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[2020] FCA 1621
Federal Court of Australia
2020-11-06
Katzmann J
Original judgment source is linked above.
KATZMANN J: 1 In this proceeding the Fair Work Ombudsman seeks various forms of relief for alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). That relief includes pecuniary penalties. The first respondent is a corporation, currently in liquidation. Leave was granted to the Ombudsman to proceed against the corporation (FTM) in September 2019. Until that time FTM was represented by lawyers. Since then it has been unrepresented. The second respondent, Colin Kenneth Elvin, was the sole director of the corporation at all relevant times. He and the third respondent, Jun Millard Puerto, an employee of FTM, are said to have been knowingly concerned in the contraventions by FTM. Neither of them is legally represented. 2 The hearing began in October 2019. At that time only the Ombudsman's evidence was taken since Mr Elvin and Mr Puerto had filed defences raising the penalty privilege. At the conclusion of the Ombudsman's case on 25 October 2019, orders were made to enable them to file amended defences and evidence and the hearing was fixed to resume on 1 April 2020. Mr Puerto did not amend his defence and filed no evidence. The orders were later varied to enable Mr Elvin to file an amended defence well outside the time fixed by those orders. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial dates were vacated and new dates appointed. Mr Elvin has filed and served affidavits containing the evidence upon which he intends to rely at the resumed hearing. The Ombudsman has filed evidence in reply. 3 On Thursday 15 October 2020, six weeks before the trial is due to resume, the Registry accepted for filing an interlocutory application lodged by Mr Elvin the previous Friday. By that interlocutory application, Mr Elvin sought an order requiring the Ombudsman to provide written answers to interrogatories. Those interrogatories are set out in annexure A to these reasons. Having regard to its timing alone, this was an extraordinary application. In his affidavit Mr Elvin merely deposed that "[t]he interrogatory questions all relate to factual matters in dispute between the [Ombudsman] and myself arising out of the proceeding". 4 The application is opposed and should be refused. It is misconceived. Indeed, it amounts to an abuse of process. 5 Rule 21.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) entitles a party to apply to the Court for an order that another party provide written answers to interrogatories. The Court's power to make such an order is conferred by r 1.41. 6 Rule 21.02 provides that no application for an order of this kind can be made until after the pleadings have closed: The reason that is so is obvious. The scope of the dispute is determined by the pleadings. Consequently, as r 21.03 expressly states, interrogatories which do not relate to an issue raised on the pleadings are objectionable. Rule 21.03 imposes other limitations, too, by providing that interrogatories which are vexatious or oppressive or call for privileged information are also objectionable. 7 Administering interrogatories is a pre-trial procedure. Their fundamental purpose, as Brereton J explained in Kalgeracos v Bomba [2009] NSWSC 1271 at [1], is to obtain admissions or particulars about material facts in the proceeding. A material fact is a fact which is essential to the cause of action. The expression refers to the fact or combination of facts that give rise to a right to sue. See, for example, Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Proprietary Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234 at 245 (Wilson J). Interrogatories can also be deployed to obtain admissions which will destroy or damage the case of the party who is interrogated, to acquire further and better particulars of the pleaded claim; or to seek to obtain accounts from a party in a fiduciary position: W A Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1981) 41 FLR 175 (FC) at 190; 30 ALR 559 (FC) at 572 (Lockhart J). 8 It is not a purpose of interrogatories to elicit evidence or to serve as a means of cross-examination: Kalgeracos at [1]. Nor can interrogatories be used to "fish" for information in order to see if there is a case which is not raised on the pleading: Bannerman at 41 FLR 175 at 190; 30 ALR 559 at 572. 9 Yet the interrogatories Mr Elvin wishes to administer fall foul of these basic principles. They can fairly be described as vexatious. Several of them are directed to exploring the Ombudsman's reasons for not taking certain courses of action either before or after the proceeding was commenced or for bringing the proceeding in the first place (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23). They amount to fishing. They all relate to matters which do not arise on the pleadings. One of the proposed interrogatories is directed to matters only the witnesses could answer and on a subject which could only go to their credit (15). Others merely seek that the Ombudsman identify the evidence upon which she relies to prove certain matters (1, 9, 10, 13, and 24). Those matters will be covered in submissions. Interrogatories 18 and 19 similarly invite submissions to support certain claims. Interrogatory 25 is both vexatious and oppressive. None of the matters the subject of the application is a proper matter for interrogatories. 10 In any event, like any power conferred by the Rules in relation to a civil proceeding in the Court, the power to order interrogatories must be exercised in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and Rules, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: FCA Act, s 37M. The exercise of the Court's power in this case, particularly at this point in the proceeding, would certainly not be the best way to promote this purpose. To the contrary, it would tend to undermine it by imposing an excessive burden on the Ombudsman for no good reason at a time when she is no doubt busy preparing for the hearing. 11 Further, no satisfactory explanation has been given for the delay in making the application. Mr Elvin's explanation was that he had raised the penalty privilege in his defence. But his amended defence, waiving the privilege, was filed on 17 March 2020 - about seven months before he made this application. It is true that a late order for interrogatories is not unprecedented. The Ombudsman referred to Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia S.R.L. (No 9) [2015] FCA 623 in which Besanko J was prepared to make an order where the application had been made six weeks before the trial was due to start. His Honour described the timing of the application as "very late" but was persuaded to make the order because the interrogatories were "targeted, clearly relate[d] to an important issue and [were] not burdensome or oppressive …" (at [17]). That is plainly not the case here. Besides, as I have already observed, the trial in the present matter started a year ago and is well under way. 12 It follows that Mr Elvin's interlocutory application should be dismissed. I will reserve the question of costs for determination at the conclusion of the substantive proceeding. There will be orders accordingly. I certify that the preceding 12 numbered paragraphs is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Katzmann.
Associate: Dated: 6 November 2020 Annexure A INTERROGATORIES TO APPLICANT The Second Respondent requires you to answer interrogatory questions, as follows:
Fair Work Ombudsman
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