Filippini v Keystone Asset Management Limited

1. By 4.00 pm on 28 November 2025, the Applicants are to file and serve on the Respondent a notice of appeal. If no such notice of appeal is filed by that date, then the application for leave to appeal shall be dismissed.
2. The application for leave to appeal is to be heard at the same time as any appeal (if leave is granted) on an estimated duration of one half day.
3. The Applicants submit a draft index to Part A of the application book no later than 4.00 pm on 28 November 2025, and file and serve Part A of the application book within 14 days of being notified of a Registrar's approval.
4. By 4.00 pm on a date six weeks prior to the hearing, the Applicants file and serve on the Respondent an outline of submissions and chronology of the relevant events.
5. By 4.00 pm on a date four weeks prior to the hearing, the Respondent files and serves on the Applicants an outline of submissions, a chronology of the relevant events and a list of materials to be included in Part C of the application book.
6. By 4.00 pm on a date 3 weeks prior to the hearing the Applicants file and serve on the Respondent any submissions in reply.
7. By 4.00 pm on a date 2 weeks prior to the hearing the Applicants file and serve on the Respondent Part C of the application book in electronic format.
8. By 4.00 pm on a date 2 weeks prior to the hearing the Applicants serve on the Respondent a list of authorities and a list of any legislation to which the party intends to refer.
9. By 4.00 pm on a date 8 business days prior to the hearing, the Respondent serves on the Applicants a list of authorities and a list of any legislation to which the party intends to refer.
10. By 4.00 pm on a date 2 business days before the hearing the Applicants file and serve an eBook of authorities being a jointly consolidated version of all of the authorities, legislation and explanatory and other material proposed to be relied on at the hearing by all parties.
11. Outlines of submissions are not to exceed 10 pages in length (5 pages for submissions in reply), including any annexures, and be easily legible using a font size of at least 12 points and one and a half line spacing throughout, including in any footnotes and annexures. Italics or underlining must be used for legislation and case citations and boldface or italics may be used for occasional emphasis.
12. All parts of the application book, and lists of authorities and legislation be provided to the Court in electronic form in accordance with the format(s) specified in paragraph 4.3 of the eBooks Practice Note.
13. Costs reserved.
14. Liberty to apply.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The applicants have sought leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge in Keystone Asset Management Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) v Filippini (No 2) [2025] FCA 1138 in which his Honour made freezing orders in relation to assets owned by the Filippini Respondents (a defined term in the primary judge's decision). Leave is of course required as the orders are interlocutory (see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCOAA)). The applicants seek leave to appeal from the orders in relation to particular assets only, which are specified in the application for leave to appeal.
2. The matter has been allocated to me to determine whether I should hear the application for leave to appeal as a preliminary matter as a single judge, or whether I should direct that the application be heard by a Full Court.
3. Section 25 of the FCOAA provides (relevantly):

(1) The appellate jurisdiction of the Court shall, subject to this section and to the provisions of any other Act, be exercised by a Full Court.

...

(2) Applications:

(a) for leave or special leave to appeal to the Court; or

...

must be heard and determined by a single Judge unless:

(e) a Judge directs that the application be heard and determined by a Full Court ...

1. The parties came before me for case management hearing on 13 November 2025 and asked me by way of consent orders to direct that the application for leave be heard before the Full Court at the same time as the appeal. It is contended that as the application would not add to the length of the appeal, and the estimate is that the applicant for leave and the appeal itself could be listed for half a day.
2. The basis of this is that the issues in each of the application for leave, and the appeal, would be effectively the same. The grounds in the draft notice of appeal attached to the application for leave demonstrate that the grounds of appeal cover whether the terms of trusts found by the primary judge to be discretionary trusts gave named trustees a power of disposition over the assets the subject of the appeal, and whether a named trust was in possession of those assets.
3. The application for leave was supported by an affidavit of Ms Alicia Salvo affirmed on 25 September 2025, which set out the background of the orders made by the primary judge and noted that the assets of the Filippini Parties sought to be subject to the original ex parte order were "up to a total of $158 million". Ms Salvo opines that any final relief which might be ordered in the proceedings would be a monetary judgment, and that as the trusts which are subject to the freezing orders are not alleged by the respondent to be sham trusts or have any liability to the first applicant, in her opinion they would not constitute "property" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (see Dwyer v Ross (1992) 34 FCR 463; [1992] FCA 20 (Davies J)). The primary judge considered arguments as to the nature of the power of appointment and held that there was a "good arguable case" (at [56] and [68]) that the first applicant controlled the trustee of each relevant trust.
4. At paragraph 20 of her affidavit, Ms Salvo notes that the trusts are restrained from dealing with assets including paying any of the costs of two of the properties subject to the order, without the consent of "the joint and several liquidators and joint and several receivers and managers of Keystone".
5. Section 25 of the FCOAA does not provide any guidance as to the exercise of the discretion to direct that an application for appeal be referred to a Full Court. The word "must" in s 25(2) indicates that there must be a basis for the departure from the requirement that leave applications be heard by a single judge. This has been interpreted to mean that there should be a "good reason" - see Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCA 536 at [12]- [13] (Barker J). As Colvin J said in Q News Pty Ltd v Google LLC [2025] FCA 1208 at [17]:

Each case must be adjudged on the basis that a direction should not be made unless the particular circumstances give rise to a sufficient reason to justify the exceptional course of convening a Full Court to deal with the leave application having regard to the purpose of the leave requirement. A view that the leave application and any appeal may be able to be determined at a hearing of not much greater duration than that required to deal with the leave application should not loom large in that assessment for reasons I have given.

1. Halley J in Kirsten v Miller as executor of the estate of Detlef John Kirsten [2023] FCA 1667 at [9]- [14] set out the principles relating to that exercise of discretion, and I adopt them here without needing to repeat them. Given that the orders seek a departure from the usual course of applications for leave to appeal, it is not appropriate that the matter should be dealt with by consent, without consideration of the principles to which I should have regard in exercising my discretion under s 25(2)(e) of the FCOAA.
2. The submissions of Mr O'Haire, counsel for the applicants, and Ms Mintz, counsel for the respondent, were that the questions to be determined on the leave application and the appeal itself were effectively the same. That is, whether the freezing order was appropriate with regard to whether it would prevent an abuse or frustration of the Court's process (a matter considered by the primary judge at [31], citing Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 743 at [7]- [9] (Wigney J)) given the nature of the relevant trusts and the powers of the respective trustees. The applicants described the freezing order as "draconian". Without accepting that description, freezing orders are of course by their nature "an extraordinary interim remedy" (see 2.6 of Freezing Orders Practice Note (GPN-FRZG)).
3. While this is finely balanced, I am of the view that the most cost-effective way of considering these issues is for the matter to be determined by a Full Court at the same time as the hearing of the substantive appeal. While I do not make any findings as to the strength of the appeal, it does not seek to deal only with the discretionary matters underpinning the exercise of the primary judge's discretion, and so is not purely a matter of consideration of the factors in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40. The draft notice of appeal's focus on the nature of the trusts and the powers of appointment and disposition does not appear hopeless or unarguable. The fact that the same principles would be dealt with in the application for leave to appeal as well as in the appeal itself means that the arguments would be almost entirely duplicated at the leave application and on the substantive appeal.
4. There was no separate evidence on whether the appeal should be expedited. However, Ms Salvo's evidence of the impact of the freezing orders on the applicants, and the nature of freezing orders per se, lead me to view the matter as one which should be placed in the March 2026 Full Court list and directions made to enable a hearing in that time period.
5. Accordingly, I am prepared to direct that the leave application be referred to a Full Court to be heard, if possible, with the substantive appeal in the March 2026 Full Court sittings, with liberty to apply to my Associates should that not eventuate.

I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Needham.