First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1

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First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1 (5 January 2026)

Last Updated: 7 January 2026

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1

File number(s):

NSD 2433 of 2025

Judgment of:

SHARIFF J

Date of judgment:

5 January 2026

Date of publication of reasons:

7 January 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - urgent ex parte application for freezing orders under r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) - consideration of applicable principles - consideration of suspicious, irregular and unusual explanations for the non-repayment of an acknowledged debt of USD $7.5 million - orders made

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2, Australian Consumer Law, s 18

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 7.32

Cases cited:

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Huang [2021] HCA 43; (2021) 273 CLR 429

EVP Opportunities Master Pty Ltd as trustee for The EVP Opportunities Master Fund v Strong Room Technology Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) (Administrators Appointed) [2025] FCA 548

Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319

UFC Enterprise Morley Pty Ltd v UFC Enterprise Northbridge Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1396

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:

Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance

Number of paragraphs:

31

Date of hearing:

5 January 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr D Ratnam

Solicitor for the Applicant:

HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

Solicitor for the Respondents:

The Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 2433 of 2025

BETWEEN:

FIRST CLASS SECURITIES LIMITED

Applicant

AND:

GLOBAL FUTURE HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 624 797 397

First Respondent

PARAGON FINANCE GROUP PTY LTD ACN 637 102 295

Second Respondent

MR ALANDE MUSTAFA SAFI

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SHARIFF J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JANUARY 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Upon the undertaking of the solicitor for the Applicant to pay any filing fees, leave be granted to the Applicant to file in Court:

(a) this Originating Application dated 29 December 2025;

(b) the affidavit of Linda Derkaca dated 29 December 2025, together with Exhibit LD-1 in support; and

(c) the affidavit of Neil Martin Wallman dated 29 December 2025

(together, Documents)

1. An order that the Originating Application dated 29 December 2025 be returnable and heard instanter as to the orders sought in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8.
2. An order that the time for service of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above be abridged to 12pm on 6 January 2026.
3. An order that service of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above and a sealed copy of these orders be effected by serving the Respondents via:

(a) mobile telephone numbers;

(i) 0402 755 582;

(ii) 0428 222 736; and

(iii) +971 562 088 088

(b) email addresses:

(i) [email protected];

(ii) [email protected];

(iii) [email protected];

(iv) [email protected];

(v) [email protected]; and

(vi) [email protected].

1. Pursuant to rule 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), until further order, and upon the Applicant giving the undertaking as to damages (which has been given), an order against the First Respondent, Second Respondent and Third Respondent in the form set out in Annexure A to these orders.
2. There be liberty to the parties to apply on 48 hours' notice.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant has made an urgent ex parte application for the making of freezing orders pursuant to r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules) against the first respondent (GFH), the second respondent (Paragon Finance) and the third respondent Mr Alande Mustafa Safi (Mr Safi). The application initially came before Longbottom J on 29 December 2025 and was stood over for hearing before me today as the Court's vacation duty judge.
2. In brief, the relevant facts, matters and circumstances that give rise to the application are as follows:

(a) the applicant is a company domiciled in Mauritius which provides brokerage services to fund managers and high net worth individuals worldwide;

(b) the relevant officers and employees of the applicant include Ms Linda Derkaca (director), Mr Tom Derkaca (employee) and Mr John Kazal (employee);

(c) Mr Kazal's role was to make recommendations and introduce investment opportunities to the applicant;

(d) GFH and Paragon Finance are both entities that promote themselves as providing private equity to major infrastructure and other high value projects including those located in Australia;

(e) Mr Safi is the sole director and a beneficial interest holder in each of GFH and Paragon Finance, and appears to be based in Dubai but promotes business opportunities for investments to be made in Australian infrastructure projects;

(f) Mr Kazal introduced Ms Derkaca to Mr Safi and thereafter Mr Safi identified a short-term investment opportunity involving a debt facility relating to an apparent infrastructure project referred to as the "South East Melbourne Airport Project landholding";

(g) the applicant and GFH entered into an Investment Agreement pursuant to which:

(i) the applicant agreed to invest a sum of up to USD $10 million in three tranches with the first tranche to be invested being USD $2.5 million, a further tranche to be invested of USD $2.5million and a final tranche to be invested of USD $5 million;

(ii) the guaranteed return on the first and second tranche invested was to be 55% equating to USD $2.75 million, and the guaranteed return on the third tranche was to be 30% equating to USD $1.5 million;

(iii) upon "maturity" of the agreement, GFH was required to repay the principal sum along with the agreed guaranteed return;

(iv) the term of the Investment Agreement was specified to be a period of 10 business banking days;

(h) in furtherance of the Investment Agreement, the applicant invested the first and second tranche totalling a sum of approximately USD $5 million, but did not proceed with making an investment as contemplated by the third tranche;

(i) the applicant claims that the investment had reached maturity such that the due date for repayment was 5 November 2025 and at that time GFH was obliged to repay the principal sum invested of USD $5 million together with the guaranteed return of USD $2.75 million, with the total amount owing from 5 November 2025 being USD $7.75 million;

(j) the applicant claims that:

(i) GFH acknowledged a debt of USD $7.75 million was owing and has repaid a sum of approximately USD $552,563, leaving a sum of USD $7,207,423.05 owing;

(ii) since early November 2025, GFH and Mr Safi have repeatedly represented that the outstanding debt has been repaid by way of purported bank transfers which have not eventuated, and have subsequently represented that the transfers were unsuccessful due to certain unidentified "compliance issues";

(iii) since late November 2025, GFH and Mr Safi have repeatedly assured the applicant that the outstanding debt would be repaid shortly in cash including by way of arrangements with third parties requiring the applicants to collect cash from unidentified individuals in various locations throughout Dubai and elsewhere;

(iv) by 9 December 2025, GFH and Mr Safi contended that the amount of the debt due is less than USD $7,207,423.05, by in effect "changing the goal posts" as to the makeup of the debt;

(v) despite these various assurances and the highly suspicious and irregular arrangements that have purported to be made for repayment, the outstanding debt has not in fact been paid.

1. In light of the above, the applicant claims that:

(a) it has a prima facie case against GFH for breach of contract, as well as a case against each of GFH, Paragon Finance and Mr Safi for misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law; and

(b) there is a danger that a prospective judgment of the Court could go unsatisfied because there is a risk or danger of the respondents' assets being dissipated.

1. For the following reasons, I have decided that the orders sought by the applicant should be made. As the matter is urgent, these reasons are necessarily brief.

2. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

1. As stated in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Huang [2021] HCA 43; (2021) 273 CLR 429 at [16]- [18] (Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ):

Rule 7.32, in Div 7.4 of the Rules, supplements s 23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act) and the Federal Court's implied power as a superior court, each of which confers power upon the Court to make such orders as are appropriate for the proper exercise of its statutorily conferred jurisdiction and powers. That relationship is emphasised by r 7.36, which provides that nothing in Div 7.4 diminishes the inherent, implied or statutory jurisdiction of the Court to make a freezing order or ancillary order.

The power conferred by r 7.32(1) is expressly subject to two limitations: first, the purpose of the order must be "the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process"; and secondly, the order must address that purpose "by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied". The first limitation corresponds with the established scope of the Federal Court's general powers to grant a freezing order, being the power to make such orders as the Court may determine to be appropriate to prevent the abuse or frustration of its process in relation to matters coming within its jurisdiction. Rule 7.32 states explicitly the requirement, stated by this Court in relation to the Federal Court's general powers to grant a freezing order, that the power must be exercised for the purpose for which it is conferred. Where the order is made in proceedings in which substantive relief is sought against the defendant, that purpose is "to prevent a defendant from disposing of his actual assets (including claims and expectancies) so as to frustrate the process of the court by depriving the plaintiff of the fruits of any judgment obtained in the action". More broadly, a freezing order is directed to dispositions "which are intended to frustrate, or have the necessary effect of frustrating, the plaintiff in his attempt to seek through the court a remedy for the obligation to which he claims the defendant is subject".

The second limitation, that an order made under r 7.32 must serve the specified purpose "by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied", also corresponds with the scope of the Federal Court's general powers to make a freezing order. Since Jackson v Sterling, it has been accepted in Australia, as a general proposition, that a freezing order could be granted if the circumstances are such that there is a danger of the defendant absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed from the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the plaintiff, if successful in obtaining a judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied. The

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