Ms Angelina Bell, town planner and officer of the Shire of Murrindindi appeared for the responsible authority.

She presented oral submissions and written submissions in two separate documents.

Mr Ian Neville Davis, respondent objector, appeared in person.

Ross S Thompson and Ms Pam Thompson were represented by Ms Linda Davis, the wife of Mr Ian Davis.

She made oral submissions including reading the contents of a letter that they had sent to the Tribunal.

Ms Yvonne Miller appeared in person and she represented Mr Ken Miller.

Various plans, photographs and other documents were tendered in evidence. The evidence and submissions in documentary form have been retained on the file of the Tribunal.

Application under s 77 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 for review of a decision of the responsible authority to refuse to grant a permit.

Application under s 149A of the said Act for a declaration.

Permission to use the land for cellar door sales (food and drink premises) and construction of a room for that purpose.

Permission pursuant to Clause 52.27 of the Murrindindi Planning Scheme to use land for the sale or consumption of liquor pursuant to a wine and beer producer's licence under the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998.

1. That no planning permit is required for the sale of wine produced on site, to off site outlets.
2. That in condition 18, the word "distribution"does not preclude the use described in 1.[1]

Low density residential zone under the Murrindindi Planning Scheme.

Lot 40 on Plan of Subdivision 142121 being the land in Certificate of Title Volume 9518 Folio 434

Irregular quadrilateral of land with a frontage of 50 metres to the west side of Girdwood Court and having an area of 1.519 hectares.

1. Mr George Filiposki owns the land at 36 Girdwood Court Alexandra.[2] It is on the western outskirts of the town. There is a house on the land and a vineyard which covers most of its area. He also owns an adjoining block known as 30 Girdwood Court, Alexandra. There is no house on that land. It is covered in grape vines. He has facilities for the making of wine on the house property.
2. George Filiposki seeks a planning permit in relation to his land at 36 Girdwood Court Alexandra. He wishes the permit to contain three planning permissions. The first is to use the land for cellar door sales which appears to come within the land use "Food and drink premises", or perhaps "Winery", in the Murrindindi Planning Scheme. The second permission sought is for the construction or extension of a building to provide room to accommodate that activity. The third permission sought is to use the land for the sale or consumption of liquor in relation to a licence as a wine and beer producer under the licensing legislation.
3. The responsible authority refused to grant the permit sought. It maintains that view and the objectors support it.
4. Mr Filiposki also seeks a declaration that no planning permit is required to sell wine produced on his land to off site outlets like local supermarkets. He further seeks a declaration that a condition in an existing planning permit, which I will refer to shortly, does not preclude such sale to off site outlets.
5. The responsible authority opposes the making of the declarations sought by Mr Filiposki. Mr Ian Davis is the only other party to the declaration applications. He supports the responsible authority.
6. I have mentioned that the permit application of Mr Filiposki seeks three separate planning permissions. The first two are required under Clause 32.03 of the planning scheme. That clause contains the zone provisions in relation to the Low Density Residential Zone. That is the zoning of the relevant land.
7. The third permission sought is under Clause 52.27 of the planning scheme dealing with licensed premises. In the course of the hearing I raised with Ms Bell, who appeared on behalf of the responsible authority, the question of whether I could or should refuse the first two permissions and yet grant the third one, and as to what the attitude of the responsible authority would be to that third planning permission, considered in isolation.
8. Ms Bell explained that this possibility had been raised with the permit applicant by the responsible authority in the course of the administration of the permit application. The applicant had been advised that such consideration would either call for an amendment of the permit application or the making of a new application for the licensed premises permit in isolation. The applicant took no steps in either of those directions.
9. The result has been that the responsible authority has considered the permit application for the package of three permissions and it has not considered what view it might take of the Clause 52.27 permission if it was applied for in isolation. It follows, of course, that the objectors are unlikely to have considered the possibility of the granting of the Clause 52.27 in isolation or the implications of such a grant might be.
10. In the circumstances, and particularly where the applicant has not made a separate application for permission under Clause 52.27 or otherwise taken up the procedural advice of the responsible authority, I will follow its approach and will not further consider granting Clause 52.27 permission in isolation on this current application for review.

1. All relevant land is located in a low density residential zone. The allotments vary in size. 36 Girdwood Court has an area of 1.519 hectares and 30 Girdwood Court has an area of 1.005 hectares so that the total area under vines amounts to 2.5159 hectares. Mr Filiposki has owned this land since in or about 2001. About five years ago he acquired another substantial allotment of land that adjoins this parcel. This further allotment, with an area of 1.007 hectares, is known as 15 Jones Close, Alexandra.
2. All these allotments can be described as being in the middle of a large area of low density residential zone on the western edge of the town of Alexandra. Downey Street is a road that runs along the northern edge of the zone. Girdwood Court is a local access cul-de-sac that runs south from a "T" intersection with Downey Street. It terminates at a court bowl. No. 36 is at a remove of one frontage to the north of the bowl.
3. Two other residential cul-de-sacs branch off from Girdwood Court between Downey Street and the subject land. The first is Jones Close which runs west from its "T" intersection with Girdwood Court for a distance before turning to run south to its court bowl. No. 15 Jones Close fronts the north-south section of this cul-de-sac, about one frontage north of the bowl. It backs onto 36 Girdwood Court.
4. Weeks Court is a short cul-de-sac that runs east from its "T" intersection with Girdwood Court from a position opposite No 30 and just north of No 36. All three of these local access cul-de-sacs are modest residential accessways, clearly intended to provide access to the various low density residential allotments that front them.
5. No 15 Jones Close, acquired by Mr Filiposki about five years ago, had and has a house on it. Since acquisition he has planted it out as an olive grove. He now has a consolidated parcel of three allotments totalling approximately 3.5 hectares (8-10 acres) devoted to the primary production of grapes and olives.
6. Mr Filiposki does not reside on the land, but he visits it. I understand that he stays there at weekends.

1. Mr Filiposki planted the vines in about 2001. At the hearing it was claimed, on his behalf, that approximately 1000 vines existed on the land when he acquired it. This differs from what it is claimed he said to neighbours at an earlier stage, but the difference is not important. He has certainly considerably increased the plantings.
2. No planning permission was in existence in relation to vine growing until Planning Permit 2005/44 was granted 4 May 2006. The application for that permit was a retrospective one for the grant of permission for activities already being conducted on the land.
3. The responsible authority had determined to refuse to grant that permit but there was an application to this Tribunal for review of that refusal. This resulted in a mediation in which the responsible authority, Mr Filiposki and some objectors, including Mr Davis, took part.
4. The disputes were settled at this mediation, but on the basis of arrangements that are reflected in the permit conditions.
5. I accept that it was clearly understood, at that stage, that permission was being granted on a strictly limited basis. That basis was that the wine growing and processing on the land was for domestic purposes only and was not to include any cellar door sales or commercial activity on the land. That this was the basis of the grant, and that the agreement of the responsible authority and the objectors to that grant was on that basis, is established by their assertions to that proposition and because the proposition is common ground, it being admitted to me on behalf of Mr Filiposki. It is further evidenced by conditions imposed in the permit issued by the responsible authority at the direction of the Tribunal on the basis of the mediation agreement.

1. The permit 2005/44 applies to both 30 and 36 Girdwood Court Alexandra. What the permit allows is stated in the following terms:

Installation and use of a vineyard; construction and Use of Farm building for the manufacture of wine.

1. Of course, planning permits are meant to be prospective, granting permission for something that is to happen in the future. In this case it was granting permission for something that had happened in the past and was continuing.
2. It should be noted that it is a "vineyard" that is allowed by the permit to be installed and used. Vineyard in ordinary English, means an area planted out in grape vines and used to grow grapes to be eaten as grapes, dried to create raisins or sultanas or crushed to produce wine or grape juice.
3. Technically the words of permission also allow the construction of a farm building. The words do not, in terms, authorise manufacture of wine although that is recited as the purpose of the building.
4. Manufacture means the making of something, and in planning would normally call up the idea of a factory or premises used for the making of goods for commercial purposes.
5. I think it is apparent, in this case, that manufacture here means no more than making in a domestic sense, as all commercial activities were disallowed. Thus it is more akin to the making of a batch of scones for afternoon tea rather than it is to the commercial production of wine.

(18) This permit does not allow any commercial use of the property such as cellar door sales or distribution.

1. Condition 18 could be better worded. In its actual literal terms it merely clarifies that this permit, whatever else it might allow, does not allow use of the land as cellar door sales or, for that matter, for "distribution" (or the commercial activity of distribution). As a matter of fact, it really says that it does not allow "any commercial use" of the property of which "cellar door sales" and "distribution" are mere examples. It is clear that this permit does not intend to allow any commercial use.
2. However, does the permit condition actually prohibit commercial use such as cellar door sales or other commercial use? In terms it does not. It merely says that the permit, of itself, does not give permission for commercial use. This is something less than imposing a prohibition.
3. However, I believe that such prohibition is the intention of the condition. After all, the provision is included in the permit as a condition, not of some mere note or recital by the way. To merely make the observation that the permit does not prohibit something is not to actually impose a condition at all.
4. If condition 18 does no more than clarify that its permission does not allow commercial use such as cellar door, it would be no more than such a note or comment.
5. Literally the permit does not purport to allow commercial use or cellar door sales or distribution, and if that is the status of "condition 18", then it does no more than if it also said that it does not allow elephant breeding or abattoirs.
6. I am satisfied that the intention is that condition 18 is to prohibit commercial use of the property, including "cellar door sales" and "distribution", and to confine the activities being allowed to private or domestic activities. Furthermore I am satisfied that this was the intention of all parties when the terms of the permit, including condition 18, were agreed to. In fact, I think that the condition needs to be interpreted in that way because otherwise it is not really a condition at all. It is clearly intended to be a condition.
7. The parties may wish to consider whether it would be appropriate to amend condition 18 to clarify its wording and reduce the danger of misinterpretation. It might better have said something like the commercial use of the property (such as for cellar door sales or distribution) is prohibited. If it was intended that the prohibition should be limited to the grapes or the product of the grapes that could be inserted.
8. The words of permission allow use of the land as a "vineyard". Vineyard is not a land use defined in Clause 74 of the planning scheme or, so far as I recall, in the planning scheme at all.[3] It is not at all the same thing as Winery which is defined in Clause 74 in the following terms:

Land used to display, and sell by retail, vineyard products in association with the growing of grapes and the manufacture of vineyard products. It may include the preparation and sale of food and drink for consumption on the premises.

1. Thus the definition of winery clearly distinguishes between vineyard and vineyard products and their display and sale in the association with the growing of grapes and possibly the preparation and sale of other food and drink. Having regard to the definition of "Winery" I think that it, rather than "cellar door sales", might be the appropriate land use that Mr Filiposki is seeking with his current application.
2. It is apparent that the existing permit 2005/44 did not give permission for a winery. If that had been sought such permission would not have been consented to at mediation by the objectors and the responsible authority. They were induced to agree on the understanding that what was to go on would be domestic and not commercial and, for that matter, the manufacture of wine, was to be for domestic family purposes, not for commercial purposes.

1. Subsequently, in 2009, the responsible authority applied to the Tribunal for an enforcement order against Mr Filiposki (and his co-owner Michael Filiposki) in relation to the conduct of the vineyard at 30-36 Girdwood Court Alexandra. That proceeding was also referred to mediation and ultimately an elaborate enforcement order was agreed to and made. The order was made to rectify the situation arising from contraventions of Clause 8, 11, 12, 14 and 16 of the permit.
2. It is clear that several years after the permit was granted, there were significant and continuing failures to comply with its conditions.

1. Later in 2009 there was a further proceeding before the Tribunal in relation to the permit. Mr Filiposki sought some amendments to some of the conditions. Some amendments were granted. It is not necessary, for present purposes, to go into the details about the alterations made.
2. It is important to note, however, that the question of the grant of the permit was not before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in that case of Filiposki v Murrindindi SC[4] was obliged to accept the existence of the permit being amended, including what it had allowed in relation to vineyard. Nevertheless, the reasons given in that case include some helpful observations in relation to land in a low density residential zone which I will refer to later.

1. I have mentioned that a permit has been granted for the adjoining land known as 15 Jones Close Alexandra for use and development for horticulture, namely an olive grove. That permit was issued at the direction of this Tribunal in its determination of Filiposki v Murrindindi SC[5] which I will refer to as Filiposki v Murrindindi SC (No 2) to distinguish it from the enforcement order case and from the case that I am now determining.
2. In that case it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that there would be too few olive trees for it to be a commercial operation. In retrospect, that appears to be a very dubious assertion. Indeed, it was also submitted that "Some oil will be used by the Applicant and some sold offsite". Was that clever wording? It was said that there would be a maximum of 700 litres of olive oil produced per year. That seems rather a lot for a household.
3. There was clearly concern in the olive area about spraying and a reassurance was given that olive trees require little spraying and much less than for a vineyard.
4. At paragraph 20 of the reasons there was some discussion of the vineyard, although it was the olive grove that was the subject matter before the Tribunal in that case. That paragraph reads:
   1. As well, the Council asserted that the Applicant represented the vineyard was not for commercial use but wine from the vineyard has been sold at retail outlets in Alexandra. From a planning viewpoint, the relevant issue is not whether some of the wine is sold (it is implicit that produce from land used for agriculture, such as a vineyard, may be sold for profit) but whether the selling occurs at such land (which there is no evidence that this occurs).

I must observe that this is comment relating to vineyard and is made by the way and not part of the Tribunal's reasons for its decision. I should not be understood to be agreeing with this side comment in so far as it suggests that sale for profit is implied in a domestic hobby or that such activity is not commercial.

1. I am a little troubled by this paragraph. I am satisfied that the "vineyard" permit was obtained on the basis that the permission was not for commercial activity and, it seems to me that selling wine grown and produced on site to retail outlets in Alexandra is a commercial activity. I would look at the question from the point of view of the permit granted, and the prohibition in condition 18 thereof, rather than what might be said to be "implicit" in relation to the products of agriculture. As I have said, vineyard is not defined in the planning scheme and, in ordinary English, does not necessarily mean commercial agriculture. An area of grapevines for domestic consumption does not imply commerce anymore than a domestic orchard or a domestic vegetable garden on a dairy farm (or in a backyard) would be, provided that the product of the farm was milk products and not wine or grape or vegetables.
2. In any event, it might be thought to be clear that selling at a cellar door outlet occurs on the land, if goods were produced on the land and stored on the land and are sold commercially by an undertaking that has no other premises, and where orders are received on the land and filled on the land and despatched from the land. In such circumstances would it be right to say that the selling does not occur on the land?
3. I can see why the responsible authority might have been concerned at the expansion, entrenchment and diversification of farming activities on what is actually residential land. In any event, the olive grove permit was granted, but subject to conditions including condition 8 which reads:

(8) No olives or olive products, including olive oil, may be sold from the land, except with the consent of the Responsible Authority.

1. I think this does imply commercial activity, at least for olives; although I would not like to say that olives or olive products are not sold "from the land" if orders are received, payment made and goods despatched to or on the land. In any event, the olive grove permit was granted, and that condition was imposed with knowledge of the existing vineyard permit with whatever understanding there then was as to what it allowed in relation to commercial activity. I am clear that it did not allow commercial activities.

1. The zone provisions in relation to Low density Residential Zone are found in Clause 32.03 of the planning scheme. That clause includes the purpose of the zone. In addition to the general purpose, applicable to all zones, there is only one purpose which is expressed in the following terms:

To provide for low density residential development on lots, which in the absence of reticulated sewerage, can treat and retain all waste water.

1. None of this land is connected to reticulated sewerage or is likely to be so connected in the foreseeable future.
2. The only purpose is for low density residential use. Such use can include ancillaries of residential use which may include hobbies.
3. This can be contrasted with the purposes of Residential 1 Zone land. There is quite a bit of Residential 1 Zone land not far away in the township of Alexandra south of Downey Street and to the east of Hall Street. In addition to the normal general purpose, the purposes in the Residential 1 Zone read as follows:

To provide for residential development at a range of densities with a variety of dwellings to meet the housing needs of all households.

To encourage residential development that respects the neighbourhood character.

In appropriate locations, to allow educational, recreational, religious, community and a limited range of other non-residential uses to serve local community needs.

1. These three purposes are probably excluded in relation to low density residential land on the basis that they have little application to it. The last of those purposes contemplates non-residential uses, including commercial ones, provided that they are to serve local community needs. This can be relevant in the closer settlement intended in relation to Residential 1 Zones. Such things as milkbars, corner shops, child minding centres, medical centres and the like can be needed in a Residential 1 Zone to serve local community needs, although they are commercial in nature. Other commercial and non residential uses, not providing for local community needs, are not within the purpose.
2. Of course, in both these zones, land uses listed in Section 2 of the respective Tables of uses can be allowed, subject to planning permission. This implies that somebody, the responsible authority in the first place or the Tribunal on review, must have a careful look as to whether, in the particular circumstances of the particular case, permission should be granted, and if so subject to what conditions.
3. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that this low density residential land and its surrounds are intended for residential purposes and that people residing there should be able to expect not to be subjected to adverse amenity impacts due to commercial or for that matter, farming activities except that, as I have said, small scale hobby activities that might be regarded as ancillary and within the residential use of land.
4. Normal farming activities can involve the coming and going of heavy vehicles, the noise and dust of ploughing or spreading fertilizer and, in relation to horticultural activities, the intrusion of spray drift. That is not an exhaustive list.
5. Reading the cases connected with this land has made me more conscious of the threat to nearby properties of spraying. I think it was Mr Davis who produced photographs of trees that have been, in his account, damaged by a spray drift. Whether that is so or not, I am not in a position to say. He also complains about deliberate vandalism evidenced by holes bored into the trunks of trees on his land. That does appear to imply vandalism, although it does not identify the vandal.
6. In this connection I find pertinent the comment made by the Tribunal at paragraph 26 in the amendment case Filiposki v Murrindindi SC where the following appears:
   1. I accept that it is appropriate for Council in a Low Density Residential Zone to promote the "dwelling" above the "vineyard". However, the fact of the matter is that there is a permit for a vineyard and that so long as the appearance of Girdwood Court continues to emphasis the dwelling, then I am satisfied that the "back of house" use of the land for a vineyard can be maximized without unnecessary buffers.

This passage does not grant permission for vineyard. It merely recognises the existing permit as a fait accompli.

1. I am not here concerned about buffers and I do not assume that appearance from Girdwood Court is the only consideration. The Tribunal is observing that there was, at that stage, an existing permit. It is not clear, one way or the other, but the Tribunal in that case leaves space for the conjecture that it might have been cautious about granting that permission. It will be recalled that such permission as was granted was not granted upon an assessment by the Tribunal, but in an agreement reached at mediation.
2. At paragraphs 36 and 37 the Tribunal said:
   1. ...This is not a Farming Zone or even a Rural Living Zone, but a Low Density Residential Zone whose primary purpose is:

"To provide for low density residential development on lots which, in the absence of reticulated sewerage, can treat and retain all waste water"

1. That purpose sets it aside from any of the rural type zones and clearly establishes the area as being first and foremost about living with all the amenity characteristics that follow from that.
2. I think that these observations are well chosen. At paragraph 47 the Tribunal said:
   1. In the current case, and in a low density residential estate like this, I think it is entirely appropriate that neighbours be told of imminent spraying so that arrangements can be made, clothes can be brought in, gardening plans can be modified and so on.
3. The Tribunal went on then to insist on the retention of conditions in relation to notice where modifications had been sought to delete that requirement. However, again, this is in the context of the vineyard permit (with concomitant spraying) having already been granted. I too am faced with the vineyard permit having been granted and being in operation, but it does leave me to question whether neighbours in a low density residential zone ought to be exposed to spraying and spray drift as well as other effects.
4. I note, by the way, that at paragraph 9 of its reasons in the olive grove case (Filiposki v Murrindindi SC No 2) the Tribunal quoted and approved of the observation of low density residential zone land being first and foremost about living with all the amenity characteristics that flow from that.

1. In the course of the hearing reference was also made to a case of Gerbert v Murrindindi SC which I have not been able to locate on the Australian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) indexes and for which I do not have a citation number although I do have a copy of the decision and its reasons. It was a case heard on 25 June 2003 with a determination date of 24 July 2003. It relates to land at 89 Seal Rock Road, Buxton, in the Shire of Murrindindi.
2. That was a proposal to develop low density residential land for a vineyard. A permit was granted. There was concern about spraying and other activities such as the scale and use of material and devices used to control birds. The case was recognised as involving a question of agricultural use in a residential zone. The lot areas are different and larger than in this present case. The Tribunal seems to have been persuaded to treat the low density residential zone land as if it were some other zone, apparently because of the larger allotments. At paragraph 18 it was said that "in the absence of strong policies to the contrary, I am persuaded that a rural residential use of the land is acceptable".
3. There was also concern about the potential for noise and traffic movements.
4. Of course, the question for granting that permission in the Buxton case is not before me. It was settled ten years ago by the grant of the permit. I do not find it to be particularly relevant or helpful in relation to the present case. It illustrates the point that particular cases have to be determined on their particular facts. Where a proposal is for a land use for which permission can be granted, that permission might be granted or might be refused, depending on the particular circumstances. In that case, at any rate, there were larger allotments. I have no intention of revisiting that decision. I have already observed that I have developed some caution about what agricultural activities on low density residential land where they may generate amenity impacts that should not be present in such situations. That does not imply that there can never be suitable situations for the grant of such permissions. Cases must be judged on their own facts.

1. There is grape growing on 30 and 36 Girdwood Court. It was commenced without planning permission. The planting was carried out, wholly or at least substantially, by Mr Filiposki and without permission. The later application for permission implies that permission was needed.
2. It was granted on an agreed basis that there would be no commercial activity and condition 18, as I have interpreted it, has that effect. There was to be no commercial use, and in particular, no cellar door sales or commercial distribution.
3. I lack evidence as to how much wine might be consumed by a household or by a household giving it away to neighbours, friends and relatives. In this case Mr Filiposki has exceeded private or domestic use. He is selling it to retail outlets likes supermarkets in Alexandra. He also has a website plainly advertising bottled wine for sale at the site. These things are not permitted by the permit. Indeed, they exceed the permit.
4. Evidence has been tended, in the form of photographs, that show multiple large stainless steel vats used for making the wine and the extensive barrels and storage areas for barrels associated with wine making. While I might not know how much a family and its friends and relatives could consume, I am satisfied that it is quite obvious from the scale of these facilities that the manufacturing capacity here far exceeds anything that could be described as domestic. It might not be on the scale of Brown Bros. at Milawa or Carlton United Breweries main brewery works, but this is on an industrial scale, perhaps modest industry, but industry nevertheless.
5. In terms of the land use definitions in Clause 74 of the planning scheme, it would come within the definition of "Industry". A sub category of industry is "Rural industry". I note that "Industry", including "Rural industry", are prohibited land uses in the zone. Rural industry means land used to handle, treat, process or pack agricultural produce or to service or repair plant for equipment used for agriculture.
6. Mr Filiposki has been been expanding his agricultural activities in area, variety, extent and, intensity. He now seeks planning permission to further expand, diversify and entrench his vineyard by turning it into a winery by incorporating cellar door sales.
7. It is all very well to give vague assurances that this would be of limited intensity and of a limited extent in terms of turnover, customers, traffic, hours and so on. It is not clear to me that activities would or could be confined as suggested and there would be little incentive to do so.
8. This would be a further aspect of a commercial intrusion into a residential zone, indeed a low density residential zone; bringing with it people, traffic and activity. The difficulty really arises from the undertaking and expanding agricultural activity in a low density residential zone, rather than in a more suitable farming zone. I am not prepared, in the relevant circumstances of this case, to approve conversion to a winery or to grant permission for cellar door sales and concomitant building activity.
9. The existing permission having been granted on the basis of non commercial domestic grape growing and wine processing, I think the activity should be confined to what is permitted and should not now be allowed to expand. Accordingly I do not think that planning permission should be given pursuant to Clause 52.27 for the sale or consumption of liquor on the land.
10. I am not prepared to make a declaration that no planning permit is required for the sale of wine produced onsite to offsite outlets. I think that is contrary to the existing permit, including where it prohibits commercial use of the property.
11. The best interpretation I can make of the use of the word "distribution" in condition 18 of the existing permit is that distribution, at least in relation to sale of produce, is a commercial use of the property prohibited by condition 18. There cannot be commercial distribution from the property, at any rate on the basis of the current permit and its conditions.
12. I therefore decline to make the declaration sought.

[1] The expression "condition 18" refers to condition 18 in an existing planning permit No. 2005/44 issued by the responsible authority on 4 May 2006.

[2] His name appears on the land title as Gjorgija Filiposki and he appears there as co-owner with Michael Filiposki but I will refer to him in the singular for the purpose of these reasons.

[3] The word "vineyard" does appear in the definition of "Winery" but winery is a defined land use and vineyard is not.

[4] [2009] VCAT 2667

[5] [2010] VCAT 1535