© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2001] WASC 87
Supreme Court of WA
2001-04-04
Mr J, Smith J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : FINESKY HOLDINGS PTY LTD -v- MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2001] WASC 87
Trespass and conversion - Damages - Exemplary damages - Limestone quarry - Encroachment into mining lease of plaintiff
Mining lease - Whether exclusive right may be claimed against the Crown
Mining lease - Stamp duty - Whether rights under mining lease before stamping - Whether prior consent of Minister a condition precedent
Mining lease - Whether no rights until lease registered - Mining Regulations 1981 (WA), reg 110
Mining lease - Minerals mined by third party - Whether lessee owns minerals so mined
Trespass - Interest - Interest under lease a profit a prendre - Whether an interest in the land - Whether grounding an action for trespass
Conversion - Nature of claim - Quarrying and removal of limestone - Whether rights of ownership in lessee
Representation - Misleading and deceptive conduct in course of trade or commerce - Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA), s 10 and s 77 - Whether authorisation for contractor to enter land misleading and deceptive conduct
Damages - Principles - Measure of - Removal of limestone from plaintiff's lease
Exemplary damages - Principles - Whether award appropriate - Whether disentitling conduct by plaintiff
Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA), s4, s 10, s 77
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18
Mining Act 1978 (WA), s 64, s 112
Mining Regulations 1981 (WA), reg 110
Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s 85(2)
Public Works Act 1902 (WA), s 112A
Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1990] FCA 55; (1990) 22 FCR 527
Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) [1988] HCA 16; (1988) 164 CLR 604
Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 53; (1982) 149 CLR 600
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Henry [1964] HCA 4; (1964) 114 CLR 322
Cousins v Wilson [1994] 1 NSWLR 463
DKLR Holding (No 2) v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510
Duke of Sutherland v Heathcote [1892] 1 Ch 475
Ellison v Vukicevic (1986) 7 NSWLR 104
Ex parte Henry; Re Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1964] HCA 4; [1963] NSWR 1079; (1964) 114 CLR 322
Hill v Tupper [1863] EngR 493; (1863) 2 H & C 121; 159 ER 51
Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6; (1995) 182 CLR 572
Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778
Mills v Stokman [1967] HCA 15; (1967) 116 CLR 61
Moreland Timber Co v Reid [1946] VicLawRp 35; [1946] VLR 237
Reid v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd [1946] HCA 48; (1946) 73 CLR 1
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1
1 ROBERTS-SMITH J: In 1996 the Western Australian Department of Transport ("DoT") was constructing a breakwater and boat harbour at Exmouth. The work had been contracted (under contract number E150) to a company by the name of Civcon Pty Ltd ("Civcon") which had been registered in December 1989 and the directors and shareholders of which were Mr Frank Simunovich and Mr William Maloney. The material for the breakwater was limestone which was being obtained from a quarry owned by the Western Australian government ("the quarry"). Not long into the project, Civcon complained it was experiencing difficulty in extracting limestone of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the contractual requirements. The Civcon representatives urged DoT to approve the extension of mining from the existing quarry site out to the north-west.
2 On 26 August 1996 that approval was given but on 13 September 1996 DoT terminated Civcon's appointment under the contract because of continuing dissatisfaction with Civcon's performance (and specifically because a creditor had filed a petition to wind up the company on 23 August) and on 18 October 1996 entered into a new contract (number E 166) with Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd ("Thiess") for completion of the harbour. Thiess in turn subcontracted the operation of the quarry to PMR Quarries Pty Ltd trading as WA Limestone ("WA Limestone").
3 As a result of losing the contract Civcon went into voluntary administration and eventually in October 1996 into liquidation.
4 Finesky Pty Ltd ("Finesky") was a shelf company registered on 31 January 1996. It was purchased by Simunovich and Maloney on 1 April 1996 and its registered office was transferred to 15 Park Lane, Bassendean (which was also Civcon's registered office). From 1 April 1996 the directors of Finesky were Simunovich and Maloney. Dexter John Carr became a director on 31 October 1997.
5 Broadly to the north-west of the quarry was a mining lease M08/6 over some 484 hectares which had been held by Alcoa of Australia ("Alcoa") since 1984.
6 On 9 December 1996 Finesky entered into a mining sublease 2H/967 with Alcoa ("the sublease") for 25 hectares of the area covered by its lease immediately adjacent to the boundary of the quarry. (See exhibit P1 trial document ("TD") 56 cl 3). A price of 30 cents per tonne of limestone was fixed, that being the royalty payable by Alcoa to the Crown.
7 Coincidentally on the same day, WA Limestone began extracting limestone from the south-eastern corner of Alcoa's mining lease M08/6 in the area covered by Finesky's sublease and continued doing so until January 1997.
8 In the meantime the sublease was approved by the Minister for Minerals and Energy on 10 December 1996 but was not stamped and registered until 20 January 1997. Also on 20 January 1997 Simunovich and Maloney advised the defendant that unauthorised quarrying was being done on the sublease. The defendant says mining operations had been completed before that and to the extent any work was then occurring it was in the nature of rehabilitation. The defendant does not dispute that until that time it had caused the extraction and removal of limestone from the Finesky sublease.
9 Finesky issued a writ of summons against the defendant on 20 May 1997 claiming damages (including exemplary damages) and an account for damages for loss caused by the defendant interfering with Finesky's rights under the sublease and removing a quantity of limestone rock from the tenement contrary to those rights.
10 By its re-amended statement of claim, Finesky claims, put shortly, that between 9 December 1996 and 27 January 1997 the defendant, by his agents Thiess and WA Limestone, entered onto the sublease and mined and carried away 13,677 bank cubic metres ("BCM") of limestone rock to which Finesky was entitled. It is further alleged that the defendant's conduct was oppressive and arbitrary in that (through his representatives) he knew he was mining and carrying away limestone to which he was not entitled. Finesky claims damages of $2,029,650, or alternatively, $587,000 depending upon the basis of the valuation of limestone removed. There is also a claim under s 10 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) by which it is said that in authorising Thiess and WA Limestone to enter upon the sublease and extract limestone from it, the defendant implicitly represented to them that it was authorised to do so, which representation was untrue, misleading and deceptive and as a result of which Finesky suffered loss and damage.
11 The defendant admits the removal of limestone but denies any liability to Finesky on the grounds that:
(a) Finesky had no mining rights in the subleased area prior to 20 January 1997;
(b) even if the sublease did confer mining rights on Finesky prior to 20 January 1997 Finesky has not shown that interference with the type of rights granted to it gives rise to any cause of action for damages at common law; and
(c) the damages claimed by Finesky are grossly exaggerated.
12 It is convenient to commence consideration of the evidence by turning first to the Alcoa lease.
13 The Alcoa lease was granted on 20 August 1984 with an annual rental payment then of $2910 which had increased to $4839 in 1996. There were prescribed expenditure conditions which required the lessee to maintain an annual expenditure of $48,400 unless exempted. In fact no expenditure was claimed and an exemption was granted for each year from 1985 to 1996. Other conditions to which the lease was subject included that any work done would have to comply with requirements for the preservation of Aboriginal sites and heritage and that no mining would be undertaken within 800 metres of a water bore. Non-compliance with the conditions would render the lessee liable to forfeiture of the lease or a fine of $1000 at the option of the Minister.
14 It appears the quarry site was selected about 1990. It comprised approximately 5.04 hectares and its north-eastern boundary was adjacent to the south-western boundary of the Alcoa lease. It is approximately 9 kilometres from the marina site and approximately 3.3 kilometres West of Murat Road. The marina site itself is located immediately South of the town of Exmouth and approximately 0.7 kilometres West of Murat Road.
15 Contract E150 ("the Civcon contract") was for the construction of breakwaters and revetments for Exmouth boat harbour, excavation of the harbour basis and entrance channel (including the placement of spoil in reclamation areas) and sundry earthworks and soil stabilisation adjacent to the harbour.
16 Significantly for present purposes, the works also included the establishment, operation and management of the quarry and access roads.
17 Civcon had tendered for the contract by tender dated 17 October 1995 in the sum of $5,113,723. That tender was accepted by letter from the DoT dated 15 January 1996. The contract was for the supply, delivery and placement of limestone armour stone. The specifications provided different rates for different classes of armour stone as well as for core stone and rubble, the highest rate being $14 per tonne of class 1 armour stone and the lowest being $10 per tonne for rubble. A rate of $5.40 per tonne was set for stockpiling 1000 tonnes of armour stone in the quarry and lump sum fees of $50,000 and $33,500 were fixed for the establishment and maintenance of the quarry access road and the establishment and operation of the quarry respectively.
18 In the Civcon tender letter dated 17 October 1995 annexed to the contract (exhibit P1, TD 7), Simunovich wrote:
"In accordance with the geotechnical report on quarrying operations prepared for the Department of Transport by Soil and Rock Engineering, we estimate that a 20% yield of class 1 armour rock should be produced from (the quarry).
However, there would appear to be inconsistencies between fracture intervals evident on the cores and the conclusions reached by Soil and Rock Engineering. Actual quarry yields of class 1 and class 2 armour may be considerably less than has been suggested.
Therefore if after establishing the quarry it is evident that the quarry will not yield the specified quantity of larger armour, we propose to redesign the breakwaters to suit the armour yield ..."
19 That offer was not accepted. In a letter to Civcon dated 5 January 1996 Mr Peter Boreham, the project manager, wrote -
"In your letter of 17 October you have offered to redesign the breakwaters at a cost of $50,000 if sufficient class 1 and class 2 armour cannot be won. The Department of Transport has not accepted this offer.
In the event that you cannot win the specified quantity of large armour from the quarry, you shall advise the superintendent in writing. The superintendent will engage a suitably experienced and qualified consultant to review the quarry operation and submit recommendations on methods of operation which will allow the larger armour to be won. If the consultant is able to recommend an applicable method, the cost of the consultant shall be met by the contractor. If the consultant advises that the required armour cannot be won, the cost of the consultant shall be met by the principal, and the principal shall arrange for a redesign of the breakwater."
20 The contract specified various classes of limestone for which payment was to be made at differential rates. They were -
21 By at least April 1996 Civcon was experiencing difficulty meeting the project timetable. This was said to be due mainly to a lower than expected rate of extraction of quality limestone from the quarry. There was a dispute about this between Civcon and DoT relating to the amount of limestone rock available in the quarry which Civcon had to work in order to obtain the rock necessary to build the breakwater. Civcon maintained there was not sufficient available rock whereas DoT considered there was an adequate quantity of appropriate rock if quarrying was carried out properly.
22 In a letter to Mr Tony Mitchell, the superintendent's representative, dated 30 May 1996, Civcon reported on areas in the contract where slippage had occurred in the programme and advised of the strategies which were intended to enable the original project target dates to be met. The letter noted (inter alia) that Civcon had already requested that enquiries be made as to the possibility of extending the north-west boundary of the quarry given its concerns that at then current yields there would be insufficient rock within the boundary of the quarry and noting there was a dispute about that in relation to the rate at which material was being won from the quarry, Civcon saw it of the utmost importance that a strategy for producing the quantities of class 1 and 2 armour rock required be developed as soon as possible and with that in mind requested assistance from the DoT consultants ABT Engineering in developing blasting and quarrying techniques to achieve that as soon as possible.
23 However, by June 1996 DoT had been persuaded by the Civcon representatives that extension of the quarry out to 100 metres to the west and 20 metres to the north was necessary.
24 Boreham became project manager for the Exmouth boat harbour project in August 1994. He had had little or no involvement with the project before then. From an examination of departmental files he was able to say that Department of Marine and Harbours file 30/8/89 has a reference to mining lease M08/6. However, that file was closed on 3 October 1990 and he did not recall examining it prior to January 1997 and was himself not aware of the existence of the Alcoa lease prior to January 1997.
25 Some time after his appointment as project manager he received a letter from Whitecrest Enterprises Pty Ltd ("Whitecrest") dated 15 August 1995 advising that company had applied for an exploration licence E08/828 over the area in which the quarry was located and that was immediately to the East and adjacent to an existing exploration licence also held by Whitecrest. Boreham checked the Mining Act 1978 (WA) and confirmed that pursuant to s 112 of that Act, exploration licences included a reservation in favour of the Crown to take rock etcetera. He assumed that the Whitecrest exploration licence covered all of the area DoT intended to quarry. He was not aware of the Alcoa lease and did not undertake any searches either then nor at any other time prior to January 1997 to establish whether there were any other mining leases in the area.
26 Boreham's understanding was that as the quarry was located in water supply reserve 34055 which was vested in the Minister for Water Resources and the land was Crown land and the works were public works under s 112A of the Public Works Act 1902 (WA), a quarry or mining lease was not required, the quarry was not covered by the Mining Act 1978 (WA) and approval from the Minister for Mines or the Department of Minerals and Energy was not required, although environmental approval was required under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA). Environmental Protection approval was given in 1992. One of the conditions of approval required the preparation of an environmental management programme for the quarry prior to the commencement of quarry operations. This was the subject of a quarry management plan ("QMP") prepared by consultants Soil and Rock Engineering in May 1995 on behalf of the Minister.
27 In preparing the QMP a nominal boundary was drawn around the area of the quarry. Boreham explained this was not a property or lease boundary in any sense but was drawn solely for the purpose of defining the anticipated maximum extent of the proposed quarry operations for the information of the approving bodies. Approval was issued on 11 March 1996.
28 There were several changes to the quarry boundaries after the QMP was first prepared. One was initiated during the Civcon contract; the remainder were initiated during the Thiess contract.
29 Civcon commenced work in the quarry site in late February 1996. On 13 March that year a meeting was held on site. This was attended by Alan Smith, Brian Harold and Dexter Carr representing Civcon and Boreham, George Anderson and Laurie Brown from DoT on behalf of the Minister. Two consultants engaged by DoT, Christopher Lane and William Delaney, were also present.
30 Boreham testified that at that meeting Alan Smith requested that the quarry boundary be extended to the North. Boreham did not agree with that request. He considered that the quarry had not been developed to a level which justified any claim that there was insufficient rock available within the existing boundaries.
31 The minutes of that meeting (attachment 8 to Boreham's statement, exhibit D1) indicate that Smith advised that Civcon could not get sufficient large armour (that is, classes 1 and 2) from the quarry. There was discussion about the soil and rock report and Smith's request that the quarry boundary be extended to the North to encompass at least the RL 50.00 contour. The minutes reflect that Boreham considered that neither desirable nor necessary given his view that adequate supplies of suitable material were available in the existing quarry area. There was further discussion about the method of quarrying and it is clear that there was some concern that Civcon were not using appropriate techniques. This was particularly reflected in Boreham's suggestion that Civcon consider employing a quarry operator with experience in that type of work to extract the rock and to pass on experience in the quarrying of large rocks to Civcon staff.
32 Over the next few months Civcon continued to seek an extension of the boundaries to the North and West, claiming consistently that there was insufficient rock within the quarry.
33 In a letter dated 5 July 1996 Simunovich suggested that urgent consideration be given to redesign of the North breakwater head and noted that unless the existing quarry area could be extended, it might also be necessary for DoT to enter into an arrangement with Whitecrest to use the Whitecrest quarry.
34 On 5 June 1996 Boreham wrote to the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") and the Waters and Rivers Commission and on 19 July to the Shire of Exmouth seeking approval to move the quarry boundaries to the north-west. The proposal was for a block shift of the boundary 100 metres north-west and 20 metres north-east. Boreham's evidence was the request was made only as a contingency and was done as a result of the representations which had been made to him by Civcon. Although he was unaware of it at the time the proposal involved an extension into the south-west corner of the Alcoa lease.
35 There was correspondence and discussions on the matter between the DoT and DEP for some weeks. Amongst other things DoT was required to prepare a revised QMP and on 30 July 1996 Soil and Rock Engineering were engaged by DoT to undertake that exercise.
36 Between the time of the original request for the boundary change and the engagement of Soil and Rock Engineering to undertake the revised QMP, Civcon's perceived need to extend the boundary gradually became more insistent. Some time prior to 6 August 1996 Civcon forwarded to Boreham a marked up contour plan showing where they expected to find armour rock based on surface indications of visible rock. The plan was forwarded with a verbal request that the quarry be extended into that area. The sketch was included in the revised QMP submitted to DEP on 6 August 1996. Thus the new QMP included an additional area beyond the extension proposed in the original request for a change to the pre-existing QMP - it was the latter boundary change which was eventually approved by the Minister for the Environment on 26 August 1996.
37 This was reflected in a letter dated 29 July 1996 from Simunovich to the DoT in which he wrote (inter alia) -
"To ensure that the works can continue without incurring further latent conditions, costs and time delays, Civcon urges you to take immediate action in allowing Civcon to quarry areas of only competent rock, mainly north-west of the existing quarry limits".
38 The total area within the new boundary was slightly reduced from the original area of 5.04 hectares to approximately 4.91 hectares.
39 Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with Civcon's performance continued and on 13 September 1996 the Minister wrote to Simunovich advising that as a consequence of an outstanding petition for winding-up of the company which had been filed on 23 August 1996, Civcon was in default under the contract and that accordingly all further work under the contract was taken out of the hands of Civcon.
40 On 18 October 1996 the Minister entered a new contract for completion of the boat harbour with Thiess who subcontracted the quarry aspect to WA Limestone.
41 On 9 December 1996 Finesky took a sublease of 25 hectares from Alcoa immediately adjacent to the boundary of the quarry.
42 On 10 December 1996 the Minister for Mining consented to the sublease "subject to the agreement being properly executed and assessed by the Department of State Taxation". That did not occur until 20 January 1997, on which date the sublease was also registered.
43 There were several further boundary changes during the course of the Thiess contract. In his approval of 26 August 1996 the Minister had stated that he did not consider the boundary changes to be substantial and so subsequent changes were dealt with at officer level with approvals being forthcoming generally within a few days. The final boundaries increased the intrusion into the sublease area.
44 Simunovich gave evidence that on 16 January 1997 he drove to Exmouth to undertake an aerial survey of the Civcon quarry for purposes relevant to the dispute and subsequent arbitration between Civcon and the Minister. He was accompanied by Maloney and Mr Greg Robinson, a surveyor.
45 They undertook the survey on 17 and 18 January 1997. They located two boundary pegs representing two of the four corners of the Civcon quarry and also located a permanent survey station in the middle of the quarry. From those three points they established the other two corners of the Civcon quarry. Those were then marked with large red plastic markers for aerial observation. Simunovich said that once the plastic markers were in place he could see clearly that the defendants new contractors had extended the Civcon quarry well beyond its original boundary and he suspected then for the first time that the defendant was quarrying limestone in the Finesky sublease area.
46 On 18 January 1997 he and Robinson were flown over the area in a chartered aircraft and took aerial photographs.
47 Simunovich says that on his return to Perth he marked the Civcon quarry on the photograph with a red border by joining the red corner markers and then plotted the relative positions of each quarry using grid references on two plans, one being a schedule to the sublease agreement and the other a document produced by the defendant in its tender documents for the Exmouth boat harbour project. Having completed that, he confirmed that the defendant's new contractor was operating in part of the area covered by the sublease and that limestone appeared to have been extracted from it.
48 According to Simunovich, on 20 January 1997 he telephoned Dr Mike Paul of DoT who had been the superintendent of Civcon's contract and advised him of Finesky's complaint that DoT was operating in the area of Finesky's sublease and appeared to be extracting limestone from that area. He says he demanded on behalf of Finesky that the Department stop quarrying in Finesky's sublease area and that it vacate the area immediately. He says Dr Paul suggests that he confirm his demand in writing, which he did by facsimile the same date.
49 The facsimile was addressed to Department of Transport, Attention Mike Paul - Superintendent, from Frank Simunovich and Bill Maloney and the subject heading was "Exmouth Quarry". The text of the message was as follows -
"With respect to our telephone conversation this morning please be advised:
1. Following an ariel (sic) survey of the Exmouth Quarry undertaken on 18.1.97 it is evident that the Department of Transport has substantially encroached and removed a considerable quantity of limestone rock from our Mining Lease.
2. Could you please ensure that ALL ACTIVITY CEASES IMMEDIATELY and all plant is removed from the north-west area of the quarry until an inspection and a survey is carried out by us."
The message was signed by Frank Simunovich and Bill Maloney and there was a "cc" to the Minister for Transport, the Hon Eric Charleton MLC.
50 Simunovich's testimony was that on 21 January 1997 he spoke to Mr Laurie Brown of DoT who was at the Civcon quarry site and asked him whether the new contractor had vacated the Finesky sublease area. Brown informed him that the contractor was rehabilitating the mined area of the Finesky sublease area by blasting the quarry faces and pushing them down to a 20 degree slope. He says that he understood by this that stockpiled waste material was being pushed back to the quarry faces and they were otherwise being flattened. The effect of this conduct was three-fold. First, it would become difficult to survey the area to ascertain the volume of limestone removed; secondly it would add considerably to Finesky's costs of opening a quarry because a large volume of stockpiled material would have to be removed before a quarry face could be exposed; and thirdly, the freshly blasted material would be significantly less valuable than the same material in situ which could be extracted more carefully as building materials.
51 Simunovich says that accordingly, by facsimile dated 21 January 1997, he wrote to Ian Hutton, the then superintendent of the Exmouth boat harbour contract and demanded that DoT cease the "rehabilitation process".
52 That facsimile message was set out in the same format as the one the previous day and signed in the same way by Simunovich and Maloney. It read -
"With respect to our facsimile yesterday and subsequent telephone conversations with Dr Paul and Mr Boreham, it is our understanding that the Department of Transport is rehabilitating our mining lease with waste material produced from their blasting.
You are hereby advised to cease this and all other operations on our mining lease immediately.
You are also advised that all materials stockpiled and pushed back to the faces will have to be removed by you to our satisfaction so that proper surveys and inspections can be carried out by us."
53 Simunovich testified that he telephoned Brown each day from 21 to 24 January 1997 and on each occasion was informed that the "rehabilitation" process was continuing, notwithstanding the facsimile of 21 January 1997. He says that it is his understanding that the contractor did not leave the area until 24 January 1997 at which stage all quarry faces had been "destroyed" by the rehabilitation process.
54 On Simunovich's instructions Finesky's then solicitors wrote to the Minister on 3 February 1997 demanding compensation for the extraction of limestone rock from the area of Finesky's sublease.
55 Lawrence Brown had been engaged by DoT as site superintendent for the Thiess contract and was on site in Exmouth between 28 November 1996 and 1 March 1997 as the superintendent's representative. He maintained a site diary and by reference to that was able to give evidence about visits made by Simunovich, Maloney and others to the site during that period.
56 According to his evidence Simunovich, Maloney and a man by the name of Ashley Crighton arrived at the Exmouth boat harbour site office on Thursday 19 December 1996 at 9am. Brown was aware that Simunovich and Maloney were directors of Civcon which he knew was the company with which DoT had previously contracted for the Exmouth boat harbour breakwater construction before Civcon went into liquidation and the Department entered into contract E 166 with Thiess. He was also aware there was a dispute between Civcon and DoT, part of which related to whether the quarry was adequate to allow Civcon to extract sufficient rock to provide for the breakwater. He took them to the quarry where they spent some 1-1/2 hours walking around and taking photographs of rehabilitated quarry faces and current working faces. He observed that work was being carried out on face 5, that being one of the faces which encroached into the sublease area. Brown's understanding was that the group were there on behalf of Civcon for purposes related to that company's dispute with DoT. At no stage did anybody mention any sublease to him.
57 At 8am on Friday 17 January 1997 Simunovich, Maloney and Robinson again arrived at the Exmouth boat harbour site office and told him that they intended to survey the original quarry boundaries, place markers at the corners of the quarry and photograph the quarry from the air. Again, at that stage he was not aware of the existence of Finesky, nor that the company had an adjoining sublease next to the quarry. His assumption was that the survey related to the liquidation of Civcon and that company's dispute with DoT.
58 He contacted Boreham, who was then in Exmouth staying at the Potshot Hotel, and notified him of the intended quarry boundary survey. Boreham subsequently advised that the group should be permitted access to the quarry. Brown saw that they conducted a survey between 1 and 3.30pm on 17 January 1997 although they did not put markers out until the following day. Later in the morning of 18 January they gave him a normal size photographic print showing an aerial view of the quarry which included red markers at the corners of the square which Simunovich informed him indicated the corners of the original quarry. They told him that this was a photograph of the quarry taken from the air about 8.30am that morning. He says there was no discussion of any nearby mining lease held by Finesky, nor of any encroachment into that subleased area. He presumed he was being given the photograph in connection with the Civcon dispute.
59 After the group left Brown arranged for the Thiess surveyor to survey the corner pegs placed by them and to provide the coordinates, which he then plotted on a drawing showing the original quarry boundary. He noted that the plotted coordinates closely coincided with the original quarry boundary corners. He then faxed that information, together with a photocopy of the aerial photograph provided by Simunovich to Boreham in Perth.
60 On the morning of Monday 20 January 1997 whilst Brown was talking to Boreham on the telephone, a facsimile message from Simunovich and Maloney arrived at his office. This was the one already referred to. He read the message to Boreham who told him that he had been made aware of the situation some 10 minutes earlier. He says Boreham advised him to continue operations as normal until advised to the contrary from DoT's Fremantle office. He forwarded a copy of the facsimile to Boreham.
61 Some time later the same day he received a telephone call from Simunovich enquiring whether or not he had received the facsimile. He said that he had and that he had discussed the matter with Boreham and was awaiting instructions.
62 Brown went to the quarry and took photographs some time between 1 and 2.30pm on 20 January 1997. His recollection was that drilling and blasting in the disputed area had finished prior to 20 January and on that date WA Limestone was tidying the area by removing suitable rocks to stockpiles and pushing down quarry faces. That this process was still underway on 20 January is confirmed by the photographs taken that date and by further photographs he took the following day. The comparison of the photographs indicate that the quarry faces had been substantially battered down. The term "battering down" describes the process of creating a slope over a sheer quarry face in order to make the face safe. This may be done by a combination of techniques; the bottom part of the slope may be created by pushing waste material back onto the sheer quarry face and the top part of the face may be blasted down.
63 Brown says he received another phone call from Simunovich at 3.30pm on 20 January 1997 who asked whether quarrying had stopped. He told Simunovich he was still awaiting instructions from Boreham. At that time, however, drilling and blasting to extract rock had ceased but rock which had already been quarried was being sorted and stockpiled. It was later established that the stockpiled rock was located outside of the subleased area.
64 About 4.30pm on 20 January Brown spoke to Boreham again by telephone and told him of the calls from Simunovich. Boreham asked him to telephone Simunovich and ascertain more details of the disputed quarry operations. He did that and Simunovich then told him that DoT's operations in the north-west area of the quarry had intruded into the south-east corner of the Alcoa lease, portion of which had been subleased to Finesky, which was a company of which Simunovich was a director. Brown relayed that information to Boreham by facsimile.
65 The following day Brown took the further photographs already mentioned and that afternoon was advised by a WA Limestone representative that rehabilitation of that area of the quarry faces was complete. The photographs taken on the morning of 21 January 1997 show a drill operating in the disputed area but the WA Limestone representative, Renzo Della Bona, confirmed that those holes were not charged nor blasted.
66 Later in the afternoon of 21 January 1997 Boreham rang Brown who advised him that all quarrying operations in the disputed area had ceased. Boreham asked him to convey that to Simunovich. Brown received a call from Simunovich about 2.35pm and during the course of that conversation advised him that DoT had ceased quarrying operations in the area concerned.
67 On Wednesday 22 January 1997 WA Limestone and Thiess hired a light aircraft and a professional photographer to take aerial photographs of the harbour construction site and the quarry site. Brown went with them and took some photographs of his own. These show the quarry faces pushed down and in a safe condition. They also show a line of unblasted charge holes along the top of one of the quarry faces in the disputed area and that the roads into that area were still in position.
68 On Saturday 25 January 1997 Brown, together with the Thiess surveyor and an assistant, pegged out the south-east corner of the sublease and took further photographs. This was the first time he was aware of the precise boundaries of the sublease.
69 According to Brown, WA Limestone withdrew its quarrying equipment from the quarry on 29 January 1997.
70 Brown's evidence on this is generally confirmed by that of Della Bona. He was a director of PMR which was trading as WA Limestone. They began work in Exmouth about October 1996 and completed the subcontract on 31 January 1997. Della Bona was on site at Exmouth supervising the quarrying operations from October 1996 to January 1997.
71 In the first week of December 1996 WA Limestone employed Dexter Carr to act as quarry manager. He was a registered quarry manager under the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (WA) and remained in that position until the contract finished on 31 January.
72 Della Bona described the work which WA Limestone was subcontracted to do as being first to quarry the limestone then to cart the stone to the breakwater site and finally to build the breakwater by placing the limestone into the ocean. It was Thiess' responsibility to undertake the excavation of the harbour basin and the entrance channel.
73 WA Limestone conducted the mining of the limestone by drilling and blasting. This involved drilling holes behind the quarry face and then charging them up with explosive. The face would then be blasted and the blasted material sorted into the various material classes. That material would then be carted to the harbour and placed in the breakwaters as and when required. Following the completion of mining in any particular part of the quarry WA Limestone was required to rehabilitate that part and make it safe by battering.
74 Della Bona testified that in late January 1997, just before completion of the contract, WA Limestone was working in the quarry close to a boundary pegged out by Thiess. After they had finished blasting and carting rock from this particular area he had a conversation with Brown about a week after WA Limestone had commenced rehabilitation work. Brown told him there was a problem about where they had been operating and asked them not to take any more rock from that area. Della Bona says that at the time of that conversation WA Limestone had already started battering in the area with the bulldozer because the quarrying operation had been completed. He says that after that conversation WA Limestone did no more blasting in that whole general part of the quarry, even for the purposes of battering and nor did it cart any more rock out of that area, although it did proceed to push rubble over the top of the quarry face to complete the battering. Della Bona says that he had a drill rig on site which was about to leave. He asked the driller to drill some extra holes in some of the quarry faces after his discussion with Brown in case he needed them later. He did not want to have to call the drill rig back to the site once it had left. In fact none of those holes were ever blasted.
75 Della Bona says he was not aware of the existence of any nearby mining lease until after his conversation with Brown. During the period of the works he did not observe any marks, posts, trenches or other things which may have been mining lease boundary marks in the vicinity of the area in which he was working, other than those placed by Thiess.
76 He did have a recollection that some time before Christmas 1996 whilst working on a face within the disputed area Simunovich, Maloney and another person who he believed to be a geologist, visited the work. His recollection was that was on a Saturday morning. He also recalled Chris Otto, his leading foreman, had told him that he had spoken to a group of men in the quarry.
77 Otto was a plant operator who drove a Caterpillar loader in the quarry for WA Limestone during late 1996 and early 1997. He was also in charge of drilling and blasting and although Thiess had nominated a quarry manager who would visit the quarry each day, Otto was effectively the person in charge, day to day. The first Thiess quarry manager was Mr William McWurter but he was later replaced by Dexter Carr. Otto gave evidence of an occasion before Christmas 1996 when he came upon a group of three men in a white Toyota landcruiser on the quarry site. He considered it unsafe for them to be there and confronted them. There was some acrimonious conversation during which threats were made. Later that day Otto spoke to Della Bona by telephone who told him that the group was from Civcon and they would be returning. In fact they did return late in the afternoon, accompanied by Brown. Otto did not speak to them on that occasion. He recalled that in January 1997 some considerable time after this incident, he was told by Brown not to do any more work on a particular quarry face because WA Limestone were not supposed to be operating there. He confirms that when he was given that instruction they had already finished quarrying two to three days earlier and had begun rehabilitating the area. According to his recollection the bulldozer spent another day or two rehabilitating in the area after the conversation with Brown.
78 Dexter Carr was called by the plaintiff. He had been employed by Civcon during 1995, prior to its liquidation, as its quarry manager on the Civcon contract. He ceased working as quarry manager for Civcon on 25 August 1996 when all work in relation to that company's quarrying activities were suspended. In early November 1996 he commenced employment as a quarry manager with WA Limestone, which position he held until about February 1997. He had been engaged by Della Bona who came to his house in Exmouth early in November 1996 and asked him whether he would be interested in becoming WA Limestone's quarry manager for completion of the project. According to Carr's evidence, Della Bona explained that WA Limestone needed a contract manager pursuant to the contract but did not have one and that his appointment would be as a "token" or "figurehead" only. Carr states that he explained to Della Bona that even though he was to be a "figurehead" appointment he would still need to visit the quarry site daily, or at least once every two days to inspect quarrying operations. Della Bona agreed to that. Carr went to the quarry site for the first time as WA Limestone's quarry manager the next day and says he visited the quarry almost every day from then until the quarry operation ceased late in January 1997.
79 When he first visited the site he saw that WA Limestone was quarrying two faces, one in the south-east area of the quarry and one towards the north-west. While quarrying in the south-east area WA Limestone encountered a cave and shortly after that, quarrying in that area ceased - this was by late November 1996. From that point WA Limestone completed the contract using rock from the north-west face.
80 The face which WA Limestone was working in the north-west was known as face 5. By December 1996 the face was outside the original quarry boundaries within which Civcon had been required to operate. Carr testified he knew this because Civcon had excavated rock right up to the north-west boundary of the original quarry during his time as its quarry manager and had not been able to excavate beyond that boundary. He stated that when he came on as quarry manager for WA Limestone a large volume of material had been removed in the area outside the original north-west boundary. Faces which had been developed before he had been appointed were exhausted and by December 1996 only face 5 was producing material. He says that some time in late December 1996 or early January 1997 WA Limestone opened a new face known as face 7. From December until the quarrying operation ceased all material placed in the breakwaters came from face 5 or face 7.
81 Greg Robinson is a qualified surveyor with 14 years' experience in mine surveying. He had known Simunovich since about 1982 when they were both working for the Department of Marine and Harbours and Simunovich was his boss. They are friends. On cross-examination (t 298 et seq) Robinson said he came to be at the same quarry at Exmouth on 18 January 1997 because Simunovich (who is himself a qualified surveyor) asked if he could borrow Robinson's surveying equipment to survey a quarry and Robinson had gone with him. He said he was not paid for it. He thought Simunovich wanted to relocate some points of the quarry relating to what Civcon had been doing. He agreed that as a professional surveyor taking probably three days to accompany Simunovich to Exmouth was "quite a decent favour". He could not recall anything being said about Finesky and he did not think there had been any mention of Simunovich and Maloney having a sublease in the area, until after his first visit to Exmouth (t 303). He thought the purpose of the visit was to confirm the original quarry boundary. It was only after the photo was taken that he realised quarrying had been done outside the original area.
82 Robinson prepared a report on material removed from the area of the encroachment. I will return to that below.
83 On 20 January 1997 Boreham became aware that Simunovich and Maloney - whom he knew as directors of Civcon - had claimed that DoT's quarrying operation in Exmouth had encroached into a mining lease held by them. He recalled speaking to Brown and discussing the fax which Brown had received and a copy of which was sent to him by Brown. Boreham noted that no evidence was advanced to support the claim, Finesky was not mentioned in the fax, there was no supporting information regarding the claim and he was not aware of the mining lease referred to in the facsimile message. From his daily conversations with the site superintendent he was aware that operations in the quarry, including in the north-west area, were substantially complete and that WA Limestone was in the process of rehabilitating parts of the quarry. Boreham did not immediately order the work to cease because there was no evidence to support the claim by Simunovich and Maloney that they held a mining lease, nor that Thiess or WA Limestone had encroached upon the area of such a lease and that under the conditions of environmental approval for the project, DoT had an obligation to rehabilitate the quarry including stabilising the quarry faces. In addition, WA Limestone was currently rehabilitating the area of the quarry which was alleged to be in the disputed area and that work consisted primarily of bulldozing material against the quarry faces. If the claim proved to be valid, then in Boreham's view the material would be easy and cheap to remove and DoT had only removed large pieces of rock and much of the replaced material would still be suitable for uses such as production of aggregate or road base which was the most likely use for a quarry at Exmouth. Furthermore, WA Limestone had advised that the works requiring rock were nearing completion and they would be withdrawing plant from the quarry within a few days. If the claims proved to be false then DoT could expect to incur significant additional costs if it was necessary to remobilise plant to complete the rehabilitation. Boreham knew that Civcon was in liquidation and felt there was little chance of recovering these costs should the claim be unfounded. At that time he was not aware of the existence of Finesky and assumed that the claim was associated with Civcon of which Simunovich and Maloney were the directors. He also added that it would have been irresponsible for DoT to leave the quarry in an unsafe condition. Boreham said that for all these reasons he instructed Brown to continue work until he had the opportunity to check the claims by Simunovich and Maloney and direct him otherwise.
84 Boreham contacted DME by telephone and they sent by facsimile a quick appraisal which listed mining tenements in Crown reserve 34055. He received that at 3.35 pm on 20 January 1997. The only tenements shown were for Whitecrest and Alcoa. There was nothing to support the claim by Simunovich and Maloney that they held a mining lease in the area.
85 Boreham telephoned Brown and asked him to contact Simunovich and ascertain further details of the claim. Brown advised him by fax timed at 4.50 pm that day that he had spoken with Simunovich who had told him they held a sublease of the Alcoa lease in the name of Finesky. That was the first time Boreham had heard of Finesky.
86 Boreham again contacted DME and they forwarded a part of a plan showing the Alcoa lease in relation to other geodatic data by fax timed at 5.19 pm. This plan was illegible but by the time he actually received and examined it, it was too late in the afternoon for Boreham to contact DME again. He was able to obtain a second legible fax of the same plan the following day at 10.15 am and he was able to ascertain that the amended quarry boundary intruded into the Alcoa lease area; however he could still not tell from those documents whether the DoT quarrying operation had entered the Finesky sublease area.
87 At 10.56 am on 21 January Boreham received a copy of the fax from Simunovich and Maloney to Hutton, which had been sent to the Exmouth site office. Boreham telephoned Brown early in the afternoon of 21 January who advised him that all quarry operations had ceased in the disputed area. He told Brown to pass that information on to Simunovich.
88 A meeting was held in Civcon's Bassendean office on 21 January between Simunovich, Maloney, Ian Hutton and Boreham to discuss the Finesky claim. At that meeting Simunovich and Maloney were advised that quarrying operations had ceased in the disputed area. They said that they wished to survey their lease in the near future and discuss compensation. They also showed a marked up photograph indicating the DoT quarry and the boundary of the Alcoa lease, a copy of the sublease and a copy of the ministerial consent for the sublease.
89 A letter dated 24 January 1997 was sent by Simunovich and Maloney to the Minister thanking him for his prompt action in stopping the quarry operations and advising that they estimated the loss of profit per tonne at $29.33.
90 The plaintiff's writ was issued on 20 May 1997. By trial, the re-amended statement of claim, after pleading certain introductory matters including the mining sublease approved by the Minister and entered in the Mining Register on 20 January 1997, continued as follows:
"4. Under the Lease, the plaintiff is entitled to:
(a) work and mine the land to which the Lease applies ("Land");
(b) take and remove from the land any minerals and dispose of them;
(c) do all acts and things that are necessary to effectually carry out mining operations in, on or under the Land;
(d) use, occupy and enjoy the Land;
(e) own all minerals lawfully mined from the Land, including limestone rock.
5. Between on or about 9 December 1996 and on or about 27 January 1997 the defendant, by his agents, Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd ("Thiess") and PMR Quarries Pty Ltd trading as WA Limestone ("WAL"), entered on the Land, mined and carried away and disposed of to his own use, 13,677 BCM of limestone rock ("Limestone").
6. The plaintiff was entitled to the Limestone by reason of the facts pleaded in paragraph 4 above.
7. The defendants conduct pleaded in paragraph 5 above was oppressive and arbitrary.
Particulars
At all materials (sic) times, the defendant, by his representatives who supervised and instructed Thiess, knew the defendant was mining and carrying away limestone rock to which he was not entitled.
8. As a result of the defendant's conduct pleaded in paragraph 5 above, the plaintiff has suffered loss and damage of $2,029,650.00, alternatively $587,000.00.
Particulars
(a) The plaintiff's loss of $2,029,650.00 is calculated as follows:
(i) 13677 BCM of Limestone at a dry density of 2.65 tonnes per BCM is 36,244 tonnes;
(ii) quarry yield of 80% for useable material - 28,995 tonnes;
(iii) value per tonne of Limestone as cladding, tiling and other building products - $270.00;
(iv) cost per tonne of severing Limestone from the Land to produce cladding, tiling and other building products - $200.00;
(v) difference - $70.00;
(vi) total loss is 28,995 x $70.00 - $2,029,650.00.
(b) Alternatively, the plaintiff's loss and damage of $587,000.00 is calculated as follows:
Use as armour stone/core
Total removal approximately 20,000 tonne
Of which
$85% armour stone 17,000 tonne
15% core 3,000 tonne
Market price armour $30/tonne $476,000.00
Less extraction costs $2/tonne
= $28/tonne
Market price core $9/tonne
Less extraction costs $2/tonne
= $7/tonne $21,000.00
$497,000.00
Spoil left behind, say 15,000 tonne
Value as core/rubble $9 tonne
Less value as land fill $3/tonne $90,000.00
$587,000.00
9. The plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 to 8 above.
10. In or about September 1996, the defendant entered into a contract with Thiess and Thiess, in turn, entered into a subcontract with WAL for the quarrying of limestone material in an area including the land.
Particulars
Particulars are entirely within the knowledge of the defendant and the plaintiff will provide full particulars prior to trial.
11. By the contract referred to in paragraph 10 above, the defendant authorised Thiess and WAL to enter the Land and extract the limestone from it.
12. Implicit in the authorisation referred to in paragraph 11 above, was a representation by the defendant to Thiess and WAL that the defendant was entitled to authorise its agents to enter upon the Land and extract limestone from it ("Representation").
13. The Representation was conduct by the defendant in the course of trade or commerce.
14. By reason of the facts, matters and things referred to in paragraph 4 above, the Representation was untrue, misleading and deceptive.
15. As a result of and induced by the Representation, between on or about 9 December 1996 and on or about 27 January 1997, Thiess and WAL entered the Land, extracted the Limestone and disposed of it to the use of the defendant.
16. As a result of the facts and matters referred to in paragraph 15 above, the plaintiff has suffered loss or damage.
Particulars
The plaintiff repeats the particulars to paragraph 8 above.
1. Damages including exemplary damages;
2. An order for compensation under section 77 of the Fair Trading Act 1987;
3. Interest on damages pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1932 from and including 27 January 1997;
4. Costs;
5. any other order this honourable Court deems appropriate;
6. any goods and services tax payable in accordance with the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 on the items of claim or damages generally."
91 By his amended defence the defendant pleads, in substance, that:
• By the sublease the plaintiff was granted a non-exclusive right to enter part of the land the subject of Mining Lease 08/6 for the purpose of extracting approximately 20,000 to 100,000 tonnes of limestone every year during the term of the sublease;
• Under reg 110(3) of the Mining Regulations 1981 the sublease was not effectual to pass any estate or interest until it was registered on 20 January 1997;
• The plaintiff is not, and at all material times was not, able to lawfully mine any limestone from the subleased land because:
a) Mining Lease 08/6 was subject to a condition prohibiting mining being carried out within 800 metres of any water bore, and the land lay within 800 metres of at least 3 water bores;
b) the plaintiff has not complied with relevant requirements of environmental protection, native title and mining legislation;
• the defendant's contract with Thiess was entered into on 2 October 1996;
• portion of the quarry site from which Thiess was to quarry limestone for the Exmouth Boat Harbour included an area which, without the defendant's knowledge, was part of Mining Lease 08/6 and which later became the subject of the sublease;
• from about 9 December 1996 until a day prior to 20 January 1997 WA Limestone quarried limestone from within the subleased area and carried it away to be used for the construction of the Exmouth Boat Harbour;
• the plaintiff suffered no loss or damage, or alternatively, failed to mitigate any such loss or damage.
92 The defendant's first contention is that a mining lease granted under the Mining Act 1978 (WA) does not operate to grant exclusive rights to the lessee as against the Crown and that the Crown was entitled to mine and remove limestone from the subleased area notwithstanding the sublease.
93 The argument begins with the proposition that at common law the Crown in right of the State has radical title to all land. The regime in the Mining Act for granting tenements is a statutory procedure for carving out interests in the Crown's common law rights. In effect, the grant of a tenement is a sale by the Crown of minerals reserved by the Crown to be taken by the lessee over a period of years as royalties. So much may be accepted: see Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513 per Gummow J (at 634-5) with whom Toohey and Gaudron JJ generally concurred (ibid, 560, 561 - but see McHugh J, contra, at 573); Wade v NSW Rutile Mining Co Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 28; (1969) 121 CLR 177, 192-3. It is necessary to consider the nature of a mining lease under the Mining Act. Gummow J discussed the common law concept in Newcrest (at 616):
"In Gowan v Christie (1873) LR 25c & Div 273 at 284 Lord Cairns described a 'mineral lease' as understood by the common law. His Lordship said it was:
'liberty given to a particular individual, for a specific length of time, to go into and under the land, and to get certain things there if he can find them, and to take them away, just as if he had bought so much of the soil.'
With reference to this passage, Windeyer J, in Wade v New South Wales Rutile Mining Co Pty Ltd [1969] HCA 28; (1969) 121 CLR 177, 192, said of the grant by the Crown of a mining lease of an area of private land that it was 'really a sale by the Crown of minerals reserved to the Crown to be taken by the lessee at a price payable over a period of years as royalties'. Kitto J had earlier stated that the common law recognises that a lease which entitles the lessee to work a mine on the demised premises gives the right not only to use the property, but also as part of the same grant the right to appropriate the minerals when severed from the land: Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Henry [1964] HCA 4; (1964) 114 CLR 322 at 330. Windeyer J also referred in Wade to the practice in Australia, when making Crown grants, to reserve minerals to the Crown as being a keeping back of a physical part of that which otherwise was granted: Wade [1969] HCA 28; (1969) 121 CLR 177 at 194."
94 Section 82 of the Mining Act prescribes the covenants and conditions that are to apply to every mining lease. Section 85 sets out the rights of a lessee. Section 85(1) relevantly authorises a lessee to work and mine the land and to take and remove minerals from the land and dispose of them.
95 Section 85(2) provides that subject to the Act, a lessee:
"(a) is entitled to use, occupy and enjoy the land in respect of which the mining lease was granted for mining purposes; and
(b) owns all minerals lawfully mined from the land under the mining lease."
"the rights conferred by this section are exclusive rights for mining purposes in relation to the land in respect of which the mining lease was granted."
97 The defendant argues these provisions do not operate against the Crown in right of the State.
99 There is no express provision in the Mining Act purporting to bind the Crown. The defendant relied on (inter alia) Commonwealth v Western Australia [1999] HCA 5; (1999) 196 CLR 392 for its assertion that the Mining Act had no express nor implied operation which would divest the Crown of its property, rights, interests or prerogatives (see Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J at 410, ibid, where their Honours described this as the presumption that legislation does not affect government property). Although Commonwealth v Western Australia concerned the application of the (State) Mining Act to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, the presumption(s) apply to the Crown in all its capacities and not simply the Crown in right of the community whose legislation is under consideration. For this reason the presumption with respect to government property is one with respect to all polities in the federation, not simply that of the enacting polity (ibid, at 410-411, referring to Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1979] HCA 15; (1979) 145 CLR 107, 122-3, 129, 136). This being so Commonwealth v Western Australia is not to be distinguished on the ground that it concerned the application of a State law to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. However that case is distinguishable in that the question was not whether the Mining Act bound the Commonwealth but rather whether it applied to lands acquired by the Commonwealth for a public purpose (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J, op cit, at 409).
100 In my view s 112(1) of the Mining Act is also of significance here. That section reads:
"(1) Subject to subsection (2), every prospecting licence and exploration licence is subject to a reservation in favour of the Crown and any person authorized thereby of the right to enter thereon and remove therefrom any rock, stone, clay, sand or gravel for use for any public purpose or for use in any prescribed work or undertaking."
101 The fact that the Act expressly reserves that right to the Crown in respect specifically of prospecting and exploration licences seems to me clearly to indicate first that the legislature apprehended that such reservation was necessary because the Crown would otherwise have retained no right, and secondly, in the absence of such a reservation in respect of mining leases the legislative intention was that there was to be no such reserved right in the Crown. It is also to be noted that the Third Schedule to the Alcoa lease contains a reservation to the Crown of all petroleum on or under the land.
102 The defendant's submissions on this point, founded on Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1 and Bridgetown Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v CALM (1997) 18 WAR 126, 183, do not I think go to the precise issue here. Clearly enough the Mining Act does apply to the Crown in right of the State for the very reason that (as the defendant acknowledges) it constitutes a statutory regime for carving out interests in the Crown's common law rights. It could not sensibly be argued, for example, that s 85(2)(b) gives a lessee ownership of all minerals lawfully mined under the lease as against all the world, except the Crown in right of the State. Nor in my view does s 85(3) give a lessee exclusive rights as against everyone except the Crown.
103 The Alcoa lease (TD 3) is in Form No 8 of the Schedule to the Mining Regulations 1981. It is a lease of the subject land for a term of 21 years. The covenants and conditions include payment of rents and royalties, use of the land only for mining purposes, compliance with prescribed expenditure conditions, and a restriction on underletting without the prior written consent of the Minister. Other special conditions notified to Alcoa in a letter from the Principal Registrar of the Department of Mines dated 22 August 1984 (TD 4) included compliance with the provisions of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA) to ensure that no action is taken which is likely to interfere with or damage any Aboriginal site (condition 3) and that no mining was to be carried out within 800 metres of any (water) bore (condition 4). By condition 8 the right of ingress and egress to the lease area is required to be available at all reasonable times to employees of the Public Works Department.
104 The sublease was dated 9 December 1996 and by cl 1(a) and 5(a) was deemed to commence on that date.
105 The term of the sublease was for four years with a right of renewal for a similar term. Some of the presently relevant provisions of the sublease were as follows:
"2. CONDITION PRECEDENT
This is a condition precedent of this Sublease that the Minister of Mines provides his prior written consent to the subleasing of part of the Lease, namely the Land to the Sublessee.
3. QUANTITY, EXTENT & METHOD OF MINING
a) Dependent on the level of building and construction activity in the vicinity of the Land, the Sublessee will extract approximately 20,000 to 100,000 tonnes of limestone every year during the Term.
b) The Sublessee will conduct all quarrying and processing such as rock cutting and crushing within the parameters of the Land.
c) In order to produce high quality building products from the limestone extracted from the Land, the Sublessee will open small faces where higher grade limestone is present. The limestone will be removed by drilling, blasting and cutting blocks in situ where appropriate.
a) Gross tonnage of limestone extracted from the Land will be assessed by quarterly surveys conducted by the Sublessee.
b) The Sublessee will pay Alcoa a royalty of $0.30 per gross tonnage of limestone extracted from the Land...
a) The Sublessee will not use or permit the Premises to be used for any purposes other than mining and processing limestone from the Land and related purposes.
...
The Sublessee covenants that it will:
a) comply with all the terms and conditions of the Lease, as well as all statutes, ordinances and regulations relating to the Premises including without limitation all EPA and other regulatory conditions for the development, operation and rehabilitation of the Land;
b) ...
c) ...
d) conduct their operations on the Premises in accordance with a mine plan approved by Alcoa and the State of Western Australia;
e) prior to commencing any mining submit for Alcoa's approval a conceptual mine site rehabilitation plan;
f) prepare all necessary submissions for environmental assessment and approval by the EPA and will submit all such submissions in draft form to Alcoa prior to submission to the EPA; ...
g) ...
h) ...
i) ...
j) ...
k) ...
l) ...
m) at the end of the Sublease deliver possession of the Premises to Alcoa in a state of repair and rehabilitation as agreed by Alcoa; and
n) upon being given 24 hours notice allow Alcoa to conduct inspections of the Premises.
9. COVENANTS BY ALCOA
Alcoa covenants that it will:
a) ensure that the Sublessee may possess the Premises without interruption or disturbance from Alcoa or its officers; ...."
106 There is nothing in the lease (nor the sublease) which would suggest any different view of the legislative provisions than that the intention was that the rights of the lessee be exclusive as against the whole world, including the Crown.
107 The whole concept of the Mining Act is to enable the State to divest itself of its interests in or rights to minerals in exchange for payment of fees and royalties. Thus, while the Crown has a continuing right to unmined minerals by way of reversion on the expiration of the term of the lease, the Mining Act does not continue a right in the Crown to mine and remove the minerals inconsistently with the rights granted to the lessee under the lease, short of lawful termination of the lease.
108 The defendant argues that the plaintiff gained no right nor interest under the sublease until it was consented to by the Minister in writing, stamped and registered.
109 There are three ways in which the requirement for ministerial consent are put. The first is that pursuant to s 82(1)(d) of the Mining Act the Alcoa lease was subject to a condition that Alcoa would not underlet or part with possession with any part of the leased land without the prior written consent of the Minister. The second was that prior written consent of the Minister was expressed as a condition precedent of the sublease itself. The third was that ministerial consent was given (in fact by a delegate, but nothing turns on that) expressly:
"... subject to the agreement being properly executed and assessed by the Department of State Taxation." (Letter from Department of Minerals and Energy dated 10 December 1996: trial doct No 28).
110 In Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 27; (2000) 22 WAR 101 the parties had entered into a form of heads of agreement which provided (inter alia) that the appellant would expend $500,000 over three years on the respondent's exploration and mining tenements "to earn a 100% interest in any base metals discovered." There were various other clauses. The appellant sought a declaration that the heads of agreement was a valid and binding contract. An argument put on behalf of the respondent was that the agreement was illegal and void because it conferred a legal or equitable interest in an exploration licence contrary to s 64 of the Mining Act. That section stipulated that:
"(1) During the first year of the term for which an exploration licence is granted, a legal or equitable interest in or affecting an exploration licence shall not be transferred or otherwise dealt with, whether directly or indirectly, unless -
(a) ...
(b) prior written consent to the dealing is given by the Minister or an officer of the Department acting with the authority of the Minister."
111 Ipp J (with whom Pidgeon J agreed) held first that the right to earn an interest in base metals discovered on the land had no bearing on any interest in the exploration licence itself (ibid, [102]) and that the agreement did not transfer nor otherwise deal with a legal or equitable interest in or affecting an exploration licence (ibid, [104]). Importantly though for present purposes, his Honour held (at [106]) that even if it did the agreement was not thereby rendered either illegal or ineffective. His Honour thought the remarks of Kennedy J in Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144 at 162 concerning s 80 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) pertinent. That section relevantly provided:
"80. A legal or equitable interest in or affecting an existing ... permit ... is not capable of being created, assigned, affected or dealt with, whether directly or indirectly, except by an instrument in writing."
"The appellant's contention was that, in the absence of an instrument in writing, the agreements were ineffective. But that contention appears to me to gloss the statute. The purpose of s 80 is to prevent legal or equitable interests in permits from being created, assigned, affected or dealt with, whether directly or indirectly, except by an instrument in writing. It does not provide that oral agreements shall be of no force: cf s 81(2). Accordingly, although an oral agreement may not, for example, assign an interest in a permit, this is not to say that it does not create a personal right in contract. I consider that it does: cf Adamson v Hayes [1973] HCA 6; (1973) 130 CLR 276 at 297, 304, 306, 319-320, the note by R P Austin, 'The Conveyancer: Moot Point' (1974) 48 ALJ 322 at 324 and N C Seddon, 'Contracts for the Sale of Land: Is a Note or Memorandum Sufficient?' (1987) 61 ALJ 406."
113 Ipp J noted that s 64(1) of the Mining Act was in similar, although not identical, terms to s 80 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act and did not provide that an agreement purporting to transfer or deal with an exploration licence during the first year of the term of the exploration licence is otherwise invalid or of no effect (Anaconda, [107]).
114 There was a further argument advanced in Anaconda which bears on the present case. The respondent there sought to rely also on s 82(1)(d) of the Mining Act which provides that:
"(1) Every mining lease shall contain and be subject to the prescribed covenants by the lessee and in particular shall be deemed to be granted subject to the conditions that the lessee shall...
(d) not assign, underlet or part with possession of such land or any part thereof without the prior written consent of the Minister, or of an officer of the Department acting with the authority of the Minister."
115 The respondent's submission was that the omission to obtain the requisite consent was a contravention of s 82(1) and so the agreement was void. Ipp J rejected that submission, noting (ibid, [108]) that the section did not prohibit dealings of the kind referred to but merely provided that every mining lease was deemed to contain such conditions. Thus, the only consequence of failing to obtain the requisite consent was that such failure would constitute a breach of the conditions of the mining lease and the lessee would be liable to have the lease forfeited under s 82(1)(g) of the Mining Act.
116 Applying Anaconda to the present case, even if the sublease is taken to operate from 9 December 1996 (prior to the date of ministerial consent) it would not be void nor ineffectual by reason of non-compliance with s 82(1)(d) of the Mining Act. It would be a valid sublease giving the plaintiff the right to mine the relevant area from 9 December 1996 (that would presumably have been a breach of the conditions of the Alcoa lease, although it is not necessary for me to make any finding about that and I do not do so).
117 That brings me to the condition precedent in the sublease itself and the conditional approval of the Minister.
118 In Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v L Schuler AG [1972] 1 WLR 840 at 850, Lord Denning MR described a condition precedent as a prerequisite to the very existence of the contract. Stephenson LJ used a similar description (at 859):
"the natural and ordinary meaning of making something a condition of an agreement is that it is made something on which the agreement depends....If the condition is one to be fulfilled before the agreement comes into force, it is what lawyers have called a condition precedent..., that is, a condition of the agreement's coming into force and if it is not performed there is no agreement."
119 Although in every case the role of such a conditional provision is to be ascertained by a process of construction of the particular document, Australian authority prefers to construe a conditional stipulation as a condition precedent to performance rather than to the foundation or existence of the contract. That preference, and the rationale for it, were explained by Mason J in Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 29; (1982) 149 CLR 537 at 552:
"Generally speaking the court will tend to favour that construction which leads to the conclusion that a particular stipulation is a condition precedent to performance as against that which leads to the conclusion that the stipulation is a condition precedent to the formation or existence of a contract. In most cases it is artificial to say, in the face of the details settled upon by the parties, that there is no binding contract unless the event in question happens. Instead, it is appropriate in conformity with the mutual intention of the parties to say that there is a binding contract which makes the stipulated event a condition precedent to the duty of one party, or perhaps of both parties, to perform. Furthermore, it gives the courts greater scope in determining and adjusting the rights of the parties. For these reasons the condition will not be construed as a condition precedent to the formation of a contract unless the contract read as a whole plainly compels this conclusion."
(and see Gibbs CJ at 541-3, Wilson J at 556-7 and Brennan J at 565).
120 In this case a proper construction of the sublease in my view shows the requirement for ministerial consent to be a condition precedent to the performance of it rather than to its very existence. The plaintiff's rights to enter into possession and mine limestone could not be exercised until the consent was obtained (which was 20 January 1997), although the term of the sublease ran from 9 December 1996.
121 The effect of the conditional ministerial consent reinforces this conclusion. The consent was expressed to be subject to assessment for stamp duty and so in its terms was not effective consent until that condition was complied with.
122 Regulation 110 of the Mining Regulations 1981 provides that:
"(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Act or these regulations, all dealings affecting a mining tenement shall be lodged for registration with the prescribed fee, at the office of the mining registrar or the Department at Perth.
(2) The registration of all dealing shall be effected at the Department by an officer acting with the authority of the Minister.
(3) No dealings shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in a mining tenement or in any way to charge or encumber a mining tenement until registered in accordance with subregulation (2)."
123 The defendant does not concede that an equitable interest may arise before registration but says that even if it could, no such equitable interest arises on the facts of this case. The defendant relies on Worsley Alumina Pty Ltd v The Shire of Williams (1986) 64 LGRA 302 for his argument that the sublease was ineffectual to create any right or interest in the land until all conditions were fulfilled which would enable the plaintiff to start mining operations. However Worsley Alumina is distinguishable in that the (statutory) agreement obliged the State government to grant a mining lease but expressly provided that mining or related operations could not commence until the consent of the owner and occupier of the relevant land had been obtained or dispensed with by a mining warden. Neither had occurred. Rowland J held that as a matter of construction, unless and until consent was obtained or dispensed with, the mining lease granted gave no rights to commence mining or related operations and that under the agreement the lessee obtained no interest in land unless and until rights to mine or other rights over the land were available to it, and they were conditioned in the first instance on the consent of the owner (ibid, 307). His Honour considered the particular mining lease, absent compliance with the conditions, was not either land nor an interest in land. In reaching that conclusion Rowland J had referred to Brown v Heffer [1967] HCA 40; (1967) 116 CLR 344 in which (at 351-2) Windeyer J discussed a contract for the sale of land which depended for its force on ministerial consent:
"While the question whether the Minister would consent was still pending, the testator or his executor was not at liberty to enter into any transaction inconsistent with an obligation to perform his contract with the purchaser. The purchaser's rights to have the testator and his executor do nothing to his prejudice were enforceable in equity by injunction. But they did not create an equitable interest in the land. However, accepting all this, as soon as the Minister consented the instrument between the parties was no longer conditional. It became absolute and operative. And, as I understand the position, it then operated according to its tenor. It became effective because consent was given but the effect it got accorded with its terms. The result it seems to me is that the giving of the consent had a kind of retroactive effect making the instrument effective as from its date." (Emphasis added)
124 It was the emphasised portion in this passage upon which Rowland J drew for his conclusion in Worsley Alumina that no interest in the land was created until the right to mine came into existence. But the important point in Brown v Heffer was that the transaction depended upon the ministerial consent for its validity and effect, and thus:
"if when the Minister's consent is required for a transaction to be valid and effective his consent is finally and conclusively refused, the transaction is at an end." (per Windeyer J at 351, ibid).
125 For the reasons articulated in Anaconda and already discussed above, that is not the situation here. In my view, notwithstanding the plaintiff's rights to enter and mine were not to be enlivened until the Minister's consent was given and the condition precedent to its effect was met (on 20 January 1997), as a matter of construction the terms of the sublease were such as to create an equitable interest in the plaintiff from 9 December 1996.
126 The defendant next submitted that the effect of reg 110(3) of the Mining Regulations was to preclude any legal or equitable interest in the plaintiff until the sublease was registered.
127 As against this, the plaintiff based its position on Barry v Heider [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197, in which the High Court acknowledged that a similar provision in Torrens title legislation did not preclude unregistered equitable interests being created in land.
128 In Barry v Heider the relevant provision was s 41(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) which stipulated:
"No instrument, until registered ... shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any land under the provisions of this Act...."
129 The substantial ground of appeal was that on a proper construction of the statutory provisions the transfer was inoperative for any purpose until registration. The Court held that notwithstanding s 41(1) an unregistered transfer of land conferred upon the transferee an equitable claim or right to the land. This conclusion was arrived at on examination of the particular statutory context. Griffith CJ (with whom Barton J agreed) drew attention to numerous provisions in the Real Property act 1900 which recognised the existence of equitable claims or title to land before, and irrespective of, registration - observing, for example, that the provisions relating to caveats embodied a scheme expressly devised for the protection of equitable rights (ibid, 206). This being so, it followed that the subject transfer conferred on the transferee an equitable claim or right to the land recognised by the law. Referring to the Torrens system statutes of the States, Isaacs J said (ibid, 213):
"They have long, and in every State, been regarded as in the main conveyancing enactments, and as giving greater certainty to titles of registered proprietors, but not in any way destroying the fundamental doctrines by which Courts of Equity have enforced, as against registered proprietors, conscientious obligations entered into by them."
"The Land Transfer Act (sic) does not touch the form of contracts. A proprietor may contract as he pleases, and his obligation to fulfil the contract will depend on ordinary principles and rules of law and equity, except as expressly or by necessary implication modified by the Act. Sec. 43, for instance, makes provision with respect to the case of a bona fide purchaser without notice, and the section says 'any rule of law or equity to the contrary notwithstanding.' Consequently, sec. 41, in denying effect to an instrument until registration, does not touch whatever rights are behind it. Parties may have a right to have such an instrument executed and registered; and that right, according to accepted rules of equity, is an estate or interest in the land. Until that instrument is executed, sec. 41 cannot affect the matter, and if the instrument is executed it is plain in its inefficacy until registered - that is, until statutory completion as an instrument of title - cannot cut down or merge the pre-existing right which led to its execution.
The basis of the contention therefore fails, and we have to consider the position as to equitable remedies as if the land were not under the Statute."
130 Here the plaintiff submits there is no relevant difference between reg 110(3) of the Mining Regulations and s 41(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The only difference is that the latter referred to an "instrument" whereas the former refers to "dealings". It is submitted there is no material difference between those terms. The defendant counters this with the submission that Barry v Heider has no application to dealings under the Mining Act because the statutory context is quite different and indeed, unlike Torrens system legislation one of the aims of which is to prevent the registration of equitable interests, the Mining Act and Mining Regulations require the registration of equitable interests.
131 It may be accepted that one aim of Torrens system legislation is to prevent the registration of equitable interests. Thus, trusts are not registrable: s 55 Transfer of Land act 1893 (WA). In Wolfson v Registrar General (NSW) [1934] HCA 29; (1934) 51 CLR 300, Rich and Evatt JJ, speaking of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), said (at 308):
"... the declared policy of the system is to keep trusts off the register, and it appears to us that the notification of such special and elaborate equities as those involved in the present case as encumbrances is within the very evil to which the Act was directed. The register was not to present a picture of legal ownership trammelled by all sorts of equitable rights in others, which those who dealt with the registered proprietor must take into account. Sec. 95(4) affords no justification for putting them upon the register. Such rights must be protected by caveat, not by notification."
132 In In re Blue Bird Gold Mines NL (1942) 44 WALR 85 Dwyer J held that a memorandum of charge executed by the company over (inter alia) certain gold-mining leases, in favour of the Bank of New South Wales, gave the Bank no legal nor equitable interest for want of approval by the Minister and registration. Section 82 of the Mining Act 1904 (WA) empowered the lessee of a mining lease, with the approval of the Minister, to encumber or otherwise deal with the lease, but further provided that no instrument shall be effectual to pass any interest in a lease or in any way charge or encumber a lease, until registered.
133 In Knezevich v Mihalj, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 5630; 23 November 1984, Rowland J reached a contrary conclusion in respect of an agreement to sell an interest in a gold-mining lease, the agreement not having been approved by the Minister and not registered. His Honour upheld the decision of the warden ordering specific performance of the agreement. That case fell to be decided under the Mining Act 1978 (WA).
134 Rowland J distinguished Blue Bird Gold Mines on a number of grounds. The first was that s 82 of the 1904 Act expressly stipulated that no instrument would be effectual to pass any interest etc until registered, whereas there was no such restriction in the 1978 Act - s 82 of the latter made ministerial approval a condition but did not restrict the effect of an instrument executed without such approval. Secondly, his Honour considered there were provisions in the 1978 Act which had not been in the 1904 Act and which tended to support a construction similar to that given to the Torrens system legislation by the High Court in Barry v Heider. Rowland J specifically instanced s 119(2), s 119(4) and the provisions allowing registration of caveats to support a claimed interest in a mining tenement which had not been in the 1904 Act and which tended to support a construction similar to that given to the Torrens system legislation by the High Court in Barry v Heider. For those reasons he concluded that reg 110(3) must be read down in the same way the similar provision in the Torrens legislation was read down by the High Court in Barry v Heider.
135 The defendant maintains the view of Dwyer J in Blue Bird Gold Mines is still correct in principle and should be followed despite Knezevich v Mihalj. This submission necessitates further consideration of the Mining Act 1978 and the Mining Regulations 1981.
136 Reference has already been made to s 82(1)(d) of the Mining Act. The registration of instruments creating, assigning or surrendering equitable interest is expressly contemplated by s 103A:
"103A (1) Where an instrument creating, assigning or surrendering a legal or equitable interest in a mining tenement ... required to be registered under this Act it shall be lodged for registration in such manner as may be prescribed...."
137 Such interests may not be created etc otherwise than in writing - s 119(2) provides:
"A legal or equitable interest in or affecting a mining tenement is not capable of being created, assigned, affected or dealt with, whether directly or indirectly, except by an instrument in writing signed by the person creating, assigning or otherwise dealing with the interest."
138 This provision takes effect according to its tenor: Sorna Pty Ltd v Flint [2000] WASCA 22; (2000) 21 WAR 563.
139 The terms of reg 110 have been set out above. Regulation 110(1) requires all dealings affecting a mining tenement to be lodged for registration. The word "dealings" is not defined. Recourse to authority does not help; meaning is always dependent on the context. In this legislation the word "dealing(s)" or expression "dealt with" (as in s 119(2)) clearly are intended to have wide meaning. I consider they connote any kind of business, trading or commercial activity in relation to or affecting a mining tenement or legal or equitable interest in a mining tenement.
140 I accept the defendant's submission that a dealing which creates an equitable interest in a mining tenement is a dealing "affecting" the tenement within the meaning of that term in subreg (1) of reg 110. The regulation must be read as a whole. The word "dealings" in subreg (3) must have the same meaning as it does in subreg (1). Thus, as a matter of construction an instrument in writing creating an equitable interest in or affecting a mining tenement is required by reg 110(1) to be registered and by virtue of reg 110(3) is not effectual to pass any estate or interest in such tenement until so registered.
141 The provisions of Part VI of the Mining Act 1978 do not detract from this conclusion. Part VI is entitled "Caveats". Section 121(1) authorises any person claiming any interest in a mining tenement to lodge a caveat, the effect of which is to forbid the registration of any transfer or other instrument affecting the tenement or interest.
142 Once a caveat is lodged a memorial or copy of it is to be entered in the register (s 121(3)). A caveat lapses on the order of a warden for its removal, its withdrawal by the caveator or on the expiration of 14 days after notice is given to the caveator that application has been made for the registration of a transfer or other instrument affecting the subject matter of the caveat (s 122(1)).
143 It is apparent the provisions of Part VI afford a different and complementary protection to the holder of a legal or equitable interest in or affecting a mining tenement, than mere registration of the instrument creating it. Registration of the instrument would not necessarily prevent a dealing on the register; a caveat has that specific purpose. There is nothing in Part VI which is in conflict with the view that s 110(1) requires registration of equitable interests and that s 110(3) operates to mean they are not effectual to pass any estate or interest in the tenement until registered.
144 For these reasons I find that the sublease was not effectual to pass any estate or interest in the Alcoa mining tenement to the plaintiff until 20 January 1997.
145 Notwithstanding this finding, I propose to consider the other issues in the case.
No right in plaintiff to lawfully mine limestone in encroachment area
146 This point arises on the plaintiff's pleading that under the sublease the plaintiff is entitled to (inter alia) own all minerals lawfully mined from the land, including limestone. That right is said to be given by s 85(2)(b) of the Mining Act.
147 The defendant says that it was a condition of the Alcoa lease that no mining should occur within 800 metres of a bore.
148 Under the sublease the plaintiff is bound by the terms of the Alcoa lease (cl 8(a)). It was not in dispute that the entirety of the area in which encroachment occurred is within 800 metres of four production bores.
149 Nor is it disputed that at all relevant times the plaintiff had not complied with relevant conditions and requirements relating to environmental protection, native title and mining legislation. (The plaintiff argues that although those conditions and requirements had not been met by it at that time - nor by the time of trial - they could be met in due course. However for reasons which will become apparent it is not necessary for me to address that argument).
150 The defendant therefore argues that the plaintiff's right to own the limestone arose only once it had been lawfully mined and since the plaintiff could not lawfully have mined limestone in this area it could have no right to ownership of the limestone which was in fact mined by the defendant's agent. It is contended accordingly that the defendant's quarrying has not deprived the plaintiff of anything for which the plaintiff can now claim damages.
151 The defendant responds to this submission directly, arguing that the wide meaning of the words "lawfully mined" would give rise to the consequence that for a minor breach of the conditions a miner would lose all rights to minerals mined during the period the condition was not met, and that cannot have been intended. The plaintiff says further that since the defendant had obtained the necessary approvals (apart from the plaintiff's consent) to quarry the area the logical inference is that the plaintiff could have done likewise. Finally the plaintiff says that in any event there was no bar to quarrying because the defendant had all the necessary approvals, and so whether the actual material quarried in the area of encroachment was quarried by the defendant or the plaintiff was irrelevant.
152 I consider the submissions of both parties on this issue miss the point. Again it turns on the proper construction of the statute. Section 85(2) relevantly provides that:
(a) ...
(b) owns all minerals lawfully mined from the land under the mining lease."
153 The words "under the mining lease" are important. The words "lawfully mined" may well not have the wide meaning suggested by the defendant - not even breach of condition (or failure to obtain an approval) would necessarily render the mining "unlawful". That would no doubt depend upon the particular circumstances. But whether that be so or not does not matter here. That is because the ownership being referred to is ownership of minerals (lawfully) "mined under the ... lease." The plain meaning of the subsection is that the lessee owns minerals mined by the lessee (or the lessee's agents) in the exercise of the lessee's rights under the lease: compare Sirr v Dwyer [1984] WAR 326. The mining of the limestone here was ex hypothesi not done in the purported exercise of any rights under the sublease. Section 85(2) accordingly did not give rise to any rights of ownership of the limestone in the plaintiff.
Whether cause of action in damages to protect mining rights
154 I turn now to the second broad ground on which the defendant denies liability, namely that even if the sublease did confer mining rights on the plaintiff prior to 20 January 1997 the plaintiff has not shown that interference to the types of rights granted to it gives rise to any cause of action for damages at common law.
155 The plaintiff's case is put as trespass and conversion. I shall deal with the claim in trespass first.
156 It is common ground that put at its highest the plaintiff's interest under the sublease is a profit a prendre, that is "the right to take some product of the land or part of the soil from the land of another": CCH "Macquarie Dictionary of Law" 2nd Ed., Sydney: CCH, 1993, 138); Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd & Ors v Attorney General (NSW); ex rel Corporate Affairs Commission (1981) 30 ACR 257.
157 I think it clear however that the sublease does give an interest in the land. As Murray J pointed out in Sorna Pty Ltd v Flint (supra), at 571, whatever the form of a tenement under the Mining Act 1978 it "includes the specified piece of land in respect of which the mining tenement is so granted or required" (s 8(1)). A mining tenement is a right to exclusive possession of land for mining purposes: see s 7 Property Law Act 1969 (WA); s 85(2) and (3) of the Mining Act; Adamson v Hayes [1973] HCA 6; (1972-1973) 130 CLR 276.
158 The first question is whether the interest here is one capable of grounding an action in trespass.
159 Every unlawful entry by a person on land in the possession of another is an actionable trespass whether or not damage is shown. A mistaken belief that the trespasser has a right of entry is not a defence: Shattock v Devlin [1990] 2 NZLR 88, 113-114. A person having the right of possession of land acquires possession of it in law by entry. When that occurs possession relates back to the time at which the right of entry accrued, and action may be taken for a trespass committed before the entry, the trespasser becoming a wrongdoer by relation back: "Halsbury's Laws of Australia", Vol 26, [415-510] and cases there cited.
160 The plaintiff accordingly acquired possession of the subleased land on 20 January 1997 and that related back to 9 December 1996. Given the defendant admits the encroachment and my finding that the plaintiff was entitled to exclusive possession for mining purposes, the plaintiff must be entitled to damages in trespass. Whether or not an award would be more than nominal will depend upon proof of actual damage.
161 I turn to the issue of conversion. The plaintiff contends that if it be found that the plaintiff had a right in respect of the land (as at the time of encroachment), whether then capable of immediate exercise or not, which would have allowed it ultimately to mine the land and own the minerals lawfully mined, then its position is analogous to that of the holder of a reversionary interest who has an action on the case for damage caused to his reversionary interest by the defendant's conversion. The defendant argues there was no property of the plaintiff's to be converted. The plaintiff (it is said) had no proprietary rights in the limestone prior to it being mined and as it was not mined by or on behalf of the plaintiff it did not then become the plaintiff's property and so could not be converted.
162 Conversion involves the deliberate dealing with a chattel in a manner inconsistent with the rights of another whereby the other is deprived of the use and possession of it: Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott [1946] HCA 46; (1946) 74 CLR 204; Claxton v Everingham (1884) 6 ALT 132. It has been defined as an intentional exercise of control over a chattel by a person which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the person may justly be required to pay its full value: Fleming "The Law of Torts", Ninth Ed, p 60-61, and see Wm L Prosser "The Nature of Conversion" (1957) 42 Cornell LQ 168. The defendant need not intend to question or deny the plaintiff's rights - it is enough that his conduct is inconsistent with those rights; nor does the wrong of conversion involve any element of dishonesty in the tortfeaser: "Clerk & Lindsell on Torts", 14th Ed, p 671, [1077]; Rendell v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1957] VicRp 88; [1957] VR 604; (1958) ALR 30. An action in conversion is founded upon possession or the right to immediate possession: Wertheim v Cheel [1885] VicLawRp 24; (1885) 11 VLR 107; Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VicRp 8; [1984] VR 97; Wood v Mason Bros Ltd (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 66; 8 WM 114.
163 In Moonta Prospecting Syndicate Ltd v Neill [1929] SASR 335 a licence agreement gave the defendant the right to prospect, mine for and sell ore from a shaft, the property of a mining company. The defendant continued to mine after the licence had expired until restrained by interlocutory injunction. The company sued in trespass. Angus Parsons J held that although the licence was non-exclusive, as against a wrongdoer the defendant would have had a sufficient possessory right, not only in the minerals which had been won, but in the property in which he was licensed to search and win minerals, so as to entitle him to maintain an action in trover (ibid, p 338). However, whatever possessory right, if any, the defendant might have had against a stranger, he certainly never obtained possession as against the company - and the company never having parted with possession to the defendant, trespass was the proper remedy for any injury to its possession. Once the licence expired, the defendant became a trespasser.
164 Whether the holder of an equitable interest only in property and who has never had possession of it has sufficient title to support an action for conversion was doubted in White v Elder, Smith and Co Ltd [1934] SASR 56. By a registered bill of sale one Kerrison assigned certain sheep and their wool (including future acquired sheep and wool) to the appellant. Kerrison sold sheep and wool through the respondent as auctioneer. After learning of the bill of sale the respondent continued to sell Kerrison's sheep and wool taking the proceeds to reduce his indebtedness to the respondent. Kerrison became in default under the bill. The respondent did not become aware of that and continued to sell Kerrison's sheep and wool, retaining the proceeds as before. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia found that the sheep were in Kerrison's possession immediately prior to the sale and the wool was shorn and sold by him under implied licence from the appellant with the consequence that the respondent was entitled to retain the proceeds. It was in this context the court said (obiter) at 61 (ibid):
"On this view of the case it is unnecessary to come to any final conclusion upon the other points that were raised. It is sufficient to say that it is by no means clear that an equitable mortgagee (who has never had possession of the mortgaged chattel) has any such title as is required to support an action for conversion. The gist of the action is 'the wrongful detention, amounting to conversion, of personal property from the true owner' (Sutton on Personal Actions, at p 49), and for that purpose the plaintiff has to prove an absolute or special property in the goods, and his right to immediate possession (Phillips on Evidence, Vol II, at p 118)."
165 I have already found that the plaintiff acquired exclusive possession of the subleased land on 20 January 1997 and that related back to 9 December 1996. The questions then it seems to me are whether the plaintiff had an absolute or sufficient special property in the limestone mined by the defendant from the area of encroachment and if so, whether the plaintiff had possession or a right to immediate possession of it.
166 The limestone was part of the realty until mined and only then became a chattel. The limestone was mined before 20 January 1997 - that is, prior to any equitable interest in it passing to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had no other rights of ownership in the limestone. Nor, for the same reasons, did the plaintiff have any right to immediate possession of the limestone prior to 20 January 1997. It follows that the plaintiff's claim in conversion of the limestone cannot be maintained.
167 Although not addressed in the plaintiff's closing submissions, the re-amended statement of claim did plead a claim for compensation under s 77 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA), for alleged breach of s 10 of that Act. Shortly put, this was said to be that the defendant made an implicit representation to Thiess and WA Limestone that the defendant was entitled to authorise his agents to enter upon the subleased land and extract limestone from it, the representation was conduct by the defendant in the course of trade or commerce and it was "untrue, misleading and deceptive". It is put that as a result of and induced by the representation Thiess and WA Limestone entered the land, extracted limestone and disposed of it to the use of the defendant.
168 All that the defendant says about this claim is that it is misconceived as there was never any false or misleading representation upon which the plaintiff could found a cause of action for damages against the defendant.
169 The Fair Trading Act expressly binds the Crown in all its capacities (s 3).
170 Section 10 provides that a person shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. "Trade or commerce" is defined as including any business or professional activity (s 5(1)). Section 10 of the Fair Trading act has its counterpart in s 52 of the Trade Practices act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA").
171 Section 77(2) of the Fair Trading Act relevantly provides that:
"(2) Whether or not other proceedings have been instituted under this Act in relation to a contravention, the Court may-
(a) on the application of a person who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage by reason of the contravention;
(b) ...
make orders under this section.
(3) The orders that may be made under this section include-
"(e) an order directing the person who engaged in the conduct or a person who was involved in the contravention constituted by the conduct to pay to the person who suffered the loss or damage the amount of the loss or damage".
172 By s 77(4) an application under subs (2) in relation to a contravention of s 11 may be made at any time within two years after the cause of action accrued or, in any other case, at any time within three years after the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff here alleges a contravention of s 10 so the three year limitation period applies. The writ was obviously filed well within time.
173 It has been said of s 52 of the TPA that it is a comprehensive provision of wide impact and that the ordinary meaning of the words used in it should not be qualified by reference to established common law principles of liability: per Fox J in Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd [1981] FCA 35; (1981) 53 FLR 340. Even so, and although not confined to conduct towards consumers, the purpose of consumer protection has been held to be at its heart: Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17; (1990) 169 CLR 594. Thus, whilst the fact that s 52 is in Part V of the TPA which is entitled "Consumer Protection" does not mean that it should be read down to apply only if consumers, as such, were misled, nonetheless the intention of the section is to protect members of the public in their capacity as consumers of goods or services: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44; (1982) 149 CLR 191 per Mason J at 202. Heydon "Trade Practices Law", Vol 1, [11.120], Law Book Co, argues that the prohibitions of Div 1 of Part V of the TPA are not to be limited to conduct affecting consumers. He advances three reasons: first, s 52 concerns conduct not only in relation to goods and services, but generally; secondly, the language of the section is clear and unambiguous (so that reference to the heading of Part V as an aid to construction is not justified) and third the omission of the word "consumers" from the section must be taken to be deliberate.
174 In the construction of s 10 and s 77 of the Fair Trading Act that which would promote the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred: s 18 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). The preamble describes the Fair Trading Act as one:
"... to regulate the supply, advertising and description of goods and services and, in certain respects, the disposal of interests in land, and to make provision with respect to certain unfair or undesirable trade practices, as to the conditions and warranties to be applicable in consumer transactions, and as to the establishment of Codes of Practice as between certain classes of suppliers and consumers, and for related purposes."
175 By s 4 the Act applies to and in respect of:
"... an acquisition or supply or the proposed acquisition or supply of goods or services, or the disposal or proposed disposal of an interest in land...."
176 It seems to me the provisions of the Fair Trading Act are directed to the provision of goods and services (including interests in land) and are intended to protect consumers. Further, the requirement that the loss or damage be suffered "by reason of the contravention" (that is, by reason of the misleading or deceptive conduct) connotes a notion of causation between the making of the representation alleged and the loss or damage claimed. There is in my view no relevant nexus here between the defendant's conduct in respect of Thiess and WA Limestone and the loss or damage claimed by the plaintiff. Nor did the defendant's conduct involve the supply of goods or services as between the plaintiff and defendant and there was no relevant reliance by the plaintiff on the implied representation alleged. I accept the defendant's submission that the Fair Trading Act has no application to the present circumstances.
177 Limestone was being mined from eight faces in the quarry. For present purposes I will designate them as F1 etc. There was a cave with apparently some Aboriginal heritage and geographical significance at the south-east end of the original boundary. F6 and F8 were adjacent to that. F3 was roughly in the middle of the original quarry area. F4 was just outside the western boundary of the original area and inside the amended boundary, but did not encroach into the sublease. F2 was on the northern side of the original boundary and extended beyond it into the amended area but again did not encroach into the sublease. F1 was outside the original quarry boundary to the north-east of F2; most of it was within the amended boundary but part of it encroached into the subleased area. F5 and F7 were to the north of F1 and partially encroached into the subleased area. The faces relevant to the encroachment are therefore F1, F5 and F7.
178 Payment to the contractor was based on the tonnage of material over a weighbridge at the harbour. The weighbridge record includes the date, tonnage, type of material and source. The source was described only as from within the original quarry boundary or from outside it. As is apparent from what I have said above, a description that material was sourced outside the original boundary did not mean that it came from the sublease area. No separate record was kept of the amount of material from individual faces.
179 The site diaries and other documents show that the quarrying operation did not extent into the sublease area until some time after 7 December 1996. I accept Brown's evidence on this. The defendant admits encroachment commenced on or about 9 December 1996 (Defence, par 5(e)) and that seems to be common ground. I accept it.
180 F1, F2, F5 and F6 were operating during December 1996. Those faces as well as F7 and F8 operated during January 1997, although I am satisfied quarrying operations to extract rock at F1 and F5 had stopped by 20 January 1997, as had those at F7 (which had only operated for seven days between 13 and 19 January 1997).
181 The first material from the quarry under the Thiess contract went over the weighbridge on 14 October 1996. The records (summarised in attachment 3 to Brown's statement Ex D15) show F1 was worked between 12 to 20 November 1996 and then from 25 November 1996 until 20 January 1997. F5 was worked from 22 November 1996 until 19 January 1997 and F7 was developed between 6 to 12 January and worked from 13 to 19 January 1997.
182 The last material over the weighbridge before the Christmas break was on 19 December 1996. The first material over the weighbridge after the Christmas break was on 7 January 1997.
183 Between 20 December 1996 and 29 January 1997, 32,866.51 tonnes of material went over the weighbridge. Of that, 12,977.14 was sourced outside the original boundary.
184 The plaintiff pleads that between about 9 December 1996 and about 27 January 1997 the defendant "... mined and carried away and disposed of to his own use, 13,677 bank cubic metres ("BCM") of limestone rock (statement of claim, par 5) and that at all material times the defendant knew he:
"... was mining and carrying away limestone rock to which he was not entitled" (statement of claim, par 7).
185 Expert evidence was called by both parties. Each led evidence from five expert witnesses.
186 The plaintiff's expert witnesses were Robinson (a surveyor), Mr Al Maynard (a consulting geologist), Mr Aurelio Farnese (a company director), Mr Nello Siragusa (a civil engineer) and Mr Scott Gillam (Area Manager, CSR/Readymix, Albany). The defendant called Mr Bradley Gillett (a surveyor), Mr John Mullally (a surveyor), Dr Michael Paul (a civil engineer), Mr Gavin Buckingham (accountant and partner, Arthur Anderson, Perth) and Mr William Delaney (principal, ABT Engineering Pty Ltd).
187 By way of a preliminary point the defendant submitted the plaintiff should be confined to its case as pleaded and presented prior to trial, specifically, to the quantity of limestone actually removed from the area of the sublease. This point has some importance.
188 The re-amended statement of claim pleads that the defendant, by his agents, entered into the land, mined, carried away and disposed of limestone to his own use. The emphasis is on mining and carrying away.
189 Until trial, the statement of evidence of the plaintiff's witness Robinson (24 May 2000: Ex P8) referred expressly to volumes "broken and removed" or limestone "extracted"; however in his evidence at trial Robinson said his calculation was not of limestone removed from the area but included blast affected limestone, whether it remained on the land or not.
190 The defendant argues that unless the plaintiff is confined to the case pleaded the defendant will suffer significant prejudice because nothing prior to trial would have alerted him to the fact the plaintiff was making a claim in respect of all blast affected material. I accept this submission. The plaintiff should be confined to its pleaded reliance on material removed.
191 It is necessary to say something about the different categories of, and uses for, limestone.
192 In this case the limestone was used for construction of a harbour and breakwater. The limestone consisted broadly of two types, core and armour. The core limestone (which is not as dense as armour) is dumped progressively into the sea and armour stone is then placed over it. Armour stone is of better quality - that is to say harder, or of greater density - and protects the core from the action of tide and waves. There are different classes of armour stone, Dr Paul explained (t 506) that the size of armour stone used varies with the specific gravity of the material. While granite has a specific gravity of approximately 2.65 or slightly higher, limestone can vary in specific gravity from 2.0 to 2.4 or 2.5. The less dense the material the larger the rock required. Thus, with limestone having a specific gravity of 2.0 it might be necessary to use a 10 tonne block to do the same job as a 5 tonne granite block, because the force exerted by the wave is affected by the size of the material.
193 Other uses of limestone include building products such as tiles and cladding, paving stones, gravel or road base and simply as rubble.
194 Boreham's evidence was that 39,000 tonnes of limestone used in the harbour construction came from outside the original quarry boundary (ex D1, Boreham [54]). The actual figure was 38,140.66 tonnes of which 11,845.36 tonnes was "core/other"; the balance was armour stone (Ex P1, trial doct 102).
195 Thiess recorded the tonnage of limestone removed from the quarry at a weighbridge at harbour site. Those weighbridge dockets are divided by reference to the class of limestone and the source. The source identified in the weighbridge dockets is either "quarry" or "extended quarry". "Extended quarry" refers to the area outside the original quarry boundary (Ex D15, Brown [11]) and so includes the whole of the extended area not just the area of encroachment. Most of F1 and F5 and about one-third of F7 were outside the area of encroachment (see trial doct 99). Furthermore, F6 was worked from 6 to 24 January 1997, F7 was worked between 13 and 19 January and F2 was worked through the whole of the period (TD 100) - none of these was in the area of encroachment.
196 The plaintiff's submission that the weighbridge dockets provide a reasonably accurate measure of the tonnage of stone taken from the sublease area between 9 December 1996 and 20 January 1997 cannot be accepted in these circumstances - of themselves, they can give no indication of that at all.
197 Clearly the ideal method of measuring the quantity of material removed by quarrying would involve surveys of the area before and after it was taken. A survey measures BCM that is, the volume of material (I will refer simply to limestone, since limestone rock is what we are concerned with here). Once an in situ cubic metre of limestone has been disturbed (eg by blasting) it has more bulk, ie occupies a larger volume. This is expressed as loose cubic metres ("LCM"). In order to ascertain the BCM the LCM has to be multiplied by a bulking factor. The tonnage may then be calculated by multiplying the BCM by the specific gravity of the particular class of limestone.
198 In this case the quarries were rehabilitated. That is done for both aesthetic and safety reasons. It involves "battering" which is collapsing the top of the quarry face by blasting and/or bulldozing rubble over the top of the face or up from the base. During battering, material other than limestone becomes mixed with the loose rock. This other material is known as fines. This has an effect on the value of any remaining rock. There is a limit to the amount of fines that will be tolerated. An example of this is to be found in the specification for the limestone core material in the contract with Thiess E166 (Ex P1, TD 25, S13 2.1.8). Similarly the specification for rubble provides that the rubble shall be substantially free from sand, silt, clay and vegetation (S13 - 2.1.9).
199 Only one witness called by the plaintiff gave evidence going to the issue of the amount of limestone removed. That was Robinson. His evidence-in-chief (statement, ex P8) was that the total earth broken and removed from the quarry was 13,677 x (sg) 2.65 = 36,244 tonnes). His statement was dated 24 May 2000. He had not seen Gillett's survey report (done in April 1997) at that time and Mullally's report was not done until 26 August 2000.
200 As already mentioned, in cross-examination Robinson made it clear that his calculation was of all blast-affected material, not the quantity of material removed from the area. He acknowledged that he and Mullally measured different things.
201 Mullally has had 16 years experience as an engineering surveyor and has been employed by the Department of Transport or its predecessor (the Department of Marine and Harbours) since 1986. He made three separate estimations of the amount of material removed from the sublease area. The first was in February 1997. For that he used an orthophoto and survey information provided by Thiess. The second was in November 1997. He relied on his previous information plus the results of two surveys of the area he made in May and October 1997 respectively. The third was a confirmatory recalculation in July 2000 using all the previous information. He prepared Digital Terrain Models ("DTM") that represented ground surfaces. He used those as input to computer software that calculates the volume differences between two surfaces by comparing two DTM. In this way, by comparing the DTM of the original ground surface and the DTM of the ground surface after quarrying, the volume of material removed can be determined. Obviously much depends on the computer software used. Mullally's experience of the software he used for these calculations and other products he has used on other occasions has been that their various volume calculations have normally agreed within 2 per cent.
202 Mullally's method made allowance for complicating factors present in this case. A comparison of surface levels at different times may show the latest survey level as lower than the original survey level: volumes calculated on that basis are referred to as Cut volume. Volumes calculated on the basis of later survey results showing a level higher from the original are referred to as Fill Volumes.
203 Cut represents the net volume of material removed. This may not necessarily be all material removed. In some cases, material has been removed, but other unused material has been put back into the excavation, typically to batter the slopes. This is LCM and when placed back into the excavation would have a greater volume than when it was in its original, unexcavated, state. Furthermore, the loosely placed material has the potential to consolidate over time, and this in turn would reduce the loose volume. These considerations complicate the calculations of volumes, and limits the accuracy to which the volume of material actually removed can be determined.
204 Fill represents volumes of material placed above the original surface. Normally, these would represent piles of unused material, that is, material disturbed but not removed from the sublease area.
205 The evidence shows that WA Limestone's blasting operations in the sublease area produced a range of material for use on the breakwater, as might be expected. It is clear that not all the blasted material was removed.
206 At the time of the Thiess survey in January 1997, some unused material had been left in stockpiles, and some had been used to batter the quarry faces to a safe slope, although battering was not complete. At the time of the Transport survey in May 1997, the battering had been completed with additional material placed against the quarry slopes.
207 According to Mullally, between May 1997 and the survey in October 1997, material had been removed from the quarry, and the quarry faces within the Finesky sublease were mostly exposed. I accept that was so. In cross-examination Simunovich acknowledged that Finesky had sold 4000 tonnes of this material to a contractor for $3 per tonne during 1997.
208 Mullally did not consider the results using the January 1997 Thiess survey to be accurate because the survey was essentially of the tops and toes of the quarry faces (and so did not account for the loose material used to batter the slope), the survey density was low (and was therefore not necessarily a close representation of the actual surface) and it was over a limited area and did not include stockpiles of unused material.
209 Using the Department of Transport survey of May 1997 he computed a cut volume of 6529m3 and a fill volume of 1453m3. He did not consider this to give a true representation of the total volume removed because unused material had been used to batter the slope.
210 The October 1997 survey produced a cut volume of 9087m3 and a fill volume of 1350m3. Between May and October 1997 loose material had been removed from the quarry faces. In Mullally's opinion the cut volume so computed is a close approximation of the total amount of material actually excavated - however, as he pointed out, it includes material excavated but not removed from the quarry (bearing in mind he had been asked to calculate the volume actually removed).
211 To estimate the volume of material disturbed but not removed (ie still in the sublease area) by the defendant he first calculated the difference in the two cut volumes above (255m3). He assumed that represented the volume of fill (in LCM) used to batter the faces and later removed by the plaintiff. He next calculated the difference between the two fill volumes (103m3) and assumed this represented the volume of stockpiled loose material (in LCM) later removed by the plaintiff.
212 From these figures he estimated the total volume of limestone disturbed but left by the plaintiff as 4011m3 LCM (2558 + 1350 + 103m3) and the volume removed by the plaintiff as 2661m3 LCM (255 + 103m3). He estimated the total volume of limestone disturbed by the defendant was 9087 BCM and the total amount removed by the plaintiff was that figure less 4011 LCM. To determine the actual volume it is of course necessary to convert LCM to BCM by using a "bulking factor".
213 Mullally did not actually determine a bulking factor for this limestone but merely gave an example of how the calculation is made (in his example an assumed bulking factor of 1.35 would produce a figure of 6086 BCM of limestone removed).
214 In his report (ex D13) Beattie used a bulking factor of 75 per cent. If that is applied to Mullally's figures, it gives a BCM of 2292 (4011 [rparenmid] 1.75 = 2292 BCM), which would in turn give a figure of 6795 BCM for limestone removed (9087 BCM - 2292 BCM = 6795 BCM).
215 The defendant's geological evidence was that tests on the limestone actually taken from the sublease area showed a density varying between 2.480 to 2.545 tonnes/m3 (Report by Soil & Rock Engineering Pty Ltd, ex D13, p 9, Table 1; Senini, statement 30 October 2000, ex D9, [12]; Boreham at t 471). There is no reason that evidence should not be accepted. The defendant was prepared to adopt a conversion factor (BCM to tonnes) of 2.545 (defendant's written closing submissions dated 21 November 2000, p 18, [71]) and I do likewise. Using that, the effect of Mullally's evidence is that on his calculations the defendant actually removed 17,293 tonnes (6795 BCM x 2.545 = 17,293.27 tonnes) of limestone from the sublease area.
216 Bradley Gillett has been a licensed surveyor in Western Australia since 1996. He has had four years general consulting surveying experience in Perth and Kununurra and has worked extensively throughout Western Australia and the Northern Territory. In April 1997 he was employed by Warren F Johnson, Surveyors, Planners and Engineers, who were contracted by Alcoa to re-establish the south-eastern boundaries of the Alcoa lease and to evaluate any encroachment. Like Mullally, he conducted a survey and used DTM. As the original natural surface of the area had not been surveyed before quarrying he had to rely on a 1:5000 Exmouth water supply map. Identified key features were matched between the computer map datum and the water supply map data and once the data sets had been aligned as accurately as possible, a volume was calculated between the two surfaces.
217 On Gillett's calculations the volume of limestone removed was 6950 BCM. Using a specific gravity of 2.545 that would be 17,688 tonnes (6950 BCM x 2.545 = 17,687.75 tonnes).
218 There is a margin of error. Gillett points out in his statement (ex D11, p 4) that the calculation between two irregular surfaces are usually accurate to between 5 to 10 per cent of the true volume. However accuracy is affected by the quality and quantity of the survey information measured in the field. In this case the true natural surface information was not available and had to be scaled from a two metre - internal contour map. Gillett was unable to say what effect that had on the true volume here because he did not know how accurate the two metre contour map was. He thought (t 406) the error margin here would be at least 10 per cent. Under the circumstances I consider Gillett's conclusion gives a degree of support to that of Mullally (as opposed to that of Robinson) and based on Mullally's evidence, I accept that the amount of limestone actually removed from the sublease area by the defendant was approximately 17,293 tonnes. That brings me to the question whether the plaintiff suffered damage or loss in fact.
219 The defendant argues the plaintiff claims damages on the basis that it would have been able to quarry the limestone taken by the defendant and have used it to sell for use in paving, tiling, cladding and building products or for armourstone. The defendant disputes that the plaintiff would ever have been able to quarry the limestone for either purpose, for a variety of reasons. In addition, the defendant says that the plaintiff would never have quarried in the subleased area before the sublease expired and also that there is sufficient limestone still available to the plaintiff under the terms of the sublease to satisfy its needs.
220 It is useful to start with general principle. The measure of damages for conversion of minerals where the tortfeasor has acted bona fide and in ignorance is the market price at the quarry, once extracted, less the costs of severing and raising: Bilambil-Terranova Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465 per Reynolds JA. In Roberts v Broken Hill Metals NL, unreported; SCt of WA (Anderson J); Library No 930464; 27 August 1993, a case involving removal of gravel, Anderson J held that:
"As regards compensatory damages, the plaintiff is entitled to receive compensation in a sum which, so far as money can do, will put him in the same position as he would have been in if the defendant had not removed this material from his land. That is the general principle governing the assessment of compensatory damages: Haines v Bendall [1991] HCA 15; (1991) 172 CLR 60 at 63. Where the wrong consists of conversion and the property converted is soil or gravel having a market value, the measure of compensatory damages is, prima facie, the value of the material as it was on the land before removal: Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93."
221 The defendant challenged that approach on appeal (Broken Hill Metals NL v Roberts, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 940431; 18 August 1994) but the Full Court upheld it, citing Bilambil v Terranova (supra), and Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93. Martin v Porter [1839] EngR 165; (1839) 5 M & W 351, in which it was held the value of the mineral as soon as it existed as a chattel formed the measure of damages and that no deduction could be made for the cost of severance, was distinguished (Broken Hill Metals NL v Roberts, ibid, 19-20). Ipp J pointed out that the trend of subsequent decisions suggests the strict rule in Martin v Porter will now apply only where the taking of the mineral is wilful or fraudulent. I do not find that to be so here. In my view the appropriate measure of damages here is the market price of the extracted limestone at the quarry gate, less the cost of severance.
222 As noted above, the defendant submits the plaintiff has suffered no actual loss (and so should not be compensated) for a number of reasons. The first is that the plaintiff has always been financially unable to establish a quarry on the sublease.
223 Considerable evidence was led about the plaintiff's financial position and its operations - or lack of them.
224 The establishment of a quarry for mining limestone by drilling and blasting would involve pre-production fixed startup costs of $768,750 (Report by ABT Engineering, ex D12, p 22 of "ABT.1"). This includes an amount for environmental assessment, which the plaintiff has not carried out. It also covers amounts for engineering studies, market and product testing, site development and access costs and drilling and exploration costs. The plaintiff did not lead any evidence to challenge these costs in relation to drilling and blasting and I accept them.
225 There was a suggestion by the plaintiff after about July 1997 that it would have mined using a diamond-wire cutting technique.
226 The establishment of a quarry for mining limestone by diamond-wire cutting would involve pre-production startup costs of at least $587,500 (ibid). In fact, this amount is supported by the plaintiff's own expert, Farnese. He said that for diamond-wire cutting the initial capital investment would be at least $746,000, but that would only be the cost of the diamond-wire cutting machine. Additional money would need to be spent on drilling before work started, for example to ensure that the area contained sufficient productive rock. Simunovich himself accepted this. Farnese's costings omitted environmental startup costs. In fact in cross-examination Farnese estimated that total startup costs including the cost of machinery, could be in the region of $1 to 1.5 million.
227 The environment startup costs alone would be significant, and were estimated by ABT Engineering as between $100,000 to $150,000. The complexity associated with the environmental review required, which has been set at the level of Public Environmental Review, is illustrated by the detailed guidelines issued by the Department of Environmental Protection to Finesky. A comparable level of detail was required for the nearby Whitecrest quarry, which led to a detailed analysis in the EPA's assessment.
228 There was much more in similar vein. I do not accept Simunovich's assertions that Finesky was an operating (ie trading) company: the evidence in my view is clear that (with the exception of one sale of 4000 tonnes of limestone from the sublease area for a price of $12,000) the plaintiff has never conducted any practical trading or quarrying activities and nor has it undertaken any genuine preparatory work to do so. It has no trading income and no financial resources. It has not attempted to recover limestone from the sublease area. Simunovich conceded that was because the market is not there (t 287). The plaintiff has never made any of the $0.30/tonne royalty payments to Alcoa because no limestone has been taken (apparently no royalty payment was made in respect of the 4000 tonnes sold to a company called Highway Constructions, that being rock already mined and stockpiled on the sublease area by the defendant). Although the plaintiff did produce a Business Plan (TD 95) it was on any view wholly inadequate, disclosed a complete lack of financial resources to implement it and indeed, the plaintiff has never sought finance for it. I accept the criticisms of the Business Plan expressed by the witness Gavin Buckingham; they were cogent and realistic; the overwhelming conclusion is that the Business Plan was simply not viable. In any event, it was not realistically pursued.
229 The next reason advanced by the defendant in support of his argument that the plaintiff has suffered no loss is that if the plaintiff wished to establish a quarry it would need to obtain environmental approvals and even if these were to be forthcoming, they would likely take a very long time and be highly restrictive. There was evidence relating to the Whitecrest quarry which is near the sublease area and affords a reasonable comparison. The Whitecrest quarry environmental approval process took some 69 weeks. The conditions eventually imposed included what the defendant describes as a "highly restrictive" condition relating to further testing for troglobitic fauna before mining could occur.
230 Simunovich admitted that any quarry proposal submitted by Finesky would, in all likelihood, be subject to a condition such as that placed on the Whitecrest quarry. He explained that, until the Whitecrest quarry approval in late 1997, no-one had been concerned about troglobitic fauna in the Cape Range Peninsula. This is consistent with the previous existence of the defendant's quarry, established at an earlier time, without such a restriction. In addition, as part of the environmental assessment, Finesky would need to carry out an ethnographic survey for the purposes of satisfying the Aboriginal Heritage Act. It has never undertaken such a survey, although it is clearly obliged to do so under the sublease and Alcoa lease.
231 The defendant's submission in relation to all the evidence led about his (which was much more extensive than I have set out above) was that the evidence demonstrates that it is doubtful the plaintiff would be able to gain environmental approval for a quarry. Even if such approval were obtained the environmental conditions would very likely contain a condition such as that imposed in relation to the Whitecrest quarry which would make mining practically difficult. Further, carrying out the process to obtain the necessary environmental approvals would be a lengthy matter, which on the Whitecrest experience might take years to achieve.
232 The defendant advanced a further argument related to restrictions on any mining by the plaintiff, namely that which prohibited mining within 800 metres of any bore ("the bore condition"). It was not in dispute that the entirety of the area in which the encroachment occurred is within 800 metres of at least four bores (Miotti, ex D5, TD 96 and 97). On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that it could have requested the bore condition be changed. The evidence was, however, that Alcoa had in fact made such a request in July 1997 (TD 67) for the condition to be amended so as to prohibit mining within 100 metres of any bore or well. The Water and Rivers Commission strongly opposed the granting of the request (TD 71, 19/8/97) and it remains unchanged.
233 In Bilambil-Terranova, (supra), the respondent sought to argue that it was not liable in damages for removing travel from the appellant's land because the appellant did not have and was unlikely to obtain approval for carrying out quarry operations. Reynolds JA ejected the argument as to planning approval. At 479 at [52] he said:
"I have some difficulty in understanding the relevance of planning conditions as to value. The submission which was made, but faintly argued, suggests that if, for example a person enters land and cuts trees for timber, the owner is precluded from recovering the value of the trees as a source of timber, if he could not have received planning permission to cut and market them. I cannot accept that this is the law."
234 Similarly at 494, par [111], Mahoney JA said:
"It was argued that, for zoning reasons, the plaintiff could not mine the gravel. Whether this be so or not (a matter on which I express no opinion) I do not think that that fact would determine the question. The gravel was mined and taken and, as was pointed out in the Livingstone case (Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25), it is the value of what was taken that must be determined. The fact, if it was such, that it was illegally mined does not mean that, having been mined, it is to be valued differently from gravel otherwise available. If the process of valuation of the minerals in situ is to be carried out in the manner to which I have referred, then, the minerals having been mined, and turned to account, the defendant is not to benefit because what he did as not merely wrong qua the plaintiff, but also illegal."
235 Mahoney JA also said (at the same page) that the fact that the owner would not himself have mined the gravel was irrelevant. There the trial Judge had expressly found that the appellant had acquired the land for subdivision and development purposes and had no intention of operating as a commercial vendor of gravel. The Court of Appeal held this to be irrelevant. Reynolds JA said at 477 (ibid):
"Once it is established that a mineral which is converted has a market value then that is the minimum value to the owner. If A deprives B of his chattel and it has a value on the open market it is impossible to contend that the damages should be less than the sum, whoever converted it, and to whatever use B was putting it or intended it to be put."
236 In my view the question whether the plaintiff could have obtained environmental, Aboriginal heritage, water resources or similar approvals is irrelevant. So too is the fact (which I find to be so) that the sublease area contains more than enough limestone to meet the quantities the plaintiff is entitled to take under the sublease. By cl 3(a) the plaintiff could take up to some 100,000 tonnes of limestone each year. The maximum the plaintiff could take over the initial term of four years plus a renewed term of four years, would therefore be 800,000 tonnes. Simunovich estimated there were three million tonnes of limestone suitable for mining in the sublease area (Answers to interrogatories, TD 85, p 15 and t 286). The witness Senini estimated there were 30 million tonnes (Senini statement, ex D9, [12])! Whatever the actual figure may be I am satisfied what is left in situ is far more than the plaintiff was entitled to take under the sublease - but that is presently irrelevant. So too is the fact that there is no evidence that the sublease was renewed at the expiration of its initial four year term and on the evidence as it stands, probably terminated on 8 December 2000. Even if this be so it seems to me to have no bearing on the plaintiff's entitlement to damages by way of compensation for the wrongful removal of limestone from the sublease area by the defendant up to January 1997.
237 I consider the measure of damages to be the value of the extracted limestone at the quarry gate, less the cost of extraction. But that is the value of the limestone to the plaintiff, not to the defendant. Damages are to compensate the plaintiff for its loss.
239 The plaintiff puts its claim on two alternative bases. The first is a claim of $2,029,650 based on use of the limestone for paving, tiling, cladding and other building products. The second is a claim of $587,000 based on use of the limestone as armourstone.
240 For its first claim ("the paving claim") the plaintiffs relied principally on the evidence of Farnese and a report of Al Maynard and Associates (ex P7). The claim is based on Robinson's evidence that the volume of limestone disturbed (or blast affected) was 13,677 BCM and Munyard's evidence that approximately 80 per cent of that volume would be large blocks capable of use as pavers, so giving a yield of just less than 11,000 BCM. It also assumes quarrying and production by diamond-wire cutting so that with all faces of the product being diamond-wire cut the top price of $32m3 for a paver should be applied. I will not refer to the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff here. Suffice it to say it postulates a realisable value of between $3.3 million and $1.9 million.
241 This is really a "lost opportunity" claim. I accept the defendant's submission that given the alleged loss is hypothetical, the question how the plaintiff would have acted had the defendant not committed the wrong must be approached subjectively, albeit having regard to objective evidence to determine the plaintiff's subjective intention: Prast v Town of Cottesloe [2000] WASCA 274, [46] to [49] per Ipp J, and [63] per Parker J.
242 I am satisfied that the plaintiff never had any actual nor genuine intention to mine for pavers and other building products using diamond-wire cutting. It was not until Farnese visited the quarry in July 1999 that diamond-wire cutting was proposed. The significance of this is that there is considerably more wastage involved with other methods. The Business Plan (TD 95), the date of which was never clearly established in evidence but which could not have been before about December 1997 because a letter annexed to it is dated 15 November 1997, does contemplate limestone being used for pavers and other building products but contains no mention of diamond-wire cutting. In his cross-examination of Simunovich, Mr Tannin strongly put that that the proposed method of mining was blasting, the implication being that pavers and building materials would not be mined in that way. I do not accept that. I think it is clear both from the Business Plan and Simunovich's evidence that what was being proposed was a method of blasting described as "pre-splitting". Holes are drilled some 6 inches rather than 2 or 3 metres apart and into which either detonating cord or a product called "Expandex" is then inserted and exploded. The purpose is to control (ie reduce) fragmentation and if possible not to break the rock at all (Simunovich, t 225-229). The Business Plan itself clearly contemplates the limestone being mined for a range of products from roadbase and stone aggregates to pavers and building products (TD 95, [2.1]).
243 However I am not satisfied on the evidence that the plaintiff would have mined the limestone for use as pavers or building products. I consider the evidence led by the plaintiff in that regard to be speculative and lacking in cogency. I am not even persuaded that limestone from the sublease area would be suitable for the purpose. The Soil and Rock Engineering Report (ex D 13) stated ([[8.3]) that the presence of voids and microfractures throughout the fine grained limestone (which comprises some 90-95 per cent of the rock within the sublease area) would preclude it being used in the production of monument stone, wall cladding and polished or unpolished internal floor tiles. Those consultants (ie Neill Beattie) opined the material would be suitable for external paving provided the void density is low but noted no testing had been done to verify compliance with slippage resistance standards. An examination of the two sample cut rocks tendered by Simunovich (Ex p 10 and p 11) tends to confirm these observations.
244 Finally, though, even apart from these considerations it seems to me it would be wrong to take the price of limestone as pavers and building products as the basis for a calculation of the value of the extracted limestone to the plaintiff at the quarry gate, because there was no prospect whatever that it could have been sold for that purpose by the plaintiff. There was no market for it then and nor has any been demonstrated since. I find the plaintiff has not made out the paving claim.
245 I turn now to the plaintiff's claim for a valuation based on use of the limestone as armourstone.
246 A great deal of evidence was led about this. Most of it seems to me to be of little assistance.
247 Nello Siragusa gave evidence (statement 2 June 2000, ex p 5) of contracts in which the developer had no option but to purchase breakwater material and pay a premium on what it would normally have expected to pay for the supply, transport and placement of breakwater material from its own nearby land. The first was construction of the Dawesville Channel near Mandurah. The rock supplied was granite armour at a rate "in the order" of $60/tonne. The material was transported from a quarry at Gosnells and a component of the price reflected that. All he could say about the material component was that it was "substantial". According to Dr Paul, (statement 30 October 2000, Ex D8) who was the Contract Superintendent for the Dawesville Channel Project, that contract was negotiated as a lump sum "no risks" contract rather than as a normal schedule-of-rates contract. Any statements of rates for supply, delivery and placement of rock should therefore be regarded as estimates. Paul gave evidence of what he described as "royalty" payments to owners or operators of quarries for rock used on particular projects. The term is really a misnomer and tends to lead to confusion with true royalty payments, which are payments made to the Crown by way of a levy on the extraction of minerals. So in the present case I would not regard the royalty of $0.30/tonne payable by Alcoa to the Crown under the Alcoa lease to be a measure of the value of limestone extracted - although it would necessarily be a component of that value. It seems to me the true measure of the value of material is the price the owner can get for it on the market (whatever that may be) less the cost of extraction. Paul gave examples of contracts involving payments for armourstone (ie as extracted rock at the quarry) including $0.50/tonne (Esperance Boat Harbour Breakwater, 1981), $1.00/tonne (Hopetoun breakwater, 1983 - granite armourstone), $0.33/tonne (Hopetoun breakwater - limestone armourstone), $2.50/tonne (surplus rock from Yatupa quarry, 1989) and $2.50/tonne (Port of Bunbury - loose rock, 1995).
248 I accept Paul's evidence that prices quoted for the supply, delivery and placing of granite or limestone armour stone in the Perth metropolitan area (or indeed, in other parts of the State) cannot validly be used as the basis for determining a valuation, in situ or at the quarry gate, of limestone in a quarry site at Exmouth. Further, reference to other contracts, even if otherwise comparable or indicative of a market available to the plaintiff, must carefully isolate the cost of the limestone itself bearing in mind that the components for loading, transport and placement will ordinarily be the most significant proportion. Thus, I do not find Siragusa's evidence about either the Dawesville Channel Project or the artificial reef at Cottesloe, at all helpful.
249 Paul's evidence, on the other hand, appeared to be valuing the material in situ (ie before quarrying). Clearly though, it has added value once quarried.
250 The evidence of Scott Gillam concerned the CSR Readymix quarry at Albany. This has the difficulty to which I have already adverted, when sought to be applied to the market at Exmouth.
251 I think the best indicators must be the prices set in the Civcon contract itself, the subsequent Thiess contract, the Cyclone Vance contract of the defendant with WA limestone and the sale by the plaintiff to Highway Constructions in 1997.
252 The Civcon contract of January 1996, Contract E150 (Ex P1, TD 7) set the following rates:
2.2.1 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 1 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.2 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 2 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.3 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 3 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.4 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 4 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.5 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 5 Limestone Armour Stone (for wave spending area)
253 The Thiess Contract, Contract E.166 (Ex P2, TD 25) of October 1996, for which the limestone was actually mined from the sublease area, set the rates somewhat higher:
2.2.1 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 1 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.2 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 2 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.3 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 2a Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.4 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 3 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.5 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 3a Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.6 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 4 Limestone Armour Stone
2.2.7 Supply, Delivery and Placement of Class 5 Limestone Armour Stone (for wave spending area)
254 In November 1999 the defendant entered into a contract (E 216) with WA Limestone to repair damage to the Exmouth breakwater caused by Cyclone Vance (Boreham, Statement 30 October 2000, Ex D1, [50] and attachment 35). WA Limestone purchased limestone armour stone from the adjacent Whitecrest quarry in Exmouth. A total of 1,384 tonnes of armour was used in the repair. The contract rate was $14.50/tonne. The armour stone had already been won from the quarry and was stockpiled in heaps. The rate included sorting and loading - but not the cost of drilling, blasting or stockpiling, nor carting and placing.
255 I have already referred to Simunovich's testimony that during 1997 the plaintiff sold approximately 4000 tonnes of spoil from the sublease area to Highway Constructions for screening to use in lining culverts. This was sold at $3.00/tonne. (Simunovich, Statement Ex P2, [14], t 188).
256 Under the Civcon contract there was no price component for the limestone since it belonged to the defendant. The rate was for its extraction, delivery and placement. The same applied in respect of the Thiess contract.
257 The Whitecrest quarry was privately owned. The Cyclone Vance contract rates therefore include a component for the material, but do not include a component for carting or placing.
258 All of this, I think, suggests the value of the limestone to the plaintiff at the quarry gate was probably around $3.00/tonne. That would produce a total of $51,879.00 (17,293 tonnes x $3.00). But from that must be deducted the cost of extraction. The unchallenged evidence of Simunovich is that would be in the order of $2.00/tonne (Ex P 3, [6]), which here then would be $34,586, giving the value of the limestone as $17,293. I consider that would be the measure of the plaintiff's damages for conversion of the limestone.
260 In a claim for damages for trespass to land asserting actual loss to the plaintiff, the nature of the plaintiff's interest must be relevant. Thus, where the plaintiff is the owner, compensation may be awarded for injury done by digging or excavation (Morgan v Powell [1842] EngR 74; [1842] 3 QB 278, per Denman LJ at 284), or damage in working a mine (Jegon v Vivian (1871) LR 6 Ch App 742; Phillips v Homfray (1887) LR 6 Ch App 770).
261 The costs of refurbishment or repair will not be allowed where the plaintiff had no intention to refurbish or repair or would not in fact have done so (Hole & Son (Sayers Common) v Harrisons of Thurnscoe [1973] 1 Lloyds Rep 345; C R Taylor (Wholesale) Ltd v Hepworths Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 659).
262 In the present case, the encroachment was to only a small part of the sublease area. The plaintiff's interest was the right to mine and remove limestone. There was more than enough elsewhere in the sublease area to allow the plaintiff to take all it was permitted to take under the sublease. I am not satisfied the plaintiff in fact ever had an actual or genuine intention to establish a quarry and mine it. The plaintiff had no apparent realistic capacity to do so and in fact it has not done so. The sublease has apparently since expired. Given the circumstances and the nature of he plaintiff's interest, nor is this a case in which there has been a diminution of the value of the plaintiff's interest in the land (which was the measure of damages in Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Company [1896] 2 Ch 538). I am not satisfied the plaintiff has suffered any actual loss sounding in trespass. Mr Curthoys submitted (plaintiff's closing submissions dated November 2000, p 33) that if ultimately, the defendant proves the plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of the defendant's trespass, the plaintiff will receive nominal damages only, citing 45 "Halsbury" (4th ed) 1503; 12 "Halsbury" (4th ed) 1170. I think that misplaces the onus: if there is a claim for actual loss it is for the plaintiff to prove it.
263 I would make a nominal award of damages to the plaintiff for trespass in the amount of $1000.
264 The plaintiff also claims exemplary damages. Since Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1; [1964] AC 1129 the law in England and Australia has differed in this regard. The scope of exemplary damages has been considerably restricted in England but not in Australia. English authorities since 1964 must therefore be approached with circumspection.
265 A plaintiff may recover exemplary damages for trespass to land wherever the defendant acts in contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights and in such a case damages are at large (XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 12; (1984) 155 CLR 448.
"... that which discloses fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, insolence and the like."
(Sanders v Snell (1997) 73 FCR 569). Although the subjective state of mind of the wrongdoer will commonly be a relevant factor as demonstrating a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights, it has been suggested that need not always be so. Kirby J said (in Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 158 ALR 485 at [86]) that exemplary damages are recoverable irrespective of the state of mind of the wrongdoer so long as the conduct complained of was, objectively, high-handed in the manner referred to in the cases. However, his Honour's comments on that subject were obiter. The appellant had sustained serious injuries when he was struck by a car deliberately driven at him by the tortfeasor. The trial Judge refused to award exemplary damages because the tortfeasor had been convicted of causing grievous bodily harm and sentenced to imprisonment and he having been so punished, there was no scope for a punitive award of damages. The High court held that to be right.
267 Kirby J's remarks at [86] (ibid) were made in a context of a claim for negligence, albeit one in which deliberate wrongdoing had been alleged. His Honour's reference to "high-handed" conduct "calling for curial disapprobation" seems to imply a degree of conscious or deliberate or wilfully reckless conduct. That view seems to me consistent with the principle that one of the purposes of exemplary damages is to deter similar conduct in the future. It is also consistent with the situation in America which is that reckless indifference to the rights of others short of malice is sufficient to ground an award (Smith v Wade [1983] USSC 73; 461 US 30 at 44-48, 52 (1983)).
268 As I understood the submission, the way it was put on behalf of the plaintiff is that in 1996 Boreham failed to check the area of the proposed extension of the original quarry for other mining leases and so failed to identify that the extension was into the area of the Alcoa lease. It is said the Department had knowledge of that from at least 1990 even if Boreham did not. There was (it is submitted) ample time for him to carry out a check while approval was being sought for the extended quarry - a process that took three months. The plaintiff submits Boreham's actions were at the least imprudent and exhibit a degree of carelessness and a disregard for the possible rights of others conferred by the Mining Act 1978. In his oral submissions, Mr Curthoys said (t 630):
"Importantly I think once it was known after 20 January 1997 that there was the claim of an encroachment it was still the case that a total of approximately 2100 tonnes or something of that order was removed. Whatever one wishes to say about the conduct of the defendant, whatever excuse might be offered before then, once it knew it still continued to remove stone that had been quarried from the encroachment. That I think is as high as one can put the claim for exemplary damages."
269 It is certainly true that there had been some reference to the Alcoa lease (although described not in that way but only as MO8/6) on a departmental file, but that was in 1990 and the file was closed on 3 October 1990 and was no longer active when Boreham became Project Manager in August 1994 (Boreham, Statement ex D1, [13]). He was not aware of the existence of MO8/6 prior to January 1997 and until that time did not undertake any searches to establish if there were any mining leases in the area ([14], ibid). The original quarry was located in Water Supply Reserve 34055 vested in the Minister for Water Resources. The way Boreham understood it, as the land was Crown land, and the works were public works under s 112A of the Public Works Act, a quarry or mining lease was not required, the quarry was not covered by the Mining Act, and approval from the Minister for Mines or the Department of Minerals and Energy was not required. Section 4 of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act also exempts from the definition of "mining operations" for that Act:
"sand, gravel, limestone, or rock excavation carried on by or for any State agency or instrumentality or any local government for the use or disposition by any such agency, instrumentality or local government".
Notwithstanding these exemptions, environmental approval was still required under the Environmental Protection Act and that was given by the Minister in 1992. That applied also to the subsequent extension of the quarry.
270 Of course it is clear that as the sublease was not registered until 20 January 1997, the defendant could not have become aware of it before that date even if a search had been done - although a search would have revealed the existence of the Alcoa lease.
271 Although the Alcoa lease was shown on the 1990 departmental file, even there it was signified only by the designation MO8/6 and was difficult to pick. Nonetheless, that information was there for anyone wishing to search for it, had they reason to do so.
272 It was put to Boreham that the existence of the Alcoa lease was brought to his attention in correspondence from Whitecrest in August 1995. In cross-examination (t 417) he was referred to a letter dated 15 August 1995 (Ex P1, TD 6) from Whitecrest concerning an application by that company for another exploration licence immediately to the east and adjacent to its existing exploration licence area on Cape Range near Exmouth. Both of those tenement applications partly encompassed the quarry site proposed by the defendant for the Exmouth marina breakwater. One of the attachments to that letter was a plan showing the Whitecrest exploration licences. Immediately below the new one applied for (EO8/828) on the plan was MO8/6, although given the poor quality of the document and the very small scale of the plan it was very difficult to get any proper sense of the latter's proximity to the defendant's quarry. Nonetheless, Boreham agreed with the proposition that in 1995 he had the means to know that MO8/6 was in close proximity to the defendant's quarry (t 418).
273 The first notification the defendant had that he had encroached into a mining lease was the telephone call and facsimile letter to Dr Paul from Simunovich on 20 January 1997. It is in my view significant that it was signed by Simunovich and Maloney and referred only to "our mining lease". Boreham pointed out that no evidence was advanced to support the claim, Finesky was not mentioned, there was no supporting information regarding the claim and he was not aware of the mining lease being referred to. He was aware that mining operations in the area were complete and that WA Limestone was rehabilitating the quarry - which the defendant was obliged to do under the conditions of its environmental approval. I have discussed earlier in this judgment Boreham's reasons for instructing Brown to continue the rehabilitation work until he had the opportunity to check the claim by Simunovich and Maloney (see [83] above). I accept those reasons were genuine.
274 It was not until 4.50 pm on 20 January 1997 that Simunovich told Brown they had a sublease of the Alcoa area in the name of Finesky. Boreham was unable to obtain a legible plan of the area until 10.15 am on 21 January and although from that he could ascertain the amended quarry boundary intruded into the Alcoa lease area, he was unable to tell whether the quarrying operation had encroached into the sublease area. In any event, all quarry operations had ceased in the area of encroachment by the afternoon of 21 January 1997.
275 Whilst in one sense it could be said that information showing the existence of the Alcoa lease was on the defendant's 1990 file and contained in the plan attached to the Whitecrest letter dated 15 August 1995, it is not in my view reasonable in the circumstances to regard that as sufficient to put the defendant on notice that extension of the defendant's quarry might have resulted in an encroachment into it. I am further satisfied that Boreham had no actual knowledge of either the Alcoa lease or the Finesky sublease until 20 January 1997 and I consider his response to the claim then made by Simunovich and Maloney was reasonable in the circumstances, particularly having regard to the stage the quarrying had then reached, the fact that rehabilitation was almost completed, the costs associated with ceasing it and perhaps having to complete it later and the history of his dealings with Simunovich and Maloney. In my view there is nothing in the defendant's conduct either prior to 20 January or on 20 and 21 January 1997 which could properly be said to show a contumelious disregard of, reckless indifference to or high-handed disregard of, the plaintiff's rights, calling for curial disapprobation. There is no basis for an award of exemplary damages.
276 In addition, I also accept the defendant's submission that any possible basis for exemplary damages is removed because of the plaintiff's own conduct.
277 As Civcon, Simunovich and Maloney had been consistently urging the defendant to extend the quarry to the north-west. Following a meeting with the defendant's representatives on 5 October 1996 at which their further requests to extend were again refused they checked for mining leases in the area north-west of the existing quarry and then immediately approached Alcoa (t 149). They obtained the sublease as a deliberate strategy, believing that the defendant would eventually move (or want to move) into that area.
278 I am satisfied that Simunovich was aware of the encroachment from at least the time of his visit on 19 December 1996 and deliberately chose not to tell Boreham nor any other representative of the defendant. I accept the defendant's submissions about this. In particular, I accept the evidence of Christopher Otto that he had a confrontation with Simunovich and his party at the quarry on that date in the course of which Simunovich said to him: "we can get you kicked out of here." The inference to be drawn from that I think is that Simunovich was revealing an awareness that he had authority to be there and to have Otto removed. That could only have been because they were on the sublease area.
279 I also accept that the real purpose of the survey by Simunovich in mid-January 1997 was not for the Civcon arbitration as he claimed (t 164, 166) but to determine the extent of the encroachment at that stage. Simunovich expressly denied that he knew of or even suspected an encroachment at that time, but I do not accept his denial.
280 Simunovich was an unsatisfactory witness. I thought he was evasive, manipulative, less than frank and generally prepared to say whatever he thought would best advance his interests and those of the plaintiff. On any issue on which there is conflict I would not be prepared to accept his testimony unless confirmed by independent evidence. My very firm impression was that Simunovich and Maloney were doing their utmost to encourage and maximise the defendant's encroachment into the sublease area and thereafter all the apparent business or operational planning and activity by the plaintiff was directed, not to any genuine purpose of establishing a mining operation but rather to creating an optimum situation for its claim against the defendant.
281 Even had there been some apparent basis for an award of exemplary damages against the defendant, I would for these reasons have regarded the plaintiff's conduct as disentitling it to such an award.
282 For convenience, I set out my major findings and conclusions below.
(1) The rights of the plaintiff as sublessee were exclusive as against the whole world, including the Crown.
(2) The sublease was not void for non-compliance with s 82(1)(d) Mining Act (consent of Minister) and gave the plaintiff the right to mine from 9 December 1996.
(3) But the rights under the sublease could not be exercised until the Minister's consent was given on 20 January 1997.
(4) As a matter of construction, the sublease gave the plaintiff an equitable interest in the land from 9 December 1996 notwithstanding it was not registered until 20 November 1997 because as a matter of construction the requirement for Ministerial consent was a condition precedent.
(5) An instrument creating an equitable interest affecting a tenement is required by reg 110(1) of the Mining Regulations to be registered and by virtue of reg 110(3) is not effectual to pass any estate or interest until so registered. The sublease was not effectual to pass any estate or interest to the plaintiff until 20 January 1997.
(6) Section 85(2) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) did not give rise to any rights of ownership to the limestone in the plaintiff.
(7) The plaintiff acquired possession of the subleased land on 20 January 1997 and that related back to 9 December 1997. The plaintiff was entitled to exclusive possession. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to damages for trespass.
(8) The limestone did not become a chattel until mined. That was before 20 January 1997. The plaintiff's equitable interest in it did not arise until then. Nor did the plaintiff have any right to immediate possession of the limestone until 20 January 1997. The plaintiff's claim in conversion cannot be maintained.
(9) The Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) has no application to the present circumstances.
(10) The amount of limestone removed from the sublease area by the defendant was approximately 17,293 tonnes.
(11) The measure of damages is the market price of the mineral at the quarry, once extracted, less the costs of severance.
(12) The question whether the plaintiff could have obtained the necessary approvals to mine is irrelevant, as are the facts that the sublease area contains more limestone than the plaintiff would have been permitted to mine under the sublease over its term, and the expiration of the sublease on 8 December 2000.
(13) The plaintiff never had any actual nor genuine intention to mine for pavers or other building products by diamond-wire cutting.
(14) It was not until Farnese visited the quarry in July 1999 that diamond-wire cutting was proposed.
(15) The evidence does not establish that the plaintiff would have mined the limestone for use as pavers or building products.
(16) It would be wrong to take the price of limestone as pavers and building products as the basis for calculation of the value of the extracted limestone to the plaintiff at the quarry gate, because the evidence does not show there was or is a market for it in that form.
(17) The measure of the plaintiff's damages for conversion of the limestone would be $17,293.
(18) There should be a nominal award of damages for trespass in the amount of $1000.
(19) There is nothing in the defendant's conduct which could properly be said to show a contumelious disregard of, reckless indifference to or high-handed disregard of, the plaintiff's rights, calling for curial disapprobation. There is no basis for an award of exemplary damages.
(20) Even if there had been some basis for an award of exemplary damages it would have been removed because of the plaintiff's own conduct.
283 For the reasons given above, the plaintiff's claim in trespass succeeds and there will be a nominal award of damages of $1000. The plaintiff's claim otherwise fails.
Finesky Holdings Pty Ltd
Minister for Transport for Western Australia [2001] WASC 87
(1990) 22 FCR 527
(1988) 164 CLR 604
(1982) 149 CLR 600
(1964) 114 CLR 322
(1986) 7 NSWLR 104
(1995) 182 CLR 572
(1967) 116 CLR 61
(1946) 73 CLR 1
(1996) 187 CLR 1
(1997) 190 CLR 513
(1969) 121 CLR 177
(1999) 196 CLR 392
(1979) 145 CLR 107
(1990) 171 CLR 1
(1997) 18 WAR 126
(2000) 22 WAR 101
(1988) 1 WAR 144
(1973) 130 CLR 276
(1982) 149 CLR 537
(1967) 116 CLR 344
(1914) 19 CLR 197
(1934) 51 CLR 300
(2000) 21 WAR 563
(1946) 74 CLR 204
(1981) 53 FLR 340
(1990) 169 CLR 594
(1982) 149 CLR 191
(1991) 172 CLR 60
(1984) 155 CLR 448
(1997) 73 FCR 569
(1998) 158 ALR 485