women, who they were and what services they were providing.
• Ms Li was cross-examined at length on her appointments book, which in April and May 2003 on most days was divided into three columns. Each column appeared to have the name of a person at the top of it, but it is clear that Ms Li took steps to erase, obliterate or cover the name of the person at the head of a column. Her explanation for this was that the lawyers told her she could do so because of questions of privacy. I do not accept her evidence. In addition, she attempted to obscure or cover other entries in relation to names and telephone numbers of the clients. The fact that she did change or obscure certain entries leads to the inference that she was seeking to cover up the true position.
• All the clients of the women who were working at the premises were male. The women charged $80 per hour for a "massage" and on some days earned as much as $600. The first article appeared on Monday, 26 May and thereafter the women disappeared from the appointments book and evidently from Ms Li's premises. Ms Li said that this was because of the article. But if the business being operated at Ms Li's premises was the provision of proper health services and massages, then there would be no reason why the women should disappear. This piece of evidence, when combined with the evasiveness of Ms Li in evidence when asked about the women concerned, their background, their last known addresses, the two telephone numbers and the appointment book, leads to the conclusion that the women at the premises were providing services additional to massage. The conclusion is strengthened when it is noted that all the clientele were men and that after the first publication the hive of activity observed on the Friday before the first article ceased, and was not repeated again that year. The male clientele dried up.
• Ms Li was cross-examined about a woman called Lisa. She gave evidence that Lisa had been interviewed but never worked at the premises. However, the appointment book for Friday, 23 May 2003 has Lisa's name at the head of a column. Attempts have been made to obscure her name. It was then put to Ms Li that there was a series of advertisements in the Herald Sun in which Lisa's name was stated, over a period of three weeks prior to the first article. Ms Li maintained that Lisa never attended at the premises to work. This was despite the fact that her name was in the advertisements and also in the appointment book on a number of days. According to the appointments book for Friday, 23 May 2003, which was the Friday before the publication of the first article, Lisa had eight appointments between 11.00am and 6.00pm and all the clients were male. She would have earned the sum of $535 that day based on the price list which was recorded on 7 April 2003 in the appointments book. Despite this telling evidence, Ms Li still maintained that Lisa never worked there. I do not accept her evidence. In my opinion, her evidence concerning Lisa was deliberately false.
• Ms Li was asked about the women sharing the advertising expenses. Her attempt to explain why she, Ms Li, contributed to those expenses was difficult to follow. She stated that she felt that she ought to pay something because when people came to see the women they might be attracted to purchasing her Forever Young capsules or receiving Chinese therapy. Her evidence in regard to the payment was also unsatisfactory. Later advertisements in the Weekly Times referred to Chinese massage but in a context of "NOW IN MELBOURNE" and told the reader to call "Lisa or Suzan".
• Ms Li was cross-examined at length as to meeting the second defendant, Mr Moor, who attended at her premises as a patient. She provided him with a receipt. The receipt recorded that she saw him on 22 and 29 April 2003 and that he received acupuncture treatment. Mr Moor gave evidence that he saw her on only one occasion, which was on 29 April 2003. On that day, Mr Moor filled in a standard form document relating to his health and Ms Li made notes in Chinese on the document concerning Mr Moor's health. He attended seeking treatment for tinnitus. She was cross-examined at length as to what occurred on 22 April 2003, it being noted that Mr Moor was not requested to fill in any document concerning his health that day, nor did Ms Li make any notes of his complaints or any treatment. She adopted a stonewalling approach to the cross-examination of what occurred on 22 April 2003. Ms Li stated often that she could not recall what happened and then, when pressed, she stated she could recall some services. It will be necessary when considering Mr Moor's evidence to further consider Ms Li's attempts to recall what happened when Mr Moor was said to have attended her premises on 22 April 2003. Her inability to provide any evidence of substance concerning what happened on that day, in particular the acupuncture treatment which she said she provided, and her attempts to hide behind a bad memory were, to say the least, unconvincing and supported the conclusion that she was making up the evidence as she went. She was shown her own price list. It draws a distinction between acupuncture and acupressure. She attempted to suggested that she had applied acupressure on 22 April 2003, which she stated was the same as acupuncture. I do not accept her evidence on that matter. She knew before entering the witness box that it was the defendants' case that Mr Moor did not attend on 22 April 2003 and that the receipt written out by her was false. She had considerable time to think about what her evidence would be in relation to this alleged visit. Her initial approach was to attempt to hide behind a lapse in memory.
• Ms Li's price list was produced. It revealed that the normal price for an initial consultation was $85. The receipt she gave Mr Moor recorded that she saw him on 22 and 29 April 2003 and charged him $45 for one alleged service and $40 for the other. She wrote out the receipt. She was asked why she gave a cut price and said it was because of a promotion. Her attempted explanations of the promotion were fanciful and indeed laughable. I do not accept them. She said that she had a promotion because the business had been through a quiet period. Apparently, this had occurred when she had been away, but then when it was pointed out that that was in January and that the business recommenced in February, she had great difficulty explaining the need for a promotion in late April. Ms Li said at one stage that it could have been because the promotion was on her website on the Internet. I do not believe her explanation for the price charged for the alleged first visit. She signed the receipt and inserted her Medibank provider number, followed by an "A", which stood for "acupuncture". By dividing up one fee into two alleged visits, it would be open to the patient to seek two refunds from a private health insurer such as Medibank.
• Ms Li was asked why she did not give Mr Moor a receipt on the first visit. Her response to that was that she had not been asked to provide one. It was put to her that since she provided a service, she was duty bound to give him a receipt upon payment. Ms Li stated that she did not believe that she had an obligation to provide a receipt. It was pointed out that Mr Moor might have wanted to claim a health rebate. Her evidence about health benefit rebates again was evasive and unsatisfactory. When pressed about what she did on 22 April when attending on Mr Moor, she said she could not remember, but stated it would be on her daily sheet. She was unable to produce the daily sheet. Her invariable answer to her failure to produce any records was that all had been handed to the conman, Michael Williams, and had disappeared. However, when pressed to produce any documents relating to the conduct of her business after the death of Williams, she stated she believed she may have them at home but none were ever produced. None were discovered. Her evidence concerning the loss of her business records was also evasive and unsatisfactory.
• Ms Li was asked about a Mr Eddie Millar attending her clinic. He attended her clinic on 22 April 2003. It was put to her that she gave him a false receipt. She denied the receipt was false. She gave him a receipt dated 22 April 2003, which recorded that he had visited her on a number of previous occasions. The receipt of that date recorded that he had attended on two previous occasions, namely, 8 and 15 April 2003, the first occasion being for consultation and acupuncture, for which he was charged $55, and on 15 April for remedial massage, for which he was charged $55. The receipt was written out by Ms Li, who signed it and inserted two Medibank Private provider numbers relating to acupuncture and massage. Again, when pressed in cross-examination as to what she had done on the previous occasions, she adopted the approach that she could not recall. She could not give any proper explanation for the receipt. At one time she stated that she thought Mr Millar's ex-wife had bought him a treatment package, which explained the total charge of $165. Her evidence was, to say the least, unconvincing and evasive. Then she said that the ex-wife had, in fact, bought him a package. Then she adopted the view that she was convinced that that explained the amount of the receipt. I do not believe her. Before giving evidence, Ms Li was well aware of what Mr Millar was going to say in evidence. He had given evidence against her in the criminal proceeding. Her attempts to explain the alleged previous visits were fanciful and unbelievable.
• Ms Li was cross-examined about Mr Millar attending on 29 April 2003. On that occasion he had received a remedial massage. Ms Li started the massage but after five to ten minutes the Thai woman, Suzan, came in and completed the balance of the massage. Ms Li accepted that Suzan was not trained in acupuncture. However the receipt records that Mr Millar received acupuncture on 25 (or 26) April 2003 and 29 April 2003. Ms Li wrote out the receipt and signed it and put her provider number for acupuncture above her signature. It was put to her that Mr Millar was not there on the earlier date and she could not explain that. Driven into a corner, Ms Li became agitated and then asserted the receipt book must have been stolen, initially, she said, by the Herald Sun. Eventually, she withdrew that statement but continued to raise questions as to whether it was an accurate and genuine receipt. In the course of her outburst, she stated that Mr Millar had not given any evidence in the criminal proceeding and that he had told the magistrate he did not want to give evidence. It was put to her this was not true. In my opinion, what Ms Li stated was a deliberate lie. I do not accept her evidence concerning the receipt provided or that Mr Millar had received acupuncture. Her attempt to explain the alleged visit on either 25 or 26 April 2003 was evasive, prevaricating and unsatisfactory. I do not believe her evidence.
• She was asked about the services provided to the representative for the brothel industry called "Bill". She gave a version which sounded contrived and the product of an imaginative mind. I will discuss her version when I deal with Bill's evidence.
• The copies of the original receipts tendered in evidence were signed by Ms Li, who provided her provider number above her signature. On each of the original receipts was a stamped portion which read:
"By Forever Young Pty Ltd
Level 4, 24 Collins Street Melbourne 3000"
and then followed phone number, facsimile number, website number and the company's ABN. Ms Li could not adequately explain why the company's name was on the receipt. By this time during the trial, it had become apparent that there were grave doubts that a company could operate a business in Chinese medicine. She was alive to this revelation and the realisation that the claim by the company had to be reconsidered. The truthful answer was that the company was operating the business from mid 2001. However, by the time Ms Li was cross-examined with respect to that issue, there was a realisation in her camp that the company could not operate the business. Rather than frankly stating that she was mistaken, she attempted to prevaricate and her attempts to explain the matter were unconvincing. Again she demonstrated that she would say anything in the witness box to assist her case, whether it be true or false.
• In re-examination, Ms Li produced some photographs, one of which showed an infra-red lamp. She had given evidence that she had used the infra-red machine on Mr Moor. He denied that. She said that she took the photograph some two weeks after the first article. The photographs had not been discovered. I had grave doubts about her evidence. The doubt increased when it was apparent that when the Court commenced to look at the back of one of the photographs, the witness immediately wanted to have a look at it. She then stated another photograph was taken some years later. I do not accept her evidence as to when the photographs were taken, nor do I accept her evidence that she used the lamp on Mr Moor.
241 After making allowances for the fact that English is not Ms Li's first language, that at times she became agitated and distraught and said things without thinking, and that on occasions she misunderstood what was being put to her, I am satisfied that Ms Li is a cunning and intelligent woman who paid scant regard to the affirmation she made, made up evidence as she went, and is a thoroughly discredited, dishonest person whose evidence should not be accepted except in relation to non-controversial matters, or unless it is corroborated by credible independent evidence or admitted.
242 In respect to the main charges levelled at Ms Li by the articles, the second defendant, Keith Moor, the journalist who wrote the articles, was called as a witness and two other men who had received services at Ms Li's premises and were given receipts, namely, Edward Millar and the representative of the brothel industry, known as Bill, were called as witnesses.
243 Mr Moor was cross-examined at some length by Ms Li's counsel. He was the writer of the articles but also provided direct evidence of an attendance at Ms Li's premises and discussions with her which were central to the accuracy his articles. He also had a number of consultations with her in which he alleged she made admissions. Accordingly, Mr Moor has a variety of interests in the outcome of this proceeding. First, he is the second defendant and any judgment in Ms Li's favour would be entered against him. Secondly, and probably more importantly, any judgment against him would affect his reputation as an honest, careful and responsible journalist. He conceded that he did have an interest in the outcome of the proceeding and recognised the importance of independence, impartiality, care and responsibility on the part of a journalist, especially so when publishing hard hitting and extremely critical articles about a person. He was cross-examined at length, and I am satisfied that he is an honest and responsible person who told the truth in the witness box.
244 The representative of the brothel industry, Bill, also has an interest in this proceeding because he was requested to obtain evidence against Ms Li. He is a consultant to the legal brothel industry and derives a substantial fee each year for his services. He accepted that he did have an interest in the proceeding. He gave evidence of a visit to Ms Li's premises. He stated that Ms Li had provided him with a sexual service for money. Ms Li denied his version. Hence there is a contest on the facts. There is no doubt that Bill does have an interest in this proceeding, not only as an important witness who took an oath to tell the truth, but also because part of his brief for the legal brothel industry is to close down illegal brothels. He was cross-examined at length and at times aggressively. He is an intelligent, worldly man who on occasions was subjected to insulting questions by counsel. Nevertheless, I am quite satisfied that he was telling the truth. I was able to observe him over a lengthy period of cross-examination, and I am satisfied that his version of what occurred at Ms Li's premises was correct. In addition, his credibility was reinforced by the evidence of a statutory declaration prepared by him on the day of his visit and declared seven days after attending Ms Li's premises, and an affidavit which he swore at the end of last year for use in the proceeding brought by the Chinese Medicine Board against Ms Li.
245 The statutory declaration was tendered in evidence through Mr Moor, for the limited purpose that it went to the state of knowledge of Mr Moor when he wrote the articles. It was not tendered as proof of the truth of the facts stated in it.
246 Mr Selimi of counsel for Ms Li cross-examined Bill at some length on the document, with the aim of showing that the declaration was incomplete and that a number of matters which he gave in evidence-in-chief, including his conversations with Ms Li, were not included in his statutory declaration. Application was made by counsel for the defendants that the document be treated as evidence for all purposes. In my opinion, by cross-examining in the way that he did, counsel attacked the truthfulness of the statutory declaration and compared it with the evidence-in-chief given by Bill, seeking to show that his oral evidence was inconsistent with his statutory declaration. This was an attack on Bill's credibility. As a result of the cross-examination, the document is now treated as a statement of the facts, and provides evidence which substantially supports the version of evidence given by Bill. It can be used to support the credibility of the witness. Mr Selimi highlighted the fact that a number of alleged conversations and observations given in evidence by the witness Bill were not included in the statutory declaration, and submitted that this reflected upon his credibility. There were omissions in the statutory declaration. However, the effect upon Bill's credibility depends upon the relative importance of the matters omitted. The important subject of the statutory declaration was the provision of a sexual service by Ms Li and payment for the service provided. When an affidavit or a statutory declaration is prepared, the focus of the document is on a particular subject. If the document omitted a matter of substantial importance which was the subject of evidence given much later, then a doubt would be raised with respect to the honesty and accuracy of the witness. However, the matters that Mr Selimi relied upon, in my view, were minor matters when compared with the real subject matter of the statutory declaration which addressed the questions of the sexual services, payment and the receipt.
247 Mr Selimi also produced the affidavit sworn by Bill last year, which evidently was provided to Ms Li's solicitors by the solicitors acting for the Chinese Medicine Board. Bill was cross-examined, again with the intention of showing that there were omissions in the affidavit. Further, there were statements made in the affidavit which were not in the statutory declaration. Mr Selimi highlighted the differences. I note the differences. Again, they were matters that were relatively unimportant when compared with the real subject matter, which was that Bill had been masturbated to ejaculation by Ms Li at her premises and had paid a fee for what was described in the receipt as a "remedial massage".
248 In my opinion, by reason of Mr Selimi's use of the statutory declaration and affidavit in cross-examination of Bill, both can be used to rebut the attack made upon Bill's credibility as a witness.
249 In Nominal Defendant v Clements,[67] a statement which had been made by an infant plaintiff was tendered in evidence after an attack was made upon his credibility. Its admission was on the question of credibility and not as truth of the fact. The rule was stated by Dixon CJ:[68]
"If the credit of a witness is impugned as to some material fact to which he deposes upon the ground that his account is a late invention or has been lately devised or reconstructed, even though not with conscious dishonesty, that makes admissible the statement to the same effect as the account he gave as a witness if it was made by the witness contemporaneously with the event or at a time sufficiently early to be inconsistent with the suggestion that his account is a late invention or reconstruction."
(Emphases added).
250 His Honour went on to observe that great care is to be exercised by a judge who
" ... must determine for himself upon the conduct of the trial before him whether a case for applying the rule of evidence has arisen and, from the nature of the matter, if there be an appeal, great weight should be given to the opinion by the appellate court. It is evident however that the judge at trial must exercise care ensuring himself not only that the account given by the witness in his testimony is attacked on the ground of recent invention or reconstruction or that a foundation for such an attack has been laid by the party but also that the contents of the statement are in fact to the like effect as his account given in his evidence but having regard to the time and circumstances in which it was made it rationally tends to answer the attack."
(Emphases added).
251 As has often been observed, counsel usually avoid a frontal attack on a witness to the effect that the witness recently made up a version, but in the end it is a question of whether the effect of the cross-examination is that an attack has been made on the witness's account suggesting that a fact has been recently invented, devised or reconstructed.
252 I am satisfied that the whole thrust of Mr Selimi's cross-examination was to the effect that Bill's oral evidence was something that was recently put together. In so doing, Mr Selimi referred to the statutory declaration to make his point. He also relied upon the affidavit which he tendered in evidence. In my opinion, both documents go to the credibility of the witness and they provide ample support for the credit of Bill on the important question of whether he was masturbated by Ms Li at her premises.
253 The final witness was Mr Edward Millar. He gave damning evidence against Ms Li with respect to the production of false receipts by her and his steps to obtain a refund from his private medical insurer. He was cross-examined at some length, and in my view he was a witness of truth doing his best to recollect the events which occurred in April 2003. His evidence was supported by the receipts given to him by Ms Li.
(ii) Defence of Justification
254 The defence of justification must meet the stings of libel. It is necessary to divide the articles up into two groups.
(iii) Articles 1 - 5 (inclusive) and 8
255 The first group comprises the articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8. The defamatory imputations which in my opinion are the stings of each article are the same and can be summarised as follows:
(i) That Ms Li operated an illegal brothel in Collins Street in that sexual services were provided for money:
(ii) That she was a prostitute in that she received money for sexual services;
(iii) That she dishonestly and illegally provided fake receipts to her patients for the provision of herbal products to enable them to make a claim on their health insurance;
(iv) That she dishonestly and illegally provided fake receipts to her patients for illegal sexual services to enable them to claim on their health insurance;
(v) That Ms Li performed sexual services on Bill for reward and gave him a receipt for remedial massage;
(vi) That Ms Li conducted a Chinese medicine practitioner's practice and also a business as a prostitute.
256 It is necessary to state the Court's findings in relation to the evidence given by Messrs Moor, Bill and Millar. Mr Moor, a journalist of some 28 years' experience and head of an investigative unit with the Herald Sun, received anonymous written information in late April 2003 and as a result attended at Ms Li's premises. He attended on 29 April 2003 without an appointment. He spoke to Ms Li. She attended him. He told Ms Li that he was seeking treatment for his tinnitus. She provided him with a new patient form to fill in. The document was described as a "Confidential Client Information", which sought, amongst other things, the identity of specific areas of soreness and whether the patient was taking any medications. Having filled in the document, Mr Moor had a consultation with Ms Li. She made notes in Chinese. The notes are recorded on the back of the document, although the evidence revealed that Ms Li made a number of additions after Mr Moor had left. Ms Li detailed what Mr Moor had told her about his tinnitus and other problems. She inspected his tongue and took his pulse. She did this by placing a finger on his wrist for about 30 seconds. Ms Li informed him that she was confident she could treat the hearing loss problem and his tinnitus with either acupuncture, remedial massage or herbs, or a mixture of the three. Mr Moor indicated he was only interested in pursuing the herbs. She then supplied him with four boxes of pills. All told, there was a total of about 800 pills. The writing on the boxes reveals that they had been produced in China.
257 In response to a question from Mr Moor, Ms Li informed him that the cost of treatment would be $85 for that day's visit, which included the cost of the herbs, and recommended another six to seven visits, costing $60 for each visit. He then asked her whether the visits could be claimed back on his private health insurance and was told that the herbal treatment was not claimable but that acupuncture was. She then said she was prepared to give him a receipt stating that she had treated him with acupuncture. He paid $85 and received a receipt. The receipt was written by Ms Li and recorded the following:
" 29.4.03
Keith Moor
22.4.03 Acupuncture $45
29.4.03 Acupuncture $40
1094871A
Dr ABBIE Li
85.00"
258 Mr Moor gave evidence that he did not attend on 22 April 2003 and that at no stage did he receive acupuncture either on 22 April or 29 April. Mr Moor stated that he understood acupuncture was some form of pressure either with needles or fingers on pressure points around the body. He specifically denied that at any stage he had any infra-red lamp treatment. Ms Li had stated that she had given him such treatment. Her evidence was that she had applied her fingers behind his head and ears. Mr Moor said she did not. I accept the evidence of Mr Moor. The receipt was false. He did not attend on 22 April 2003. He did not receive acupuncture at any time. The fact that Ms Li had written on her receipt her provider number for acupuncture, which is different to her remedial massage provider number, supports Mr Moor's evidence as to her statement that he could use the receipt to claim on his private medical insurer. I reject Ms Li's evidence that Mr Moor attended on 22 April 2003, that he received a form of acupuncture on any occasion and that her receipt was not false. Her evidence was false. She blatantly lied as to the attendance on 22 April 2003 and the treatment given to Mr Moor.
259 Mr Moor gave evidence that he spoke to a representative of the Australian Adult Entertainment Industry, which is a lobby group for legal brothels. He had known the person, Bill, from prior experience. They had a discussion and Bill agreed to go into Ms Li's premises to determine whether or not she was providing the relief massages for money. Bill stated he was prepared to do so and did so. Mr Moor stated that he had attended the home of Bill. Bill said that did not occur. The point is of little substance in the proceeding, and does not in any way shake my view as to the credibility of either witness.
260 Bill attended on 7 May and Mr Moor met him at a coffee shop in the building in which Ms Li had her premises and handed to him $80 in cash. Bill went to Ms Li's premises and received a massage. Bill returned, detailed what had happened and gave Mr Moor a receipt. The receipt revealed Bill's full name and the date 7 May 2003, and recorded the service provided, which was described as "Remedial Massage". Ms Li had signed the receipt and inserted a different provider number to that which had been inserted on Mr Moor's receipt. This was the provider number for remedial massage. Some seven or eight days later, Mr Moor received a copy of Bill's statutory declaration made on 14 May 2003.
261 Having received the statutory declaration, Mr Moor contacted Ms Li by telephone on 14 May and informed her that he was preparing articles alleging that she was running an illegal brothel and issuing false receipts. He stated that he wanted to give her the opportunity to comment upon the allegations. Ms Li requested a face to face meeting, which took place in the coffee shop in her building some 15 to 20 minutes later.
262 At the meeting, Mr Moor detailed his observations and told her what Bill had told him, namely, that she had masturbated him to ejaculation. Initially, Ms Li stated that she could have carried out a prostate check, that sometimes she performed an impotency check, and that perhaps Mr Moor's informant had misunderstood. Mr Moor put to her that she had masturbated a person to ejaculation and that that was a sexual service. He gave evidence that at that point, she became emotional and admitted that she sometimes did that for some clients and that she was sorry and would not do it again. She offered to pay to keep her name out of the paper. She said she was prepared to pay any penalty. She stated that any publication would destroy her business, that it was a bad time for her, that her father had recently died and that she had a new relationship with a male friend. In respect to the allegation that she had provided false receipts, she also stated she could not see anything wrong with allowing people to claim back on their health insurance because they paid a lot for their insurance. She kept saying she did not want the articles to appear and she would pay any penalty to stop the publication.
263 The following morning, at about 9.30am, Mr Moor telephoned Ms Li with a view to getting her to repeat what she had said. He recorded the telephone conversation.
264 I have closely listened to the tape recording. It is necessary to scrutinise the recording with considerable care for a number of reasons. First of all, Mr Moor was seeking to obtain admissions and accordingly was controlling the discussion with that end in mind. He did not inform Ms Li that the conversation was being recorded. Mr Moor originates from Northern England and has a distinctive Northern English accent. On occasions, he speaks quickly. He sometimes did so in giving evidence. The recording does not suggest that he was speaking quickly on that occasion. However, it is clear from some of her responses that Ms Li was having some difficulty explaining herself. I have listened carefully to the tape recording on a number of occasions. What does stand out, contrary to what one may infer from the transcript of the conversation, which is used as an aide memoire, is that Ms Li was remarkably calm and controlled. I have observed her in the witness box when she has become agitated and distressed and said things that I am sure she did not mean to say or had difficulty in expressing herself. The recorded telephone conversation shows a remarkably calm person who, in my view, did understand what Mr Moor was putting to her. I am satisfied, from her responses and the way she gave them, that she did understand what Mr Moor was saying and that she was responding to the questions put. Making all allowances, in my opinion what Ms Li said during that conversation incriminates her in relation to providing sexual services and issuing false receipts. Although Mr Moor's first main question was of some length, he concluded that the only query of his editor was whether one could be sure that Ms Li would not do it again. The reference to "doing it again" was what Mr Moor described as "offering the sexual services and issuing the false receipts". He observed that Ms Li had given him, Mr Moor, her word that she would not do it again. Hence, the only question to which she was responding was that the editor wished to know whether "we can be sure that you won't do it again". She responded by asking "What do you give me offer?" and then when Mr Moor indicated he had difficulty understanding, she replied:
"I said, I don't know what, I don't know how I can prove for sure."
265 It was put by Mr Selimi that "prove for sure" referred to Ms Li proving her innocence. I do not read her response in that way and the balance of the conversation does not support that observation. Mr Moor followed that observation by asking whether, if the article was not published, she would give her word that she would not do it again. Her response was:
"No, I won't do again for sure. For sure. You give me offer what I can prove or whatever I really ... ".
266 Mr Moor interrupted and stated, "You said that you would pay any penalty?" to which she responded, "Yes". Mr Moor then said that he would go back to his editor. Ms Li then went on to say:
"Yes, you give me offer. I haven't got idea how I can, I can, give you and prove myself over the phone. It is very hard for me to say, how do you say, I never do it again for sure, this one for sure, and so the penalty whatever you give me offer what I can do, I can prove myself. I don't know which way I can do it."
267 The written word does not truly reflect what Ms Li was saying. The evidence is what the tribunal of fact determines and hears on the recording. Her response was patiently given and demonstrates that she was prepared to promise that she would not do it again, that is, provide sexual services and issue false receipts. I am satisfied that the promise she was making referred to her not providing sexual services and issuing false receipts in the future. What stands out about the conversation is that it was a pleasant conversation, without anger, and that neither participant was speaking quickly or appeared to be agitated.
268 In October 2003, Mr Moor was contacted by the conman, Michael Williams. He met him on three occasions in that month. On the third occasion, Williams gave him an audio tape. Williams died shortly thereafter. The tape had two recordings on it. I interpolate to observe that Ms Li admitted her voice was on the first recording but not on the second. I have closely listened to the second conversation. I am not prepared to find, based simply upon listening to the second conversation, that the female voice is indeed that of Ms Li. Some of the subject matter discussed suggests that it was. The voice expert, Mr Peter Garde, was of the opinion that on the balance of probabilities it was the voice of Ms Li. He carried out a number of tests comparing the recording with recordings of Ms Li's voice not only whilst giving evidence in Court, but also in respect to the first part of the recording on that tape and also the conversation with Mr Moor. Having carried out exhaustive tests, Mr Garde opined that the test and control data appeared to be from the same speaker. He said:
"While it cannot be conclusively proven that the speaker labelled F4 and Abbie Li are one and the same, the investigator could find no single feature by which the speakers could be distinguished and there is much qualitative evidence to indicate that they are indeed one and the same."
269 The reason why Mr Garde labelled the female voices on that second part of the recording F1, F2, F3 and F4 is that the recording continuity was questionable due to stop/start transient events. Mr Garde prepared a transcript of the telephone conversation and the person who is labelled F4 indeed is the person who speaks for most of the tape. Mr Moor gave evidence, which I summarise hereafter, that Ms Li admitted that her voice was on the recording of the telephone conversation. Given the evidence of Mr Garde, the overall untruthfulness of Ms Li and Mr Moor's evidence that she admitted that she was recorded on the tape of the telephone call, I find that she was the female voice on the recording.
270 However, having said that, I approach with considerable caution anything that is recorded on either of the recorded statements, and particularly any admission made by Ms Li.
271 Mr Moor saw Ms Li on 2 February 2004 when he attended her premises. He produced the recording given to him by Williams with the two recorded conversations and requested Ms Li to listen to it. Ms Li agreed to listen to the recording through the headphones. Mr Moor waited about 15 to 20 minutes while she listened. Her reaction was she did not want to talk to him and she asserted he had ruined her business. Initially Ms Li was reluctant to admit her voice was recorded but Mr Moor pressed her and eventually she nodded her head, indicating that her voice was on the recording. Mr Moor produced in evidence the recording given to him by Michael Williams. The authenticity of the tapes was the subject of evidence by Peter Garde, the expert in voice recognition. I accept unreservedly his evidence. The first recording, which appears to be a face to face discussion between Ms Li and Mr Williams, was divided into six segments. I accept Mr Garde's evidence that within each segment the tape is authentic. However, what occurred between segments has been omitted, and one must proceed with considerable caution in considering the evidence. Mr Garde pointed out that the bulk of the telephone conversation, which is difficult to hear, was recorded in one segment and accordingly is authentic. It will be necessary to consider the contents of the recordings when considering articles six and seven. Mr Moor also obtained an unsigned statutory declaration given to him by Michael Williams, which was admitted for the limited purpose that it was handed to him and went to his state of knowledge. It was not evidence of its contents.
272 I accept the evidence of Mr Moor. I do not accept the evidence of Ms Li, which is contrary to Mr Moor's evidence. As stated earlier, Ms Li was extremely evasive and vague about Mr Moor's so-called first attendance on 22 April 2003 and, secondly, whether she had provided any acupuncture. I am satisfied that she gave Mr Moor a false receipt to enable him, if he was so minded, to make a claim on his private health insurer for a refund. I am also satisfied that she admitted to him, both face to face and over the telephone, that she was providing sexual services to clients and also providing false receipts.
273 Bill is a self-employed consultant to a body called the Australian Adult Entertainment Industry Inc. He had been so for some six and a half years. His duties include advocating and agitating on behalf of the body for change in the attitude of government agencies to illegal brothels, and encouraging the authorities to take enforcement action against illegal brothels.
274 Bill gave evidence that he had a discussion with Mr Moor and later attended a meeting in a sidewalk café at the top end of Collins Street. This occurred on Wednesday, 7 May 2003 at the café at 24 Collins Street. He was shown the advertisements in the Herald Sun for 5 May 2003 and he stated, based on his knowledge, that there were potentially three premises which met his criteria of what was likely to be an illegal brothel. He referred to three but did not refer to that of Ms Li. I note his criteria and, in my view, Ms Li's advertisement met his criteria of an advertisement for a brothel. On 6 May 2003, he telephoned Ms Li's business and obtained an appointment for 7 May 2003. He attended Ms Li's premises at 4.00pm on 7 May. On attendance he introduced himself to the receptionist. Another female entered the reception area and introduced herself as Abbie Li. He identified Ms Li in Court. She invited him to a consulting room and he informed her that he was there for an enjoyable relaxation therapy massage. He was requested to pay $45 for a 30 minutes session. She requested him to remove his clothes and she left the room. He did so. He stated he was naked when Ms Li returned to the room. He was requested to get onto a massage table and lie face down. Ms Li put across his buttock region a bath mat sized towel. She massaged his body. He informed Ms Li during the course of the massage that he was enjoying it. Ms Li then raised the question of the condition of his prostate and stated she could examine him. She then proceeded to probe with her fingers a region between his anus and genitals. She then stated that he did not appear to suffer from any prostate problem. Ms Li then stated that the 30 minutes was up. Bill said he was keen to progress the massage. He indicated that he would pay her more money and that he hoped the massage might conclude in a happy ending, to which she replied that that could be arranged. He was informed the cost would be $35 and he was then asked whether he would like it if Ms Li did an impotency test. He asked what that involved and was told it would be enjoyable. By this time, he was on his back. Ms Li removed the bath mat sized towel, put a pair of latex gloves on her hands and applied creams and oils to his testicles and penis. His penis became erect and Ms Li masturbated him to ejaculation. She then used tissues to remove the semen and wipe him clean. After that he dressed and left the room and paid the $35.
275 Ms Li requested him to insert his name on the receipt, which he did, and she wrote out the receipt which recorded as follows:
" 7.5.03
(Bill's name inserted)
Remedial massage
1068681M
Dr ABBIE Li
80.00"
276 Ms Li informed him that she was describing the service in such a way that he would be able to obtain a return on his medical benefit fund. All told, the remedial massage took about 45 minutes.
277 Bill went downstairs, met Mr Moor, told him what had occurred and said he would provide a statutory declaration.
278 Bill was cross-examined for a long period and, at times, aggressively. Given that he had an interest in attending Ms Li's premises, and further that the conversations he said took place at Ms Li's premises were not stated in his statutory declaration or the affidavit he swore for the purposes of the Chinese Medical Board's inquiry, a concerted attack was made upon his credibility. In addition, he disagreed with Mr Moor's evidence in respect to two matters. He did not recall Mr Moor coming to his house and his recollection was that the first approach was over the telephone, followed by the meeting in the coffee shop on 7 May 2003. In addition, he was adamant that he did not agree with Mr Moor that he would attend court and give evidence of what occurred, if requested. He stated that he would provide Mr Moor with a statutory declaration. Mr Moor gave evidence that Bill had agreed that he would, if necessary, give evidence in a court of law. I note these differences. They can be put down to a defect in memory of either of the witnesses. But, in my view, the differences do not affect their honesty as witnesses. The differences may reflect upon their accuracy of memory in regard to the particular topics. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that Bill was a truthful witness. I accept his version of what occurred in Ms Li's premises.
279 For her part, Ms Li's version of events is unbelievable. It was a figment of her imagination and no doubt has been thought up by her over a lengthy period of time. According to her version, it was Bill's initiative to ask her to masturbate him, a request which she refused, and she then fled the room. She said she heard him shouting out her name, which appears to be her version of him having an orgasm. She said she was afraid. She retreated to a room in her premises. She said that her receptionist had disappeared. Some minutes passed, she went back into the room and Bill followed her out, again yelling out her name. Despite these events and her alleged fear, she gave him a receipt. Her version is unbelievable in that despite her concern and fear of Bill, she nevertheless filled out a receipt for him and signed it and inserted her remedial massage provider number. Not only that, it is clear that he wrote out his name on it and this was at her request. This evidently all occurred at a time of great tension, according to Ms Li. Her evidence is fanciful and the product of a deceptive person with a vivid imagination. Despite the concerted attack made by Mr Selimi on Bill, I accept Bill as a reputable, honest witness.
280 The next witness was Edward Thomas Millar, who is a registered nurse and has been for 27 years. He suffers from a hearing problem in his right ear. Mr Miller's ex-wife suggested that he seek treatment for tinnitus from Ms Li. He made an appointment and attended at her premises on 22 April 2003.
281 On arrival, he met Ms Li and after a short period went into an office and was asked a number of questions. He gave her a page he had prepared which outlined his medical conditions. He said that he had a discussion with Ms Li about his tinnitus and then Ms Li gave him a copy of her book "Eating for Life". He was then asked to go through to a treatment room. He undressed and lay face downwards on the table. Ms Li commenced to massage Mr Millar's back region and actually scratched his back. He stated the scratch felt like somebody was running their fingernails across his back. Ms Li suggested that he show his girlfriend the scratches. He felt sore on the back. The pain was in the upper shoulder and middle of the lumbar region. The massage extended over a period of 30 minutes. He got dressed, went through to the reception room and Ms Li gave him a couple of bottles of pills which she described as vitamins and herbs. All told there were about 200 pills. Ms Li informed him that he could claim on his insurance fund for the treatment given that day. He was then given a receipt. The receipt recorded that he had attended on three occasions, namely, 8, 15 and 22 April 2003. In fact he only was there on the 22nd. The receipt noted that he had received consultation and acupuncture on 8 April, for which he was charged $55, and on 15 April 2003 he received remedial massage and was charged $55. I accept his evidence that he was not there on either day. The treatment for 22 April 2003 was remedial massage. Ms Li put both her provider numbers on the receipt, namely, the numbers for acupuncture and remedial massage. Mr Millar paid by credit card $165. Mr Millar then attended at Medibank Private and received a refund. It is observed that the receipt produced in evidence was a photostat copy of the original. This had the stamp of the company Forever Young on it. The copies of other receipts produced in evidence did not bear the company's stamp.
282 Mr Millar returned on 29 April 2003 for further treatment. He was taken through to a consulting room and lay down on the massage table. Ms Li commenced the massage but after a brief period she left the room and a woman of Asian origin entered and continued and completed the massage. She was of Thai origin. The massage comprised an all over body massage and at one point, the woman got up on the table and commenced to manipulate his arms and legs. After completion, Mr Millar went to the reception, where Ms Li asked him to pay and gave him a further 200 pills. He received a receipt dated 29 April 2003 written out by Ms Li, and this recorded that he had been there on either 25 or 26 April 2003 (it is difficult to read the date) and had received acupuncture for which he was charged $72.50. I accept the evidence of Mr Millar that that did not occur and that the receipt was false. The receipt recorded that the service provided on 29 April 2003 was acupuncture, for which Mr Millar was charged $72.50. I am satisfied that the treatment he received that day was not acupuncture. After receiving the receipt, Ms Li said he could take it to his health insurance fund and claim on it. He paid by credit card. He then attended at Medibank Private and claimed for that day's treatment. He received a refund.
283 He later saw an article concerning Ms Li in the newspaper on 26 May 2003. He became concerned about his claims on Medibank Private and wrote out a cheque and sent a letter to Medibank Private on 27 May 2003. He refunded the sum of $47.40.
284 I accept the evidence of Mr Millar. He was a credible witness. The evidence establishes that Ms Li gave him false receipts for attendances which did not occur, and for treatment which he did not receive. I am also satisfied that Ms Li told him that he could claim on his health insurance fund. It is pertinent to observe that Ms Li, on the occasion when she gave the receipt of 22 April 2003, recorded both provider numbers, namely, for acupuncture and massage, and yet in respect to the receipt dated 29 April 2003, she inserted one number being the acupuncture number. This evidence provides another example of Ms Li's willingness to tell an untruth in the witness box. She sought at one stage to suggest that she had put those numbers on the blank receipts prior to providing any service.
285 The acceptance of the evidence of Messrs Moor and Millar with respect to the false receipts amply demonstrates that Ms Li is an extremely dishonest person. Not only was she prepared to dishonestly provide false receipts, but in so doing she enabled the client, if he desired, to make a fraudulent claim on a private health insurer. She was a willing party to the potential for fraud. She emphatically denied on affirmation in this Court that she gave false receipts. Her denials provide further evidence of her dishonesty and propensity to deceive if she thought it would assist her. Acceptance of the evidence of Bill establishes that she provided a sexual service for money and then provided a receipt for remedial massage with her provider number to enable him, if he was so minded, to obtain a refund from his private health insurer.
286 Near the end of her examination-in-chief on the third day of the hearing, Ms Li was asked a number of questions by her counsel. She was asked what her reaction was to page 3 of the first article. Having stated that it was rubbish, she then asserted:
"I'm never cheating anybody. I never do sex with anybody."
Her answers were lies.
287 Having been asked whether she now knew what the word "fake" meant, she said "yes". She was then asked a question whether she had admitted making any fake or false receipts. Her response was:
That was a lie.
289 She was then asked the question:
"Have you ever provided any receipt to allow any person to claim for any brothel service?"
Her answer was:
"No".
That was a lie.
"Are you a cheat?
Are you a liar?
Are you a dishonest person?
Are you a fraud?
Have you ever provided any sexual service to any of your patients?
Have you ever masturbated a client or a patient?"
Her answers to all of those questions was "no". Each answer was a lie.
291 She was then asked the questions:
292 Ms Li is a person who has no credibility.
293 The allegations made in the articles published by the defendants involved charges of criminality. The standard which rests upon the defendants to prove the defence of justification is on the balance of probabilities, but I accept that the standard is what is described as the Briginshaw standard. In Briginshaw v Briginshaw,[69] Dixon J said:[70]
"The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of the given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences. ... When, in a civil proceeding, the question arises of whether a crime has been committed, the standard of persuasion is, according to the better opinion, the same as upon other civil issues ... But, consistently with this opinion, weight is given to the presumption of innocence and exactness of proof is expected."
294 I am satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the defendants have proven the defence of justification in respect to the defamatory imputations conveyed in the first five articles and the eighth article.
295 Mr Selimi, on behalf of Ms Li, submitted that the only instance of a sexual service being provided for money with the provision of a receipt to enable the client to obtain a refund from his private health insurer was the evidence of Bill. The defamatory imputation conveyed to the reader that Ms Li provided fake receipts so that her clients could claim sexual services on their private health insurance. However, in my opinion, there is further evidence to support the conclusion that the occurrence was not an isolated incident and that the defendants have justified the defamatory imputation.
296 The evidence supports the conclusion to the requisite standard that Ms Li was providing sexual services for reward illegally, in that she was conducting an illegal brothel and was giving receipts to enable clients to make claims on their health insurers for sexual services. In support of that conclusion, I rely upon the following evidence:
(i) Bill's evidence;
(ii) The circumstantial evidence, being the advertisements, the presence of three different women on the premises providing massage services to a male clientele, the appointments book being divided into three columns, the efforts made by Ms Li to cover her tracks in relation to this, and the false evidence given by Ms Li in respect to the issue. In addition, there is the fact that the women disappeared on the publication of the first article and were not seen again, save that Ms Li asserted one of them attended on two later occasions;
(iii) The evidence of Mr Moor as to the face to face meeting with Ms Li in the coffee shop on 14 May 2003, in which Ms Li admitted her activities;
(iv) The recorded telephone conversation between Mr Moor and Ms Li on 15 May 2003, in which she admitted such activities;
(v) Ms Li's evidence, in which she lied in respect to a number of important matters. Her lies were false denials. She lied in relation to what occurred when Bill attended at her business premises, she lied with respect to the provision of receipts for other services, she lied in respect to the presence of the three women at her premises providing services, and she lied with respect to the appointments book dealing with the provision of services by the three women. She lied in circumstances which lead to the conclusion that she knew that if she told the truth it would implicate her in the provision of sexual activities at her business premises and the provision of receipts which would enable her client to perpetrate a fraud on their private health insurers. I am satisfied that she deliberately told the lies, that they related to material issues in this proceeding, and that the lies were told to cover up the truth which Ms Li knew would prejudice her case.
297 In my opinion, Ms Li lied to this Court in relation to a number of matters. She lied in her evidence as to the reason why the three women were engaged in performing services at her premises, she lied in her evidence concerning the services provided to both Messrs Moor and Millar, and she lied in her evidence concerning the receipts and her attempts to explain the falsity. She deliberately lied as to the sexual service she provided to the witness Bill.
298 There is a substantial difference between the rejection of a witness's evidence and a finding that the witness lied.[71] The mere rejection of evidence does not logically lead to the conclusion that the person has lied. It is a finding that should not lightly be made.
299 Where a litigant deliberately gives false evidence in relation to an important issue in a proceeding, it is cogent evidence of an admission by that litigant that the truth would not assist the cause and indeed would damage it. I am satisfied that the lies told by Ms Li in court were deliberate, that they do relate to the material issues in the proceeding and that the reason she lied was that if she told the truth, her case would fail.[72] The principles relating to the use of lies have been discussed in many criminal cases. A fortiori the same principles apply in a civil case. In Edwards v The Queen,[73] Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said:
"A lie can constitute an admission against interest only if it is concerned with some circumstance or event connected with the offence (i.e. relates to a material issue) and if it was told by the accused in circumstances in which the explanation for the lie is that he knew that the truth would implicate him in the offence. Thus, in any case where a lie is relied upon to prove guilt, the lie should be precisely identified, as should the circumstances and events that are said to indicate that it constitutes an admission against interest."
300 I am satisfied that Ms Li lied in respect to a number of material issues and she lied because she knew that if she told the truth it would be established, first, that she was conducting an illegal brothel, secondly, that she was providing sexual services for money, thirdly, that she was a prostitute in the sense of charging for sexual services, and fourthly, that she had signed and issued false receipts to enable her patients to make an application for a refund from a private medical insurer. I am satisfied the false denials provide cogent evidence supporting the defence of justification that Ms Li was providing sexual services for clients and issuing them with false receipts to enable them to recover a refund from their private insurers.
301 My conclusion is reinforced by Ms Li's conduct and that of her lawyers in respect to the institution of this proceeding and during the following ten months, which leads to the conclusion that she, and her legal team, had little faith in her own personal claim. The evidence revealed that soon after the first article appeared in May 2003, the conman Michael Williams made contact with Ms Li. He informed her that he could assist her. There is no doubt that she had considerable contact with Mr Williams thereafter and it is hard to believe that she thought he was a lawyer. However, it emerged that in about June 2003 she retained the firm of solicitors Coadys. She went to Coadys at the suggestion of Mr Williams and in his company. Prior to doing so, she had a number of discussions with a Queen's Counsel seeking advice as to what she could do about the defamatory articles. By this time, the Herald had published the first three articles and the fourth and fifth articles were published on 14 July 2003, which was around the time that Coadys was acting for her. That firm sent a letter of demand to the defendants. The defendants' solicitors responded to the effect that they did not accept that Ms Li or her company had any claim. Coadys ceased to act for Ms Li. She continued to see Mr Williams thereafter, on almost a daily basis over the following months, according to her daughter. Ms Li provided him, according to her own evidence, with most of her records relating to the services provided by her business. Williams died at the end of October 2003. Some time after that date, Ms Li engaged her present solicitors. By this time, five articles had been published, the last on 14 July 2003. The articles were making very grave allegations against her. Anybody who read the five articles would appreciate that the grave charges were being levelled against her personally. In four articles were references to Ms Li conducting a business called "Forever Young". However, the clear import of the articles was that it was her personal conduct in running her business which was the subject of the serious allegations. The serious allegations were not made against the business name "Forever Young" and the reference to the name made no real difference to the clear thrust of the articles, namely, the dishonest conduct of Ms Li.
302 Despite this obvious state of affairs, when the writ was issued on 20 February 2004, the sole plaintiff was "By Forever Young Pty Ltd" and the imputations were carefully drawn, stating that the company, through its director Dr Li, had been the subject of defamatory imputations. The writ was served. Pausing there, one can confidently infer that Ms Li and her then lawyers were of the opinion that Ms Li should not be a party to the proceeding. I do not accept the submission of Mr Selimi that the solicitors were ignorant and knew very little about defamation. Indeed, the statement of claim is in the normal form and the defamatory imputations have been carefully drafted. The first five articles were clearly defamatory of and concerning Ms Li. The only issue for consideration by a lawyer was whether or not the publishers had any defence. Any lawyer with a modicum of understanding of the law of defamation, would immediately consider the defence of justification. This would be done in consultation with Ms Li and an assessment made of whether or not the publishers could prove the defence of justification.
303 On 23 February 2004, another article was published and, again, a number of serious allegations were made against Ms Li. On 29 April 2004, a summons was filed in the proceeding seeking orders that the proceeding be entered in the Major Torts list and that Ms Li be joined as a party. On 20 June 2004, the proceeding was entered in the Major Torts list but the application to join Ms Li as a party was adjourned to 17 September 2004, and eventually to 10 December 2004. On 23 November 2004, there was a change of solicitors. Ms Li was joined as a party on 10 December 2004 and an amended statement of claim was delivered.
304 Experience shows that after a defamatory article is published, the immediate reaction of the victim is one of outrage, annoyance, upset and distress. This is followed up by a letter of demand and sometimes the issue of a writ. This is usually done within a few months of the publication. The issue of a writ has a two-fold effect. First, it informs the publisher that the plaintiff seeks damages for defamation. Secondly, in the great majority of cases, it deters any publisher thereafter from continuing to publish defamatory words concerning the plaintiff. To further publish defamatory imputations would, if the publisher was unsuccessful, inflate the damages. Between the date of the issue of the writ and her joinder as a plaintiff, Ms Li was the subject of three further articles. Indeed, she had some advanced warning in early February 2004, when Mr Moor made contact with her, that further articles were to appear. Mr Moor saw her on 2 February 2004 and played the tape recording of the conversations between Ms Li and the conman Williams. The writ in the name of the company was issued on 20 February 2004 and two further articles appeared on 23 February 2004. The final article appeared on 17 June 2004. The conduct of Ms Li and her then solicitors, who ceased to act on 23 November 2004 and who are now, in fact, her present solicitors, in the proceeding, leads to a conclusion that she and her then advisers had real doubts about her prospects of succeeding in her personal capacity in any defamation proceeding. The amended statement of claim delivered by her new solicitors in December 2004 was signed by two counsel of the Inner Bar and a junior, and there is a real suspicion that her joinder and the delivery of the amended statement of claim were designed to be "stop writ". However, the Court does not proceed on suspicion.
305 Conduct by a litigant suggesting lack of faith and confidence in the litigation is evidence that can be relied upon, on a common sense basis, that if a litigant does anything which tends to suggest a lack of confidence in the claim, it is a matter that can be taken into account and lead to an inference that the claim lacks merit. It is a piece of circumstantial evidence. It is not a piece of evidence which, taken in isolation, would lead to the conclusion that the case has no merit, but it is a price of circumstantial evidence that may be taken into account.
306 The principles of the law of evidence concerning conduct of a litigant evidencing a lack of faith in his or her case or evidencing a weak cause are often applied in litigation. A familiar example is the failure to call an important witness who could provide relevant evidence in respect to an important factual issue. Other examples are the destruction of, or failure to produce, important relevant documents, particularly incriminating ones, and the subornation of a witness or the fabrication of evidence. The rule is based upon common sense and life's experiences. It leads to an admission or, as Professor Wigmore in his work on evidence said, "is a discrediting circumstance".[74] The learned author said:
"Such conduct, for example, the fabrication or suppression of evidence, the failure to produce important witnesses or documents, indicates a consciousness that one's cause is a bad one or a weak one, and from this consciousness or belief may be inferred the fact that it is bad or weak i.e. the facts essential for its support are lacking."
307 The conduct is a piece of circumstantial evidence which, when taken in isolation, may not advance the cause, but when considered with other evidence, provides a link in the reasoning process to an adverse conclusion against the litigant. The conduct is confined to that of a party to the litigation, including his or her agent. The types of conduct which may amount to a litigant's lack of belief in his cause, are varied and numerous. As Professor Wigmore said:[75]
"So far as regards the nature of the conduct which is open to this inference, all that can be said, in generalising, is that there are broadly two sorts,
first, conduct indicating a consciousness of the weakness of the cause in general, - bribery, destruction of evidence, and the like;
and, secondly, conduct indicating a consciousness of the weakness of a specific element in the cause, - failure to produce a particular witness or a document, and the like.
In the former the inference is an indefinite one, that the whole cause must be an unfounded one since such means are employed to sustain it; in the latter the inference is a definite one, that a specific witness or document bears unfavourably on the cause."
308 The learned author went on to state:[76]
"It has always been understood - the inference, indeed is one of the simplest in human experience - that a party's falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct, is a receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not apply itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause."
(Emphases added).
"The conduct of a party to a cause may be of the highest importance in determining whether the cause of action in which he is plaintiff, or the ground of defence, if he is defendant, is honest and just; just as it is evidence against a prisoner that he has said one thing at one time and another at another, as showing that the recourse to falsehood leads fairly to an inference of guilt. Anything from which such an inference can be drawn is cogent and important evidence with a view to the issue. So, if you can shew that a plaintiff has been suborning false testimony, and has endeavoured to have recourse to perjury, it is strong evidence that he knew perfectly well his cause was an unrighteous one. I do not say that it is conclusive; I fully agree that it should be put to the jury, with the intimation that it does not always follow, because a man, not sure he shall be able to succeed by righteous means, has recourse to means of a different character, than that which he desires, namely, the gaining of a victory, is not his due, or that he has not good ground for believing that justice entitles him to it. It does not necessarily follow that he has not a good cause of action, any more than a prisoner's making a false statement to increase his appearance of innocence is necessarily a proof of guilt; but it is always evidence which ought to be submitted to the consideration of the tribunal which has to judge of the facts; and therefore I think that the evidence was admissible, in as much as it went to show that the plaintiff thought he had a bad case."
(Emphases added).
"The principle is in fact well established ... it is this, that the conduct in the litigation of a party to it, if it is such as to lead to the reasonable inference that he disbelieves in his own case, may be proved and used as evidence against him."
(Emphasis added).
311 In my opinion, conduct of a litigant which leads to a conclusion that the litigant has a doubt or doubts about his cause is relevant and admissible. The type of conduct which may lead to the inference will vary from case to case. It is impossible to prepare an exhaustive list of the types of conduct which would lead to the conclusion. Every case, of course, must depend on its own particular circumstances. One example which Professor Wigmore referred to was the delay in instituting a proceeding. The learned author said:[81]
"In general, a delay in instituting a prosecution, or a reluctance, overcome only by the instigation of others, is some indication - perhaps only a slight one in fact, of a consciousness of the weakness of one's cause. So also is the failure to sue or prosecute in the jurisdiction or court which would naturally be sought. These are but a few illustrations of a great variety of a party's conduct which may and constantly is enquired into as affecting his belief in the merits of his cause. Like all other similar circumstances it is of course open to explanation."
(Emphasis added).
312 The principles are discussed in the works on evidence.[82]
313 As there may be any variety of motives as to why and how a person conducts himself or herself in a certain situation, it is necessary to closely examine the evidence and determine whether it does amount to an implied admission that one's cause is a weak one. However, after careful scrutiny, and bearing in mind that it is no more than a piece of circumstantial evidence, it is open to a court to use the evidence as leading to a conclusion that the plaintiff does not have a good case.
314 Ms Li was asked in evidence by the Court why the proceeding was instituted in the name of the company only and why she had not been joined as a party for another ten months. This was drawn to her attention by the Court, and in answer to a question put by her counsel as to what she asked her solicitors to do when she first went to them, Ms Li replied, "I just want to sue the newspaper. I want to clear my name."
315 The conduct of Ms Li and her solicitors leads to a conclusion that an opinion was formed that her case was a weak one. All the articles which had been published up untl 20 February 2004 were critical of her conduct and not that of the business name Forever Young or the company. Each of the articles libelled her and libelled her in a very serious way. Any lawyer with a minimal understanding of the laws of libel would have come to the conclusion that Ms Li would have no difficulty in proving her case in defamation. The only issue for consideration was whether the publishers had any defence, and of course the first defence to consider was one of truth. In my opinion, the conduct leads to the conclusion that there was an opinion formed that the defendants had a good defence in justification and that the writ was issued for the purpose of stopping further publications. It is a piece of circumstantial evidence. In isolation, it would not be sufficient to provide proof of the truth of the defamatory imputations. It is a piece of circumstantial evidence that I take into account. It reinforces my conclusion as to the defence of justification.
316 There is no evidence that the sexual services provided by Ms Li herself involved sexual intercourse with any patient or client. However, for reasons that I have already stated, in my opinion, first, the articles do not convey that meaning to the reasonable reader and, secondly, if they did, in my view the defamatory sting is the provision of sexual services for money to patients or clients and the fact that it was sexual intercourse rather than some other form of sexual service, such as masturbation to ejaculation, makes no difference to the sting of the libel. This is especially so when the reasonable reader is informed that Ms Li was conducting an illegal brothel, which was proven as true.
317 If the first, third, fourth and fifth articles did impute that Ms Li had given Bill a fake receipt for remedial massage, then in my opinion, the evidence establishes the truth of the allegation. The charge made was for a one hour remedial massage. The period was 45 minutes. It comprised in the main a remedial massage, but also a sexual service. The receipt was a fake in the sense that the sexual service was included and a sum of money was paid for the total service, including the sexual service. The patient would not be entitled to recover a private health refund in respect to that sexual service. Further, the charge of $80 was for one hour, and the period in question was 45 minutes. Further, I am satisfied that the evidence established that Ms Li was conducting a Chinese natural therapy business and was also conducting the business of a brothel. I refer to the evidence summarised above which supported the conclusion that she was conducting an illegal brothel. I am also satisfied that the defendants have proven that it was true, as stated in the articles, that Ms Li provided fake medical receipts to enable her patients to defraud the private health insurance system. She was a willing party to that potential and provided evidence to enable the fraud to be carried out.
318 It follows that, in my opinion, the defendants have proven the defence of justification to the defamatory imputations in articles 1 - 5 (inclusive) and 8.
(iv) Articles 6 and 7
319 The sixth and seventh articles repeat the defamatory imputations which are found in the other articles, namely, that Ms Li operated an illegal brothel, that she was a prostitute and that she provided fake medical receipts to assist clients or patients, if so minded, to make fraudulent claims. However, it was contended that the sixth article conveyed two other imputations reflecting upon Ms Li, namely, that she performed illegal sexual services at her premises for a barrister and a Federal politician who were her clients, and, secondly, that she was forced by them to perform sexual acts upon them.
320 I have already determined whether the said imputations are defamatory. The said barrister and Federal politician are not named and, in my view, the imputation adds nothing to the sting that she was providing sexual services to her clients at her premises. I am satisfied, for reasons already stated, that the defence of justification has been made out in respect to the imputation that she was providing sexual services to her clients for money.
321 The Court has earlier considered whether the sixth and seventh articles conveyed to the reasonable reader that Ms Li was forced to perform sexual acts on a federal politician and a Melbourne barrister. In my opinion, for reasons already stated, both articles do not convey that she was so forced. What the articles state is that she had claimed in a recorded conversation and a highly dubious statutory declaration that these things had occurred. However, the whole import of both the sixth and seventh articles, which appeared in the one edition of the newspaper on 23 February 2004, was that they were claims only and were of highly doubtful import. I would not read into the articles the conclusion that these sexual acts actually occurred as a result of force. Indeed, in article 6, the reader is informed very early in the article that both the politician and barrister denied that they had received any form of sexual services during their sessions with Ms Li. I accept that a publisher, whilst making claims or allegations, may express the words in the article in a way which conveys that the claims or allegations were true, that is, in this case, that Ms Li was forced to perform the sexual acts. However, I have carefully read both articles and I am satisfied that they convey the claims by Ms Li that these things occurred and no more, in a context where the reasonable reader would have considerable doubts about anything that was said by her to the conman. In my opinion, the defendants have proven that it was true, that is, she did make such claims in the two recorded conversations with the conman Williams. Insofar as the articles impute that the claims were made by her, I am satisfied that the defendants have proven the truth of the imputations.
322 In the seventh article, in addition to the imputations with which I have already dealt, there is another imputation which is expressed in this way, namely, that Ms Li had conducted herself in such a way "that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation into attempting to blackmail a Federal politician and a Melbourne barrister and in making false allegations against them."
323 I have already dealt with this imputation. In my view, what was said in the article does not support that imputation. The article stated no more than the expectation of the publishers that the police would look into the question. However, if I am wrong, the mere fact that it is asserted to readers that a person is under police investigation, or indeed has been charged with a criminal offence, is not defamatory.[83] The mere expectation that a person may be investigated in relation to an alleged offence as a general rule would not convey guilt, or indeed any defamatory reasoning. However, that is only a general rule, and the wording may be such that it imputes that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person arrested has committed the offence.
324 However, if I am wrong in my conclusions, I am satisfied that the defendants have established the truth of the imputation pleaded. Ms Li stated that she met the conman Williams a matter of days after the first article and that she had considerable contact with him thereafter. Her daughter in her evidence said that for a period of some two to three months from June 2003, she and her mother spent up to five days a week at his home and often they would spend all day there. The evidence revealed, and there was no dispute, that Williams was a conman and that he had attempted to blackmail both a former member of Parliament and a senior barrister. In evidence, Ms Li denied that she told Williams anything about the senior barrister but she admitted telling him about the former politician. In the taped conversations between Ms Li and Williams, Ms Li claims to have had a sexual relationship with the politician and was recorded as saying that she never charged extra. For the reasons already stated, I am satisfied that she did hear both recordings when Mr Moor requested her to listen to them, and admitted that her voice was recorded on the tape in respect to both conversations. Ms Li gave evidence that she did not have any sexual relationship with or provide any sexual services to the former politician or the senior lawyer. The authenticity of the tape recording is questionable, but I accept the evidence of Mr Garde that some segments are uninterrupted and, in my opinion, some parts of the recordings provide evidence upon which the Court can rely. The questions arise as to why Ms Li was continuing to have discussions with Williams, especially after Coadys, the solicitors, ceased to act for her and, secondly, and more importantly, why was she providing him with information in respect to the sexual services she admitted providing to the two men concerned? The solicitors, Coadys, ceased to act for Ms Li some time in July 2003. By this time, Ms Li had formed the view that she was not proposing to issue a writ for defamation at that time. Nevertheless, she continued to see Williams and provide him with substantial information. Part of the information related to the two men concerned. In mid to late October and shortly before Williams died, he attempted to blackmail both men. In order to do that, he needed information from Ms Li and it is clear from the recorded conversations provided to Mr Moor by Williams that he was seeking to gather information from her in a leading way.
325 In my opinion, that evidence proves the allegation, if it is conveyed by the article, that Ms Li had conducted herself in such a way that there were reasonable grounds for a police investigation into whether she was involved in either a blackmail attempt or in making false allegations against a Federal politician and a Melbourne barrister. That is not to say that the evidence establishes that she did. The question is whether there were reasonable grounds for an investigation. In my opinion, the evidence establishes that. The defence of truth to that imputation is made out, if the imputation is conveyed in the article and if it is defamatory of Ms Li.
Conclusions - Liability
(i) Ms Li's Claims
326 In my opinion, the defendants have established the defence of justification to the defamatory imputations conveyed in each of the eight articles concerning Ms Li being the subject of the causes of action in libel. It follows that Ms Li's claims must fail.
(ii) The Company's Claims
327 If the company had proven that there were imputations which reflected upon its business or trading reputation and were defamatory of its business or trading reputation, the conduct concerned was that of Ms Li. It follows, in my opinion, the defendants having proven the defence of justification in relation to Ms Li's activities, that the claims by the company that it was defamed in four articles must fail.
(iii) The Polly Peck Defence of Justification
328 In paragraph 31 the defendants have pleaded what is known as a Polly Peck defence.[84]
329 The Court having found that the defendants have proven their defence of justification, it is unnecessary to consider this defence. It was pleaded that the first front page headline and the first article, when read together, and the third, fourth and fifth articles meant, or were understood to mean, that Ms Li was operating an illegal brothel and had defrauded the health insurance system by providing fake medical receipts for her patients to enable them to claim the cost of sexual services and Chinese herbs, which were otherwise not claimable, and that in those meanings the articles were true in substance and in fact. It is noted the defence was pleaded in respect to four articles.
330 In Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic,[85] I discussed the Polly Peck defence. I was of the opinion that such a defence was available in some defamation cases, but it would be a rare defence. The defence is available where a plaintiff fails to properly plead the alleged false imputations or seeks to confine the case, ignoring the real sting of the words complained of when read in context. As I said:[86]
"Common sense and justice demand that the defendant be permitted to plead the true imputation conveyed by the words complained of and in that meaning prove that they are true and correct."
331 In my opinion, the defence is not open in this proceeding. The two broad imputations pleaded by the defendants were already covered by the imputations pleaded by the plaintiffs. In those circumstances, the defence is not open. In any event, the imputations relied upon by the plaintiffs, which are the same as pleaded in the purported defence, have been proven as true.
(iv) Defence of Fair Comment
332 The defendants also relied upon the defence of fair comment, relying upon the rolled up plea. Paragraph 32 of the amended defence pleaded that "in so far as the articles consist of statements of fact, the same are true in substance and in fact and, in so far as the same consist of expressions of opinion the same are fair comment upon a matter of public interest."
333 Again, in light of my findings in respect to the defence of justification, it is unnecessary to consider whether this defence is made out.
334 Defendants' counsel did not in final submissions address the Court on this defence. In opening their case, the defendants' counsel did refer to the fact that there was the alternative defence of fair comment and that the defendants would rely upon it if the Court came to the view that the defamatory imputations established by the plaintiffs were in the nature of comment rather than a statement of fact. However, there is no doubt as a matter of law that if the defamatory imputation relied upon by the plaintiff is an assertion of fact, then the defence does not apply. Sometimes, to draw a distinction between an assertion of fact and an expression of opinion is difficult.
335 In my opinion, any defence based upon fair comment must fail. Most of the defamatory imputations in each of the articles are assertions of fact and not comment. The defence fails at the outset.
Damages
336 In light of my decision that the defendants have proven the defence of justification, the proceeding must be dismissed and it is unnecessary to say anything about the question of damages. However, as this proceeding may go further and the issue of damages was the subject of evidence and submissions, it is appropriate to make a number of observations about damages.
337 In this proceeding, Ms Li seeks general damages including aggravated and exemplary damages, and also special damages, namely, pecuniary loss. In the case of Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic,[87] I discussed the principles concerning damages in a libel case. I said:[88]
"In a libel case, general damages are presumed to be the natural or probable consequence of a defamatory publication. The damages need not be proven by direct evidence but in most cases evidence is called in relation to general damages. The damages will be recovered where the words are defamatory of the plaintiff thereby impairing his or her reputation. There are any number of factors which can be taken into account in determining damages. The two main objects of damages in a libel case are, first, as a vindication of the reputation in the minds of those who know the plaintiff or know of her and secondly, for self hurt, that is, the distress, upset and indignation. There are many factors relevant to the issue and a convenient summary is found in Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome [1972] UKHL 3; [1972] AC 1027 at 1070-1. The list is not exhaustive. These damages are compensatory. However the Court may augment compensatory damages by awarding aggravated damages."
338 There are a number of difficulties facing the Court in making any meaningful determination of general damages in this proceeding. This is so because it is difficult to make an assessment where the Court is strongly of the view that the Ms Li's causes of action must fail. The quantum of damages will depend upon many factors, one of which is the particular defamatory imputations which have not been proven true. It is impossible, in my view, for the Court to make any meaningful assessment for that reason. However, the Court is in a position to make a number of observations concerning the evidence.
339 I am satisfied that Ms Li was very upset by the publication of the articles and what might be described as the newspaper's campaign against her. I am also satisfied on her evidence, and the evidence of psychiatrist Dr Paul Kornan, that she has suffered an adjustment disorder with features of anxiety and depression. Dr Kornan was of the view that now, because of the sequence of events, namely, the publications and the present proceeding, there are indications of Ms Li suffering from a major depression. If, in fact, the defendants had failed to prove truth, I have little doubt that most of these features of her mental health could be sheeted home to the publication of the articles. However, I do not accept the evidence that she attempted to commit suicide. Evidence was given by Ms Li, her daughter and also a friend, Ms Heatley. The evidence was contradictory, inconsistent, vague and uncertain. It also depended upon believing Ms Li. Even on the balance of probabilities, I would not be prepared to find that as a result of the publication of these articles, she attempted to commit suicide. I accept Dr Kornan's view that once these proceedings are over, and assuming that Ms Li had succeeded, her mental state would have improved markedly and would gradually subside over a period of some 18 months.
340 Another problem with assessing general damages is the way in which Ms Li has conducted her case. The first two causes of action concern articles published on the same day and in the same newspaper. Articles 4 and 5 were also published in the same newspaper on the one day. Articles 6 and 7 were also published on the same day. The articles published on the same day were connected, each referred to the other article published that day, and each repeated similar facts and imputations.
341 For reasons which I have already stated, in my view, the plaintiffs should not have pleaded separate causes of action in respect to the articles which appeared in the one edition of the newspaper because they were clearly interconnected and, secondly, and more importantly, the defamatory imputations in each article were practically the same. In my opinion, the two articles should have constituted one cause of action. However, no objection was taken by the defendants to the way the case was pleaded and presented, and accordingly the Court must approach the issue of damages on the basis of eight separate causes of action. In my opinion, the Court would be bound to award a separate sum of general damages for each of the publications. However, in my opinion, in so far as it is necessary to determine a sum for a second article published on the same day and connected with the first article, the amount of damages for the second article would by considerably less than for the first article. The amount of general damages should be assessed on the first article. Because there were similar defamatory imputations made in the second article, the award of damages for the later article would be substantially less. It is the first article which caused the initial hurt, distress and upset, and the later article aggravated that head of damage. The Court should approach the issue on a global approach in respect to the two articles. In much the same way as a tribunal of fact is invited to consider various heads of damage in a personal injury case, the Court should total the damages, stand back and pose the question whether the total amount is reasonable, in all the circumstances, to both the plaintiff and the defendant. In my view, that is an appropriate course to follow in a case such as the present in respect to the award of damages for two articles in the one newspaper. There is clear overlap between the award of damages in respect to each article and this approach would achieve a just result for both parties.
342 Depending upon whatever findings are made, there may be grounds for awarding aggravated damages because of the continued repetition of much the same defamatory words over a long period of time. I suspect that when the proceeding was issued solely by the company, a view was formed by the defendants that Ms Li was not prepared to sue. But, having said that, this would not meet a head of aggravated damages based upon the repeated publication of the same defamatory imputations.
343 If the defendants had not proven justification, in my opinion Ms Li would be entitled to general damages, including aggravated damages, in the order of $250,000 as a global sum for general damages for the eight separate causes of action. If, however, the defendants partially justified the imputations but did not establish truth to all, then the amount of damages would be less. However, it is impossible to make any meaningful decision or observation because it depends upon the particular imputation which was not proven truthful. Partial justification would result in a lesser sum of damages. Indeed, depending upon what defamatory imputations were proven as true, if the more grave and serious defamatory imputations were established as true, then success by Ms Li in relation to less grave imputations may result in a very small sum of damages.
344 In Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd,[89] the plaintiff, a well-known professional soccer player and goalkeeper, was the subject of an article alleging that he accepted bribes to fix the result of games. There was clear evidence that he entered into corrupt agreements but there was no evidence that in fact he took steps in a game to throw a match. The House of Lords held that as a result of the clear evidence that he had entered into corrupt agreements, he had no reputation and, accordingly, although it was not proven that he had in fact indulged in suspect play during games, the appropriate award of damages was nominal, namely, [sterling]1. Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:[90]
"The tort of defamation protects those whose reputations have been unlawfully injured. It affords little or no protection to those who have, or deserve to have, no reputation deserving of legal protection. Until 9 November 1994 when the newspaper published its first articles about him, the appellant's public reputation was unblemished. But he had in fact acted in a way in which no decent or honest footballer would act and in a way which could, if not exposed and stamped on, undermine the integrity of the game which earns the loyalty and support of millions. Even if the newspaper had published no more than what, on my interpretation of the jury's verdict, it was entitled to have published, the appellant would have been shown to have acted in a way which any right thinking person would unequivocally condemn. It would be an affront to justice if a court of law were to award substantial damages to a man shown to have acted in such flagrant breach of his legal and moral obligations."
(Emphasis added).
345 For example, in the present case, if the plaintiff had succeeded on one imputation which had not been proven true, namely, that she had engaged in sexual intercourse for reward, as was alleged to have been conveyed by the first, fourth and fifth articles, and it having been proven that she had provided sexual services to her clients and provided fake receipts, in my opinion an award of damages would be no more than nominal, namely, $10. However, it is difficult to make any worthwhile observations concerning this aspect of the case and I say no more in respect to compensatory damages.
346 If the defendants had failed to prove the truth of any of the more serious defamatory imputations, then in my view, there would be a strong case for an award of exemplary damages based on the repetition of the particular defamatory imputation over a long period of time.
Special Damages - Alleged Pecuniary Loss
347 The plaintiffs claimed that the publication of the articles caused each pecuniary loss. The inadequate pleading and the presentation of the plaintiffs' cases in respect to the alleged pecuniary loss raised a number of difficulties for the plaintiffs.
348 The Court expects and requires that the best evidence be adduced to prove pecuniary loss. Further, claims for pecuniary loss must be properly pleaded with particulars. As earlier observed, the particulars in this case were inadequate. The Court drew plaintiffs' counsel's attention to the inadequacy and required him to prepare and file written particulars of the special damages claim. The new particulars, whilst providing some information, were also totally inadequate. It was apparent in the first week of the trial during Ms Li's evidence that her evidence on the issue at that time was inadequate and vague. The Court reminded plaintiffs' counsel a number of times that the Court expected the best evidence available. The primary source of the best evidence was Ms Li. She conducted the businesses and she stated she kept records. The law has always required that where a claim is made for pecuniary loss arising from the commission of a tort, the claim must be properly pleaded and strictly proven.
349 At the outset, it is important to emphasise that the plaintiffs claimed special damages for loss of income. The case was not pleaded or presented on the basis that the plaintiffs suffered general damages resulting from a decline in their businesses due to the publication of the defamatory articles. Such losses can be claimed as general damages. See Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd.[91] Nevertheless, if a claim was made for loss of custom as part of the claim for general damages, in my opinion it would be necessary for the plaintiff to give particulars or plead in a way which forwarned the defendant that such a claim was being made. Rules 13.07 and 13.10 of the Rules of Court[92] require the provision of particulars.
350 The nature of the pleading, the necessity for particularity in a claim for pecuniary loss and proof of same were stated by Bowen LJ in Ratcliffe v Evans,[93] where his Lordship, speaking for the Court, said:
"In all actions accordingly on the case where the damage actually done is the gist of the action, the character of the acts themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which these acts are done, must regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which the damage done ought to be stated and proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry. The rule to be laid down with regard to malicious falsehoods affecting property or trade is only an instance of the doctrines of good sense applicable to all that branch of actions on the case to which the class under discussion belongs."
(Emphasis added).
351 His Lordship's observations were in respect to a malicious falsehood claim, but in my respectful opinion, his Lordship's observations apply generally and in respect to the present proceeding.
352 The claim for pecuniary loss was not properly pleaded. When the writ was issued in the name of the company only, it was asserted that it had been seriously injured in its credit and reputation and had suffered and would continue to suffer loss and damage. No particulars were given of any claim for economic loss, although it may have been inferred that since it was a trading company, its loss would have been of a pecuniary nature. In the amended statement of claim delivered after Ms Li was joined as a party, it was asserted that she had suffered loss and damage and the particulars stated that she had suffered "significant loss of custom, particulars of which shall be provided in due course." The same allegation was made in respect to the company being injured in its trading reputation and it was asserted that it had suffered significant loss of custom. No particulars were in fact supplied. No criticism can be levelled at the defendants' advisers because they were not obliged to require the plaintiffs to carefully consider a claim for special damages. The point was made by Slade J in Longdon-Griffiths v Smith,[94] where his Lordship said:
"I agree that where no special damages are claimed the defendant is well advised to let sleeping dogs lie, and he can hardly be expected to ask for particulars of the claim for special damage where none is alleged."
353 It would be a matter of judgment for the defendant and its adviser as to whether or not it should agitate the issue.
354 In the further amended statement of claim filed on 1 March 2006 pursuant to leave granted by Harper J on 6 February 2006, the particulars subjoined to paragraph 126, which dealt with the allegation that Ms Li had suffered damage, were amended to state:
"(b) As a result of the publication of the articles the first plaintiff has suffered significant loss of custom and economic loss, full particulars of which are contained in an expert report of Brian Jones dated 21st December 2005 filed herein."
355 There was a similar claim made on behalf of the second plaintiff. This is not a proper way to give particulars of a claim for lost income and pecuniary loss. The Court on the first day of the trial informed plaintiffs' counsel that the particulars were inappropriate and required the filing of particulars. The following day, Mr Selimi produced a document which claimed a total "estimated economic loss" of $4,740,616. There were eight heads of claim identified. Again, reference was made to the report of Brian Jones. The Court emphasises once again that this is not the proper way to particularise a claim for loss of income. By failing to give proper thought and attention to this part of the claim, and relying upon a report which, in my view, was inadequate, vague and largely inadmissible, the plaintiffs' claims for economic loss were based upon inadequate evidence, speculation and evidence of doubtful authenticity and validity. When he produced the revised particulars, Mr Selimi was asked to identify which particular plaintiff was making which particular claim in respect to the various heads of economic loss. He did so, but later changed the party claiming some of the heads of loss.
356 The pleading of the claim should not have been difficult and full particulars should have been given. It would have focussed the minds of the plaintiffs and their advisers as to how their claims should be proven. The general rule relating to the measure of damages and their assessment was stated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co,[95] where his Lordship defined the measure of damages as:
"That sum of money which would put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation."
357 That dictum has been often quoted, always with approval, and applies to the measure of damages in both tort and contract. It has been followed in Australia.[96]
358 Applying that formula, it would not have been difficult to plead and present a case, if in fact any economic loss had been suffered. It would have been a fairly simple exercise to prove the loss, provided, of course, there was evidence of substance based upon primary source materials as to the income derived by the business and the downturn in income after the publication of the defamatory articles. It would not have been difficult, if it was the fact, that the publication of the defamatory articles caused a loss or downturn in custom. Production of satisfactory documents relating to past income up to the date of the first publication would have demonstrated the capacity of the business to derive income, and production of the primary documents recording the trading activities of both plaintiffs thereafter would have revealed, if it be true, a loss of custom which could be calculated with some degree of certainty. The application of the assessment formula requires the Court to consider what would have been the position if the tort had not been committed, and to compare it with what actually did happen after the commission of the tort. The hypothetical situation is compared with the actual situation.
359 In the first few days of the trial, the Court raised the question of who was conducting the Chinese medical practice. At that time, the evidence was that the company was conducting the business and employing Ms Li on a salary. Ms Li was the sole director and shareholder of the company. The company was registered on 14 June 2001. The quarterly Business Activity Statements and the company tax returns for the period from 1 July 2001 through to the present revealed that the company purported to conduct the Chinese natural therapy business, which included the sale of Forever Young capsules. On the other hand, the evidence revealed that the business name known as C.N.T. Chinese Natural Therapy, was first registered on 26 September 1996 and was continuing as a business up until 26 September 2005. The proprietor of the business was Ms Abbie Li, the first plaintiff. No documents were produced relating to the company or its acquisition of the business after it was registered. On the other hand, some of the incomplete and very rough documents produced by the accountant, Mr Dunstan, who was the accountant for both plaintiffs during the relevant period, tended to support the view that the company was operating the business. This was despite the fact that there had been a business name registration and that the name on the door of Ms Li's premises in Collins Street was not the company but the description "C.N.T. Chinese Natural Therapy."
360 The Court drew attention to the provisions of the Chinese Medicine Registration Act 2000. Part 2, which came into operation on 1 January 2002, concerned registration. A natural person could apply for registration as a Chinese herbal medicine practitioner and an acupuncturist. There is nothing in the Act which enabled a company to be so registered. The evidence established that Ms Li was registered in the year 2002. Part 5, which also came into operation on 1 January 2002, deals with offences and any unregistered person, which would include a company, who took or used the title of a registered Chinese medicine practitioner committed a criminal act. I have earlier discussed the potential liability of the company Forever Young under the Act. The problems concerning the company conducting the business were pointed out by the Court to counsel for the plaintiffs, who then informed the Court that the claims for economic loss would be made by Ms Li, and not the company, in relation to the conduct of the Chinese therapy medical practice. This was despite the fact that the Business Activity Statements, the tax returns and the few accounts that were tendered showed that the company operated the business from 1 July 2001 to the year 2005. In addition, the receipts given to patients contained a stamp which showed that it was the company that had received the money for services rendered and had provided the receipt. Mr Selimi then informed the Court that the company was no longer making the claims for lost income of the Chinese natural therapy business and that Ms Li was making the claims. He informed the Court the accountant, Mr Jones, was preparing a supplementary report.
361 This change created difficulties for the plaintiffs. What the plaintiffs sought to do was to undo what in fact had occurred, and to attempt to re-write the history between 1 July 2001 to 2005 in respect to the conduct of the business operated at the Collins Street premises.
362 When Ms Li gave evidence, no attempt was made to adduce documentary evidence of day to day accounts of the business activities. She was cross-examined about the lack of primary accounting documents. The Court reminded her counsel of the necessity of proper proofs. When criticisms were first made by the Court with respect to the inadequate evidence being called in relation to the financial position of the business, the Court was informed that the accountant, Mr Dunstan, was not going to be called as a witness. The tax returns and Business Activity Statements for the years 2002-2004 were not lodged until 2005. Apparently they were lodged by Mr Dunstan. Ms Li, in answer to a number of probing questions as to what records she had kept and why the documents were lodged so late, stated that it was the fault of Mr Dunstan. Ms Li herself did not produce any documents relating to the financial conduct of the business. She stated that she had kept daily sheets of the business activities but that she had handed them to the conman Williams. They had disappeared. Some documents from Mr Dunstan's file were made available to Mr Jones. They are copies of summaries prepared by Ms Li and some draft accounts prepared by Mr Dunstan. These documents were made available to Mr Jones when he prepared his economic loss report in December 2005. No mention is made of them in his first report. Mr Jones stated that he did not rely on them. He said that he relied on the copy of taxation returns, many of which were prepared and lodged well after the defamatory articles were published. The documents are referred to in his supplementary report, which was delivered in the course of the trial. The documents were not discovered and were made available to the defendants' lawyers only after the proceeding had commenced. Ms Schoff of counsel, for the defendants, informed the Court that her instructing solicitors had been chasing primary documents for a very long period of time, and the only documents that were eventually produced were those contained in the supplementary report of Mr Jones produced in the course of the trial. To say the least, the documents are very rough and ready and do not provide a very adequate foundation for a claim for loss of income or business loss. The reason why Mr Dunstan did not lodge the documents until the year 2005 was not explored in evidence and appeared to relate to some personal matter which was not identified.
363 Overall, the Court was left in a position where there was little evidence produced, and the evidence that was produced raised more questions than it gave answers, and provided little or no certainty.
364 During the course of her evidence, Ms Li produced a number of copy tax returns for herself and the company. Her personal tax returns were for the financial years ending 30 June 2000 through to 2004. The return for the year ending 30 June 2000 was lodged on 2 April 2001 by her accountant, Mark Dunstan. The return for the following year was lodged on 21 May 2004, and the returns for the two following years were lodged on 23 March 2005. The returns were evidently prepared and lodged by Mr Dunstan. The explanation for the delay was less than convincing. Ms Li stated that she did not want to go into the reasons, other than it was the fault of her accountant. At that stage it was envisaged that he would not be called as a witness. When he was called, he accepted that he failed to lodge the returns in time. The company return for 30 June 2002, which was its first year of operation, was lodged on 21 May 2004, as was the following year's return. The return for 30 June 2004 was lodged on 23 March 2005. Again, all company returns were prepared and lodged by Mr Dunstan and again, the explanation for the delay was the fault of the accountant.
365 The Business Activity Statements lodged in the business name of Cntchinese Natural Therapy (sic) were produced by Ms Li in her evidence. The Statement for the first period to 31 December 2000 was lodged on 12 December 2001. The Statements for the following two quarterly periods were also lodged on the same date. The one to September 2001 was lodged on 28 June 2005. The following quarterly Statements up to April 2004 were all lodged on the same date. The Statement to June 2004 was lodged on 3 August 2005. Again, blame for the delay was laid at the door of Mr Dunstan. Mr Dunstan gave evidence and did not suggest otherwise. It is noted that the Business Activity Statements were lodged in the name of Cntchinese Natural Therapy. Yet it is clear from both the company returns and Ms Li's personal tax returns that in the period from mid-2001, the company was conducting the Chinese natural therapy business. The evidence of Mr Dunstan was less than satisfactory. He was vague. He could not explain why certain documents were not produced. He appeared to work off very rough summaries of the business activities prepared by Ms Li. He did not produce any company documents relating to its business activities. He produced what were rough and ready draft profit and loss statements and the company's copy tax returns. Ms Li provided him with periodic summaries of the business activities. Mr Dunstan did not produce any proper company accounts. There appeared to be real uncertainty as to whether it was the company or Ms Li who was conducting the business during the relevant period. The copy tax returns, the receipt books and the summaries prepared by Ms Li led to the conclusion that it was the company, and this conclusion was supported by the evidence of Mr Dunstan and the early evidence of Ms Li. On the other hand, the Business Activity Statements suggested otherwise.
366 Ms Li did not produce any other documentation concerning the income derived by her business of Chinese Natural Therapy and the sale of the Forever Young capsules. She was cross-examined about the lack of documentation. She said that she had daily sheets recording the financial transactions of the business, which she had handed over to Mr Williams, and that these had disappeared.
367 The bundle of documents which had not been discovered, and which had been provided to Mr Jones in December 2005 and revealed in his supplementary report, was tendered in evidence. The documents contain a number of what could be described as rough and ready draft profit and loss statements of the business prepared by Mr Dunstan, which were provided to the plaintiffs' former solicitors on or about 12 April 2005 but not discovered. They comprised draft profit and loss accounts for the financial years ending June 2002, 2003 and 2004. Behind each draft profit and loss statement was a summary of the receipts and expenses of the business in the handwriting of Ms Li, the subject matter of each transaction being in English and Chinese. It was these summaries prepared by Ms Li which formed the basis of the rough and ready profit and loss statements. They in turn were used as the source material for the taxation returns which were returned many years after the event, and well after the first publication.
368 Ms Li's evidence as to her financial position was unsatisfactory and, bearing in mind her overall lack of credibility, must be viewed with enormous suspicion in relation to any value that can be placed upon it. Her evidence as to the amount that she earned from her job at the Hyatt Hotel in more recent times was also vague. She asserted that she cleared about $1,000 a week. Mr Dunstan's evidence was also somewhat vague. No proper accounts for either the business or the company were produced. Despite the fact that a company was apparently operating the business, there were no company accounts and no attempts to produce any annual returns or any records of any annual meetings of the company. Ms Li was not able to enlighten the Court as to whether any such accounts existed, or had ever existed, or whether any annual meetings took place. It is noted from the company search that annual returns were lodged, but apparently late. Despite the fact that it appeared that the company took over the business some time in mid 2001, no documents evidencing any transfer of the business were produced. The question was raised with Mr Dunstan. No documents were forthcoming. Mr Dunstan was unable to enlighten the Court either as to these important questions or as to the preparation and adoption of proper accounts for either business. The evidence was left in an entirely unsatisfactory state.
369 In my opinion, it is impossible for the Court to determine with any degree of certainty whether there had been any loss of income by either Ms Li or the company after the publication of the articles. The appointments book revealed that business appeared to fall off for the balance of the year 2003 after the publication of the first article. The three women who had been working in the premises did not work after the publication of the first article. There were no other source materials available. Ms Li did not produce any receipt books. However, there is some evidence to suggest that business did fall away, although to what extent cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty. Of course, having found that the assertion that she was conducting a brothel was established, it is not surprising that the three women disappeared and that business dropped off. Reference to the appointments book up to the publication of the first article on 26 May 2003, showed that in the preceding month the business was busy. As earlier stated, it would not have been a difficult exercise to prove, if it was the fact, that the publication of the articles caused a drop in the income of the business. Production of reliable accounts from before and after the first publication, and deposed to as being accurate and truthful by Ms Li, would have been a basis for establishing a loss. No documents were forthcoming. The evidence that was produced could only be described as extremely doubtful, incomplete and uncertain. It did not need an expert witness to prove the loss.
370 The evidence of Mr Jones as an expert was also unsatisfactory. If he did read the code of conduct prescribed by Order 44 of the Rules of this Court in respect to the evidence of an expert, he did not understand the code. He asserted in his first report that he understood his duty to the Court. I do not accept that he did so understand.
371 The first exercise that Mr Jones performed in his revised report was to determine the loss of income of the Chinese medical practice carried on by Ms Li. He determined the loss of profit from 1 July 2003 to 31 December 2005 at a figure of $94,853. His evidence was not expert evidence. That is not to say that a court may not be assisted by an accountant preparing a summary of the source material to determine the levels of income on an annual basis. The tribunal of fact is usually assisted by an accountant preparing a summary of the source material. However, it is not expert evidence. It is a summary to assist the tribunal of fact and to avoid the time spent by the tribunal of fact in calculating the loss from the proven source material itself.[97] However, a summary has no evidentiary value if the source material is not tendered in evidence. The source material must provide an accurate basis for the summary. What Mr Jones did was to project the business income at the end of the financial year 30 June 2003 based upon the growth over the previous four years' trading. In order to ascertain the previous four years' trading, he treated the business, which was at that time conducted by the company, as being conducted by Ms Li because of the problems with the Act. He determined that there had been a 49% growth over this four year period and he then projected an expected business income increase of 49% for the year 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. His approach was fallacious. It was nonsense. He then added another substantial increase from the year 2004 to 2005, and then capped the amount for the following two years. His exercise was fallacious, had no basis in logic and was pure speculation. Assuming that one could place any reliance upon the financial figures that were produced by Ms Li and Mr Dunstan, and indeed they were scanty, incomplete and uncertain, there is no way that one could add from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 an anticipated increase of 49% based on the past trading. I reject his evidence. An exercise could be carried out but the uncertainty of the basic figures makes it extremely difficult to come up with any figure that would satisfy any test of certainty. In addition, there is the problem of who, in fact, was deriving the income. The fact was it was the company. It would be contrary to law to permit it to claim a loss, taking into account that it had no legal right to conduct a business of Chinese natural therapy.
372 Mr Selimi finally, and somewhat desperately, submitted that Ms Li would be entitled to loss of income based upon the fact that she was receiving $36,400 gross salary from the company during the relevant period. However, I am not satisfied that there is any evidence that she received less than that thereafter. Indeed, her evidence was that when she was working at the Hyatt she took home about $1,000 a week.
373 Mr Jones in his report then turned to the loss of business value. Again, a problem arises with respect to valuing the business. The Chinese natural therapy business was in fact conducted by the company during the relevant period. This was contrary to law. Mr Jones carried out an exercise in which he sought to determine the future maintainable profits on an annual basis of what were described as the "personal services" provided by the business and the "associated herbal tonic sales", which apparently were the Forever Young capsules. Having done that, he then multiplied that figure by three. The case as presented was that the impact of the defamatory articles was such that it destroyed the Chinese natural therapy business, including the business selling the Forever Young capsules. One method to determine the loss suffered is to value the business as a going concern for the purposes of sale to a willing but not over-anxious purchaser. In valuing the business as a going concern, one method is to take the annual future maintainable profits and adjust for any particular extraordinary items and then determine an appropriate multiplier to reach the value of the business. The multiplier must be the subject of expert evidence. I was not persuaded that Mr Jones was an expert in the area of valuing Chinese natural therapy businesses or indeed similar types of businesses. Mr Jones frankly admitted that the choice of the multiplier of three was based upon a general rule of thumb across businesses. He was unable to provide an appropriate multiplier based upon any study of the sale of Chinese medical therapy businesses. His so-called expert evidence in relation to the multiplier I do not accept. I am not persuaded that he was an expert in that area. This claim has real problems, again, because the company was operating the business. I am by no means persuaded that there was any goodwill. Indeed, it may be said that the business was very personal, in that it depended upon Ms Li's ability as a Chinese medical therapist and masseuse, and that it did not have any goodwill at all. There was no evidence as to the number of Chinese medical therapist businesses in this State. Indeed, they are clearly of recent establishment in this State and whether there is any real market for the businesses was not established. In my opinion, the plaintiffs have failed to prove what value should be put on the loss of the business. In any event, the business was conducted by the company. As a matter of law it was not permitted to conduct the business.
374 Mr Jones also sought to carry out an exercise to determine the loss on a book that had been published by Ms Li. The evidence revealed that she had published a book called Eating for Life. I am by no means persuaded that she was ever able to sell these books. Indeed, the evidence was that she gave many of them away. Reference to the book shows a number of English errors which, quite frankly, made it difficult to understand what the book was about. I am not persuaded by any of the evidence that there was a market for this book. Accordingly, any such claim for loss of profit from the sale of that book has not been proven. Mr Jones' evidence was pure speculation. He was not an expert in the field of the sale of books. Ms Li's evidence relating to the book was vague and uncertain.
375 Mr Jones then did an exercise on the publication of a second book. The evidence revealed that Ms Li, with the assistance of others, had drafted another book called Forever Young, Ancient Chinese Secrets for Eternal Youth. The manuscript had been prepared and was tendered in evidence. She evidently started work on the book in early 2003. She had contact with a publisher and some discussions took place. She was given a draft agreement by the publisher to consider and the stage was reached where negotiations had commenced but had not been finalised. The project was aborted as a result of the publication of the first article. The publisher, Mr David Tenebaum, gave evidence to the effect that he thought the book may have sold. He admitted that he had never published a similar book before. He stated that he expected the first print would be 3,000 books and that hopefully, over a number of years, they could be sold. If this had occurred, Ms Li would have received 10% of the sale price, which means she would have made approximately $3 per book. He thought that she may be involved in the direct selling of another print of 5,000 books. All this evidence was based upon hope and expectation. Mr Tenenbaum was a publisher and had been for some years, but had never published this type of book. Whether or not Ms Li's second book would have had any success was highly debatable. The Court notes that there are any number of books on the market promising all types of things about staying young and the effect of certain diets. Doing the best I can on what would be described as a hope and an expectation of future sales, if I had to assess an amount of damages in respect to this head of damage, I would assess it at $10,000.
376 A claim was also made for the production and distribution of the Forever Young capsules. This would have been a claim by the company. It manufactured the capsules and apparently sold them. Mr Jones did an exercise to show that he thought the company over a five year period would have earned a profit in the order of $218,602. His exercise was based on the fact that he thought the company could sell about 30,000 bottles of capsules. The problem with his exercise is that there is no credible evidence in the past to support future sales of such a quantity of pills. Again, this was an area where Ms Li could have given evidence, if indeed there was any evidence, as to the sales of the product in the past and whether there were any clients who were prepared to purchase the pills. There was some evidence that clients did purchase the capsules and that there were some repeat clients. But there was a complete absence of any reliable record of past sales. To talk about the future of the product in the absence of credible evidence of past sales is nothing more than pure speculation. Of course, to read the future is impossible. But in determining what the future may hold for a product, the history of the sales of the product provides a springboard to reach a conclusion. The evidence as to the past was absent. This claim would also fail.
377 A feature of Mr Jones' original report and later report concerned what he described as a head of damage being the loss of commercial opportunity to generate future income for a herbal tonic, namely, the capsules. He stated in his original report that an important part of the loss was connected with the trademark registration. He was of the view that a trademark registration would have protected the business from future potential competition, but would not have affected the pursuit of the commercial opportunity. In his first report he did an exercise and said that a loss related to the trademark registration. He reported that the collapse of the sales of the capsules allegedly caused by the publication of the defamatory articles resulted in a loss of $2,850,000. His exercise is flawed and his result is nonsense. He misunderstood the effect of a registered trademark. The registered trademark provides protection to a distinctive mark or device attached to or accompanying an article intended for sale, the purpose being to inform the world that it was manufactured or sold by a particular business. In other words, it is the means by which the product is advertised to the world. The phrase "Forever Young", as the evidence revealed, was already the subject of a registered trademark by others. The distinctive accompanying mark or device is what is protected. Mr Jones in his original report proceeded on the assumption that Ms Li did have a trademark and that it would contribute to the value of the "Forever Young" product. He proceeded on the assumption that there was no restriction to "Forever Young" selling the trademark and that it had value. He then valued the loss of the potential of the trademark over a period of five years and came up with a figure of $2,850,000. In his supplementary report, he noted that in fact that Ms Li did not have a registered trademark. Nevertheless, he did another exercise and came up with a figure of $1,000,093.11. His reasoning is flawed. It is based on pure speculation. He is not an expert in the area of valuing trademarks. He is not an expert in valuing the loss of the business which may have had a form of trademark. The fact is that the business could continue to sell the product in the way it was always sold, irrespective of whether the trademark was registered or not. There was no evidence that the publication of the articles caused a drop in sales. There was no evidence that the publication of the articles had any effect on a so-called trademark. I do not accept the evidence of Mr Jones. His evidence was also double dipping. His earlier exercise concerned the alleged loss of the business. Part of the business was the sale of the capsules. If there was a loss of that part of the business dealing with the sales of the capsules, the loss should be calculated as part of the loss of the business.
378 The defendants' solicitors engaged a chartered accountant, Mr Joe Dicks, who prepared a report dated 25 January 2007. He considered the original report of Mr Jones. He drew attention to the fact that when seeking to calculate the alleged loss of profits as a result of the publications, there was insufficient information to make a proper assessment. In respect to the alleged loss of business value, he drew attention to the fact that Mr Jones used a multiple of three and he questioned the methodology used. Mr Dicks concluded that the alleged loss on the publication of the first book by Ms Li was based upon insufficient evidence, and he was unable, on the evidence before him, to reach any conclusion as to the expected publication of the second edition. He again noted the lack of evidence in relation to the claim assessed by Mr Jones as to the production, sale and distribution of herbal tonic, and made a rough estimation that it could be $120,000. Of course, in the end, it is a matter for the Court based upon the evidence placed before it. He also noted the claim by Mr Jones concerning the value of the trademark and noted that neither Mr Jones nor he had the necessary expertise. I agree entirely with the criticisms made by Mr Dicks of the attempts by Mr Jones to prove any economic loss.
379 In conclusion, the presentation of the case on damages for economic loss was totally inadequate, lacking in evidence and based on speculation. It would not have been a difficult exercise to work out the loss of income, if there was any, and any loss of business value due to the publication of the defamatory articles. Other than the possibility of a loss on the sale of the second manuscript, and this is highly doubtful, it is difficult to determine what pecuniary loss was suffered as a result of the publication of the articles.
CONCLUSION
380 The defendants have established justification to the defamatory imputations in each of the articles the subject of the eight causes of actions brought by Ms Li. Accordingly, her claim must be dismissed. In my opinion, the second plaintiff, the company, was not defamed in its business or trading reputation and its claims must also fail. But if I am wrong in relation to that conclusion, I am satisfied that insofar as the business was conducted by Ms Li in the business name of Forever Young, and if the trading reputation of that business name was defamed by any of the four articles specified, the defendants have proven the truth of the imputations made on the basis that Ms Li was conducting the business, and the defamatory imputations established as true against her must also result in the claims brought by the company failing.
381 Subject to submissions by counsel, I propose to dismiss the proceeding. There will be judgment for the defendants. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
Attachment "A"
Attachment "B"
Attachment "C"
Attachment "D"
Attachment "E"
Attachment "F"
Attachment "G"
Attachment "H"
[1] See s.61(1)(a).
[2] See s.46(1) of the Act.
[3] [1982] HCA 4; (1982) 150 CLR 500.
[4] At 505.
[5] See Mirror Newspapers v Harrison [1982] HCA 50; 149 CLR 293 at 301.
[6] See Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at p.1240.
[7] [1835] EngR 38; (1835) 2 C M & R 156; 150 ER 67.
[8] 10th ed at para 3.29.
[9] [2003] HCA 50; (2003) 77 ALJR 1657 at para 187.
[10] Reader's Digest Services v Lamb, supra at p.505.
[11] [1837] EngR 852; (1837) 2 M & ROB 45; 174 ER 209.
[12] [1865] EngR 23; (1865) 4 F & F 225 at 228; [1865] EngR 23; 176 ER 541 at 542.
[14] At 413.
[15] [1976] 1 NSWLR 712 at 725.
[17] At 655 et seq.
[19] At [42] - [43].
[21] See Barclay v Cox [1968] VicRp 87; [1968] VR 664.
[22] [1937] HCA 74; (1937) 58 CLR 416.
[23] At p.420-1.
[24] [1824] EngR 253; (1824) 1 Bing 403 at 409; [1824] EngR 253; 130 ER 162 at 165.
[26] At p.79.
[28] At p.1142.
[29] See Polly Peck (Holdings) plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000.
[31] (1998) 193 CLR 519.
[32] [2003] VSCA 161; (2003) 9 VR 1.
[34] See South Hetton Coal v North Eastern News Association [1894] 1 QB 133.
[35] supra, at p.139.
[36] [1968] 2 QB 157 at 171.
[37] [2003] HCA 50; (2003) 77 ALJR 1657 at 1699.
[38] [1964] AC 234 at 258.
[39] [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1245.
[40] See Neville v Fine Arts Co [1897] 1 AC 68 at 72, and Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 at 771.
[41] At 106.
[42] [1960] 1 WLR 997 at 1,002.
[43] [1964] AC 234 at 283.
[44] [1973] 1 NSWLR 43 at 49.
[45] [1910] HCA 43; (1910) 11 CLR 63 at 77.
[46] [1995] UKHL 6; [1995] 2 AC 65.
[47] At p.69.
[48] At p.73.
[49] [1968] 2 QB 157 at 173.
[50] At 174.
[51] Supra at 74.
[52] [1982] HCA 50; (1982) 149 CLR 293.
[53] At 301.
[54] [1964] AC 234 at 285.
[56] 6th ed at p.409.
[57] [1972] 2 QB 169 at 175.
[58] (1865) 6 B and S 340; [1865] EngR 378; 122 ER 1221.
[61] At p.427.
[62] See Howden v Truth and Sportsman [1937] HCA 74; (1937) 58 CLR 416 at p.429 (Evatt J quoting with approval what was stated in Gatley on Libel and Slander, 2nd ed).
[63] Supra at p.75.
[64] See Masel v Financial Times Limited [1915] 3 KB 336. See also Cohen v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 916 at 919.
[65] [1945] HCA 51; (1945) 70 CLR 219 at 240.
[66] [1849] EngR 999; (1849) 4 Ex Ch 511.
[67] (1960) 104 CRL 476.
[68] At 479.
[69] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[70] At 362-3.
[71] See Smith v NSW Bar Association [1992] HCA 36; (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 268.
[72] See R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 at 724; and Edwards v R [1993] HCA 63; (1993) 178 CLR 193.
[73] Supra at 210.
[74] See 3rd ed vol 2 p.95.
[75] op cit at 119.
[76] At 120.
[78] At 319.
[79] (1905) 20 Cox Cr R.
[80] At 852.
[81] At 161.
[82] For example, Phipson on Evidence, 10th ed at para 360; Cross on Evidence, 5th Australian ed at para 33435.
[83] Mirror Newspapers Limited v Harrison [1982] HCA 50; (1982) 149 CLR 293.
[84] See Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 at 1032.
[85] [2003] VSCA 161; (2003) 9 VR 1 at 61 et seq.
[86] At 62.
[87] Supra at 76 et seq.
[88] At 76.
[89] [2002] UKHL 40; [2002] 1 WLR 3024.
[90] At 3036.
[92] See also the observations of Hunt J in respect to the New South Wales position in Bickel v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 474.
[93] [1892] 2 QB 524 at 532.
[94] [1950] 2 All ER 662 and 678.
[95] (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39.
[96] Butler v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1966] HCA 38; (1966) 114 CLR 185 at 191.
[97] See R v Mitchell [1971] VicRp 5; [1971] VR 46 and Smith v The Queen [1970] HCA 48; (1970) 44 ALJR 467 at 469.
Li & Anor
The Herald & Weekly Times Pty Ltd & Anor [2007] VSC 109
(1982) 150 CLR 500
(2003) 77 ALJR 1657
(1987) 10 NSWLR 651
(1937) 58 CLR 416
(1998) 193 CLR 519
(2003) 9 VR 1
(1910) 11 CLR 63
(1982) 149 CLR 293
(1945) 70 CLR 219
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1992) 176 CLR 256
(1993) 178 CLR 193
(1966) 114 CLR 185
(1970) 44 ALJR 467