1. It was confirmed in Warilla Timber and Hardware Pty Ltd v Newton,[2] Albury Real Estate Pty Ltd v Rouse and anor[3] and in Richardson that the term "support" in s 25 of the 1987 Act is not limited to financial support and encompasses other multifactorial aspects including assistance with day-to-day activities and emotional support.
2. In TNT Group 4 Pty Limited v Halioris,[4] McHugh JA stated:

"Dependency is a question of fact: Potts v Niddre & Benhar Coal Co Ltd [1913] UKLawRpAC 23; [1913] AC 531 at 539, 542; Aafjes v Kearney (1976) 50 ALJR 454 at 456, 457 and 459. It is concerned with actual and not theoretical support. A person claiming dependency need not be in actual receipt of support at the date of death. It is enough that, as at that date, he or she had a reasonable expectation of support in the future. Dependency may exist at the date of death although actual support cannot or is unlikely to occur until a future time."[5]

1. Further, in Kaur v Thales Underwater Systems Pty Ltd,[6] President Keating stated:

"The question whether there is in fact dependence or reliance at the date of death is not to be answered by looking only to the circumstances as they existed at that date;"[7]

...'past events and future probabilities' have to be considered. (Aafjes v Kearney 180

CLR 199; 8 ALR 455; 50 ALJR 454, 456, 457 and 459 (Aafjes))."[8]

1. The applicant was in a loving relationship since 2010. According to her evidence, she was emotionally and financially dependent on the deceased. I am satisfied from the applicant's evidence that their relationship would have lasted well into the future but for the deceased's untimely death.
2. According to the applicant evidence, she and the deceased shared the household expenses. The deceased's salary was paid into a joint account, and this was used to pay the mortgage and other household expenses. However, at all times the applicant has been in employment, so in the circumstances, I am satisfied that she was partly dependent on the deceased at the time of his death.
3. Given the tender years of the deceased's daughter, I accept that she was both financially and emotionally dependent on the deceased. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the first respondent was wholly dependent on the deceased at the time of his death.
4. Having regard to the statutory declarations of the deceased's family members, I am satisfied that there were no other persons wholly or partly dependent on the deceased at the date of his death.

1. In order to apportion the lump sum, it is necessary to review all of the relevant facts disclosed in the evidence. In Wratten v Kirkpatrick,[9] Egan A-CCJ stated:

"The exercise of power to determine the correct amount to be apportioned to each dependant requires an examination of all relevant facts including the extent of past dependence, the anticipated future dependence, the ages of the dependants, their health, special needs, lifestyle, etc."[10]

1. Each case requires an examination of the individual facts as no two matters are identical. The applicant would be entitled to a greater proportion of the lump sum having regard to her past dependency, her age, current employment and needs. This of course needs to be weighed up with the dependency of the first respondent.
2. It is obvious that the legal representatives have put some time into assessing the respective rights of each party. I see no reason why I should apportion the benefit in a different fashion.
3. Accordingly, I apportion the lump sum payment of $791,850 pursuant to s 29 of the 1987 Act as follows:

(a) Crystal Monique Evry: $696,900 (75%), and

(b) Indiana Storm Evry: $232,300 (25%).

1. The power to award interest is discretionary[11] and can apply to some or all of the compensation payable for the entire period from the date of the claim to the date of the order or for a lesser period. A claim is made when sufficient information is served to enable a decision to be made to accept or dispute liability.[12]
2. The rate of interest is also a discretionary matter. However, whilst the discretion is wide, one must have regard to the facts of the case.[13]
3. I am mindful that the purpose of ordering interest is to compensate a worker for the loss of his or her income, or in this case, the applicant and the respondents, for not being able to access the significant death benefit. On the other hand, an order for interest is not intended as a penalty against the employer or insurer.
4. The parties have reached agreement in respect of the interest payable from the date of receipt of the claim on 18 December 2025 to date as follows:

(a) Crystal Monique Evry - $32,430.67, and

(b) Indiana Storm Evry - $10,810.22.

1. Section 25(1A) of the 1987 Act provides that where a lump sum death benefit is paid to the NSW Trustee for the benefit of a dependant in accordance with s 85 of the 1987 Act, the employer must pay additional compensation fees for management of the funds by the NSW Trustee as prescribed by the regulations. Clause 177 of the 2016 Regulation contains the prescribed formula for the calculation.
2. The SIRA website contains a lump sum benefit additional fees calculator which simplifies the calculation. According to the calculator, the additional fees payable by the second respondent to the NSW Trustee and Guardian are as follows:

1. I propose to make orders in accordance with the above calculations.

1. The deceased worker, Alexander Richard Evry, died on 20 April 2024 as a result of injury sustained arising out of or in the course of his employment with the first respondent.
2. Crystal Monique Evry was partly dependent for support upon the deceased at the date of death.
3. Indiana Storm Evry was wholly dependent for support upon the deceased at the date of death.
4. The second respondent is liable for the payment of lump sum compensation, interest and the management fee.

1. The second respondent is to pay the applicant lump sum compensation of $729,330.67 pursuant to ss 25(1) and 85A(1)(a) of the 1987 Act and s 109 of the 1998 Act.
2. The second respondent to is pay $310,560.26 to the New South Wales Trustee and Guardian pursuant to ss 25(1A) and 85(1)(c) of the 1987 Act, s 109 of the 1998 Act, and cl 177 of the 2016 Regulation to hold on trust until the first respondent attains the age of 18 years.
3. Liberty to the parties to apply with respect to the calculations of interest and the management fee by close of business on 4 October 2025.

[2] (1995) 11 NSWCCR 546, [554] to [555].

[3] [2006] NSWWCCPD 139, [45] to [50].

[4] (1987) 3 NSWCCR 10; 8 NSWLR 486 (Halioris).

[9] [1996] NSWCC 2; (1996) 15 NSWCCR 32 (Wratten).

[11] Haidary v Wandella Pet Foods Pty Limited, Dynamix Pty Ltd and Burrangong Pet Foods Pty Ltd [2005] NSWWCCPD 9 (Haidary).

[12] Cameron v StateCover Mutual Ltd [2015] NSWWCC 325.

[13] Brambles Australia Ltd t/as Gardner Perrott Industrial Services v Hamilton & Monier Ltd [2206] NSWWCCPD 169, [43] (Brambles), and Haidary, at [10], [15].