The appellant then asserted that by reason of the testator's contracts with respect to the settlement purchase leases the gift of the leases to the respondent was adeemed and the proceeds of sale thereof fell into residue. The question thus raised was submitted to the Supreme Court by originating summons, and Hardie J. held that the devise was not adeemed. With respect we agree. Ademption of a specific gift by will occurs where the property the subject of the gift is at the testator's death no longer his to dispose of: Stanley v. Potter [1] . An obvious case of ademption is that in which the testator has completely divested himself of the property in his lifetime so that at his death there is in his estate nothing which even substantially (see McBride v. Hudson [2] ) answers the words of gift. But ademption occurs also where the property has been so dealt with that by the rules of equity it must be considered at the death as having been converted into other property, such as money, which the words of gift are not apt to comprehend: Watts v. Watts [3] ; McArthur's Executors v. Guild [4] ; In re Edwards dec'd; Macadam v. Wright [5] . Thus, in the case of a simple devise of land, if it is found at the testator's death that after making the will he became bound by a contract to convey or transfer the land to another, and the contract is still subsisting, so that when he died he was, in the sense of Lysaght v. Edwards [6] , a trustee of the land for the purchaser and entitled only to money in its place, there is no property in respect of which the words of devise are capable of taking effect: Bennett v. Tankerville (Earl) [1] ; Farrar v. Winterton (Earl) [2] . It is true that in such a case the testator still held the legal estate at his death, and under the old law that estate would have passed to the devisee though only as a trustee for the purchaser and without any right to retain the purchase money when received; but now that the legal estate passes on the death to the personal representative there is no subject matter at all to which the words of gift can apply - in the absence, that is to say, of a sufficient special context as in In re Lewis's Will Trusts; O'Sullivan v. Robbins [3] . What is meant by a contract being so binding upon the testator as to effect a notional conversion of the land into money is that the state of affairs existing immediately before his death was such that a court of equity if applied to at that time would have ordered specific performance by him of his obligation under the contract to convey or transfer the land to the purchaser upon performance of such of the purchaser's obligations as the contract required to be performed at or before settlement: Re Thomas; Thomas v. Howell [4] . As Lord Parker of Waddington observed for the Privy Council in Central Trust and Safe Deposit Co v. Snider [5] : "It is often said that after a contract for the sale of land the vendor is a trustee for the purchaser But it must not be forgotten that in each case it is tacitly assumed that the contract would in a Court of Equity be enforced specifically Their Lordships (in Howard v. Miller [6] ) came to the conclusion that, though the purchaser of real estate might before conveyance have an equitable interest capable of registration such interest was in every case commensurate only with what would be decreed to him by a Court of Equity in specifically performing the contract, and could only be defined by reference to the relief which the Court would give by way of specific performance" [7] .