FAMILY LAW - MAJOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL PROCEEDINGS LIST - PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - a property adjustment proceeding on foot in this court and a property adjustment proceeding on foot in Singapore between the same parties concerning the same subject matter - the proceeding in this court commenced earlier in time - divorce not yet granted, whether in Australia or in Singapore - consideration of the matrix of criteria to be addressed as espoused in Henry v Henry

1. The more important factual matters to which the respondent deposed on this stay application may be synthesised in the manner recorded below. They were -

(a) she and the applicant are each 58 years of age;

(b) she was born in Singapore, is a citizen of Singapore, a resident of Singapore and a permanent resident of Australia;

(c) the applicant was born in Country C, was raised in Country D, is a Country D citizen, undertook tertiary studies in the United States of America and is the holder of a long-term visitor pass entitling him to remain in Singapore for up to 90 days during any visit to Singapore;

(d) the applicant is not permitted to stay within Australia for more than 183 days in any calendar year by reason of his status in not being an Australian tax resident;

(e) in 1997 the applicant and respondent commenced a romantic relationship, they married in 1999 and since the death of the respondent's father in 2015, they have split their time between Australia and Singapore, usually spending five months each calendar year in Australia, five months each calendar year in Singapore and two months each year travelling for recreational purposes;

(f) the applicant presently resides at F Street, Suburb G in the State of Victoria, Australia;

(g) the respondent presently resides at S Street, Singapore with her mother and aunt;

(h) the respondent inherited the S Street property upon her father's death together with T Pty Ltd;

(i) she currently manages what she described as "significant property" in Singapore;

(j) her mother and aunt with whom the respondent lives are each 79 years of age and under the terms of the respondent's late father's will, the respondent is required to "maintain and care for (her mother) to the same standard as she enjoyed during" the marriage between the respondent's parents;

(k) the respondent's aunt requires "a lot more care and attention" (the respondent's words) than does the respondent's mother, which care the respondent currently manages;

(l) during COVID, the respondent was unable to return to Singapore between December 2020 to March 2022 and worked in Melbourne;

(m) on the parties' separation, the applicant visited Singapore staying in a hotel;

(n) the applicant has not applied for Singaporean citizenship because he would be required to relinquish his Country D citizenship if he did, as a result of which in 2021 the respondent obtained a long-term visitor pass for the applicant enabling him to spend time in Singapore;

(o) the respondent is a tax resident of Singapore;

(p) the parties separated under one roof on 27 April 2022 while in Melbourne and on 24 June 2022 the applicant vacated the Suburb G property at the respondent's request; and

(q) they have no children.

1. During the currency of counselling sessions convened to explore reconciliation, the applicant, unbeknownst to the respondent, issued this proceeding in this court on 19 July 2024 seeking urgent interim and final property settlement orders. In his claim, the applicant seeks 40% of the net asset pool which the respondent rejects because she says the majority of assets in the pool of assets are gifts or assets devolved by inheritance in Singapore. She deposed to her assets being made up of AUD $295,000,000, of which AUD $254,000,000 are inherited assets located in Singapore. As is canvassed below, under Singaporean laws, ordinarily property acquired by inheritance is not amenable to adjustment in the division of spouse parties' assets.
2. Some of the circumstances surrounding the events immediately after the respondent commenced litigation in Singapore were canvassed in my earlier reasons in this case.[4] The respondent deposed to the following additional matters in her 12 May 2025 affidavit -

(a) she filed proceeding FC/OAD ... in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore in early 2025;

(b) the applicant was served with the Singaporean process in early 2025;

(c) a short time later, she filed a summons in the Singapore proceeding seeking orders restraining the applicant from taking any step to participate further in the proceeding in this court;

(d) five days later, the applicant filed a summons in the Singaporean proceeding to stay that proceeding, contending that on forum non conveniens grounds the proceeding should be stayed; and

(e) a short time later, a case conference was conducted in the Singapore proceeding resulting in consent orders being agreed.

1. The respondent said in her affidavit that the assets in issue in this case take several forms. She deposed to the following -

(a) the majority of her assets are physically located in Singapore;

(b) those assets consist of gifts and inheritances;

(c) they vastly exceed (inferentially, the value of those assets vastly exceeds) those located in Australia;

(d) the inherited assets are governed by complex Singaporean law; and

(e) if a dispute exists in respect of the existence or the value of the assets in Singapore, the respondent will need to engage expert evidence on the issue, which, in relation to inherited assets, will involve expert evidence about the nature and arrangements under the inheritances, the rights of the respondent's mother and expert evidence about wills and succession law in Singapore.

1. The respondent deposed in paragraph 51 of her affidavit to the existing assets and liabilities of the parties. She divided her analysis between Australian assets and liabilities on the one hand as compared with Singaporean assets and liabilities on the other hand. Recognising that she gave no evidence in the capacity as an expert within the meaning of s 79 of the Evidence Act,[5] she attributed estimated values to the assets. The Australian assets were said to be owned -

(a) by the parties jointly; or

(b) by one or other of them; or

(c) by family trusts.

1. The total of the Australian assets said to be located in Australia was $20,595,629. Liabilities in respect of loans where the payment was required to go to the wife or a company associated with the wife was $20,862,504. In other words, the liabilities exceeded the assets in respect of assets located in Australia.
2. In relation to assets in Singapore, the respondent provided details of them and their values (not estimated values) identifying assets which were inherited, assets forming part of the undertakings of corporations in which she had an interest and assets the respondent owned with her mother. The respondent attributed the amount of AUD $254,378,861 to the Singaporean assets. In her affidavit the respondent listed, in Australian dollars, the total assets in Singapore as being $254,378,861 yet she listed a greater sum of $295,836,994 representing total net assets excluding superannuation.
3. The respondent addressed contributions in her affidavit. She said that her father's company, L Pty Ltd, loaned money to fund the respondent's property development projects. She deposed to establishing companies in Australia which borrowed funds from L Pty Ltd then used those funds to finance the property development projects of the applicant's and respondent's two developments in Western Australia and one in Victoria.
4. The respondent deposed to her father or his company T Pty Ltd lending money to L Pty Ltd[6] in the 2016 financial year in the amount of AUD $21,161,744. She said those loans were not repaid so on the death of her father she inherited those loans. That was a curious contention, at least for the purposes of Australian law. The lender was T Pty Ltd. Presumably it had perpetual succession. The loan was an asset payable to T Pty Ltd, rather than the debt owing to T Pty Ltd being an asset payable to the respondent's father. Precisely how the loan due to T Pty Ltd came to be owed to the respondent's father went unexplained. Equally unexplained was the way in which the debt became one capable of being passed to the respondent as an inheritance.
5. However that issue need not be decided on this stay application.
6. The respondent went on to depose that she used her inheritance in Singapore "by way of loans to [L Pty Ltd]" (a phrase very difficult to follow in the circumstances just narrated). She said she is owed AUD $19,897,176.
7. The respondent deposed to conducting a property development business in Australia called "[H Group]". She said one development currently in progress is in Suburb N and is close to completion. She said the development is an apartment complex in which apartments are presently listed for sale. The respondent stated that -

(a) she participates in the decision making of the business, responding to external parties, undertaking banking, marketing and sales along with general office administration;

(b) the applicant is a professional, he has experience in building and construction and he plans and constructs; and

(c) the respondent's cousin, Mr U and the office manager Ms V oversee day-to-day operations.

1. The deponent addressed inheritance matters. She deposed to the death of her father (the late Mr W sometimes called Mr X) in 2015 and that the respondent and her mother were appointed as executrices of the estate of the late Mr W. She deposed to her late father's will providing for her to inherit the shares of which he stood registered in -

(a) L Pty Ltd;

(b) J Pty Ltd; and

(c) T Pty Ltd.

1. She deposed to her late father's will providing that she also inherits all household furniture and effects, jewellery and personal items at S Street and the balance of the residuary estate. The respondent deposed to the late Mr W's will providing that the respondent was to maintain and care for her mother to the same standard she enjoyed during the mother's marriage for the rest of the mother's life. The respondent inferred that the mother was not left anything in the will of the late Mr W by reason of the fact that the respondent would provide for her. She also deposed to Mr W specifying in his will that the respondent was to form a charity in the name of her grandfather, Mr Y. The establishment of the charity was to be settled by the payment of SGD $20,000,000, although that sum had not been applied to the settlement of that charity.
2. The respondent deposed to a grant of probate having been made in 2016 to which a schedule of assets was attached. In that schedule real property was recorded as were corporate assets in Australia plus corporate assets in Singapore plus cash standing to the credit of various bank accounts, publicly listed shares and three motor vehicles. Once liabilities were deducted, the respondent's inheritance of assets was SGD $150,066,731 leaving her net assets inherited by her standing at AUD $148,220,910.
3. The respondent attempted to explain the approach adopted by a Singapore court to inheritances. Recognising that the respondent is not a legal practitioner and so her capability to canvass those issues is much confined, other evidence on this stay application addressed legal issues concerning inheritances. Mr Q was the relevant expert. He prepared a report as a joint single expert in this proceeding in this court. The respondent said the applicant has not been fully cooperative with the joint single expert on the subject of the treatment of inherited assets.
4. The respondent deposed to her taxable income being SGD $169,350. She said she received rental income.
5. Among the exhibits to the respondent's affidavit was correspondence involving Mr Q and documents referrable to litigation funding. She also exhibited a large volume of company searches.

1. In preparation for the contested interlocutory application on 26 May 2025, the applicant made his affidavit on 12 May 2025. He deposed to making that affidavit -

(a) in opposition to the respondent's stay application; and

(b) in support of his own application to restrain the respondent from progressing proceeding FC/OAD ... issued in the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore including her anti-suit injunction application filed early 2025.

1. A large number of factual matters as recorded in the applicant's affidavit were common to the same facts as were set out in the respondent's affidavit. Those included formal details of each party such as ages, places of birth, citizenship, the parties' first meeting, their occupational histories, their marriage, where they lived and when, events during COVID, the respondent's father's death and their separation. There is no need to repeat those details here as there is little in the way of relevant discrepancies in the versions each gave. The applicant took issue with the respondent's description of him having issued litigation in Singapore "surreptitiously". He deposed to issuing the Singapore proceeding in July 2024 after concluding that reconciliation was unlikely. Whether any so-called surreptitious conduct attended the applicant's filing of litigation in Singapore was not a matter on which I was required to pass judgment or to even consider, having regard to the formulations of the applicable legal principles.
2. The applicant deposed (in a manner more akin to submissions than as a statement of pertinent facts, the latter being required by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 ("the court rules")) to six main reasons why he contended that Australia was the proper forum for the determination of the parties' division of property. Those six reasons were -

(a) each of the applicant and the respondent are permanent residents of Australia;

(b) he is domiciled in Australia and has been so domiciled since late 1999;

(c) the applicant and respondent have spent a significant portion of their married lives together in Australia having undertaken joint development projects and businesses in Australia - even having engaged in IVF procedures in Australia;

(d) the applicant intends to apply for Australian citizenship;

(e) he is not a citizen of Singapore and when he and the respondent divorce, his LTVP visa in Singapore will lapse;

(f) he and the respondent have an interest in the following corporations -

(i) J Pty Ltd in which the respondent is one of two directors but the sole shareholder;

(ii) K Pty Ltd of which the applicant, the respondent, the respondent's mother and the respondent's cousin are directors with the respondent and her mother each being 50% shareholders;

(iii) H2 Pty Ltd of which the applicant, the respondent and the respondent's cousin are directors with the applicant and respondent each being shareholders as to 50% of the issued shares in the capital of that company;

(iv) H5 Pty Ltd of which the applicant, the respondent, the respondent's mother and the respondent's cousin are directors with the applicant and the respondent each being the holders of 50% of the issued shares in the capital of that company;

(v) H3 Pty Ltd of which the applicant, respondent and the respondent's cousin are directors with 100% of the issued shares in the capital of that company being held by H5 Pty Ltd;

(vi) H4 Pty Ltd of which the applicant, the respondent, the respondent's mother and the respondent's cousin are directors with 45% of the issued shares in the capital of that company being held by the respondent, 40% of the issued shares in the capital of the company being held by the applicant and 15% being held by the respondent's mother;

(vii) H1 Pty Ltd of which the applicant, the respondent, the respondent's mother and the respondent's cousin are directors with the respondent and her mother each holding 50% of the issued shares in the capital of that company; and

(viii) L Pty Ltd of which the respondent and her cousin are directors with the respondent holding 100% of the issued shares in the capital of that company.

1. The applicant gave evidence about two family trusts. Those were -

(a) The Adams & Marchenko Family Trust of which H5 Pty Ltd is the trustee of a discretionary investment trust settled in 2023 or thereabouts; and

(b) H Trust of which H2 Pty Ltd is trustee of a discretionary trading trust settled in or about late 2013.

1. The applicant deposed to a significant portion of the parties' assets being held in Australia by the above companies and trusts. He said -

(a) through companies and trusts the parties owned several properties, nine of which are rented and owned by J Pty Ltd;

(b) the entities that make up the H GroupGroup carry on a development business created in the year 2000 or thereabouts;

(c) the Suburb G property is valued at approximately $4,500,000 and is registered in joint names although that valuation is an estimate conducted in 2021; and

(d) the respondent owns at 50% interest as a tenant in common in real property known as O Street, Suburb P the estimated value of which is $750,000.

1. So far as cash at bank in bank accounts was concerned, the applicant deposed to several accounts. He said -

(a) the respondent has funds on $137,702 in Z Bank accounts ...18 and ...01; and

(b) she has funds of $24,363 in Z Bank account ...39.

1. The applicant asserted that by reason of the Australian assets not having been valued, it is possible that their real value exceeds the asserted value of $20,595,629.
2. The applicant deposed to litigation in the Supreme Court of Victoria in which he and the respondent were involved "in our capacity (sic) as directors and shareholders of [H2 Pty Ltd]". He said the plaintiffs in that case are seeking $3,514,785 as liquidated damages against a builder and the outcome of that litigation "may affect the value of the shares in [H2 Pty Ltd]". The plaintiff in that case was identified as H2 Pty Ltd. Whether the plaintiff and H2 Pty Ltd were intended as an interchangeable reference, the applicant's affidavit did not say.
3. The applicant said he had applied for litigation funding from an entity called "[AA Financial Services]" and he is awaiting the outcome of his application.
4. The applicant asserted that the respondent has engaged in conduct which he believes "is tantamount to economic abuse and coercive control so that [he] would not be provided [with] an equal playing field in the Australian proceeding and the Singapore proceeding by severely curtailing my access to funds".
5. The applicant deposed to his views of the estimated value of the parties' net assets in Australia. He deposed that -

(a) overall, the parties' net assets were valued at AUD $310,000,000;

(b) of that figure, AUD $35,000,000 worth of assets were held in Australia; and

(c) the respondent has more recently deposed to a figure more closely approximating $295,836,994 in value of which $20,595,629 in value are held in Australia.

1. Expressed in tabular form, the applicant deposed to the asset and liability position in the terms set out hereunder. He said -

(a) Australian personal assets were valued at AUD $4,412,065;

(b) his interests in Australian corporate assets were valued at AUD $16,183,564; and

(c) Singaporean assets were valued at SGD $254,378,306.

1. The applicant deposed to contributions. He stated -

(a) at the commencement of cohabitation the respondent owned a 50% interest in a parcel of real property in the State of Victoria the value of which was unknown;

(b) he had modest assets when he and the respondent met;

(c) since 2001 he and the respondent have invested in and developed bespoke residential projects for private residences in Western Australia and in Victoria;

(d) the two have been committed to luxury design principles with refined architectural quality above standard developments maintaining a staff of six since 2001;

(e) he has overseen all projects, consulted with the respondent and has endeavoured to maintain that approach even since separation with the respondent having control over finances;

(f) Australian operations are funded by the Singaporean company T Pty Ltd; and

(g) currently the only income being generated in Australia is rental income from a development in Western Australia.

1. So far as inheritances were concerned, he deposed to being unable to verify that the amount stated by the respondent as representing a sum inherited upon the death of her late father (AUD $148,220,910) was correct.
2. As for spousal maintenance, he said that at no time has he received a salary for the work he has done. He gave details that he said pointed to his need to be paid spousal maintenance.
3. He said he is not entitled to an interim property order under Singaporean law.
4. He said he is not entitled to a litigation funding order under Singaporean law.
5. He said that if he is prevented from continuing with this proceeding in this court he will have no ability to pay for legal representation in Singapore.
6. He made allegations against the respondent concerning family violence.

1. Mr Q, a legal practitioner of Singapore prepared a report which became a single expert's report. It is established beyond debate that evidence of foreign law is a question of fact. A large number of authorities - ancient and modern - make good that proposition, including The Duchess of Di Sora v Phillipps,[7] National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation,[8] Lloyd v Guibert,[9] Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd[10] and Talwar & Sarai.[11] I have considered each in the determination of the matters before me. Mr Q was requested to provide a report that addressed certain specific issues and in doing so he was asked to proceed by adopting an agreed statement of facts. He was provided with a collection of documents including the affidavits of the parties some of the more salient provisions of which have been extracted above. Mr Q's report was recorded in his firm's letter to the parties dated 29 April 2025. Mr Q's report is detailed and considered. For the purposes of this interlocutory application I have avoided recording the depth of his consideration of an issue in respect of which his response was sought, instead preferring to paraphrase the substance of his response. For present purposes, aspects of this stay application that may overlap with the parties' divorce application have been addressed in less detail than the threshold issue of the parties' property alteration application - whether in this court or in the court of the Republic of Singapore.
2. The operation and legal consequences of the provisions of Singapore's Women's Charter 1961 ("the Charter") were essayed in detail by Mr Q. Some of the more important matters on point that emerged from his single expert report were as follows -

(a) pursuant to s 112(10) of the Charter the Singaporean court has power to order "the division between the parties of any matrimonial asset";

(b) the definition in the Charter of "matrimonial asset" includes any asset acquired before the marriage by one or both parties to the marriage which is ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while residing together or for household, education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes;

(c) the definition of matrimonial assets also includes assets substantially improved during the marriage by one or other or both parties to the marriage as well as any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one or other party to the marriage; and

(d) the definition of matrimonial asset does not include any asset (not being the matrimonial home) acquired by one party at any time by gift or inheritance and which has not been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or both parties to the marriage.

1. Mr Q put the proposition in the following terms in paragraph 51 of his report. There he said the following -

"In a nutshell, matrimonial assets are:

1. Assets acquired during the marriage (not by gift or inheritance) by either party;
2. Assets acquired by one party prior to the marriage that have been ordinarily used for the family or substantially improved by the other party;
3. Assets acquired by one party by gift or inheritance that have been substantially improved by the other party; and
4. The matrimonial home."

1. Mr Q expressed the opinion that the Singaporean court is unable to make orders in a matrimonial action that are intended to bind third parties or assets owned by third parties without the consent of the third party, even declaratory relief.[12]
2. Mr Q addressed the powers conferred by s 112(5) of the Charter, only one of which (s 112(5)(d) which refers to a third party holding assets on trust) and in all other cases the purport of the power is in respect of matrimonial assets owned by a spouse party. Mr Q expressed the opinion that in respect of trusts, the Family Justice Courts in the Republic of Singapore possess power in the nature of an in personam jurisdiction to deal with trusts only where the assets are held by the parties legally and beneficially but the court does not have power to deal with the assets held legally by third parties. That is subject to the exception that the court does have power to deal with a trust where the court has grounds to believe that the trust was established to conceal or to dissipate assets. That power inures pursuant to s 139M of the Charter. A temporal limitation exists of three years prior to the filing of the relevant application. Any such transaction may be set aside by the court, even if the relevant transaction is the settlement of the trust by which the trust is first constituted.
3. Mr Q stated that it must be added that the court's power to notionally return assets to the pool of assets for division should be addressed as was canvassed by the Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK.[13]
4. In practical terms, he said that the operation of the holdings of the court in TNL v TNK is fourfold. The court can notionally return marital assets to the pool for division if -

"a. One spouse engaged in a transaction during divorce proceedings, or when divorce proceedings are imminent;

b. The transaction involved a substantial sum of money, or an asset with a substantial value;

c. The other spouse can be considered to have at least a putative interest in the money or asset; and

d. Is regardless of the reason for which the transaction was entered into."

1. The 2018 decision of Ong J in UKA v UKB[14] provides a recent illustration, according to Mr Q. There, Ong J made orders returning the value of the assets to the pool for division notwithstanding that the trust was expressed to be irrevocable.
2. Mr Q cited but did not provide a detailed exposition of the provisions of ss 69(4)(b) and 114(1)(f) of the Charter in respect of the concept in Singaporean family law of "financial resource".
3. Mr Q provided a helpful exposition on the subject of inheritances and the manner in which inheritances are treated in Singaporean law. He said inherited assets do not form part of the asset pool available for division unless those inherited assets are converted in the same manner as premarital assets may be converted.
4. Assets that have come into ownership of one of the parties to the marriage by gift do not form part of the asset pool available for division unless those assets the subject of the gift have been converted in the same manner as premarital assets may be converted.
5. Even if the assets are located in a jurisdiction other than Singapore, Mr Q said the Family Justice Courts of Singapore possess an in personam jurisdiction over the parties with the consequence that the Singaporean court may make orders that apply to the parties in personam. That emerged from the decision in Harjut Jaur d/o Kulwant Singh v Saroop Sing a/l Amar Singh.[15] However, the Family Justice Courts of Singapore have no jurisdiction to make orders in the nature of declaratory relief in respect of ownership of assets (whether movable or immovable) in Australia. Singapore applies the learning from The British South Africa Company v The Companhia de Moçambique[16] in that regard.
6. Mr Q stated that the Family Justice Courts in Singapore have power under s 112(5) of the Charter to order -

(a) a transfer of real property located in Australia from the parties' joint names to the name of one party or from one party to the other;

(b) a sale of real property located in Australia;

(c) a transfer of shareholding or other investments held in Australia from one party the other; and

(d) a sale of shareholdings or investments held in Australia.

1. Mr Q said that the power under s 112(1) of the Charter does not confer upon the Singaporean court the power of ordering an alteration in office holdings in a company, although Mr Q said the point is not yet the subject of a decided case on point.
2. Superannuation splitting orders are not made by the Family Justice Courts in Singapore as that court does not possess power to make orders that bind third parties, according to Mr Q. That means that an order cannot be validly or effectually made against a trustee of a superannuation fund. That is to be contrasted with funds in a person's account maintained under the Central Provident Fund Act, pursuant to which certain pensions were established. The Family Justice Courts are empowered to make an order that binds the Central Providence Fund Board by operation of s 27B(1) of the Central Provident Fund Act.
3. Mr Q also addressed the approach adopted by the Family Justice Courts of Singapore to the determination of an application for the division of assets. He said that according to the court's decision in USB v USA[17] five elements are involved in the determination of a property alteration case. Those elements are -

"a. A determination of the pool of matrimonial assets available for division;

1. Ascription of a ratio that represents each party's direct financial contributions relative to the other party;
2. Ascription of a second ratio to represent each party's indirect contributions to the well-being of the family relative to the other party throughout the marriage;
3. Using each party's relative direct and indirect contributions, deriving each party's overall contribution to the family which would then form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets; and
4. A determination of whether there is any basis for the overall ratio to be adjusted having regard to the circumstances of the case and any adverse inferences to be drawn."

1. So far as direct financial contributions were concerned, Mr Q said those contributions have been construed to mean contributions "made towards the acquisition and maintenance of matrimonial assets".[18] Where immovable property is concerned, two authorities[19] provide that direct financial contributions refer to the following -

"i. Any lump sum payment to the seller / developer of the property (whether a down-payment or otherwise);

ii. Payments towards monthly mortgage instalments;

iii. Legal fees and stamp duties incurred in the purchase of property;[20] and

iv. Commissions paid to property agents for the purchase of the property."[21]

1. Where parties' finances have been comingled especially by the use of accounts in joint names, the "income approach" is used involving the determining of ratios of the parties' direct financial contribution by reference to the income earned through the period of the marriage for which records are available.[22]
2. Mr Q said that under Singaporean law indirect contributions take one of two forms. The first is indirect financial contributions being payments made by the parties for the family's day-to-day expenditure mostly payments that do not result in the acquisition of capital assets. The second is indirect non-financial contributions being contributions of a non-monetary nature mostly such things as the provision of care for children, maintenance of the home or living environment and care for the extended family. Mr Q pointed out that in ANJ v ANK[23] the Court of Appeal held that quantifying in accurate valuation terms a party's indirect contributions is impossible with the consequence that the court's approach is necessarily based on impression and judgment.
3. When ascertaining the fourth element, the court determines the average ratio between the parties' direct financial contribution and their indirect contributions. Mr Q gave as an illustration a scenario where the direct financial contributions were 70:30 and the indirect contributions were 50:50, the average ratio would be 60:40.
4. In the final element the court determines whether any adjustment should be made to the average ratio. Such an adjustment may be made, according to Mr Q, in one of two ways, namely -

(a) putting more weight on either direct financial contributions or indirect contributions; and/or

(b) directly applying an uplift to the average ratio.

1. Illustrations were taken from the decision in ANJ v ANK.[24] Those included the following -

"a. In very short, childless, marriages, the Court may divide assets according to the parties' DFC, and decline to give any weight to indirect contributions;

1. If the pool of assets is extremely large and was acquired through the extraordinary effort of one party, the Court may give greater weight to DFC; and
2. In long marriages in which the parties have children who have reached adulthood, the Court may place greater weight on the parties' indirect contributions.

1. Mr Q expressed the opinion that in Singapore a part property settlement was not available unless by consent in which case the parties agree that the receipt is an advance payment from that party's share of the matrimonial pool to be taken into account when final orders are made for the division of assets.
2. So far as spousal maintenance orders in Singapore were concerned, Mr Q stated that such an order is only available to a husband if the husband is "incapacitated during the marriage and unable to maintain himself", as provided for in s 113 of the Charter. Mr Q recorded that the statement of agreed facts with which he was provided said nothing about any incapacity of the applicant so he did not meet the requirement of being incapacitated with the consequence that he did not qualify for spousal maintenance in Singapore.
3. The respondent, on the other hand, is able to seek spousal maintenance regardless of incapacity. So far as spousal maintenance of a wife was concerned, Mr Q stated that Singaporean family law operated in the following manner -

(a) following a divorce, the purpose of spousal maintenance is to "even out the financial inequities that exist between the parties following the divorce";[25]

(b) the court scrutinises the reasonableness of a claim for maintenance and compares it to the husband's ability to pay when determining how much to award by way of maintenance;

(c) the wife should not expect a full subsidy of her post-divorce lifestyle, as was held in Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow;[26]

(d) ordinarily the court takes into account the former wife's share of the matrimonial assets in determining whether maintenance is payable and if so how much;

(e) where the former wife is financially independent or is capable of becoming financially independent an order for spousal maintenance is unlikely;[27]

(f) if the former wife is found to be entitled to spousal maintenance, the amount of any such spousal maintenance will be determined by reference to s 114(1) of the Charter and factors that include the following -

"(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the marriage to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; and

(g) in the case of, proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage that party will lose the chance of acquiring."

(g) if a claim for a lump sum maintenance is sought, the court will consider whether a lump sum order or an order for recurring maintenance payments is more appropriate, as the Court of Appeal held in AYM v AYL;[28]

(h) a lump sum payment allows for a clean break and should be ordered wherever feasible[29] because a clean break helps avoid further litigation and acrimony between the parties;[30]

(i) a lump sum amount should not be ordered if it will financially cripple the husband;[31] and

(j) a lump sum payment is appropriate where there is reason to believe that default in recurring maintenance payments will follow.[32]

1. Mr Q was requested to express an opinion about the operation of the rules of court governing disclosure and discovery in a divorce proceeding in Singapore. He said that the rules of court in matrimonial proceedings in the Family Justice Courts were overhauled in 2024. Now, certain standard documents are required but if documents beyond those standard documents are sought they can be requested.
2. Mr Q was asked to address litigation funding in Singapore and he concluded that litigation funding is not available in Singapore whether from one party to the other or from a third party. In Singapore, parties are responsible for their own legal fees, a proposition Mr Q said was applied with vigour.[33] Legal fees are paid out of each party's share of matrimonial assets.[34]
3. Mr Q reported that on 2 January 2025 s 58B of the Charter was introduced containing definitions of "family violence" yet no decisions have been yet handed down interpreting those provisions. However, Mr Q stated that in the majority of cases, allegations of family violence will have no impact on the court's decision on the division of matrimonial assets because the court is primarily concerned with the parties' contributions towards the assets and the marriage.[35] That said, in an extreme case, when a party has so poorly conducted himself or herself that the court considers such conduct as having detracted form the marriage, the court has power to make a subtraction from that party's indirect contributions. An illustration is provided by the decision in Chan Tin Sun v Fong Quay Sim.[36] There the wife had systematically poisoned the husband during 2004 and 2005 leading to the husband's diagnosis in 2006 with chronic arsenic poisoning. She was charged, convicted and sentenced. The court held that such conduct warranted the reduction in the wife's indirect contributions from 35% to 28% her share of the matrimonial assets, a 7% discount. Another illustration may be found in TQU v TQT,[37] yet decision that is fact specific, according to Mr Q.
4. Mr Q addressed issues related to a stay application or an anti-suit injunction application. The following propositions may be distilled from the opinions expressed in Mr Q's response to question 25 as posed to him -

(a) despite the existence of litigation in Australia, in the absence of an application in the Singaporean court to stay the litigation in Singapore, the Singapore court will continue to hear and determine the litigation pending in the Singaporean court;

(b) it is the responsibility of the party seeking to stay the Singaporean proceeding to bring to the Singaporean court's attention to any determination made by an Australian court.

(c) even if the decision of an Australian court is brought to the attention of the Singaporean court, decisions of Australian courts do not bind the Singaporean court;[38]

(d) the Singaporean court applies to the test propounded by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd ("Spiliada");[39]

(e) the Spilada test requires in any debate about whether a proceeding should be stayed on a forum non conveniens basis that there is (1) another and (2) more appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute;[40]

(f) the requirement of appropriateness will be satisfied only if the other forum is "clearly or distinctly more appropriate;[41] and

(g) a Singaporean court will refuse to stay its own proceeding if the above-mentioned test is not satisfied despite any decision of an Australian court that the Australian court is the more appropriate forum.[42]

1. Mr Q then addressed legal issues associated with the recognition of a foreign order. He said that in accordance with the decision in the Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG,[43] defences to recognition are usually in one of three forms, namely -

(a) contravention of the public policy of the forum;

(b) where the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud or in breach of natural justice; or

(c) where the recognition of the judgment would amount to the direct or indirect enforcement of foreign penal, revenue or public laws as was held in Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Gauthier Inc.[44]

1. Mr Q said that recognition is only a prerequisite to enforcement and that two matters must be established before an order of a foreign court can be enforced in Singapore, namely -

(a) the order of the foreign court must be entitled to recognition; and

(b) thereafter, the order must meet one of the established modes of enforcement.

1. Mr Q reported that in Singapore three modes exist pursuant to which an order of a foreign court can be enforced. They are -

(a) at common law;

(b) by registration under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Sing); and

(c) through the making of a mirror order under Part 4A of the Charter.

1. Mr Q said that the rules concerning common law enforcement were set out in Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc.[45] He said that in order for a foreign order to be enforceable as a common law enforcement, it must be -

"a. an in personam order;

b. a final and conclusive judgment;

c. rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;

d. a judgment for a definite sum of money; and

e it must not:

i. be procured by fraud;

ii. be contrary to public policy if enforced; and

1. have been granted in proceedings that were contrary to natural justice."

1. Mr Q expressed the opinion that an order for the division of property cannot be enforced by common law enforcement. However, an order for one party to pay another a defined amount can be so enforced.
2. As to the second enforcement method, that is to say, under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act Mr Q said that four criteria apply. Those are -

"a. the Court which made the order must be from a jurisdiction which has been gazetted by the Minister as a reciprocating jurisdiction;[46]

1. the judgment that was made must, similarly, be of a type that has been gazette by the Ministers;[47]
2. the application for enforcement must be made within 6 years of the date of the judgment;[48] and
3. the jurisdiction of the Court making the order must be recognized by the law of Singapore."[49]

1. However, Mr Q said that registration may be refused or registration may be set aside in any one of seven circumstances. Those are -

"a. if the judgment has been wholly satisfied, discharged, or could not have been enforced in the original jurisdiction, as at the date of application for registration;[50]

b. if the requirements described in paragraph 188 above have not been met;

c. if the order was made ultra vires the foreign court's jurisdiction;

1. if the judgment debtor did not receive sufficient notice of the foreign proceedings to enable him to defend it;

e. if the judgment was obtained by fraud;

f. if the enforcement of the judgment would offend local public policy;

1. if the person who registered the foreign judgment was not the person to whom any rights or entitlements under the foreign judgment were vested in."

1. Only money judgments have been registered and in DGX v DGY[51] the court refused to register a non-money order even when it originated from the Family Court of Western Australia.
2. Mirror orders are available pursuant to the provisions of part 4A of the Charter.
3. Mr Q highlighted the observations of the Court of Appeal in UFN v UFM.[52] Mr Q also observed that five matters must be satisfied in respect of mirror orders. They are -

"a. the parties' marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or the parties have been legally separated, by means of judicial or other proceedings in a foreign country;[53]

1. the divorce, annulment, or separation, is entitled to be recognized as valid under Singapore law;[54]
2. the Singapore Court has jurisdiction over the parties and over the matter;[55]
3. there must be 'substantial ground' for the application;[56] and
4. it must be 'appropriate' for such an order to be made in Singapore."[57]

1. Mr Q pointed out that mirror orders can be made in relation to non-money orders. He said that procedurally, an application for mirror orders requires the party applying to seek permission to commence a substantive proceeding by operation of s 121D of the Charter, ordinarily brought by originating application without notice and once permission is granted, the application for substantive relief is commenced by separate originating application on notice. When a mirror order is made it is enforceable in the same way as a local court's order is enforced.
2. So far as remedies for enforcement are concerned, Mr Q stated that several remedies are available. They are -

(a) seizure and sale as well as garnishee;

(b) contempt applications; and

(c) in the case of a money order, bankruptcy.

1. Mr Heath KC on behalf of the respondent urged me to address his client's stay application first, ahead of the applicant's divorce application the applicant filed in this court. Mr Heath KC submitted that the respondent's stay application would be largely rendered nugatory if the applicant's divorce application were to be granted. He said no pressing urgency attended the hearing of the divorce application by either party. In the upshot, I determined that the respondent's stay application should be heard and decided first. Mr Shaw KC submitted that on its proper construction, Mr Q's report was to be construed in such manner that the Singaporean court would not deal with any property aspect of the parties' dispute unless the divorce is granted in Singapore and for Singaporean purposes, the forum will for all intents and purposes be determined by the venue in which the divorce is determined. Mr Shaw KC submitted that the proper way forward was to hear and determine the stay application first and then argument concerning the anti-suit injunction. He submitted that if the stay application failed on the basis that Australia was not the clearly inappropriate forum then, according to the applicant, the divorce should be granted in Australia and the case will then be determined in Australia.
2. The case proceeded before me on the basis that the stay application was to be dealt with first.
3. Before addressing the competing considerations of the respondent's stay application, it is essential to examine the mainstay of the respondent's contentions on her stay application, derived from the decision of the High Court in Henry v Henry.[58] Mr Heath KC submitted that the reasons in that authority are of special significance having regard to the fact that it was a case involving family law where a stay application was sought in respect of competing litigation in Australia on the one hand and Monaco on the other. Certain discrete statements of principle may be recorded as appear below.
4. Before addressing those statements, it is as well to record that in Singapore, the courts apply the doctrine from Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Consulex Ltd[59] whereas in Australia, the doctrine in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Ltd v Fay[60] as well as in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd[61] has been adopted in preference to the principles for which Spiliada stands.
5. The statements that follow represent the propositions extracted from Henry v Henry. It is important to observe that the High Court overturned the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in In the Marriage of Henry.[62] All members of the court allowed the appeal, although Brennan CJ delivered separate reasons from the plurality.[63]
6. Brennan CJ held that following Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay,[64] in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd the High Court, by majority, adopted the "clearly inappropriate forum" test to be applied when a party to a proceeding in an Australian forum seeks a stay of that proceeding in order to permit the same matter to be determined in a foreign forum having the necessary jurisdiction.
7. Brennan CJ held that before a proceeding instituted under the Family Law Act is stayed, two conditions must be satisfied. They are -

(a) the Family Court is a clearly inappropriate forum in which to determine a proceeding for a decree of dissolution of marriage; and second

(b) there is some forum in another country which has and can exercise jurisdiction in a proceeding for a decree of dissolution of marriage.

1. The majority adopted a slightly different path of reasoning. After reciting the reasons of the registrar and of the single judge who heard the appeal from the registrar, the majority addressed general principles governing a stay of a proceeding in favour of a foreign forum.
2. The majority's holdings may be set out in the manner that now follows in precis form. The majority held that in the decision in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd the High Court of Australia confirmed its rejection of the forum non conveniens principle stated by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Consulex Ltd. Conversely in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd the High Court held that a stay should be granted if the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum which will be the case if continuation of the proceeding in that court would be oppressive in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging" or vexatious in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment" citing Oceanic Sun. In Henry v Henry the High Court overruled the decision in Gilmore v Gilmore.[65]
3. In Henry v Henry the High Court held that it is prima facie vexatious and oppressive to commence a second proceeding in the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the same matter in issue in another forum, as was held in Moore v Inglis.[66] In Henry, the majority held as follows -

"It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed. However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question of whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", or, vexatious, in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment". And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation."

1. In this litigation two separate proceedings are on foot - one in this court and one in Singapore between the same parties involving aspects of the same marital relationship between them. On the facts of the case, the court in Henry said the following -

"If separate proceedings are commenced between the husband and wife in different countries, differences in procedure, in available remedies and in the substantive law with respect to marriage and divorce will ordinarily ensure that the proceedings are different in significant respects. However, the proceedings will ordinarily be concerned with the same controversy. And that will be so even if the initiating party is not the same and even if the proceedings seek inconsistent remedies or outcomes. The marital relationship lies at the heart of all proceedings between the husband and wife with respect to their marital status, especially proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. In such cases, it is the marital relationship itself which is the subject of controversy. And if the marriage is still subsisting, disputes with respect to property, maintenance and the custody of children will ordinarily be but aspects of an underlying controversy with respect to the marital relationship."

1. Having set out certain of the more important observations from Henry, it is now necessary to address the matters raised in the written submissions of the parties.
2. It is also necessary to recognise that to a certain extent a stay application and an anti-suit application have features in common. In CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd[67] the court held that an application for an anti-suit injunction should not be considered without the court first considering whether its own proceeding should be stayed.
3. Counsel for the respondent pointed out in their written submissions that a variety of orders are sought in different fora. By the respondent, in the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore they are -

(a) an order for divorce;

(b) an order for the division of matrimonial assets;

(c) an anti-suit injunction restraining the applicant from continuing with the proceeding in this court; and

(d) costs of the dissolution of the marriage.

(a) that the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens; and

(b) if the respondent's stay application in this court is refused, then an order should be made giving the applicant time to file his reply in the proceeding in the Republic of Singapore.

1. In the proceeding before this court the applicant seeks -

(a) interim and final orders for spousal maintenance; and

(b) orders for the alteration of property interests on the basis that the applicant retains 40% of the net pool of assets (including superannuation) and the respondent retains 60% of the net pool of assets (including superannuation).

1. Counsel for the respondent submitted in their summary of argument on the threshold issue of the proper forum (those submissions being dated 23 May 2025) that the applicant seeks orders which only a court in Singapore can grant by reason of his assertion in paragraph 52 of his affidavit made 12 May 2025 in which he lists assets and liabilities in both Australia and in Singapore. Counsel for the respondent submitted that in order for the applicant to receive 40% of the matrimonial asset pool of assets, he needed to avail himself of assets in Singapore because -

(a) the assets in Singapore make up 92% of the total assets;

(b) in his further amended initiating application the applicant does not seek to retain any Australian assets; and

(c) the only specified asset the applicant indicated he wishes to retain in his final relief is superannuation and the only known superannuation is in Singapore.

1. An order for spousal maintenance is not readily obtainable in Singapore and in any event, the applicant is 58 years of age, in good health, he holds a master's degree, he has an extensive professional history and he gives evidence that he has managed a property development group since the year 2000 receiving over 20 awards for project development.
2. Counsel for the respondent advanced a collection of contentions to support their principle thesis that Australia is the clearly inappropriate forum for the hearing and determination of the parties' property alteration dispute. Those submissions included the following -

(a) this court possesses an implied power to prevent its own processes from being used to bring about injustice, citing CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd;[68]

(b) the power to make an order staying a proceeding is reposed in r 1.06 of the court rules;

(c) in Henry v Henry[69] the majority identified seven factors as being relevant to the question whether the Australian court was the clearly inappropriate forum, those factors being -

(i) the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and the issue on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions;

(ii) the stage at which each proceeding had reached and the costs;

(iii) whether the parties can participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing;

(iv) whether the controversy between the parties is the same in both jurisdictions;

(v) whether or not complete relief is available in the local jurisdiction;

(vi) whether or not anything is to be gained in the overseas proceeding or whether the overseas proceeding will give rise to additional or other remedies; and

(vii) whether each jurisdiction will recognise the other's orders and decrees, and if so, the relevant ease with which the Australian orders can be recognised in another country;

(d) it is relevant to consider the applicability of the statements of law in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique[70] and in Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (No 2)[71] which render proceedings non-justiciable in common law jurisdictions including -

(i) a proceeding relating to title in land a foreign sovereign jurisdiction; and

(ii) a proceeding relating to possession and trespass to land in a foreign sovereign jurisdiction;

(e) orders in rem in respect of real property of the parties located outside Australia cannot be made by this court;

(f) according to Mr Q, a Singaporean court called upon to determine a stay application must be independently satisfied that the requirements for a stay of the proceeding have been satisfied;

(g) in order for the Singaporean court to recognise an order of an Australian court, such an order must be in personam in nature and limited to a judgment for a specific monetary sum;

(h) an order of this court altering the parties' interests in property in Singapore will not be recognised in Singapore and an order affecting land in Singapore which is in rem will not be recognised under Moçambique principles_;_

(i) a money order is akin to a judgment debt and it does not take effect in fact or in law as an order altering the property interests of the parties;

(j) a Singaporean court has power to make in personam orders in respect of assets in Australian while dealing with a proceeding for property division commenced in Singapore; and

(k) in Singapore the enforceability of orders made in a matrimonial proceeding is dealt with according to common law principles and if a Singaporean court were to make orders in a proceeding for the alteration of property interests in respect of assets in Australia, a relevant issue is whether the Australian property is to be the subject of enforcement in Australia.[72]

1. Counsel for the respondent contended that on the facts of this case, the parties have a greater connection to Singapore. They supported that contention with the following -

(a) the parties have lived equally between Singapore and Australian for most of their marriage with the respondent spending greater periods in Singapore;

(b) the parties last lived jointly cohabiting in Singapore from December 2020 to March 2022;

(c) neither party is a tax resident of Australia whereas the respondent is a tax resident of Singapore;

(d) the Singaporean assets which are the subject of dispute have an estimated net value of $254,654,554 whereas the net Australian assets are valued at $20,595,629 the consequence of which is that the vast majority in value of the assets are located in Singapore; and

(e) the parties conducted a property development business yet the respondent owns and manages a business in Singapore.[73]

1. Counsel for the respondent addressed factors under the rubric of legitimate personal or juridical advantage of each proceeding. They relied on four broad matters, namely -

(a) the respondent has received a collection of pre-marital assets by way of gift or inheritance which do not form part of the divisible asset pool unless converted into matrimonial assets by being ordinarily used during the marriage for the family or being substantially improved during the marriage by the other party, the evidentiary onus of which to demonstrate falling upon the applicant;

(b) inherited assets for the purpose of Australian family law may at the court's discretion be included on a table of shared assets and liabilities available for division or whether they are kept separate;[74]

(c) in Australia, it is competent for the court to make a part-property order, a matter to the advantage of the applicant whereas in Singapore, absent consent, the Family Justice Courts do not usually hear and determine interim property settlement orders; and

(d) no facility is available in Singapore for spousal maintenance unless the applicant is incapacitated (which the respondent is not) and in any event, no basis for a claim for spousal maintenance is open having regard to the applicant's health, he is educated and he is a property developer with the consequence that any claim for spousal maintenance brought by the applicant in Singapore would not require defending.

1. In those circumstances, there is a certain attraction to the submission that one party's legitimate advantage is the other party's disadvantage, leading to the end result that the advantages inuring in favour of the respondent in continuing with the proceeding in Singapore balance out the advantages that inure in favour of the applicant in continuing with the Australian proceeding. However, the determination of the clearly inappropriate forum involves more than that.
2. Counsel for the respondent addressed on the significance of the applicant commencing this proceeding in this court earlier in time than the Singaporean case. The proceeding in this court was commenced, as was common ground, on 19 July 2024. Counsel for the respondent conceded that the applicant was first in time by commencing this proceeding. They submitted that it was necessary to view that date of 19 July 2024 in context. They submitted that the context involved the following additional considerations -

(a) in April 2024 the applicant proposed to the respondent that he and her move into their newly constructed apartment in Suburb N which proposal the applicant said the respondent construed as a reconciliation attempt;

(b) in response, the applicant and respondent undertook joint counselling in August and September 2024;

(c) while the applicant suggested that he and the respondent moved into the Suburb N apartment by way of reconciliation, it was not accompanied by a statement to the respondent; and

(d) at no stage did the applicant comply with the mandatory requirements prior to commencing litigation in this court by informing the respondent of his intention to commence this proceeding.

1. No rule of law exists to the effect that the first in time enjoys any particular status in a case of forum non conveniens. High Court authority says as much[75] as does intermediate appellate authority relevant to my determination.[76]
2. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the proceeding in this court was commenced duplicitously (their words) because the parties were seeking to reconcile when the proceeding was commenced. The respondent's counsel submitted that the fact that the applicant commenced the proceeding in this court first should not be considered as a factor in his favour.
3. So far as any consideration was relevant about the stage at which each proceeding in each court had reached, counsel for the respondent submitted that each proceeding was in its infancy. They submitted that the stage which the proceedings had reached was not a significant factor in the case.
4. Counsel for the respondent submitted that neither this court nor the Singaporean court automatically recognises an order made by the other court. Monetary sum orders are enforceable as foreign judgments yet orders for the alteration of property interests are not. So far as the potential use of mirror orders was concerned, counsel for the respondent submitted that any application for mirror orders in Singapore would require the commencement of another proceeding the likely success of which is unknown to Mr Q because no reported decisions exist in Singapore about mirror orders being made in family law cases.
5. As to the requirement that complete relief be available in the local jurisdiction,[77] counsel for the respondent advanced a collection of contentions. They were as follows -

(a) on its face, final orders sought by each party (aside from the applicant's claim for spousal maintenance) reveal that the court in Singapore is more likely to provide complete relief on the basis that 92% of the value of assets are held there (including known superannuation);

(b) the Singaporean court can and may very well make in personam orders concerning Australian assets including -

(i) an order for the respondent to transfer her interest in the parties' Suburb G property to the applicant;

(ii) an order for the transfer of one party's shareholding to another and for an order for the sale of shareholding; and

(iii) an order against trusts settled and operating in Australia including the H Trust and the Adams & Marchenko Family Trust;

(c) if the respondent failed to comply with orders of the Singaporean court, sanctions include penalties against her;

(d) a Singaporean court can adjust inherited assets so long as the legislative requirements anterior to the making of such an order were satisfied; and

(e) based on the views expressed in Voth[78] and in Henry[79] Australian courts should not unduly concern themselves with an assessment of the comparative procedures or other claims in the foreign forum or with the merits of that system.

1. Counsel for the respondent addressed the calling and giving of evidence in the relevant forum. In Australia, assets equating to 8% in value of the asset pool are situated (the parties' 50% interest in O Street, Suburb P property and the parties' Suburb G property). Each will require valuation evidence. However, they said that such evidence of values pales (that was the word used by the respondent's counsel) when regard is had to the sum of 92% in value of the Singaporean assets which includes four real properties held in personal names along with Singaporean entities.
2. In addition, the respondent's counsel submitted that evidence will be required from a legal practitioner practising in Singapore to address aspects of the respondent's father's will.
3. As to the equal footing argument, counsel for the respondent submitted that no evidence existed to suggest that either party would be participating in either jurisdiction on anything but an equal footing. Costs are not in issue as the applicant has funds in his own account or he can arrange for litigation funding if required.
4. Counsel for the respondent advanced contentions about the operation of s 25(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act. In essence that section provides that this court has jurisdiction to exercise its statutory powers in relation to persons or things outside Australia. That includes the power conferred by s 79 of the Family Law Act, they argued.
5. Counsel for the respondent argued that a key factor supportive of an order staying the Australian proceeding is the role Singaporean law will play in the determination of the property settlement proceeding even if the case were determined in an Australian court. They contended that the Australian common law in respect of land and immovable property, the lex situs (the law where the property is located) determines the applicable matrimonial property regime: Welch v Tennet.[80] This would indicate that Singaporean law provides the appropriate law for the determination for the parties' entitlement in respect of land in Singapore. They argued that a foreign court has greater expertise in applying its own law than does an Australian court which receives foreign law as a fact, as canvassed above.
6. The argument in relation to s 25 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act was not the subject of contest, or for that matter any debate from Mr Shaw KC on behalf of the applicant. In those circumstances it is not appropriate for me to make a determination on the reach of s 25(2) of the Act, its contrast to the provisions of s 67(a) of the Australian Consumer Law 2010 or s 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 or the Financial Emergency Act 1931 or the Citizenship Act 1948. That said, I agree that s 79 of the Family Law Act says nothing about the law to be applied in s 79 cases. They relied on the decisions in In the Marriage of Hannema,[81] Cain v Cain,[82] Gilmore v Gilmore[83] and Pagliotti v Hartner.[84] I need not determine nor reconcile those authorities because the point was not argued. In paragraph 119 of their submissions counsel for the respondent addressed the proposition that the continuation of both proceedings would be vexatious and oppressive within the contemplation of the observations of Deane J in Oceanic. They argued that a continuation of the Australian proceeding would be vexatious and oppressive and that Australia is the clearly inappropriate forum. They advanced the following submissions in that regard -

(a) while the parties have a connection with both jurisdictions, Singapore was the place where the parties last lived together for a significant period and is where almost all of the assets are located;

(b) due to the location and nature of the assets in Singapore, together with the wife's obligations pursuant to her father's will, there will need to be significant expert evidence adduced by the respondent;

(c) the evidence of the expert is that a Singaporean court can make orders in personam to adjust each party's interest in Australian assets;

(d) as the assets are primarily located in Singapore and the respondent resides in Singapore, orders made in Singapore will have the most utility as they will be enforceable against the respondent and her significant assets;

(e) a Singaporean court will only recognise an order by this court if it is a judgment debt and as the respondent has less than $350,000 in bank accounts in Singapore, there would need to be an adjustment of assets or a sale of assets. It is settled law that an order that does not take this into account is not 'just and equitable';

(f) both stages of litigation are in their infancy with neither court proceeding yet dealing with the substantive property matters;

(g) the parties can participate on an equal footing in each proceeding;

(h) there are advantages and disadvantages to each party in each jurisdiction to the effect that they cancel each other out; and

(i) finally, the interplay between s 25(2) and 79 of the Family Law Act suggests that, to the extent that this court would consider Singaporean assets, Singaporean law would need to be applied by this court and since a Singaporean court has much greater expertise in applying its own law, that is the forum for it to occur.

1. As has been already stated, the respondent sought orders staying this proceeding.

1. Counsel for the applicant relied on written submissions dated 23 May 2025 in addition to viva voce submissions argued on 26 May 2025. Counsels' principal thesis was twofold, namely -

(a) the respondent's stay application should be dismissed; and

(b) the applicant's anti-suit injunction should be granted.

1. Counsel for the applicant addressed the respondent's stay application first. They argued -

(a) the clearly inappropriate forum test as held in Voth was the applicable test;

(b) in family law litigation, the Voth test is applicable as was held in Henry v Henry;

(c) the onus is on the party applying for the stay (relevantly here, the respondent) to establish that this court is the clearly inappropriate forum;[85]

(d) several non-exhaustive factors are usefully considered when assessing whether a particular forum is the clearly inappropriate forum;[86]

(e) here, both parties have a connection[87] to Australia;

(f) the parties have assets of more than $20m in Australia;

(g) while the majority of the parties' wealth is in Singapore that factor alone does not result in Australia being the clearly inappropriate forum;

(h) of the total assets about which the respondent gives evidence ($295,000,000 or thereabouts) $254,000,000 (or thereabouts) is inherited, situated in Singapore;

(i) Australia can more effectively provide for the complete resolution of the matters in issue including spousal maintenance;

(j) an extant divorce application is pending in both jurisdictions;

(k) even if a divorce order is made in Singapore this court can determine the property alteration case was well as spousal maintenance;

(l) the parties will need orders concerning office holders and of shareholders in corporate entities and the Singaporean court cannot make those orders absent consent;

(m) even though assets are physically located in Singapore, this court is obliged to take into account all property wherever situated and this court has power to make in personam orders;[88]

(n) in Singapore, premarital assets are excluded from the assets to be divided between the parties unless those assets are converted into matrimonial assets;

(o) of the net assets of $295m inherited assets make up $254m which, if the case is litigated in Singapore the parties run the risk of not being dealt with in Singapore;

(p) the applicant's claim for spousal maintenance is unlikely capable of disposal in Singapore;

(q) the applicant is not entitled to a part property settlement or to litigation funding in Singapore;

(r) the Australian proceeding is first in time yet the applicant has spend costs in Australia of $140,000 and the respondent $138,000;

(s) overseas valuations will be needed;

(t) the applicant is at a disadvantage as he has no access to litigation funding;

(u) the applicant has lived in Australia for 25 years whereas the respondent lives in Singapore;

(v) three modes exist pursuant to which a foreign order can be enforced in Singapore, namely through common law enforcement through registration and by obtaining a mirror order; and

(w) a strict comparison of the two fora is not required in an effort to decide which is the clearly inappropriate forum because according to Voth and Oceanic, the relevant test is whether one forum is the clearly inappropriate forum.

1. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the court in Navarro & Jurado[89] held that the task of a judge in my shoes is not to weigh the relevant factors against one another and instead the task of the first instance judge is to assess whether enough factors exist to indicate that the relevant forum is the clearly inappropriate forum. The court further held that if significant factors point to the conclusion that the chosen forum is appropriate, it is immaterial that many factors suggest that another forum might be appropriate or even more appropriate. In that case it was also held that the weighing of factors to see where the balance lies would, in effect, be to undertake a Spiliada like "more appropriate forum" test.
2. Counsel for the applicant submitted that it cannot be said that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.

1. Mr Heath KC who appeared with Ms Renwick of counsel advanced a collection of valuable submissions in support of their client's stay application before me. Among the more important issues on which Mr Heath KC addressed were the following -

(a) the sequence with which various applications presently before the court were dealt was important because disposing of the issues concerning the divorce application (the applicant's in this court and the respondent's in the court in Singapore) bore upon other aspects of the two proceedings (one in this court and the other in the Family Justice Courts in Singapore);

(b) the divorce application and the anti-suit application pending in this court should be stayed pending the determination of the stay application;

(c) if the respondent's stay application were unsuccessful, the respondent would be unable to oppose the applicant's divorce application in this court and that if the divorce application were granted, the anti-suit application brought in this court to restrain the respondent from prosecuting the Singapore proceeding would fall away; and

(d) if the stay application succeeded, the anti-suit injunction application would fall away on the basis that Singapore would be regarded as being the forum in which all disputes and controversies should be heard and determined.

1. The High Court of Singapore in UFN v UFM addressed difficulties in respect of attempts to enforce in a Singaporean court orders made by a non-Singaporean court and in paragraph 50 of the reasons of Ong J, the existence of property in Singapore is a strong indicator that the Singapore court is the appropriate forum. Her Honour held as follows -

"For reasons which we will elaborate on below, we agreed with the Judge that the Wife would have difficulty enforcing Indonesian court orders against the Husband in Singapore. We also agreed that this was an important factor which would prima facie make it appropriate for the Singapore courts to grant relief. Indeed, the difficulty in enforcing a foreign order for division of assets was an impetus for enacting Ch 4A of the Women's Charter. As the Law Reform Committee explained at para 26 of the LRC Report, it would be difficult to enforce a foreign order division of assets regardless of whether the order was an order in rem (one where the court adjudicates on the title or disposition of property as against the whole world) or an order in personam (one which compels a party to do a certain act in respect of property). In respect of in personam orders, only money judgments (which are final and conclusive) are enforceable under common law rules, although Singapore has entered into agreements with some countries for the mutual recognition and enforcement of maintenance orders: see eg, Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (Cap 169, 1985 Rev Ed). As for in rem orders, it is essential to the recognition of a foreign judgment in rem that the res was situated in that foreign country at the time of the judgment: The Republic of the Philippines v Maler Foundation and others and other appeals [2014] 1 SLR 1389 at [66]. This means that a Singapore court would not recognise an order by a foreign court declaring the title to a property in Singapore. Thus, if the Wife had obtained an order dividing the Seaview Property in Indonesia, she would face difficulty enforcing it in Singapore, regardless of whether the order is an order in rem or an order in personam. The fact that there is property in Singapore (ie, the Seaview Property) available for division is a strong factor in favour of the Singapore court being the appropriate court to grant the relief."

1. Mr Heath KC contended that several decisions in the High Court on the subject of anti-suit injunctions, including CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd, incorporate criteria that are not specific to family law whereas the High Court's decision in Henry v Henry continues to be the locus classicus on stay applications and anti-suit injunction applications in family law matters. He submitted that according to the formulations of principle in Henry v Henry, the court addressing the stay application is required to engage in the comparative exercise set out by the majority "to work out (how) the least injustice" can be delivered.[90]
2. It must not be overlooked that the respondent's mother asserts an interest in Singaporean property. Of course, an Australian court could determine the legal and equitable interest of parties to property, including the interest asserted by the respondent's mother in the relevant property in issue in this proceeding. However if it were determined in this court that the respondent had an interest (of a legal or equitable nature) in property in Singapore and if that interest gave rise to a claim in rem then registration of the Australian judgment in Singapore would be required and in any attempt to register an Australian judgment in Singapore the complications and restrictions recorded by Ong J in UFN v UFM would be enlivened. Conversely, if the interest of the respondent's mother in property in Singapore amounted to an equitable in personam interest which was not a money order, other but equally troublesome issues would be likely to present themselves in registering in Singapore that equitable interest as declared by the Australian court. Mr Heath KC also focussed on rights under the will of the late Mr W.
3. The contention that the applicant needs litigation funding to continue with any litigation - whether in Australia or in Singapore - was met with the respondent's evidence to the effect that she has set in train an arrangement enabling the applicant to draw down at total of $20,000 per month on a credit card and that the applicant has access to approximately $480,000 which sum or part thereof can be applied towards funding the applicant's expenses in the running of this litigation.
4. Mr Heath KC addressed on the issue of the litigation being conducted in Singapore in respect of this legal imbroglio in which the applicant and respondent find themselves. He said the following -

"MR HEATH: So under the Voth test, your Honour, the availability of an alternative forum and whether it would give the plaintiff or the claimant adequate relief are relevant to determining whether the local forum is clearly inappropriate.

HIS HONOUR: Well, adequate as opposed to exhaustive. You're pitching your case on the basis that Singapore will give you everything.

MR HEATH: It will give - - -

HIS HONOUR: Rather than - adequate and exhaustive seem to be two different things.

MR HEATH: Yes. It will give the parties the best chance and the best opportunity to resolve everything.

HIS HONOUR: To finality.

MR HEATH: To finality.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR HEATH: And, much better, it will help the parties - the conduct of the litigation in that court in the Republic of Singapore will achieve the best outcome when one has regard to the risks and potholes here in terms of enforcement in relation to the so-called juridical advantages exchanges, which are non-existent for reasons I explained a moment ago, and in relation to the real risk that this court will need to deal with a host of common law - private international common law rules to apply the lex causae or the law of Singapore to determine many issues. Your Honour, Voth says that the plaintiff has a prima facie right to fight in the forum that he or she selects."[91]

1. The real issue is on a trial judge in my shoes assessing whether there are enough facts that indicate the local forum (here, Australia) is clearly inappropriate, as was held in Bakshi.[92]
2. True it is that no facility exists in Singapore to address a superannuation splitting order. Mr Heath submitted that details of superannuation were unknown. That may be unsurprising as the applicant is not registered as a tax payer in Australia. In any event, even if superannuation were present in Australia, under s 112 of the Charter the Singaporean court could examine the value of foreign property such as superannuation and make appropriate adjustments to reflect those superannuation funds if they exist.

1. Mr Shaw KC who appeared with Ms Johnston of counsel likewise advanced a collection of valuable submissions in opposition to the respondent's stay application. Among the more important issues on which Mr Shaw KC relied were the following -

(a) the law is as stated in Voth and Oceanic Sun;

(b) the clearly inappropriate forum test continues to apply;

(c) the clearly inappropriate test is binary in the sense that the test is either satisfied on the evidence or it is not with the consequence that it is relevant to consider the percentage by which the evidence demonstrates the clarity of the inappropriateness;

(d) the better jurisdiction for the hearing and determination of the lis pendens is not the relevant enquiry;

(e) once mirror orders are made by the High Court of Singapore they take effect as if those orders had been made first by the High Court of Singapore;

(f) according to a collection of authorities in this court,[93] where the court deals with s 79 of the Family Law Act, no matter where the property is located, the law being applied is Australian law as has been prescribed by common law principles of international law;

(g) the Singaporean court has no power to make orders giving effect to changes in the office holders of companies;

(h) inherited assets do not form part of the pool unless converted and property devolved by gift likewise does not form part of the pool;

(i) the evidence about the preponderance of witnesses is not the subject of expert evidence;

(j) while a precise percentage value cannot readily be ascribed to the matter, most of the land in Singapore is caught by the general prohibition on dealing in Singapore with land that has been inherited or received as a gift; and

(k) the respondent said that in monetary terms land in Singapore in that category was $254m out of $295m in value.

1. Mr Shaw KC did not forcefully press for the anti-suit injunction to be addressed because he contented, correctly in my view, that the determination of that application is likely to turn on the same factual matters on which this stay application has focused.

1. The competing positions of the parties on the matter before me, the respondent's stay application, were interlocutory in nature in that a decision in respect of it did not determine the entirety of the litigation now pending. That said, in order to determine the stay application I was required to assess the parties' respective positions in accordance with the observations in Navarro & Jurado. That seemed to me to be consistent with the warning sounded in a series of cases[94] to the effect that this court should avoid making findings of fact on a contested interlocutory application. When undertaking the assessment of factors of which Navarro & Jurado spoke, I am not to be taken as making findings of fact on a contested interlocutory application.
2. No doubt exists that the relevant test against which this contested stay application is to be assessed is that set out in Oceanic Sun and in Voth, namely whether the relevant forum (this court) is the "clearly inappropriate forum". The relevant test is not the "more appropriate forum" as was the rest prescribed by the House of Lords in Spiliada, that test having been rejected by the High Court of Australia.
3. In undertaking the task set by Voth to determine whether Australia is the clearly inappropriate forum, I have considered the various factors the case law instruct must be considered. No one particular factor predominates in the sense that it tips the outcome.
4. The test prescribed by Voth uses the adjectival qualification "clearly". In debate with King's Counsel for both parties I explored whether the use of the word "clearly" somehow qualified the reference to "inappropriate forum" and if so, how. It seemed to me that the introduction of the word "clearly" in the Voth test of the inappropriate forum was intended to reflect that any determination that a particular forum was inappropriate must be demonstrably inappropriate, hence, "clearly" so. Whether that had the effect of excluding cases where the inappropriateness of the forum was borderline, as opposed to "clearly", was not the subject of debate. None of the authorities to which any attention was directed made any reference to the point.
5. In undertaking any consideration of the factors which are said to be relevant to the determination of this stay application, matters of substantive law, practice and procedure in respect of Singaporean law are to be taken as those stated by the joint single expert, Mr Q. Matters of foreign law are matters of fact as has been surveyed above. Both parties have placed reliance upon the evidence of Mr Q.
6. It must also be remembered that according to Voth and Oceanic Sun, a party who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of this court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise. Accordingly, the onus is on the respondent to establish that Australia is the clearly inappropriate forum, as was held in Henry v Henry.[95]
7. It is necessary to take in turn each of the factors which the case law says illuminates whether the court the process of which is sought to be stayed is the clearly inappropriate forum.

The connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the potential jurisdictions and the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions

1. It can fairly be said that the applicant on the on hand and the respondent on the other each has a connection with the Commonwealth of Australia. The applicant is a citizen of Country D, a permanent resident of Australia and he has lived in Australia for 25 years or thereabouts. The respondent is a permanent resident of Australia, she has substantial business interests in Australia and owns real property in Australia although she lives now in Singapore.
2. So far as the parties' connection with Singapore is concerned, the applicant was born in Country C, he spent his childhood in Country D and for discrete periods he spent time in Singapore during the parties' marriage. He obtained a long-term visitor's pass to Singapore in 2021. The respondent pointed out that both parties have historically conducted a property development business in Australia plus the respondent owns and manages businesses in Singapore.
3. The value of the Singaporean assets in this case is estimated to be in the sum of $254,654,550 or thereabouts. The value of the Australian assets in issue in this case is $20,595,630 or thereabouts. In monetary terms, even on an estimated basis, the overwhelming value of assets is in Singapore those assets being in excess of 10 times the value of the Australian assets.
4. It is true that the respondent has an advantage if the parties' property division case is conducted in Singapore because pre-marital assets and assets received by her by way of gift or inheritance will not form part of the matrimonial asset pool unless converted into matrimonial assets. So far as inherited assets are concerned in Australia, in Australian family law a discretion exists permitting the trial judge to incorporate inherited assets among a list of shared assets if the parties.[96] Further, in Australia the applicant is entitled to seek a part-property settlement. Unless by consent, a part-property order is usually not made in a Singapore court. The applicant is unable to seek spousal maintenance in Singapore unless incapacitated, which he is not.

The stage at which each proceeding has reached and costs

1. In Australia, the applicant commenced this proceeding first in time on 19 July 2024. The respondent commenced her proceeding in Singapore in early 2025 and filed her response to the initiating application in the Australian proceeding on 20 February 2025. Both pieces of litigation are at an early phase. It may fairly be said that by reason of the effort made and activity associated with the stay application in this proceeding, greater detail has been provided in the form of affidavits than has been undertaken in the Singapore proceeding to date. That said, a very considerable volume of valuation and other evidence will be required in placing before the court aspects of the parcels of real property said to make up the amount of $254m (plus).
2. Costs were approximately equal, around $140,000 to date.

Whether the parties can participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing

1. It seemed to be common ground that no linguistic obstacles impede either party. The husband asserted that he will not have access to litigation funding in Singapore and so, it was said, it will be very difficult for him to participate in the Singapore litigation on an equal footing. That contention, while superficially persuasive, is not supported by the evidence because the applicant deposed in his affidavit between paragraphs 84 to 86 that he possesses funds in excess of $100,000 in a bank account. Rather than avail himself of access to those funds, the applicant indicates that the respondent would prefer to use the respondent's credit cards to pay his legal fees as he has done to date. To my mind, his preference to use the respondent's credit card to meet his own legal fees when he has a significant sum in his own bank account from which his legal fees can be met indicated to me that the parties are on a largely similar footing to enable them to participate in either or both pieces of litigation.

Whether the controversy between the parties is the same in both jurisdictions

1. In the Australian proceeding, a divorce order can be made, a part-property order can be made, final orders can be made adjusting certain property interests and spousal maintenance orders can be made. However, so far as property orders are concerned, orders in personam only may be made in respect of real property situated in Singapore and if it became necessary to enforce any order made by this court in respect of real property in Singapore, complexities abound because the registration of overseas orders in Singapore is ordinarily limited to money orders rather than to orders for one party to perform certain acts such as transferring property. Orders made in Australia for the division of property may not be enforceable in Singapore. So far as mirror orders in Singapore were concerned, in order to enliven the mirror order procedure a separate proceeding needs to be commenced with a view to registering the order. Having said that, no reported decision yet exists on point.
2. It cannot be said that the controversy between the parties is the same in both jurisdictions.

Whether complete relief is available in either jurisdiction

1. The answer to that consideration is in the negative. Complete relief is not available in either jurisdiction. For example -

(a) in Australia it is possible for a litigant to seek an order for divorce, to seek spousal maintenance orders and to seek orders for the alteration of property interests whereas in Singapore, an order for spousal maintenance in respect of a person who is not incapacitated is not usually made and in respect of in personam orders made in Australia relating to real property in Singapore, the order will only be given effect if the relevant Australian order is registered and registration of a foreign order other than a money order is highly problematic in Singapore;

(b) a s 79 application in Australia can address inherited property brought to the matrimonial pool whereas in Singapore inherited property does not ordinarily form part of the matrimonial pool in the absence of consent or unless the asset has been converted into matrimonial assets;

(c) if the divorce is granted in Australia, the court in Singapore generally does not make orders for the division of matrimonial assets because the divorce has not been granted in Singapore;

(d) in Australia, litigation funding is available whereas it is not in Singapore;

(e) the majority in value of assets in this litigation are located in Singapore;

(f) an Australian court has no power to make orders in relation to land in a foreign jurisdiction; and

(g) conversely, a Singapore court has jurisdiction to make orders in rem in relation to property in Singapore whereas any orders made in respect of the parties' interests in Singaporean land in Australia would take effect as in personam orders only, enforceable only if registered in Singapore and registration of foreign orders in Singapore is ordinarily confined to money orders.

1. While the proceeding going forward in Singapore will not provide complete relief on all issues, the assets having the greatest value are located in Singapore. Put slightly differently, if this proceeding goes forward in Australia, several consequences will follow. They are -

(a) only part of the assets will be addressed in Australia, valued at about $25,000,000 or thereabouts;

(b) insofar as Singaporean assets are involved, orders in rem cannot be made by this court and will not be enforceable in Singapore; and

(c) it is likely to produce additional costs and the potential of duplication of effort and costs if the litigation were continued in Australia.

1. Ultimately, it is a question of extent and degree when determining whether this court is the clearly inappropriate forum. Neither forum provides complete relief on all issues to be litigated. It would be surprising if the situation were otherwise. If the litigation goes forward in Singapore -

(a) the overwhelming value of assets will be the subject of court order;

(b) in personam orders can be made in respect of Australian assets; and

(c) the applicant's claim to spousal maintenance is likely to vanish.

1. Conversely, if the proceeding goes forward in this court, most of the assets in value in this case will not be the subject of effectual determination.
2. In those circumstances, I am of the view that this court is the clearly inappropriate forum. I grant the stay order sought by the respondent. I make the order set out at the commencement of these reasons. Having regard to the indication by counsel for the applicant that the anti-suit injunction would follow the determination of the stay application, in granting the stay the anti-suit application falls away.
3. I will hear parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-three (153) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wilson.

[1] [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571.

[2] The relevant court is the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore in which a proceeding between the applicant and the respondent has already been commenced and which is presently on foot.

[3] [2025] FedCFamC1F 225.

[4] Chu & Tan [2025] FedCFamC1F 225.

[5] Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, Dasreef v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588, Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122 and Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29; (2023) 278 CLR 323.

[6] She did not say whether references to two companies with L in their name were one company - both being owned and controlled by her father.

[7] [1863] EngR 875; (1893) 10 HLC 624.

[8] [1989] FCA 274; (1989) 22 FCR 209.

[9] (1865) LR 1 QB 115.

[10] [2005] HCA 54; (2005) 223 CLR 331.

[11] [2018] FamCAFC 152.

[12] He cited in support the decision in USA v UDB [2018] SLR 1056.

[13] [2017] 1 SLR 609.

[16] [1893] UKLawRpAC 53; [1893] AC 602.

[18] AJR v AJS [2010] 4 SLR 617.

[19] Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette [1997] 1 SLR (R) 336 and Yee Wah Chin v Lim Lei Thoh Joan Grace [2005] SGDC 34.

[20] See, for instance, Tham Khai Meng v Nam Wen Jet Bernadette, [1997] 1 SLR(R) 336 - TAB-28 - at [25].

[21] See, for instance, Yee Wah Chin v Lim Lei Thoh Joan Grace, [2005] SGDC 34 - TAB43 - at [9].

[23] [2015] 4 SLR 1043.

[24] [2015] 4 SLR 1043.

[25] ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2.

[26] [2012] SGCA 15; [2012] 2 SLR 506.

[29] Lee Puey Hwa v Tay Cheow Seng [1991] 2 SLR (R) 196.

[30] Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee [2012] 4 SLR 405.

[31] Neo Mei Lan Helena v Long Melvin Anthony [2002] 2 SLR (R) 616.

[32] BCS v BCT [2012] SGDC 338.

[33] AQT v AQU [2011] SGHC 138.

[34] WUA v WUB [2024] SGHCF 10, WRX v WRY [2024] 1 SLR 851 and UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426.

[37] [2020] SGCA 8.

[38] Sun Travel & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR 732.

[39] [1986] UKHL 10; [1987] AC 460.

[40] That was embraced in CIMB Bank v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR (R) 543.

[41] VH v VI [2007] SGHC 221.

[45] [2009] SGCA 60; [2010] 1 SLR 1129.

[46] Section 3(1) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

[47] Section 3(3) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

[48] Section 4(1)(a) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

[49] Section 5(3)(c) read with section 2(2)(A) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

[50] Section 4(3) Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

[51] [2024] SGHC 17.

[53] Section 121B(a) Women's Charter 1961.

[54] Section 121B(b) Women's Charter 1961.

[55] Section 121C Women's Charter 1961.

[56] Section 121D(2) Women's Charter 1961.

[57] Section 121F(1) and (2) Women's Charter 1961.

[58] [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571.

[59] [1986] UKHL 10; [1987] AC 460 (Lord Goff of Chieveley)

[60] [1988] HCA 32; (1988) 165 CLR 197.

[61] [1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538.

[62] (1995) 19 Fam LR 227.

[63] Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh & Gummow JJ.

[64] [1988] HCA 32; (1988) 165 CLR 197.

[65] [1993] FamCA 3; (1993) 16 Fam LR 285.

[66] (1976) 50 ALJR 589.

[69] [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571, 592-593.

[70] [1893] UKLawRpAC 53; [1893] AC 602.

[72] In their written submissions, counsel for the respondent relied on a decision of the Full Court of this court in Yadu v Orjit (2022) 66 Fam LR 231, a decision I regard as being unpersuasive and unhelpful in the determination of the issues before me.

[73] The respondent relied on the decision in Hugh & Skinner [2012] FamCA 145, a fact specific decision at single judge level having no precedential operation on me.

[74] Holland v Holland [2017] FamCAFC 166; (2017) 57 Fam LR 84 and Bishop & Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138.

[75] Wigmans v AMP Ltd [2021] HCA 7; (2021) 270 CLR 623 (at [97]).

[76] Bakshi & Mahanta (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 90 (at [50]), Teo & Guan [2015] FamCAFC 94; (2015) 53 Fam LR 248 (at [139]) and Navarro & Jurado [2010] FamCAFC 210; (2010) 44 Fam LR 310 (at [264]).

[77] Lan & Hao (No 2) (2019) 59 Fam LR 214 (at [59]).

[80] [1891] UKLawRpAC 41; [1891] AC 639.

[81] (1981) 7 Fam LR 542.

[82] [1987] FamCA 27; (1987) 11 Fam LR 540.

[83] [1993] FamCA 3; (1993) 16 Fam LR 285.

[84] [2009] FamCAFC 18; (2009) 41 Fam LR 41.

[85] Henry v Henry (op cit) p 579, 580 & 589.

[86] O'Bannon v Scarffe [2021] FamCAFC 33; (2021) 62 Fam LR 397.

[87] In Merritt & Hill [2016] FamCA 338 (at [59]) it was held that "connection does not mean simply residence".

[88] Teo v Guan [2015] FamCAFC 94; (2015) 53 Fam LR 248, 271.

[89] [2010] FamCAFC 210; (2010) 44 Fam LR 310, 342 (at [166]).

[90] Transcript 26 May 2025, p. 25 line 33.

[91] Transcript 26 May 2025, p. 41 lines 10 - 40.

[92] Bakshi & Mahanta (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 90.

[93] In the marriage of Gilmore [1993] FamCA 3; (1993) 16 Fam LR 285, Pagliotti v Hartner [2009] FamCAFC 18; (2009) 41 Fam LR 41, Galloway & Midden [2014] FLC 93 586, In the Marriage of Hannema (1981) 7 Fam LR 542, In the Marriage of Cain [1987] FamCA 27; (1987) 11 Fam LR 540 and Adams & Marchenko [2012] FamCA 225.

[94] Marvel v Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348, SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, Redmond & Redmond [2014] FamCAFC 155 and Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104.

[95] [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571, 579, 580 and 589.

[96] Holland v Holland [2017] FamCAFC 166; (2017) 57 Fam LR 84 and Bishop & Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138.