austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/1122
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-07-18
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
DOWNINGS PTY LTD T/AS FREMANTLE PHARMACY ACN 150 076 556
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
(1) Affidavit of Sam Coton affirmed 11 April 2025; and
(2) Affidavit of Jay Chin affirmed 11 April 2025.
The business has been sold. The company has no remaining assets and will be liquidated.
I am writing to inform you that Downings Pty Ltd is no longer trading.
The business has been sold as a going concern.
The company has, now, no assets and is not trading.
It is now negotiating with the lending bank as it owes more than the sale generated.
The company will go into liquidation.
I am sorry to inform you that the legal process will only deliver more costs that cannot be paid.
9 The Commissioner's contentions should be accepted and the appeal allowed. Under the civil penalty regime provided by the Act, the purpose of a civil penalty is primarily, if not solely, the promotion of the public interest in compliance with the provisions of the Act by the deterrence of further contraventions of the Act. In that context, the penalties fixed by the primary judge were appropriate because they were no more than might be considered to be reasonably necessary to deter further contraventions of a like kind by Mr Pattinson, the CFMMEU or others. They represented a reasonable assessment of what was necessary to make the continuation of the CFMMEU's non-compliance with the law, amply demonstrated by the history of its contraventions, too expensive to maintain.
10 The Full Court's critical error was that it was distracted by a concern, drawn from the criminal law, that a penalty must be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct that constituted the contravention. The power conferred by s 546 of the Act is not subject to constraints drawn from the criminal law and there is no place for a "notion of proportionality", in the sense in which the Full Court used that term, in a civil penalty regime. Further, and relatedly, their Honours were misled by the view that the Act required that the maximum penalty be reserved for only the most serious examples of the offending comprehended by s 349(1), and that this principle could prevent the court from imposing the maximum penalty even though a penalty in that amount might reasonably be considered to be necessary to deter future contraventions of a like kind. Nothing in the text, context or purpose of s 546 requires that the maximum penalty be reserved for the most serious examples of misconduct within s 349(1). What is required is that there be "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed". That relationship is established where the maximum penalty does not exceed what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of s 546: the deterrence of future contraventions of a like kind by the contravenor and by others**.**
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14 In The Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate ("the Agreed Penalties Case")13, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that civil penalty provisions of the kind enacted in s 546 have a "statutory function of securing compliance with provisions of the [statutory] regime". Although it is accepted in the authorities that the courts may adapt principles which govern criminal sentencing to civil penalty regimes, "basic differences"14 between criminal prosecutions and civil penalty proceedings mean there are limits to the transplantation of principles from the former context to the latter. Indeed, the Act is emphatic in drawing a distinction between its civil penalty regime and criminal proceedings. For example: a contravention of a civil remedy provision is not an offence15; the rules of evidence and procedure for civil matters are applicable to proceedings relating to a contravention of a civil remedy provision; and a court must not make a pecuniary penalty order for a contravention of a civil remedy provision against a person who has already been convicted of an offence for substantially the same conduct.
15 Most importantly, it has long been recognised that, unlike criminal sentences, civil penalties are imposed primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of deterrence. The plurality in the Agreed Penalties Case said:
"[W]hereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance:
'Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act] ... The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act.'"
16 In a similar vein, in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner21, the Full Court of the Federal Court cited the decision of French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd22 and the reasons of the plurality in the Agreed Penalties Case as establishing that deterrence is the "principal and indeed only object" of the imposition of a civil penalty: "[r]etribution, denunciation and rehabilitation have no part to play".
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18 In CSR, French J listed several factors which informed the assessment under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value:
"The assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value will have regard to a number of factors which have been canvassed in the cases. These include the following:
1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss or damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention."
19. It may readily be seen that this list of factors includes matters pertaining both to the character of the contravening conduct (such as factors 1 to 3) and to the character of the contravenor (such as factors 4, 5, 8 and 9). It is important, however, not to regard the list of possible relevant considerations26 as a "rigid catalogue of matters for attention"27 as if it were a legal checklist. The court's task remains to determine what is an "appropriate" penalty in the circumstances of the particular case.
Relevant Principles
- The relevant civil penalty imposition principles are largely agreed in the otherwise competing written submissions and may be shortly summarised as follows. The primary, if not sole, purpose of a civil penalty is deterrence: Pattinson at [9] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ). The Court is to identify the "appropriate" penalty necessary to deter future contraventions "of a like kind" by the contravener and others to achieve specific and general deterrence: Pattinson at [9]-[10]. This will require regard to be taken of the conduct giving rise to the contravention, the circumstances of the contravener, and factors indicating the risk of future contraventions: Pattinson at [58]-[60].
- Following Pattinson at [10] and [38]-[42], the power to impose a civil penalty in s 546 of the FWA is "not subject to constraints drawn from the criminal law and there is no place for a 'notion of proportionality' " of the kind identified for the purposes of criminal proceedings in Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, namely a relationship between the seriousness of the conduct and the penalty imposed. Rather, what is required is that there be "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed": Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; 340 ALR 25 at [156], quoted in Pattinson at [53]. That relationship is established where "the maximum penalty does not exceed what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of s 546: the deterrence of future contraventions of a like kind by the contravenor and by others": Pattinson at [10].
- The concept of proportionality is confined to striking a reasonable balance between deterrence and oppressive severity, Pattinson approving in that context what was said in Reckitt Benckiser at [152]:
If it costs more to obey the law than to breach it, a failure to sanction contraventions adequately de facto punishes all who do the right thing. It is therefore important that those who do comply see that those who do not are dealt with appropriately. This is, in a sense, the other side of deterrence, being a dimension of the general deterrence equation. This is not to give licence to impose a disproportionate or oppressive penalty, which cannot be done, but rather to recognise that proportionality of penalty is measured in the wider context of the demands of effective deterrence and encouraging the corresponding virtue of voluntary compliance.
- Where a contravener has already taken steps to mitigate the risk of future contraventions, deterrence may be effective with a more modest penalty: Pattinson at [60]. Effective deterrence of a well-resourced contravener may require a larger penalty: Pattinson at [60]. However, as CBA and CommSec correctly observed, it does not follow that a profitable and large employer must, as a matter of course, attract the highest penalty.
- Drawn from Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076 at 52,152 (French J), quoted in Pattinson at [18], relevant but non-exhaustive considerations in the assessment of the appropriate penalty may include:
1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss or damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for enforcement of the Act in relation to contravention.
- State of mind is also an issue in this penalty imposition exercise. As was pointed out by the Full Court in Reckitt Benckiser in relation to state of mind in relation to civil penalty contraventions generally at [131]:
If a contravention does not involve any state of mind then it is for the party asserting any particular state of mind (be it a deliberate flouting of the law, recklessness, wilful blindness, "courting the risk", negligence, or innocence or any other characterisation of state of mind) to prove its assertion. If, in the event, neither party discharges its onus to establish any particular state of mind in relation to the contraventions, the Court determines penalty on no more than the fact of the proscribed nature of the conduct (see, by analogy see R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; 166 ALR 330; [1999] HCA 54 (Olbrich) at [22]-[28]). However, if any degree of awareness of the actual or potential unlawfulness of the conduct is proved then, all other things being equal, the contravention is necessarily more serious. Such awareness may be able to be inferred from the very nature of the conduct or representations constituting the conduct. However absence of such proof does not establish a mitigatory state of mind (see, by analogy, R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 at 369, quoted with approval by the majority in Olbrich at [27]; see also [25]). It means only that the neutral state of mind required for liability has not been disturbed for the purposes of penalty. If a contravening party wishes to go beyond the neutral statutory state of mind for liability and positively assert a lack of consciousness of the character of the conduct for the purposes of penalty, that is a circumstance of mitigation which the contravening party must prove.
- Moreover, as the majority judgment in Pattinson pointed out at [46]:
A contravention may be a "one-off" result of inadvertence by the contravenor rather than the latest instance of the contravenor's pursuit of a strategy of deliberate recalcitrance in order to have its way. There may also be cases, for example, where a contravention has occurred through ignorance of the law on the part of a [contravenor], or where the official responsible for a deliberate breach has been disciplined by the union. In such cases, a modest penalty, if any, may reasonably be thought to be sufficient to provide effective deterrence against further contraventions.
(1) The Federal Court, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) or an eligible State or Territory court may, on application, order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision.
Note 1: Pecuniary penalty orders cannot be made in relation to conduct that contravenes a term of a modern award, a national minimum wage order or an enterprise agreement only because of the retrospective effect of a determination (see subsections 167(3) and 298(2)).
Note 2: Pecuniary penalty orders cannot be made in relation to conduct that contravenes a term of an enterprise agreement only because of the retrospective effect of an amendment made under paragraph 227B(3)(b) (see subsection 227E(2)).
Determining amount of pecuniary penalty
(2) Subject to this section, the pecuniary penalty must not be more than:
(a) if the person is an individual - the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the relevant item in column 4 of the table in subsection 539(2); or
(b) if the person is a body corporate - 5 times the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the relevant item in column 4 of the table in subsection 539(2).
(2A) Despite paragraph (2)(b) and subsection (2AA), if:
(a) the civil remedy provision is a selected civil remedy provision; and
(b) the person is a body corporate; and
(c) when the application for the order is made, the person is not a small business employer; and
(d) the contravention is associated with an underpayment amount; and
(e) the application specifies that the applicant wants the maximum penalty to be calculated based on a multiple of the underpayment amount; and
(f) the person is not taken to have contravened the civil remedy provision under section 550 (person involved in a contravention); the pecuniary penalty must not be more than the greater of the following:
(g) the amount worked out in accordance with subsection (2AA);
(h) 3 times the underpayment amount.
Note: For when contravention of a civil remedy provision is associated with an underpayment amount, see section 546A.
(2AA) Despite paragraph (2)(b), if:
(a) the civil remedy provision is a selected civil remedy provision; and
(b) the person is a body corporate; and
(c) when the application for the order is made, the person is not a small business employer;
the pecuniary penalty must not be more than 5 times the amount worked out in accordance with paragraph (2)(b).
Payment of penalty
(3) The court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to:
(a) the Commonwealth; or
(b) a particular organisation; or
(c) a particular person.
Recovery of penalty
(4) The pecuniary penalty may be recovered as a debt due to the person to whom the penalty is payable.
No limitation on orders
(5) To avoid doubt, a court may make a pecuniary penalty order in addition to one or more orders under section 545.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street.
Fair Work Ombudsman
Downings Pty Ltd trading as Fremantle Pharmacy [2025] FedCFamC2G 1122
(1999) 199 CLR 270
(1988) 164 CLR 465