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EzFunds Holding Pty Ltd trading as Hai Money v Finsure Finance & Insurance... [2026] NSWSC 526 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWSC

EzFunds Holding Pty Ltd trading as Hai Money v Finsure Finance & Insurance Pty Ltd

[2026] NSWSC 526

Supreme Court of NSW|2026-05-15|Before: Williams J

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-05-15

Before

Williams J

Catchwords

EQUITY – Where plaintiff sought interim injunction prohibiting defendant from acting on its letter to the plaintiff terminating or purporting to terminate a Sub-Aggregator Agreement between the plaintiff (as Sub-Aggregator) and the defendant (as Aggregator) – Where plaintiff established serious questions to be tried – Consideration of balance of convenience – Interim injunction granted.

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

EQUITY – Where plaintiff sought interim injunction prohibiting defendant from acting on its letter to the plaintiff terminating or purporting to terminate a Sub-Aggregator Agreement between the plaintiff (as Sub-Aggregator) and the defendant (as Aggregator) – Where plaintiff established serious questions to be tried – Consideration of balance of convenience – Interim injunction granted.

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: EzFunds Holding Pty Ltd trading as Hai Money v Finsure Finance & Insurance Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 526

Hearing dates: 13 May 2026

Date of orders: 15 May 2026

Decision date: 15 May 2026

Jurisdiction: Equity - Duty List

Before: Williams J

Decision: See orders at [66]

Catchwords: EQUITY – Where plaintiff sought interim injunction prohibiting defendant from acting on its letter to the plaintiff terminating or purporting to terminate a Sub-Aggregator Agreement between the plaintiff (as Sub-Aggregator) and the defendant (as Aggregator) – Where plaintiff established serious questions to be tried – Consideration of balance of convenience – Interim injunction granted.

Cases Cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] HCA 63
BMW Australia v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45
May v Walker [2023] NSWSC 1628
Papas v Grave [2013] NSWCA 308

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: EzFunds Holding Pty Ltd trading as Hai Money (ACN 662 894 297) (Plaintiff)
Finsure Finance & Insurance Pty Ltd (ACN 068 153 926) (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Mr A P Cheshire SC and Mr A Rizk (Plaintiff) Mr C D Wood SC with Mr O’Sulivan (Defendant) Solicitors: Mitry Emerson Lewis Lawyers (Plaintiff) Etienne Lawyers (Defendant)

I shall refer to the plaintiff by its trading name, Hai Money.
I shall refer to the defendant as Finsure.
In support of its application for the interim injunction, Hai Money relied on an affidavit of its sole director and shareholder, Mr Songyang Li, affirmed on 1 May 2026.
In opposing the interim injunction, Finsure relied on an affidavit of its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Simon Bednar, sworn on 7 May 2026 and an affidavit of Mr Peter White AM, a consultant to members of the mortgage broking industry in Australia, sworn on 7 May 2026.
Each party also tendered certain documentary evidence.
What follows is a description of the salient aspects of that evidence and does not record findings of fact.
Hai Money was established in October 2022.
On 14 June 2024, Hai Money (as Sub-Aggregator) and Finsure (as Aggregator) entered into a Sub-Aggregator Agreement (the Agreement).
As an aggregator in the mortgage broking industry, Finsure has direct accreditation agreements with lenders. As a sub-aggregator, Hai Money has a network of mortgage brokers who make loan applications on behalf of their borrower clients through Finsure’s aggregation platform (via Hai Money as sub-aggregator) to Finsure’s panel of over 75 lenders. The brokers each operate their own business as credit representatives of Hai Money under Hai Money’s Australian Credit Licence. Lenders pay commissions (including upfront and trail commissions) to Finsure in respect of loans written by brokers in Hai Money’s network through Finsure as aggregator. Finsure remits those commissions to Hai Money after deducting Finsure’s own fees and charges, and Hai Money then pays commissions to individual brokers within its network after retaining its share of those commissions.
Brokers in Hai Money’s broker network make all loan applications to lenders through Finsure. That is to say, Hai Money does not have a relationship with any other aggregator.
Hai Money’s financial results in each month during the period between July 2025 and March 2026 varied significantly, ranging between a net loss of $1,841,322.77 (in December 2025) and a net profit of $1,959,235.17 (in November 2025). Commissions received are its largest source of income and commissions paid out to brokers are its largest expense.
During the period between June and September 2025, Finsure notified Hai Money that National Australia Bank (NAB) had suspended 15 of Hai Money’s brokers, including Mr Andrew Hu of Cloud Sven International Pty Ltd. The suspensions were made pending an investigation or review of files. During the period of the suspension, those brokers were not authorised to submit loan applications to NAB via Hai Money through Finsure’s aggregation platform.
In October 2025, Finsure notified Hai Money that NAB had terminated the accreditation of two of Hai Money’s brokers.
On 5 December 2025, Finsure notified Hai Money that NAB had terminated the broker accreditation of Mr Andrew Hu and his company Cloud Sven International Pty Ltd.
Immediately following each of those terminations, Hai Money took steps to terminate its relationship with the relevant broker.
On or about 23 December 2025, Finsure informed Hai Money that NAB had suspended the accreditation of all 220 brokers in Hai Money’s network.
Mr Li learned from media publications in December 2025 that Mr Andrew Hu had been charged with fraud as part of the alleged “Penthouse Syndicate” fraud ring, and that the charges were related to Mr Hu’s former employment with NAB.
Neither NAB nor Finsure provided any reasons to Hai Money for NAB’s suspension of Hai Money’s broker network. Neither NAB nor Finsure made any findings against Hai Money or against any of the suspended brokers. Mr Li sought to find out the reason for the suspension. Mr Bednar of Finsure told Mr Li in February 2026 that the Hai Money brokers had been suspended by NAB due to Mr Hu being charged with fraud. According to Mr Bednar’s evidence, the decisions to suspend and terminate certain individual brokers, and the decision to suspend all of Hai Money’s brokers, were made by NAB and were not made at the request of Finsure.
From January 2026, NAB began to clawback commissions paid to Finsure in respect of loans written on applications made by Hai Money brokers, and Finsure in turn began clawing back those commissions from sums otherwise payable to Hai Money under the Agreement. NAB and Finsure did not provide any explanations to Hai Money of any reasons why commission in respect of particular loans was clawed back. According to Mr Bednar’s evidence, the clawback decisions were made by NAB and not by Finsure. Finsure does not underwrite the payment of commissions by lenders and only remits to Hai Money what it receives from lenders.
At the request of and with the knowledge of Finsure, Hai Money undertook a series of steps with a view to satisfying any concerns underlying NAB’s suspension of the whole of Hai Money’s broker network and in the hope of facilitating reinstatement of broker accreditations. Those steps included a management and shareholding restructure, enhanced compliance, supervision and risk management measures across Hai Money’s broker network at a cost of approximately $150,000, and submitting to an independent compliance review undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) under instructions from Finsure at Hai Money’s cost.
The Executive Summary of the PwC compliance review report highlights key conclusions and recommendations in relation to the need for formal policies and governance frameworks to replace existing procedural documentation, enhanced controls, and a structured risk management approach to support sustained business growth and regulatory adherence. Areas of strength noted in the Executive Summary include Hai Money’s established loan file review process that provides ongoing oversight of broker conduct and regulatory obligations, and Hai Money’s proactive compliance function. The Executive Summary stated that PwC’s review of Hai Money’s loan file process did not evidence adverse broker behaviours.
On 8 April 2026, Mr Bednar of Finsure sent the PwC compliance review report to NAB, stating:

According to Mr Bednar’s evidence, as at 22 April 2026:
NAB had decided to terminate the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers and rejected Finsure’s suggestion that it limit the termination to those Hai Money brokers about whose conduct NAB had concerns. There is no evidence of the reason for NAB’s decision to terminate all Hai Money brokers;
the Commonwealth Bank had suspended the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers pending an investigation for the purpose of which the Commonwealth Bank requested certain information from Finsure, including the PwC compliance report;
Macquarie Bank had terminated the accreditation of five Hai Money brokers on 20 April 2026, stating that those individual brokers “no longer align with our current risk appetite” due to their association with one of two other individual brokers;
ANZ had terminated the accreditation of 17 Hai Money brokers, stating that it had determined that each individual broker did not meet ANZ’s broker accreditation criteria; and
Suncorp had terminated the accreditation of 23 Hai Money brokers. However, the documents exhibited to Mr Bednar’s affidavit record Suncorp’s suspension of certain individual brokers pending an investigation into applications submitted by those brokers, rather than terminations of any individual broker.
Mr Bednar gave evidence that the terminations of accreditation of Hai Money brokers by lenders was a loss of accreditation of “Intermediaries” within the meaning of clause 5.3(iii) of the Agreement and were, therefore, “Intermediary Events of Default” within the meaning of clause 5.3. Mr Bednar considered that those Intermediary Events of Default were incapable of rectification.
Mr Bednar gave evidence that he was, and remains, concerned:
that the terminations of accreditation of Hai Money brokers by large lenders would taint Finsure’s reputation in the mortgage broking industry and that Finsure would rightly or wrongly be seen as “guilty by association” with the brokers whose accreditation had been terminated by those lenders;
about the potentially increased insurance premiums for Finsure if it was held liable for involvement in any contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law by brokers whose accreditation had been revoked; and
that Finsure’s association through Hai Money with the brokers whose accreditation had been revoked could attract scrutiny from regulatory authorities such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. Mr Bednar gave evidence that he is confident that Finsure has not contravened any applicable laws or regulations, but he is nevertheless concerned that dealing with such scrutiny “would require a substantive response that would divert Finsure’s resources away from carrying on its business in the usual manner”.
Mr Bednar gave evidence that, for those reasons, Finsure does not wish to remain in a commercial relationship with Hai Money.
It is very difficult to reconcile Mr Bednar’s evidence about his claimed concerns with the documentary evidence which shows that:
in March 2026, Finsure recruited as its Business Development Manager one of the five brokers whose accreditation was terminated by Macquarie Bank as referred to at [33] above; and
as at 30 April 2026, Finsure was “onboarding” seven Hai Money brokers and sought reference checks from Hai Money as part of that onboarding process.
Mr Li gave evidence that the immediate effect of Finsure’s termination or purported termination of the Agreement is to effectively shut down Hai Money’s business because Hai Money’s broker network cannot submit any new loan applications and Hai Money therefore has no ability to generate revenue. As I have already mentioned, Hai Money does not currently have a relationship with any other aggregator. According to Mr Li’s evidence, it would take four to six weeks in order for Hai Money to establish a relationship with another aggregator. During that period, Hai Money’s existing cash reserves of about $450,000 will be depleted by staff costs (approximately $100,000 per month), operating expenses (approximately $20,000 per month), and legal expenses, and it will lose revenue of approximately $1.3 million per month. Hai Money will also be exposed to the risk that its brokers will terminate their relationship with Hai Money and seek to enter into an arrangement with another sub-aggregator in the industry in order for the brokers to be able to continue operating their businesses. Since the notice of termination was issued by Finsure, approximately 140 of Hai Money’s brokers have already left Hai Money’s network and more are likely to follow. Those brokers who have not yet been able to secure an arrangement with another sub-aggregator are suffering from the loss of income resulting from Finsure’s termination or purported termination of the Agreement.
Mr Li’s evidence concerning loss of revenue to Hai Money is based on his understanding that Finsure will immediately cease paying any commissions to Hai Money. Mr Bednar’s evidence that Finsure intends to continue to remit to Hai Money commissions received from lenders contradicts Finsure’s clear statement in its letter dated 20 April 2026 that “we will not pay any further Commission, including Trail Income, in respect of the Loans introduced by the Sub-Aggregator”. I therefore give no weight to this aspect of Mr Bednar’s evidence in determining the interim relief application.
Mr Bednar gave evidence that reinstating the Agreement would not result in lenders reinstating the accreditation of Hai Money’s brokers, as that is a decision for each lender to make. Mr Bednar also gave evidence that he understands that “the Lenders” are not willing to allow Hai Money brokers to be accredited. However, the source of Mr Bednar’s understanding is one email from one aggregator or sub-aggregator which had been considering onboarding a particular Hai Money broker and subsequently advised that it had decided not to onboard any Hai Money brokers “[a]t this point in time” because “the lenders will not transfer”. It is not clear which lenders the email was referring to, and the basis for the opinion expressed by the writer of the email that “the lenders will not transfer” is not identified. According to the evidence presently before the Court, NAB is the only lender that has terminated the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers. Mr Bednar’s evidence suggesting that he understands that no lenders are willing to allow any Hai Money brokers to be accredited is contrary to Finsure’s conduct referred to at [36] above and is inconsistent with his evidence that Hai Money’s brokers will not be prejudiced by Finsure’s termination of the Agreement because Hai Money could establish relationships with other aggregators who are competitors of Finsure. Mr Bednar’s evidence of his understanding that “the Lenders” are not willing to allow any Hai Money brokers to be accredited therefore carries no weight in the determination of the interim relief application.
According to Mr Li’s evidence, there were approximately 250 loans with a total value of approximately $200 million which had received unconditional approval but which had not settled at the time Finsure terminated or purported to terminate the Agreement. If those loans are not permitted to proceed to settlement as a result of the termination or purported termination, this could result in loss to borrowers, including in respect of any liabilities they may incur to third parties if the failure of their loan to proceed to settlement causes them to breach contractual obligations owed to third parties.
Mr Bednar gave evidence that he understands that unconditional approved loans will proceed to settlement subject to normal loan terms and conditions. However, Mr Bednar also gave evidence that the decision whether to proceed to settlement of any loan that has unconditional approval is a decision for the lender which is beyond the control of Finsure, and that this will remain the case even if Hai Money is reinstated as a sub-aggregator to Finsure. For the purpose of determining this interim relief application, I proceed on the basis that there is an inherent business risk that lenders will not proceed to settlement of loans with unconditional approval, and that Finsure’s termination or purported termination of the Agreement is a factor that may heighten that risk in respect of loans that were approved following loan applications made by Hai Money brokers through Finsure.
Mr Li refers to media coverage of the events described above which he says has caused reputational harm to Hai Money and to the brokers within its network. Most of the media coverage to which Mr Li refers concerns the events preceding Finsure’s termination or purported termination of the Agreement, and includes statements made to the media by Hai Money and by Mr Li personally.
Mr Li gave evidence that damages would not be an adequate remedy for Hai Money in respect of Finsure’s allegedly invalid termination of the Agreement because Hai Money would be likely to become insolvent before any final hearing, its broker network would be destroyed in any event, and it would be difficult to quantify the damage to Hai Money’s reputation and the loss of its business in monetary terms.
Hai Money gives the usual undertaking as to damages. Finsure disputes the worth of that undertaking.

As senior counsel for Finsure candidly acknowledged, there is no evidence presently before the Court that Hai Money or any broker has committed or been ancillary to conduct of the kind described in clause 5.1(d). There is evidence of media reports of allegations that certain individual brokers have engaged in fraud, and there is evidence that certain lenders have taken action to suspend or terminate the accreditation of certain brokers, to suspend the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers (in the case of the Commonwealth Bank) and to terminate the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers (in the case of NAB). There is no evidence of any findings made by those lenders (if any) in respect of any particular brokers, let alone evidence of the basis of any such findings. As I have mentioned earlier in these reasons, Finsure expressly disavowed making any findings against Hai Money brokers whose accreditation Finsure terminated or proposed to terminate on 14 April 2026. [4] The event which gives rise to a right of termination under clause 5.1(d) is the conduct referred to in that clause, not an allegation or reasonable suspicion of such conduct.
Finsure’s submissions made at the hearing of the interim relief application did not rely on clause 5.1(b) or clause 5.2 of the Agreement as source of a contractual right to terminate without notice on 22 April 2026.
During the course of the hearing, senior counsel for Finsure abandoned reliance on clause 5.3 of the Agreement as an alternative source of a contractual right to terminate without notice on 22 April 2026. As senior counsel properly conceded, clause 5.3 confers a right on Finsure to terminate an Intermediary’s accreditation with Finsure, not to terminate the Agreement.
For those reasons, Hai Money has established that its claims for final relief raise a serious question to be tried. On the basis of the evidence presently before the Court, Hai Money has a strong case that Finsure’s notice issued on 22 April 2026 did not validly terminate the Agreement and is of no effect. [5]
In my opinion, the balance of convenience favours granting the interim injunction sought by Hai Money for the following reasons.
First, Hai Money’s case for final relief is a strong case as things presently stand for the reasons explained at [52]-[54] above. [6]
Second, if the interim injunction is not granted, and Finsure is ultimately found to have invalidly terminated the Agreement, damages will be a wholly inadequate remedy for the prejudice that Hai Money will have suffered as a result of Finsure acting on the termination in the meantime, as described in Mr Li’s evidence which I have summarised at [38] above. I accept Hai Money’s submission that, in addition to being an inadequate remedy for the loss of its business, damages would be difficult to quantify given that Hai Money is a relatively new business and was in an expansive phase of its development at the time Finsure issued the notice terminating or purporting to terminate the Agreement. I accept Mr Bednar’s evidence that the granting of the interim injunction is unlikely to resolve all of the difficulties that Hai Money presently faces. However, the interim injunction will remove Finsure’s arguably invalid termination of the Agreement as a cause of those difficulties pending final determination of these proceedings. As things presently stand, this will afford Hai Money the opportunity to continue its business through members of its broker network (who have not yet moved to other sub-aggregators and whose accreditation has not been suspended or terminated by Finsure under clause 5.3 of the Agreement) generating loan applications to lenders that have not suspended or terminated the accreditation of those brokers. The evidence before the Court is to the effect that there are many large lenders who have terminated the accreditation of only a small number of Hai Money brokers.
Third, the prejudice to Hai Money described above far outweighs any prejudice that Finsure will suffer if the interim injunction is granted. The evidence presently before the Court does not persuade me that Finsure’s reputation in the mortgage broking industry will be tainted if the Agreement remains on foot. As I have already observed, the evidence presently before the Court indicates that most lenders have not moved to terminate the accreditation of the majority of Hai Money’s brokers. NAB has terminated the accreditation of all of Hai Money’s brokers. However, Mr Bednar’s evidence of his concern that Finsure will be judged “guilty by association” by the industry if it retains a relationship with any of Hai Money’s brokers is contradicted by Finsure’s own conduct, as I have already observed. [7] Mr White’s evidence adds nothing of substance to Mr Bednar’s evidence on this subject. Mr White’s evidence is little more than bare assertion and is founded on an assumption of fact that is not supported by the evidence presently before the Court. In any event, the grant of an interim injunction will not affect the operation of clause 5.3 of the Agreement. Mr Bednar’s concern about increased insurance premiums arises from any past contravening conduct (if any) of brokers whose accreditation has already been revoked by Finsure panel lenders. That concern is not relevant to where the balance of convenience lies in respect of the interim injunction sought by Hai Money. Mr Bednar’s concern about regulatory scrutiny fails to grapple with the reality that any entity in Finsure’s position must accept regulatory scrutiny as an incident of doing business under statutory licences in a regulated industry, and that the degree or intensity of that scrutiny may vary from time to time by reason of events affecting that industry.
Fourth, I reject Finsure’s submissions that the claim for the interim injunction is effectively a claim to have the Agreement reinstated, and that this would involve the Court forcing the parties to remain in a relationship of trust and confidence and in a relationship of personal service. The Agreement creates a commercial relationship between Finsure and Hai Money and facilitates commercial dealings in chain beginning with mortgage brokers in Hai Money’s broker network and ending with lenders on Finsure’s panel of lenders, with Finsure and Hai Money playing intermediary roles in that chain. Those relationships are overlaid with the statutory provisions that apply to Australian Credit Licensees and their credit representatives. The relationship between Finsure and Hai Money created by the Agreement cannot properly be described as one of trust and confidence or personal service such that the Court would be reticent to grant injunctive relief restraining an arguably invalid termination of the relationship. Hai Money does not seek to reinstate that relationship, but to restrain Finsure from acting on an allegedly invalid termination of the Agreement and to maintain the status quo pending the final determination of that dispute. The relationship will continue on the terms of the Agreement. As senior counsel for Hai Money submitted, it will remain open to Finsure to exercise any other rights it may have under the Agreement. I reject Finsure’s submission that the possibility of such other rights being exercised, and the possibility of disputes arising from any such exercise or purported exercise of those other rights, are matters that weigh against granting the interim injunction presently sought by Hai Money, in circumstances where Hai Money has established a strong prima facie case that Finsure did not validly terminate the Agreement by its letter dated 22 April 2026. In determining any such disputes that may arise, the Court would not be supervising the parties’ relationship. The Court would merely be adjudicating fresh disputes concerning the parties’ contractual rights and obligations.
Fifth, I accept Mr Bednar’s evidence that Finsure no longer wishes to remain in a commercial relationship with Hai Money. However, it does not follow that the Court should decline interim relief restraining Finsure from terminating that relationship in a manner that is arguably in breach of the Agreement that Finsure chose to enter into governing that relationship, in circumstances where Hai Money has a strong prima facie case that the termination was invalid and in all the circumstances described above.
As I have mentioned earlier in these reasons, Hai Money gives the usual undertaking as to damages which it must give as the essential condition to the grant of an interim injunction. [8] Finsure submits that there is a real risk that its own business will be shut down by lenders taking steps against Finsure if the interim injunction is granted, and that Hai Money’s undertaking will not be adequate to cover such losses. The evidence which I have summarised above does not establish any such risk as opposed to a mere speculative possibility. The evidence shows that some lenders have sought some information from Finsure to assist in the lender’s investigations into brokers, but there is no evidence that any lender has taken or even foreshadowed any action against Finsure itself. There is no evidence that Finsure has engaged or is even suspected to have engaged in any conduct that might arguably cause any lender to take action against Finsure. Even in the case of NAB which suspended and then terminated the accreditation of all Hai Money brokers, there is no evidence suggesting that NAB is contemplating terminating its relationship with Finsure. There is no evidence that NAB or any other lender has a contractual or other right to terminate its relationship with Finsure in the events which have happened.
As senior counsel for Hai Money submitted, Mr Li’s evidence that Hai Money has cash reserves of approximately $450,000 was not challenged on the hearing of this interim relief application. Hai Money will continue to earn revenue if the interim injunction is granted, although it must be said that there is some uncertainty about the amount of that revenue given the clawbacks and the reduced size of its broker network. However, as I have explained above, there is no evidence of a risk of Finsure losing the whole of its business, or of losing its business with one or more specific lenders. Finsure did not identify any other kind of loss that it may suffer if the interim injunction is granted and the Court ultimately declines to make the declarations sought by Hai Money by way of final relief. Having regard to the terms and conditions of the Agreement as a whole, it is difficult to identify other potential kinds of loss. I am therefore satisfied that the usual undertaking as to damages offered by Hai Money is sufficient in the circumstances of this case.