Fairbairn v Radecki

1. Pursuant to section 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) it is declared that a de facto relationship existed between Mr Hong (the applicant) and Ms Lai (the respondent) between 2008 and April 2011.
2. The applicant's application for leave filed on 5 December 2023 pursuant to section 44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), to institute property proceedings under Part VIIIAB of the Act, is dismissed.
3. Pursuant to section 114UB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Court makes no order as to costs.
4. Time to appeal is not to run until the parties are sent the written record of the oral ex tempore reasons for judgment.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These proceedings were commenced on 5 December 2023 by the applicant de facto husband ("de facto husband") against the respondent de facto wife ("de facto wife"). These proceedings involve a threshold issue as to the date of the commencement and duration of the de facto relationship. The de facto husband contends that the relationship started in 2005 and continued until 8 October 2022. The de facto wife contended that the de facto relationship commenced in 2008 and ceased on 9 April 2011.
2. There is one child of the de facto relationship, X, born in 2012 ("the child"). There is no dispute that at some stage, the parties were in a de facto relationship, and at some stage, that relationship ended. The threshold issue under s 44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") arises because these proceedings were not commenced, on the de facto wife's case, two years after the end of the de facto relationship, but, on the de facto husband's case, almost 12 years after the end of the relationship. There is no relevant financial agreement between the parties, and the parties have not consented to the bringing of the application.
3. The Court can, under s 44 of the Act, grant leave to apply after the end of the standard application period, which, on the de facto wife's case, ended in 2013. The de facto husband contends that he did not require leave and that the relationship continued until October 2022. In terms of the requirements in order to grant leave, the Court will refer to the law below.

1. The Court received into evidence the following affidavits, with annexures treated as being in evidence subject to certain rulings:

(1) The Affidavit of Mr Hong dated 12 April 2025; and

(2) The Affidavit of Ms Lai dated 1 July 2024, which contained deletions in terms of admissibility in the contents of paragraph 22, 24, 25, 26 and annexures I to K

1. The Court also received into evidence the following exhibits:

(1) Exhibit A: Applicant Financial Statement dated 2 December 2023;

(2) Exhibit B: Applicant Tender Bundle;

(3) Exhibit C: Legal Aid Email to Court dated 25 November 2025;

(4) Exhibit D: Applicant's Email for Adjournment dated 4 December 2025; and

(5) Exhibit E: Balance Sheet dated 16 August 2025.

The Applicant de facto husband ("the de facto husband") is born.

The Respondent de facto wife ("the de facto wife") is born.

De facto husband and de facto wife worked at the same company.

De facto wife divorced her previous husband. At the time, the de facto husband had a child Mr B born in 1997, aged 6 ("Mr B").

De facto husband divorced his ex wife. Parties commenced dating shortly afterwards.

De facto wife fell pregnant to the de facto husband.

De facto wife left the de facto husband and returned to China after multiple disputes and arguments. De facto wife had no intention of resuming the relationship.

De facto wife commenced debt recovery proceedings in China against the de facto husband.

De facto husband and de facto wife attended Centrelink to update status as separated.

De facto wife returned to China after 2 weeks (about April 2011).

The de facto husband maintained his status as "Single" with Centrelink.

De facto wife asked the de facto husband to close the C Bank Joint Account.

De facto wife found out that the de facto husband was served with an ADVO protecting Mr B.

De facto wife resigned from her employment and permanently returned to Australia. The de facto wife briefly lived in the Suburb D property and then relocated to Suburb E.

The de facto wife purchased the Suburb G property using her own funds including the deposit.

The de facto wife moved to her Suburb G property with her sons.

The de facto husband remained living in the Suburb D property.

The de facto wife has lived in the Suburb G property since she purchased it in 2013 independently of the de facto husband and without any assistance from the de facto husband.

The de facto wife submitted formal visa application to Department of Home Affairs for her mother. In the application she indicated her status as "separated".

The de facto husband received Parenting Payment Single and Rent Assistance from Centrelink.

X moved out and lived with the de facto wife at Suburb G.

Centrelink records indicate X living with the de facto wife.

Matter listed for 2-day final hearing. Proceedings adjourned on day 1 of the final hearing being stood over until 4 December 2025.

1. The de facto husband's affidavit contended, in very summary form, that the parties separated on 8 October 2022, when it is alleged the de facto wife identified her new relationship. The de facto husband asserted that cohabitation began whilst divorcing the de facto husband's then wife. The de facto husband alleged that he divorced his then wife, Ms H, in 2005 and commenced cohabitation with the de facto wife. The de facto husband contended that the parties lived together continuously, except for the period when the de facto wife was working in China from 2005 to 2022.
2. The de facto husband identified periods of employment. The de facto husband identified the purported shared households and making contribution to household expenses and contributing to renovations, and asserted particular domestic activities and relied upon WeChat messages and referred to travel and social activities and disputed the assets and liabilities identified by the de facto wife. The substantive application by the de facto husband was one in respect of which the de facto husband was seeking the transfer of the de facto wife's interest in the property of F Street, Suburb G to the de facto wife.
3. This is not a case where the allegation of hardship relates to a child, as identified by counsel that was then acting for the de facto husband on 25 September 2025. The relevant hardship alleged is that of the de facto husband. The de facto husband gave evidence alleging that the parties commenced living together in about 2004. He referred to learning that the de facto wife was pregnant in 2008. The de facto husband agreed that there were engagement celebrations in 2008. The de facto husband explained that he borrowed $90,000 Australian dollars from the de facto wife to pay out his ex-wife in China, and that there were proceedings then, in China, where the de facto wife was seeking to recover the $90,000. The de facto husband told the Court that he never paid the de facto wife the $90,000.
4. The Court asked the de facto husband whether there were tensions because of the subject proceedings on foot in China, and the de facto husband gave an unresponsive answer. The de facto husband contended that the parties discussed coming to Australia because of the potential to have a second child. The de facto husband contended the parties migrated to Australia in 2008, when the de facto wife was still pregnant. The parties' child was born in 2008. The de facto husband disagreed that there were a great number of arguments between him and the de facto wife between 2008 and 2010. The de facto husband agreed that, in 2010, the de facto wife told him she was going back to China to live, and that she left him in July 2010.
5. The de facto husband agreed that the de facto wife returned back to Australia in April 2011, but disagreed with the proposition that it was just to see the children. The de facto husband was asked about steps being taken by the de facto wife to crystallise the separation of the relationship in April 2011, and gave an unresponsive answer. The de facto husband then identified that he was aware that the de facto wife went to Centrelink, in April 2011, and told Centrelink that they were separated in 2011. The de facto husband gave an unresponsive answer when asked whether that separation was true, and then gave an answer asserting that they were not actually separated, and the de facto husband confirmed that he knew the de facto wife had gone to Centrelink to tell them that they were separated.
6. The de facto husband contended that he knew that the de facto wife was going to tell a falsehood. It was squarely put to the de facto husband that the truth was they had, in fact, separated in April 2011, and the de facto husband responded:

No. That's not the truth. We simply lied to Centrelink to protect for the Court proceedings in China.

1. The de facto husband agreed that the de facto wife returned back to China after her April trip in 2011. The de facto husband also agreed that around this time in 2011 he was asked by the de facto wife to close the joint bank account and confirmed that that joint bank account around that time was, in fact, closed.
2. The de facto husband was asked by the Court whether he knew what was being told to Centrelink by the de facto wife as to them being separated would be recorded in the Centrelink records, and he said, "Yes. That's right." The Court raised with the de facto husband:

Can you understand in those circumstances the court may well find that you told Centrelink the truth and that you were, in fact, separated at that time? Can you understand that?

1. And the witness said, "Yes. I understand." The Court asked:

And do you understand that that record is inconsistent with the evidence that you're telling me that you were still a couple? Do you understand that?

1. And the witness answered, "Yes. I understand that."
2. There was evidence given as to the de facto wife continuing to work and live in China in 2012, and there was reference to an assault by the de facto husband on the de facto wife's older child, who was 15 years old, in 2012. The significance of the police record in that regard, which was put to the de facto husband, was that it identified the de facto husband as informing the DCJ that he had been a single parent since 2010. The Court went back to that same record and raised it with the de facto husband again, identifying squarely that the de facto husband told the officer that he had been a single parent since 2010, and the de facto husband said, "Yes. That's right."
3. The de facto husband was taken to other records inconsistent with his case, that identified that he had lived separately for the last three or four years in a record recorded in May 2020. The de facto husband was also taken to Centrelink records in 2016, receiving payments on the basis that he was a single parent, and also Newstart records inconsistent with his assertion of remaining a couple. The de facto husband agreed in evidence today that there is no record that supports any contribution, in terms of direct financial contribution, to the acquisition or holding of the three properties identified in the balance sheet as belonging to the de facto wife. The de facto wife's evidence attached the records to which the court has referred, inconsistent with the asserted case advanced by the de facto husband and opposed to circumstances relating to the engagement party in 2008, when their relationship, she identified, formally commenced.

1. The de facto wife maintained that, in July 2010, she returned to China after multiple disputes with the de facto husband, and had no intention to come back, and was living and working independently. The de facto wife identified, in April 2011, she returned briefly to Australia, and that the de facto husband and wife attended Centrelink together to record their separation. The Centrelink record corroborates the evidence of the de facto wife. The de facto wife identified purchasing herself the Suburb G property the subject of the de facto wife's application, and moving in there with her sons in August 2013, and having lived continuously there. The de facto wife identified the de facto husband did provide parenting contributions to their son, including from 2012 to 2016.
2. The de facto wife materially deposed, in paragraph [17] of her affidavit dated 1 July 2024, that, since January 2013, she has solely paid the mortgage, water bills and child related expenses. The de facto wife also identified paying utility bills. The de facto wife referred to the child support records confirming the separation in terms of payments commencing 2016, and referred to the DCJ record in respect of the de facto husband being single, being stated during the interview in 2012. The de facto wife said she had not shared a bedroom or household responsibility with the de facto husband since 2012.
3. The de facto wife did acknowledge from 2012 to 2024, the de facto husband occasionally stayed at the Suburb G property when visiting her son, X, but never continuously, and that he moved in and out, and that they did not share meals, beds, finances, or activities. The de facto wife said that the de facto husband was not present for family events, holidays or trips with friends and children, and maintained that the parties had separated in April 2011, and that they thereafter lived independently physically, financially, emotionally, socially, and domestically. Because the de facto husband became unrepresented through his own voluntary conduct, notwithstanding an earlier order under s 102NA of the Act, the de facto husband was not permitted to cross-examine the de facto wife, consistent with a notation to the Court's orders made back in May 2025, being note B to the orders dated 16 May 2025.

1. The de facto husband maintained that the relationship had continued until 2022 and that he would suffer hardship if the Court did not grant leave to permit him to commence the proceedings, if leave was required. The de facto husband maintained that no leave was required if the Court accepted that the de facto relationship continued until 2022. The de facto husband also appeared to suggest that if leave was required, the relationship had ceased in 2016. The de facto husband contended that the Court should not accept the evidence of the de facto wife as to the period of cohabitation and contended that there were errors made by Centrelink in respect of child support payments. The Court has also treated the case outline that was filed on behalf of the de facto husband as before the de facto husband for the purpose of considering whether or not there is a relevant hardship and/or whether the Court should accept the de facto husband's case as to the cohabitation continuing until 2022.
2. There was also put into evidence a balance sheet that purported to identify the assets and liabilities of the parties, including financial resources of the de facto husband and some small superannuation.

1. The de facto wife maintained that the Court should accept the de facto wife's evidence, that the relationship was from 2008 to 2011, and that the requirement of hardship was not made out, and that the application for leave should be dismissed, and took the Court to the numerous inconsistencies, in respect of the case advanced by the de facto husband.

1. Under part VIIIAB of the Act, which deals with financial matters relating to de facto relationships, the Court has had regard to s 90RD which confers jurisdiction on the Court to make a declaration about the existence of de facto relationships.
2. Section 90RD of the Act is as follows:

Declarations about existence of de facto relationships

(1) If:

(a) an application is made for an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL; and

(b) a claim is made, in support of the application, that a de facto relationship existed between the applicant and another person;

the court may, for the purposes of those proceedings (the primary proceedings), declare that a de facto relationship existed, or never existed, between those 2 persons.

(2) A declaration under subsection (1) of the existence of a de facto relationship may also declare any or all of the following:

(a) the period, or periods, of the de facto relationship for the purposes of paragraph 90SB(a);

(b) whether there is a child of the de facto relationship;

(c) whether one of the parties to the de facto relationship made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c);

(d) when the de facto relationship ended;

(e) where each of the parties to the de facto relationship was ordinarily resident during the de facto relationship.

Note: For child of a de facto relationship , see section 90RB.

1. In J_onah & White_ (2011) 45 Fam LR 460 at [39] Justice Murphy asserted that a declaration as contemplated by 90RD of the Act as to the existence of a de facto relationship does not involve an exercise of judicial discretion, rather it is an evaluative factual determination.
2. When determining whether a de facto relationship exists, the Court is guided by the definition of a de facto relationship in s 4AA of the Act, which is set out as follows:

4AA De facto relationships

Meaning of de facto relationship

(1) A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:

(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and

(b) the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6));

(c) having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.

Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).

Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple

(2) Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:

(a) the duration of the relationship;

(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;

(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;

(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;

(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;

(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;

(g) whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;

(h) the care and support of children;

(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.

(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.

(4) A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.

(5) For the purposes of this Act:

(a) a de facto relationship can exist between 2 persons of different sexes and between 2 persons of the same sex; and

(b) a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship.

1. In Cizek & Mihov [2024] FedCFamC2F 584 at [22]- [24], Boymal J summarised the principles in determining the existence of a de facto relationships as follows:

[22] No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the parties were in a de facto relationship.[1] None of the matters referred to in section 4AA(2) has precedence over any other, nor must all necessarily be found before a finding of a de facto relationship is made.[2] The Court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate in the circumstances.[3]

[23] Regard must be had to all of the circumstances of the relationship, whether or not they are specified by subsection 4AA(2).[4] The Court is required to look at the "composite picture" produced by the synthesis of the evidence and statutory considerations prescribed in section 4AA.[5]

[24] In Sinclair & Whittaker [2013] FamCAFC 129 the Full Court of the Family Court at [55] cited with approval Fitzgerald J's statement in Lynam v Director-General of Social Security [1983] FCA 274; (1983) 52 ALR 128 at 131:

Each element of a relationship draws its colour and its significance from the other elements, some of which may point at one direction and some in the other. What must be looked at is the composite picture. Any attempt to isolate individual factors and to attribute to them relative degrees of materiality or importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error. The endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities means that there will be an almost infinite variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. In any particular case, it will be a question of fact and degree, a jury question, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the statutory test.

1. The High Court in Fairbairn v Radecki [2022] HCA 18; (2022) 275 CLR 400 observed:
   1. Section 4AA(1)(c) identifies the relationship which is the concern of the Act: "a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis". The existence of such a relationship is determined having regard to "all the circumstances" of a relationship; significantly, those "circumstances" include any or all of the circumstances listed in s 4AA(2), and, by reason of s 4AA(3), no particular finding about any circumstance is necessary for there to be a de facto relationship. Consistently with the reality that human relationships are infinitely mutable, in determining whether a de facto relationship exists a court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate.

...

1. The language of s 4AA of the Act and its reference to "living together" requires no different approach to determining whether a relationship exists of the kind defined. "Living together", consistently with authority, should be construed as meaning sharing life as a couple. Section 4AA does not prescribe any way by which a couple may share life together. Its language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the great variety of ways a de facto relationship may exist. That conclusion is supported by the varied factors listed in s 4AA(2). In a given case, some of the factors listed in s 4AA(2) may be relevant and some may be irrelevant; inevitably some may have greater prominence than others. A conclusion that a de facto relationship has ended may also arise because of factors not listed in s 4AA(2). Such a conclusion is mandated by s 4AA(3) and (4). In particular, s 4AA(4) is a statutory recognition that what may constitute a genuine de facto relationship is not be determined in the same way in every case by reference to rigid criteria that must always be satisfied. In that respect, the language of s 4AA(2)(b) does not assume that every de facto relationship must have a "common residence" to some "extent" and of some "nature". Such a construction is entirely denied by s 4AA(3).

(Footnote omitted)

1. The Full Court in Shelby & Rylan [2022] FedCFamC1A 143 observed:
   1. The High Court has arguably clarified that parties do not need to live together in order to be in a de facto relationship if they are sharing life as a couple. This however does not mean that every couple sharing life is necessarily living in a de facto relationship. The Court must have regard to all of the evidence, including to the matters referred to in s 4AA(2) of the Act. On one view, the phrase "sharing life" is simply a general summary of the s 4AA(2) circumstances.
2. Section 44(6) of the Act provides:

(6) The court may grant the party leave to apply after the end of the standard application period if the court is satisfied that:

(a) hardship would be caused to the party or a child if leave were not granted; or

(b) in the case of an application for an order for the maintenance of the party--the party's circumstances were, at the end of the standard application period, such that he or she would have been unable to support himself or herself without an income tested pension, allowance or benefit.

1. The Court has taken into account Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 93 ALR 479; Whitford and Whitford [1979] FamCA 3; (1979) FLC 90-612; Walker and Walker [1984] FamCA 55; (1984) FLC 91-564; Neocleous and Neocleous [1993] FamCA 44; (1993) FLC 92-377; Emerald & Emerald [2018] FamCAFC 217; (2018) FLC 93-870.
2. In Edmunds & Edmunds [2018] FamCAFC 121; (2018) FLC 93-847, the Full Court observed:

48. That involves a consideration, but not a final determination, of the nature of the applicant's claim. In doing so, the Court must weigh the applicant's case against that of the respondent's and form a view as to whether there is in fact a prima facie case, or a real probability of success, that would, if leave were granted, alleviate hardship.

1. The Full Court observed in Sharp v Sharp [2011] FamCAFC 150; (2011) 50 Fam LR 567:

97 Merely because the respondent to an application for leave does not point to particular prejudice that might arise if leave were granted, does not dispose of the question. The law presumes prejudice to flow to a person sought to be joined in litigation after the effluxion of the relevant time limits. Even if the court came to the view that there was no significant prejudice to the respondent, the court may consider whether in all of the circumstances of the case, it is just and reasonable to grant the extension sought.

1. The New South Wales court of Appeal in McLean v Sydney Water Corporation [2001] NSWCA 122, per Giles JA (Hodgson and Stein JA agreeing) said at [22] that:

22 ... Prejudice engendered by delay and unlikelihood of a fair trial will be highly material, and if there is prejudice and unlikelihood of a fair trial that will tell strongly, often conclusively, against the grant of an extension of time. It does not follow that in the absence of prejudice (other than general prejudice) and unlikelihood of a fair trial it will be just and reasonable to grant an extension of time.

1. The observations of this Court, in Cela & Houghton [2021] FedCFamC2F 668 at [22] - [24] have also been taken into account.

1. The Court does not accept the de facto husband as being a credible witness. The willingness on the de facto husband's case to allegedly lie to Centrelink, materially undermines the credit of the de facto husband. The contemporaneous closure of a joint account is entirely corroborative of the de facto wife's case. The statement to DCJ, in relation to the incident in 2012 of a 15-year-old son, records an admission made by the de facto husband, utterly inconsistent with his case. The other records referring to circumstances that reflected a state of separation are corroborative of the de facto wife's case, and not of the de facto husband's case.
2. The de facto husband was not an impressive witness and was evasive in answering questions. The Court finds on the evidence, that the de facto relationship commenced at the time of the engagement party, with the formal identification to family and friends, when the de facto wife was pregnant in 2008, and concluded in April 2011. The Court will make an appropriate declaration in that regard. The Court turns to the issue of whether, in those circumstances, leave should be granted under s 44(6) of the Act, given the proceedings has been almost 12 years out of time. The Court has taken into account the observations that leave is a power that should be exercised liberally to avoid hardship, and that the relevant hardship to which s 44(6) of the Act refers is not the loss of a right to institute proceedings, but the consequences of a loss of that right.
3. In the present case, the s 90SM application under the statutory criteria codifying Stanford v Stanford [2012] FamCAFC 1; (2012) 247 CLR 108 would require the Court to take into account the relevant statutory steps, including what the assets and liabilities of the parties are. The Court does have a balance sheet that identifies that state of affairs. The first criteria to consider is whether it is just and equitable at all to alter the property interests. In the present case, the state of affairs up until the commencement of proceedings is one where the de facto wife paid for, and has lived in, the Suburb G property without any direct financial contribution by the de facto husband to that property. The Court accepts that there may have been indirect contributions by some repair work by the de facto husband, and that he may have assisted in respect of some payment relating to services.
4. On the evidence before the Court, it could not be said that any of those contributions could be described as significant or substantial. Upon the material before the Court, the de facto husband has not contributed financially directly to the three properties identified in the balance sheet as belonging to the de facto wife. It is apparent that both parties, post-separation in 2011, have made parenting contributions to the child of the relationship. Those parenting contributions, however, do not reflect such a significant contribution by the applicant as to identify a prima facie case of entitlement to relief under s 90SM of the Act, altering the property interests of the parties. The mere fact that both parties have made parenting contributions does not, in the present case, identify a prima facie case or establish hardship of the kind required to warrant a grant of leave to institute these proceedings.
5. It is not necessary for the Court to go through each of the other statutory steps in s 90SM of the Act because the cessation of the relationship in 2011 is such that in the absence of direct or real financial contribution to the property of the de facto husband and/or substantial parenting contribution in excess of and disproportionate to that of the de facto wife, it is not apparent that the first preliminary step under s 90SM, at a prima facie level, would be met namely that it is just and equitable to alter the property interests of the parties given the cohabitation ceasing in 2011.
6. The Court finds the de facto husband has not made out a prima facie case for the exercise of their judicial discretion in respect of the granting of leave to commence proceedings out of time. The Court finds the refusal of leave in the present case does not give rise to a significant hardship to the de facto husband. The Court finds that it is less than likely that the de facto husband would succeed in obtaining any order under s 90SM and that the potential for relief that might be granted would be trifling.
7. The Court finds that there is no prejudice in terms of the extension of time that requires the Court to grant leave in the present case and in all the circumstances finds that it is just and reasonable to refuse and dismiss the application for leave under s 44(6) of the Act.
8. Accordingly, in relation to the consideration of whether a Court should make an adverse order as to costs under s 114UB of the Act, the Court has taken into account the financial circumstances of the de facto husband, and in particular, that he is currently unemployed. The Court has otherwise taken into account the factors under s 114UB of the Act, but is not persuaded that there are circumstances that justify the Court making an order other than each party bear their own costs.
9. It is for these reasons the Court makes the above orders.

1. I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street.

[1] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AA(3).

[2] Clarence & Crisp [2016] FamCAFC 157 at [33].

[3] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AA(4).

[4] Sinclair & Whittaker (2013) FamCAFC 129 at [51].

[5] Colburn & Cleese [2022] FedCFamC1A 147; (2022) FLC 94-105 at [79].