Farrington & Belkis (No 8) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1772 (12 December 2025)

1. Counts 7-10 are concurrent.
2. Counts 11-12 are concurrent as to each other and also concurrent as to Counts 7-10.
3. Counts 1-5 are concurrent as to each other, but cumulative upon Count 11.
4. The aggregate is four months imprisonment.
5. The respondent is liable to serve a period of full-time custody for two months from late 2025 until early 2026.
6. A warrant of commitment is to issue forthwith.
7. From early 2026:

(a) Upon the respondent entering into a bond, without surety or financial security, but on security of an undertaking in the terms set out below, the balance of the total period will be suspended;

(b) The respondent's release will be the day he enters into the bond, or early 2026, whichever occurs first.

I, [Mr Farrington], undertake that for a period of 12 months from the date of entering into a bond secured by this undertaking, I shall:

(1) Be of good behaviour; and

(2) Comply with orders made by this court.

I acknowledge that by this undertaking, up to two months of my term of imprisonment imposed in late 2025 is suspended.

I acknowledge that failure to comply with this undertaking may result in a requirement that I serve the balance of the suspended term of imprisonment in custody.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. On 4 August 2023, interim orders were made under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act")[1] with respect to two children - X and Y who are now 14 and 12 years old.
2. On 14 June 2024, final orders were made.[2]
3. On 1 November 2024, the mother filed an Application - Contravention alleging that:

(a) Contrary to interim Order 6 made on 4 August 2023, the father contacted X on six occasions and Y on one occasion, on and between October 2023 and June 2024; and

(b) Contrary to final Order 7 made on 14 June 2024, the father contacted X on six occasions and caused them to be contacted via [their half-sister] on one occasion, on and between July 2024 and September 2024.

6. The Father's contact and time with the children is suspended immediately.

7. The Father be restrained by injunction from any contact with the Children, directly or indirectly, including through their older sister, [Ms M] (born [in] 2007), or by electronic means or social media.

1. On 12 November 2025, orders were made to the effect that:

(a) Of the allegations of contravention made by the mother against the father, three were found not proved and eleven were found proved without reasonable excuse; and

(b) Procedural orders were made affording the parties the chance to adduce further evidence and to make any further submissions which could influence the determination of penalty.

1. Reasons for those orders are at Farrington & Belkis (No 6) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1571 ("the No.6 Judgment"). They are essential reading with respect to the disposition of the mother's Application - Contravention and effectively are Part 1 of these reasons.
2. On 21 November 2025, the Court, differently constituted, and in separate proceedings (CAC1398/2025) reserved judgment upon hearing of the father's application for the final parenting orders to be reconsidered pursuant to s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 ("the Act").
3. On 24 November 2025, the father filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking to vacate or stay the progression of these proceedings until his s 65DAAA application had been determined. His application to adjourn was dismissed.[3] The father seeks leave to appeal that decision. (NAA6060/2025). That does not stay the operation of the orders made on 12 November 2025 in the meantime.
4. Pursuant to the orders made on 12 November 2025, with respect to penalty:

(a) The mother filed evidence on 2 December 2025, which has been read, and submissions on 9 December 2025, which have been received.

(b) The father has not filed any evidence. He filed submissions on 9 December 2025 which have been received.

1. Applicable principles to the imposition of sanctions, extracted from Galvis & Galvis [2024] FedCFamC1A 123, are as follows (references removed):

(a) The question of penalty is to be separately addressed after the findings of contravention are made. [38].

(b) Individual sanctions need to be imposed for individual contraventions. [45]

(c) Common law sentencing principles may guide the determination of sanctions. [46]

(d) Reasons need to include the material considerations in the sentencing exercise such as:

(i) A comparative assessment of the objective seriousness of the respondent's conduct in respect of each of the contraventions;

(ii) The existence and the nature of aggravating and mitigating factors;

(iii) How the type of sanctions were selected in preference to others to satisfy the objectives of general deterrence and specific deterrence;

(iv) Why the sanctions ultimately selected are appropriate in the context of legislative maximums. [48]

(e) The imposition of a penalty is an exercise of discretion involving a process of instinctive synthesis of multiple factors. Accordingly, the exercise must entail the consideration of material factors, the disregard of irrelevant factors, and be properly explained. [49]

1. With respect to each of the earlier counts, there are no statutory objectives specifically for proceedings under Division 13A. I adopt what was said by Cronin J in McClintock & Levier [2009] FamCAFC 62; (2009) FLC 93-401 [233] that "[t]he focus of a Court therefore in dealing with a contravention application under Division 13A must be in making orders which will enforce future compliance with its orders." More recently, adopted and applied by McClelland DCJ in Virtanen & Ferreyra (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 104 at [27].
2. With respect to each of the later counts, s 70NAB of the Act[4] provides:

The principal objects of this Division are to meet the best interests of children to whom child - related orders relate by:

(a) supporting compliance with child - related orders; and

(b) resolving difficulties associated with child - related orders that are parenting orders which have contributed to non - compliance with such orders (including by varying or making further orders); and

(c) deterring non - compliance with child - related orders; and

(d) upholding the authority of the court by enforcing compliance with child - related orders where the court considers this necessary and appropriate; and

(e) providing for sanctions for a person who contravenes a child - related order without reasonable excuse.

1. As recognised in the No. 6 Judgment at [27], the provisions of Pt VII Div 13A of the Family Law Act 1975 in force as at the time of the alleged contraventions must be applied.[5] Unhelpfully, the allegations presented as numerical counts in the Application - Contravention are not in chronological order. They are dealt with herein chronologically.

1. Counts 7-10 occurred on or between 14, 17, 28 October 2023 and 15 November 2023 respectively. The applicable provisions of Pt VII Div 13A of the Act are in Compilation Nos. 95 and 96 and the relevant provisions are identical across those compilations.
2. With respect to each of the earlier counts, I have already found, beyond reasonable doubt, that the father behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his obligations under the order and Subdivision F of the Act applies.[6]
3. Section 70NFB 'Powers of court' relevantly provides:

...

(2) The orders that are available to be made by the court are:

(a) if the court is empowered under section 70NFC to make a community service order - to make such an order; or

(b) to make an order requiring the person to enter into a bond in accordance with section 70NFE; or

...

(d) to fine the person not more than 60 penalty units; or

(e) subject to subsection (7), to impose a sentence of imprisonment on the person in accordance with section 70NFG; ...

...

(6) An order under this section may be expressed to take effect immediately, at the end of a specified period or on the occurrence of a specified event.

(7) When a court makes an order under this section, the court may make any other orders that the court considers necessary to ensure compliance with the order that was contravened.

1. Counts 11-12 and 1-5 occurred on or between June 2024 and September 2024. The applicable provisions are in Compilation Nos. 98 and 99 of the Act and the relevant provisions are identical across those compilations.
2. With respect to each of the later counts, I have already found, beyond reasonable doubt, that the father behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his obligations under the child-related order.[7]
3. Section 70NBF relevantly provides:

(1) If the court finds that the respondent has contravened a child - related order without having a reasonable excuse, the court may make any of the following orders:

(a) an order requiring the respondent to enter into a bond in accordance with section 70NCA;

...

(d) where the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent contravened the order:

(i) an order imposing a fine not exceeding 60 penalty units;

(ii) an order imposing a term of imprisonment.

(2) In making an order mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to:

(a) the likely effects of making the order on any child, or any other person; and

(b) the seriousness of the contravention.

...

(4) The court may sentence the respondent to imprisonment under subparagraph (1)(d)(ii) only if the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate for the court to deal with the contravention in any other way under subsection (1).

1. The material factors with respect to each count are:

(a) The father has not previously been found to have contravened court orders which is a mitigating factor.

(b) In spite of the orders and the reasons prohibiting contact, the father maintained indefinite, surreptitious communications anyway.

(c) The communications are consistent with the behaviour what was described in the reasons as "ongoing, unrestrained and unrelenting conduct" from which the children required protection from.[8]

(d) The father's behaviour was contumacious.

(e) There has been no expression or indication of remorse from the father which may otherwise have been a mitigating factor.

(f) Outstanding and unpaid costs orders against the father exceed $60,000.[9] I expressly state that is not an aggravating factor, but it informs the question of what the appropriate type of sanction is.

1. The father has placed much stock in his forensic position that his s 65DAAA application may invalidate the subject orders and thereby render any contravention of them as meaningless or at least cast the contraventions in a different light. In that regard, his contentions and the basis for his application for an adjournment have been determined as misconceived. See Farrington & Belkis (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1686, including at [14]:

The highest regard that could be had to the father's contentions is that the two, separate proceedings might be informative of each other, but neither is dependent on the other. Under the procedural orders, it is open to him to muster whatever admissible evidence he chooses and to make whatever submissions he says are relevant. His s 65DAAA application is no more than a potentially relevant circumstance.

1. It is plain and obvious across all of his evidence in the proceedings that the father has fixed views about what is in the best interests of the children and his conduct was in furtherance of his beliefs. He maintains that "without my immediate intervention, [X] may have actually succeeded in his plan to suicide."[10]
2. The father has chosen not to provide the court with evidence as to his personal circumstances. His submissions are not evidence. His submissions are lengthy. The vast majority of the submissions go to his re-litigation of the substantive proceedings, re-litigation of the findings on contravention, and his claims of a denial of natural justice.
3. The father's absence of insight and complete refusal to accept the mother's evidence and the court's findings with respect to the harm caused by his behaviour raises the importance of the considerations of specific deterrence and protection from harm.
4. The father's complete absence of remorse raises the importance of the consideration of the need for rehabilitation in pursuit of future compliance.
5. As to his mental health, the father seeks to give evidence in his submissions:

126. Since the worsening of my Major Depressive Disorder in 2023 and the return of my Complex PTSD in early 2025, my life has been forced to change significantly.

127. As I have been under active psychiatric care since February 2014, I have recently undergone an increase to my current medications and a return to ketamine treatment commencing which will recommence [in] January 2026.

128. These steps post-date the contraventions and are directed to stabilisation (sleep, anxiety, mood regulation) and further relapse prevention.

1. I comfortably infer that the conduct occurred during periods of significant challenge and difficulty for the father where the court's findings and consequential orders were opposite to his beliefs. However, there is no material evidence as to what, if any, impact there was on his behaviour relevant to the contraventions other than his own fixed beliefs.
2. During the proceedings, the father submitted his diagnosis of PTSD negatively impacted upon the preparation of his evidence. If the father does suffer from PTSD or any other mental impairment, there is no material evidence as to how, if at all, any mental impairment suffered by the father may be impacted by any of the types of sanctions he is now exposed to. Nor is there any material evidence as to any other circumstance that may be impacted by any of the types of sanctions he is now exposed to. Such as his physical health, his financial circumstances or any people who may be dependent on him.

1. The contraventions are described by the mother as having made the children suspicious and traumatised[11] against the background of prolonged and sustained behaviour by the father over 11 months from October 2023 to September 2024. The mother described it as normal to worry that X was planning to escape and run away.[12] When Y came into the care of the mother she engaged in behaviours of self-harm. I am satisfied that during the time the contravening behaviour was taking place, it had a significant and profound impact on the health and wellbeing of both children.
2. The father's behaviour has also had considerable impact on the mother. She describes it being "extremely difficult to parent two quite suspicious and traumatised children whilst also trying to manage a fulltime job and family court proceedings."[13] When the children came into the care of the mother there was a period of hypervigilance in trying to prevent the children from engaging in destructive behaviours and keeping them safe in her care.[14] The mother has suffered a number of physical symptoms caused by the stress of being "locked in court battles for so long now" which she describes as having a cumulative effect.[15]
3. The mother deposed:

14. It has taken considerable time and effort and patience to rebuild our trust and get back to having a healthy parent /child relationship. [Mr Farrington]'s covert conversations did much to undermine this throughout 2023 and 2024 when the children were supposed to have been quarantined, but the children and I have overcome it all together.

1. With respect to each of the counts, the father has been found to have behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his obligations under the child-related orders, and the contraventions are serious. I am satisfied that requiring the respondent to enter into a bond does not meet the objectives nor do justice in this case. However, that is not to say that a bond or bonds, in combination with other sanctions, may not be appropriate.
2. With respect to each of the earlier counts, no evidence was adduced nor submissions made with respect to a community service order. I am satisfied that a community service order would not meet the objectives of Division 13A proceedings[16] and is not appropriate in this case.
3. With respect to each of the counts, I am satisfied that the imposition of a fine, regardless of the amount, is not appropriate in this case. The father already has outstanding and unpaid costs orders of over $60,000[17] and I infer that financial consequences are of no consequence to the father.
4. With respect to each of the counts referable to the interim order, the interim order that was breached has since been discharged by the making of final orders. With respect to each of the counts referable to the final order, there is no ambiguity or difficulty that contributed to the contravention of the order. As such, there is no merit in the varying or making of further orders.
5. With respect to each of the counts, in all the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that it would not be appropriate for the court to deal with the contraventions in any way other than a sentence of imprisonment. The reasons being that:

(a) In this case, none of the other sanctions are likely to achieve the objectives of supporting compliance, deterring non - compliance and upholding the authority of the court;

(b) None of the other sanctions are commensurate with the seriousness and contumacious nature of the father's conduct;

(c) None of the other sanctions are likely to deter the father from reoffending;

(d) Of all the available sanctions, a period of imprisonment is most likely to protect the children and the mother from the harm caused by the father's conduct; and

(e) Of all the available sanctions, a period of imprisonment is most likely to prompt rehabilitation of the father with respect to his contumacious conduct.

1. With respect to each of the later counts, pursuant to s 70NBF(2) of the Act, I am required to have regard to the likely effect of making a penalty order on any child or other person. Pursuant to court orders since August 2023, the children live with the mother and are to have no contact with the father. The children have begun to rebuild their relationships with their mother. A term of imprisonment would permit this to continue without the risk of flagrant intervention by the father. A term of imprisonment would not disrupt the current parenting arrangements in place for the children.
2. I reject the father's submissions with respect to s 70NBF(2) that:

(a) "... a punitive outcome (bond with punitive conditions, fine, or custody) risks disrupting my treatment and destabilising the children's care arrangements."[18] There is no material evidence of what, if any, treatment the father is undergoing. The children's care arrangements already include no contact with the father.

(b) "... a punitive response should not entrench orders whose factual foundation is shown to be materially unsound."[19] For the reasons already comprehensively explained in Farrington & Belkis (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1686.

(c) " ... my conduct must be assessed in the context that I pursued lawful avenues (urgent AIP; risk notices) while the mother leveraged restricted court material in collateral processes in order to exact and increase her revenge. That context tells against any finding that I acted with "serious disregard" of obligations."[20] For the reasons already comprehensively explained in the No. 6 Judgment.

1. Having made the determination that it would not be appropriate to deal with the contraventions in any way other than a sentence of imprisonment, with respect to each of the earlier counts, s 70NFG[21] 'Sentences of imprisonment', relevantly provides:

(1) A sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e) is to be expressed to be:

(a) for a specified period of 12 months or less; or

(b) for a period ending when the person:

(i) complies with the order concerned; or

(ii) has been imprisoned under the sentence for 12 months or such lesser period as is specified by the court;

whichever happens first....

(5) A court that sentences a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e) may:

(a) suspend the sentence upon the terms and conditions determined by the court; and

(b) terminate a suspension made under paragraph (a).

(6) A court, when sentencing a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e), may, if it considers it appropriate to do so, direct that the person be released upon the person entering into a bond described in subsection (7) after he or she has served a specified part of the term of imprisonment.

(7) A bond for the purposes of subsection (6) is a bond (with or without surety or security) that the person will be of good behaviour for a specified period of up to 2 years.

(8) A court that has sentenced a person to imprisonment for a period expressed as provided by paragraph (1)(b) may order the release of the person if it is satisfied that the person will, if he or she is released, comply with the order concerned.

1. With respect to each of the later counts, s 70NCC[22] 'Matters relating to imprisonment,' relevantly provides:

(2) The sentence of imprisonment must be expressed to be: (a) for a specified period of no more than 12 months; ...

(3) When sentencing the respondent to imprisonment, the court may direct that, after serving a specified part of the term of imprisonment, the respondent be released upon the respondent entering into a bond (with or without surety or security) that the respondent will be of good behaviour for a specified period of up to 2 years.

1. And s 70NCD 'Powers of court in relation to imprisoned person,' relevantly provides:

(1) The court that has sentenced the respondent to imprisonment may order the release of the respondent if it is satisfied that the respondent will, if released, comply with the court's orders.

(2) The court that sentences the respondent to imprisonment may:

(a) suspend the sentence upon the terms and conditions determined by the court; and

(b) terminate such a suspension.

1. As to a description of the contraventions and the objective seriousness of each count, I refer to and repeat the No.6 Judgment at:

(a) Paragraphs 62-74 with respect to Count 7;

(b) Paragraphs 76-80 with respect to Count 8;

(c) Paragraphs 82-87 with respect to Count 9; and

(d) Paragraphs 89-94 with respect to Count 10.

1. This group of contraventions are the first in time. They occurred in October 2023 and in November 2023 being two to three months after the delivery of judgment and interim orders on 4 August 2023.
2. The subject matter of the communications is largely innocuous though they do venture into harmful areas such as X's exposure to court documents and the proceedings, sharing opinions about the mother's representations, and that their communications remain clandestine.
3. The most harmful aspects of these contraventions is the perpetuation of the difficulty adjusting to the new arrangements provided for under the interim orders. That is precisely something that the reasons for judgment foreshadowed.[23] The most serious aspect of these contraventions is the father nevertheless engaged in contact so soon after having the benefit of the reasons for judgment.
4. As a light but still mitigating circumstance, I take into account that this would have been the peak of whatever anxiety and concern the father may have felt about X being in 'imminent danger' of self-harm as a consequence of the no contact order and the father may have been struggling and psychologically vulnerable.
5. A term of imprisonment of one month on each count is warranted.

1. As to a description of the contraventions and the objective seriousness of each count, I refer to and repeat the No.6 Judgment at:

(a) Paragraphs 106-123 with respect to Count 11; and

(b) Paragraphs 125-130 with respect to Count 12.

1. They occurred in June 2024 being ten months after the delivery of judgment and interim orders on 4 August 2023. With respect to Count 11, findings from the No.6 Judgment include:

112. ... Where the previous breaches were primarily with respect to maintaining the communication per se, the content of the communications in this count are an aggravating circumstance.

113. It was seven months since the previous contravention of this type (being communicating with [X] vis Discord [in] November 2023 - Count 10) and there is now an identifiably different tone to the communications.

114. ... There are now heightened and concerning communications from the father ...

...

120. The chatting has escalated to clear and obvious control and manipulation of a vulnerable and damaged young boy by his father. The messaging includes the father denying facts, forcing [X] to get involved, daring [X] not to believe him, criticism suggesting an apology is warranted, obtaining apologies and then forgiving [X].

...

122. The father attempts to establish contact with [Y] through [X] and asks him directly "Will you chat with [Y] for me?".

123. Any pretence that the father held concerns about [X]'s immediate and imminent self-harm as the grounds on which he is maintaining communications since the interim order of August 2023 have long gone. There are no aspects consistent with acting "carefully, proportionately, and consistently to protect the children's welfare." Rather, it is an ongoing, unrestricted and unmonitored line of communication as between the father and [X].

1. A term of imprisonment of three months on Count 11 is warranted.
2. With respect to Count 12, the subject matter is innocuous. The time of day (4:10am-4:45am) is indicative of a constant line of communication as between the father and X which is an aggravating circumstance. A term of imprisonment of one month on Count 12 is warranted.

1. As to a description of the contraventions and the objective seriousness of each count, I refer to and repeat the No.6 Judgment at:

(a) Paragraphs 144-152 with respect to Count 1;

(b) Paragraphs 154-159 with respect to Count 2;

(c) Paragraphs 161-166 with respect to Count 3;

(d) Paragraphs 168-173 with respect to Count 4; and

(e) Paragraphs 175-180 with respect to Count 5.

1. They occurred in July 2024 and September 2024 being one month and then three months after the delivery of judgment and final orders on 14 June 2024.
2. There are no mitigating circumstances to these counts. The father's concerns about X and his given reasons for the ongoing contact still hark way back to X's 'farewell message,' circa September 2023, which I have found to have been extinguished no later than November 2023.
3. The aggravating features of this group of counts are:

(a) The father's conduct remains ongoing, unrestrained, unrelenting, unchecked and now unphased by the final orders of the Court;

(b) The order breached is a final order which occurred so soon after the father having received the benefit of the reasons for judgment;

(c) Despite there being no evidence of any acutely serious topics, the subject matter has settled into a steady understanding and acceptance of compulsion, secrecy and subjugation of X by the father which is arguably even more harmful overall.

(d) A consistent theme to Counts 2-5 is the time of day the father initiates contact with X being extremely early (7:06am, 4:24am, 4:56am and 12:55am). I comfortably infer that this has the effect of ensuring that the father has inserted himself into X's life as one of, if not the first, thing that X experiences that day.

1. A term of imprisonment of one month on each count is warranted.

1. In Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610, at [45] the plurality of the High Court stated that:

A Judge sentencing an offender for more than one offense must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of cumulation or concurrence, as well, of course, as questions of totality.

1. This is a case where the common law sentencing principle of totality ought to be applied to ensure the appropriateness and proportionality of the totality of the sanctions in light of the totality of the father's conduct and circumstances.
2. I also adopt and apply what was said by Gill J in Polak & Polak (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 275 at [62]:

In determining the length of a term of imprisonment, it is important to consider that even a relatively short period, measured in a few months, is a heavy weight to be borne by the sentenced individual, and perhaps more so in the absence of any indication that prison is other than a foreign and unknown experience for the respondent.

1. Sanctions are to be imposed on the father as follows:

(a) Count 7 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(b) Count 8- imprisonment for a period of one month.

(c) Count 9 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(d) Count 10 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(e) Count 11 - imprisonment for a period of three months.

(f) Count 12 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(g) Count 1 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(h) Count 2 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(i) Count 3 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

(j) Count 4- imprisonment for a period of one month.

(k) Count 5 - imprisonment for a period of one month.

1. Turning then to questions of cumulation or concurrence:

(a) Counts 7-10 are concurrent.

(b) Count 11-12 are concurrent as to each other and also concurrent as to Counts 7-10.

(c) Counts 1-5 are concurrent as to each other, but cumulative upon Count 11.

(d) This is an aggregate of four months.

1. Further, on the questions of totality, I take into account that:

(a) The father has not previously been found to have contravened orders of the court; and

(b) The father has not had the benefit of being subject to the impact of the penalty on the earlier in time contraventions prior to the imposition of penalty on the later in time contraventions.

1. The father will serve at least two months in custody.
2. On the father entering into a bond, without surety or financial security, but on security of an undertaking in the terms set out below, the balance of up to two months will be suspended.
3. The term of the bond secured by the undertaking is to be 12 months.
4. Accordingly, the terms of the imprisonment will be that the father is liable to serve full time custody for two months from late 2025 until early 2026. The balance of two months may then be suspended. He may then be released, unless he fails to enter into the undertaking, in which case the release shall be the day he enters into the undertaking, or early 2026, whichever occurs first.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Mansfield.

I, Mr Farrington, undertake that for a period of 12 months from the date of entering into a bond secured by this undertaking, I shall:

(1) Be of good behaviour; and

(2) Comply with orders made by this court

I acknowledge that by this undertaking, up to two months of my term of imprisonment imposed in late 2025 is suspended.

I acknowledge that failure to comply with this undertaking may result in a requirement that I serve the balance of the suspended term of imprisonment in custody.

[1] See Farrington & Belkis (Interim Change of Residence) [2023] FedCFamC2F 1076.

[2] See Farrington & Belkis (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 660.

[3] See Farrington & Belkis (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1686.

[5] Hatfield & Rivas [2024] FedCFamC1A 202 at [67] and [72].

[6] Farrington & Belkis (No 6) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1571 at 75, 81, 88 and 95.

[7] Farrington & Belkis (No 6) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1571 at 124, 131, 153, 160, 167, 174 and 181.

[8] Farrington & Belkis (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 660 at [478].

[9] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 23.

[10] Submissions of Mr Farrington dated 9 December 2025 at paragraph 30.

[11] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 13.

[12] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 4.

[13] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 13.

[14] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 4.

[15] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 18.

[17] Affidavit of Ms Belkis dated 2 December 2025 at paragraph 23.

[18] Submissions of Mr Farrington dated 9 December 2025 at paragraph 129.

[19] Submissions of Mr Farrington dated 9 December 2025 at paragraphs 100, 123.

[20] Submissions of Mr Farrington dated 9 December 202 at paragraph 124.

[21] Of Compilations 95 and 96 of the Act.

[22] Of Compilations 98 and 99 of the Act.

[23] Farrington & Belkis (Interim Change of Residence) [2023] FedCFamC2F 1076, paragraph 73.