Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board

The facts are that the appellants did not deliver the eggs in question to the Board. Instead they sold and delivered them to a person other than the Board and this was the act of conversion which gave rise to the action. In these circumstances the question arose as to the manner in which the damages should be assessed and this came before Little J. in the Supreme Court by way of special case. The Board's contention was that it was entitled to the full value of the eggs converted. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the Board's loss was represented by the difference between the price for which it would have sold the eggs had they been delivered to it by the appellants and the amount which in that event it would have had to pay to them.

It is obvious that in a particular case it may be difficult to determine these two amounts with precision but in the present case the parties have been able to agree upon the figures. The sum of £4,000 has been accepted as the value of the eggs and the amount for which they would have been sold by the Board had they been delivered to it and £1,100 has been accepted as being the difference between that amount of £4,000 and the amount which would, in that event, have been paid to the appellants out of what we will call the "pool".

Little J. upheld the Board's contention and from his decision this appeal is brought. His Honour's reasons began with the proposition that in an action of conversion the general rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the goods converted. There are, he pointed out, exceptions to that general rule, as where the defendant, as between himself and the plaintiff, has an interest in the thing converted. This exception, he thought, had no application to the present case. The appellants had no interest in the eggs. All that they had were claims for payment which were conditioned upon delivery of the eggs to the Board, a delivery which in fact had not been made. For these reasons his Honour applied what he described as the general rule and held that the Board was entitled to recover the full value of the eggs.

If this be correct, it would mean that the appellants would have to pay to the Board, by way of damages, the amount which the Board would have received had the eggs been delivered to and sold by it. The amount so paid would become part of the Board's funds and as such would be available to meet a proportion of its costs and to provide payments to other producers who were entitled to share in the "pool" but the appellants would not be entitled to receive any such payments since the eggs had not been delivered by them to the Board. It would follow that the Board would be in a better position financially than would have been the case had the appellants complied with the Act since it would have received the full value of the eggs, would have incurred no expense in handling and disposing of them and be under no obligation to make any payment for them. But such a result would not accord with the general principle upon which compensatory damages are assessed, whether in actions of contract or of tort. That principle is that the injured party should receive compensation in a sum which, so far as money can do so, will put him in the same position as he would have been in if the contract had been performed or the tort had not been committed: Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. [1] . And this principle is as much applicable to actions of conversion as it is to the case of other actionable wrongs. In most cases of conversion it is, of course, obvious that its application will result in the injured plaintiff recovering the full value of the property converted since that will usually represent the loss that he has sustained by the defendant's wrongful act. Hence the statement which appears so often in the books that the general rule is that the plaintiff in an action of conversion is entitled to recover the full value of the goods converted, but this statement should not be allowed to obscure the broad principle that damages are awarded by way of compensation. If the present case had been one in which the appellants had agreed to sell and deliver the eggs to the Board under a contract which had passed the property in them to the Board and, in breach of their contractual obligation, had failed to deliver the eggs and instead had converted them to their own use, the Board would not have been entitled to recover the full value of the eggs. Its loss would have been represented by the difference between that value and the price which it had agreed to pay and which it would have had to pay had the vendors carried out their contract: Chinery v. Viall [2] . Here there was no such contract. The case is one of compulsory acquisition. It is true that the appellants, by their wrongful act, put it out of their power to make delivery with the result that the Board came under no obligation to pay them but, to adapt the words of Bramwell B. in Chinery v. Viall [3] , it would be singular if the same act which saved the Board the price of the eggs should vest in it a right of action for their full value without deducting the price. The Board's loss must, in our opinion, be determined by considering what sum of money would be required to place it in the same position as it would have been in if the appellants had performed their statutory obligation. Had they done so, the Board would, on the figures agreed upon by the parties, have realized £4,000 by selling the eggs and out of that sum would have had to pay the appellants £2,900. Its loss resulting from the appellants' tortious act is therefore £1,100.

1. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25, at p. 39. 2. (1860) 5 H. & N. 288 [157 E.R. 1192]. 3. (1860) 5 H. & N., at p. 294 [157 E.R., at p. 1195].

For these reasons we would allow the appeal. In these circumstances the parties agree that we should set aside the order of the Supreme Court and in lieu thereof make an order in terms of the memorandum signed by counsel.

In my opinion this appeal should be allowed, notwithstanding that I am satisfied that in the circumstances the appellants are not entitled to any payment from the respondent for the eggs which they produced, which became the property of the respondent by vesting, and which they subsequently converted by sale to The Victoria Ltd. The only right to payment in respect of vested eggs is "payment in accordance with this Act" (Marketing of Primary Products Act 1958 Vict.), see s. 17, and nothing has occurred to give rise to any obligation on the part of the respondent to make any payment for the converted eggs.

The order appealed against would, however, entitle the respondent to damages for conversion considerably in excess of its actual loss for, had the eggs which were converted been delivered to it by the producers, the Marketing of Primary Products Act would have created an obligation upon the respondent to make substantial payments to the appellants and presumably to incur other expenses in relation to the eggs.

Damages should, I think, be assessed not on the basis of the value of the eggs at the time of the conversion but upon the actual loss sustained by the respondent because the appellants converted the respondent's eggs instead of delivering them in accordance with the Act.

There is no hard and fast rule that the value of the goods at the time of a conversion is always the measure of the damages to be assessed for the conversion. Often the application of such a rule would produce an obviously unjust result - for example, if goods converted by a defendant had since been recovered by the plaintiff-owner. The true rule is, I think, that stated by Bramwell B. in Chinery v. Viall [1] , viz. that the plaintiff is entitled to recover no more than the real damage he has sustained. Not only is the principle of that case applicable here, but the facts of the case afford an instructive application of the principle. Punishment for noncompliance with the Act is within the realm of the criminal, not the civil, law.

It having been agreed that, if the appeal were to be allowed, the damages to which the respondent is entitled are $1,283.33 as against the appellant company and $916.67 as against the other appellants, I would allow the appeal and direct that damages in those sums should be entered for the plaintiff in the action.