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austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2026/75
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2026-03-11
Original judgment source is linked above.
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)
STANDING - where the applicant has sold the lot, whether the outcomes sought are relevant or required; GENERAL MEETING MOTIONS - whether certain motions were invalid and orders should be made declaring the resolutions to pass them were, at all times, void; ADMINISTRATOR - whether an administrator should be appointed.
a) outcomes about Motions 11 and 17 proposed at the 2025 AGM > > b) an order for the appointment of an administrator for the scheme, and > > c) an order that the applicant be reimbursed in the amount of $308.
[1] This application is about decision-making for the administration and maintenance of a 7-lot scheme in Surfers Paradise, which was developed and registered in the 1970s.
[2] The applicant, who was the owner at the time of Lot 7, originally sought interim orders about specific motions and decisions made by the body corporate at its annual general meeting held in August 2025 (2025 AGM) and about the administration of the body corporate in general. In response to that application, I made several interim orders.[1] The body corporate sought leave to appeal the Interim Orders from the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).[2]
[3] After the Interim Orders were made, the application was referred back to the Commissioner. The applicant confirmed he wanted his application to proceed to adjudication for final orders and it progressed as required under the Act.[3]
[4] In November 2025, the applicant made a second and separate application for, among other things, an emergency order that the body corporate be required to provide him with an information certificate because he wished to sell his lot. I made orders in response to that application.[4]
[5] The applicant's original application has now been referred to department adjudication for final orders. However, not unexpectedly given his stated intention to sell the lot, records from the Titles Office show that the applicant is no longer the owner of Lot 7. Although I wrote to the applicant enquiring whether he had any ongoing interest in the disputes that are the subject of this application, I received no response.
[6] In these circumstances, an adjudicator may continue to determine the application or, if satisfied the outcomes sought are no longer relevant or required, may dismiss the application. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied some of the 7 outcomes sought remain relevant or required while others are not. I have made the above orders in accordance with the reasoning below.
[7] Everglades community titles scheme 14058 (Everglades) is a 7-lot scheme and common property in Surfers Paradise. It is registered as BUP1041, a building units format plan of subdivision. The community management statement (CMS) shows the Standard Module applies.
[8] At the time the application was made, the applicant was the owner of Lot 7. A search of the Queensland Titles Registry shows that the applicant is no longer the registered owner of the lot.[5]
[9] The respondent is the Body Corporate for Everglades.
[10] As described in the first of the Interim Orders, the applicant says the body corporate held an annual general meeting in August 2025. He challenges several of the motions and decisions made at that meeting.
[11] The applicant also suggests more broadly that the scheme is not being properly administered, with the body corporate failing to adopt budgets or make decisions about contributions in the way required under the legislation, holding minimal (if any funds), failing to perform its maintenance obligations, and meetings not being called or held in the way required by the legislation. He says this amounts to extreme circumstances that would justify the appointment of an administrator for the scheme. The applicant also says he paid $308 for repairs to utility infrastructure that were the responsibility of the body corporate.
[12] The applicant seeks 7 outcomes, specifically orders that:
(a) The resolution to Motion 18 purportedly passed at the [2025 AGM] was at all times void.
(b) Motion 17 was invalid;
(c) Motion 16 was invalid;
(d) The resolution to Motion 14 purportedly passed at the [2025 AGM] was at all times void;
(e) Motion 11 was invalid;
(f) [a named person] be appointed as administrator of Everglades CTS 14058 with the Administrator Powers (defined below);
(g) The Body corporate reimburse the applicant the amount of $308 incurred [for electrical works].
[13] The applicant's grounds for the outcomes sought are discussed in more detail below.
[14] Submissions about the application were received from the owners of two lots.
[15] One of those submissions made comments about the application for interim orders and the Interim Orders made. The owner says generally that "I am very thankful to the Applicant for their form 15, and for the issuing interim orders which I believe have been instrumental in getting Everglades back on their feet and addressing the two safety concerns for our property." She says special levies have been raised for electrical and staircase repairs.
[16] The same owner supports self-management of the scheme. The owner reports that in November 2025 the body corporate approved a budget and issued levy notices per entitlement rather than by lot in accordance with statutory requirements. With levies paid, she also reports that the applicant was reimbursed. While the owner would like to see the Majority Owner being limited to a single vote at general meetings and the end to excessive emails, she opposes the appointment of an administrator.
[17] The joint owners of Lot 3 also made a submission about the application. They say the Majority Owner is still conducting general meetings and proposing unlawful motions while refusing to allow other owners to submit motions. They say the minutes of an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) are inaccurate because no budget was introduced or agreed to. Further, they say the Majority Owner called an EGM for November 2025 and proposed a motion for exclusive use of common property but refused accept other owner motions.
[18] In addition, the same owners say the Majority Owner purported to issue a Form 33 on behalf of the body corporate which contained information that was incorrect and not supported by evidence. In terms of property maintenance and damage, they say the Majority Owner continues to insist they are responsible for repairs to the common property. The owners also say plumbing work to Lot 5 by the Majority Owner caused serious damage to their lot, which he has not rectified. The damage is such that they are still unable to reside in their lot. One of the owners is in poor health and they say the property damage is preventing them from selling their lot at fair value.
[19] The owners say generally that the Majority Owner is not self-managing the complex lawfully, mis-manages the funds, sends defective levy notices, does what he wants, contradicts himself and causes financial loss and disadvantage to the other unit holders. They say an administrator is required so the body corporate can have maintenance issues addressed and stop the Majority Owner from running property values down so he can purchase the lots. These owners support the appointment of the administrator proposed by the applicant.
[20] In circumstances where I am satisfied that the applicant has sold the lot, there are threshold questions to be determined that will inform whether (and how) I proceed to address the merits of the application.
Jurisdiction, standing, and power to dismiss or continue
[21] Chapter 6 of the Act establishes arrangements for resolving certain disputes that arise in the context of community titles schemes. To come under the ambit of Chapter 6, a dispute must be between one of the combinations of persons and bodies specified in section 227 of the Act.[6] One of the specified combinations is a body corporate and the owner of a lot.[7]
[22] The subject matter of the dispute must also fall within one of the 4 categories of disputes described in section 228 of the Act. Relevantly here, two of those categories are disputes involving claimed "contraventions of this Act or community management statements" and "the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or community management statements."[8]
[23] A person who is directly concerned with, and is a party to, one of the four categories of dispute may make an application for dispute resolution under Chapter 6 of the Act if they have made reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute by internal dispute resolution.[9] In legal terms, this is often referred to as having standing to make an application.
[24] Where the Commissioner refers an application to department adjudication, adjudicators investigate the application, make findings of facts, and apply relevant legal principles.8 Adjudicators are given a broad and general power to make an order that is "just and equitable in the circumstances (including a declaratory order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles scheme" about contraventions of the Act or CMS and the exercise of rights or powers, or performance of duties, under the Act or CMS.[10] Adjudicators also are empowered to make an order dismissing an application.[11]
[25] Although a person may be a party to a dispute and have standing at the time an application is made, their relationship to the scheme and their interest in the dispute may change during the pendency of the application. For example, a lot owner may sell their lot or an occupier may end their tenancy and cease to be an occupier.
[26] The Act expressly contemplates and makes provision for this.[12] During the period an application is under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner,[13] she has a statutory discretion to "substitute another person as the relevant person for the application."[14] Alternatively, she may reject the application.[15]
[27] Where an application has been referred to a department adjudicator but there has been a change in the standing of a party, section 239C of the Act applies to provide in relevant part that:
(2) Unless someone else is substituted as the relevant person under subsection (3), the application continues subject to this chapter as if the party continued to be the relevant person for the application.
* * * *
_(7) To remove any doubt, it is declared that nothing in this section prevents - _
(a) the commissioner from rejecting an application under section 241; or
(b) an adjudicator from making an order dismissing an adjudication application under section 270.
[28] Where there is a change in the standing of a party, section 270(1) of the Act expressly provides that an adjudicator may exercise the power to make an order dismissing an application in circumstances where:
_(e) the adjudicator is satisfied - _
(i) a party to the application is no longer a person mentioned in section 227(1) for the dispute the subject of the application; and
(ii) the outcome sought by the application is no longer relevant or required; or
[29] To summarise the above, where I am satisfied the applicant is no longer an owner of a lot in the scheme and I am satisfied the outcomes sought in the application are no longer relevant or required, I may dismiss the application. If, however, I am satisfied one or more of the outcomes sought remain either relevant or required, I may proceed to determine an application as if the applicant continued to be an owner of a lot. In the latter case, after considering the law and the facts of the disputes, I may proceed to make just and equitable orders to resolve the disputes raised in the application.[16]
[30] For this application, it is conceivable that some of the outcomes sought may continue to be relevant or required, whilst other outcomes sought may not satisfy either element of that test. Accordingly, I will proceed to consider each outcome separately by firstly assessing whether it remains relevant or required. If satisfied it does, I will consider the merits of that part of the application to determine whether I am satisfied there is a legal basis and that it is just and equitable to make the particular order sought.
[31] Motion 18, which was proposed at the 2025 AGM, states:
THAT All weekly strata levies for all units regardless of entitlements to be $100 per week due to cost of insurance + rectifications to property.
FURTHER THAT the special levy totalling $9,800 (inclusive of GST) be raised apportioned according to lot entitlement according to entitlements, and payable by the lot owners. This levy is to be issued immediately upon approval at the Annual General Meeting, With a due date 30 August 2025.
[32] The applicant says the minutes for the 2025 AGM record that Motion 18 passed. The applicant says the motion should have been ruled out of order because it conflicts with the Act, the Standard Module, and is unlawful and/or unenforceable.
[33] More specifically, citing the relevant sections of the legislation, he says Motion 18:
[34] For those reasons, the applicant says the motion is invalid and the decision to pass it should be declared void.
[35] Motion 18 purports to set levies for all owners and how those levies are to be apportioned. In my view, notwithstanding the sale of the applicant's lot, the outcome requested in the application - that Motion 18 and the body corporate's decision to pass it at the 2025 AGM - is still potentially relevant in the circumstances and to the remaining owners in the scheme.
[36] It is not entirely clear from the submissions whether the resolution passing the motion was subsequently put into effect. There are indications it may have been superseded with new decisions made about the amount and apportioning of levies. One submission suggests that "general levies have been issued as per entitlement rather than by Lot."
[37] However, there are also assertions and evidence that the Majority Owner is continuing to use his poll voting power to purport to apportion at least some non-insurance related levies on a per lot basis (1/7th) rather than according to the contribution schedule lot entitlements as required by the legislation.[17] Given the history of this scheme, I also consider that it is more likely than not that the body corporate has not voted to rescind its decision for Motion 18.
[38] In the circumstances, I am satisfied on balance that the validity of Motion 18 is a matter that continues to be relevant to owners.
[39] As a matter of law, as I observed in the Interim Orders:
[90] .... The legislation clearly provides that contribution levies are to be calculated proportionally to the [contribution schedule lot entitlements]. To change the schedule of Contribution Entitlements, a body corporate must first pass a resolution without dissent. In other words, my preliminary view is that a body corporate has no power to resolve by ordinary resolution at a general meeting to levy owners for contributions to the administrative and sinking funds "regardless of entitlements." Although the Majority Owner points me to a provision in the legislation that he says allows a body to charge contributions equally, my preliminary view is that the section he is referring to only permits contributions for insurance premiums to be potentially equal. .....
[92] Motion 18 also purports to fix a special levy of $9,800. However, the motion does not describe the specific liability for which the contribution is required. My preliminary view is that there is also a serious legal question raised about whether the second part of the motion is in conflict with the Act and therefore also invalid.[18]
[40] I am satisfied that Motion 18 is invalid on its face for each of the reasons given by the applicant and that it should have been ruled out of order.
[41] The next question is whether it remains necessary or appropriate to make an order about Motion 18. I consider the same reasons that satisfied me the outcome sought for Motion 18 remains relevant to the body corporate and all owners, also justify and warrant the making an order declaring the motion was invalid and the resolution to pass it was at all times void.
[42] Motion 17 proposed simply that "Tree to be removed outside unit 2 due to root system lifting slab. See picture attached."
[43] The applicant claims the body corporate failed to act reasonably when it decided to pass this motion because: there is no evidence the tree was lifting the slab, it is unknown who will be performing the work or the cost of the work, and no quotes were provided for the works. He sought an order that the decision to pass this motion be declared void.
[44] For this outcome, I am not persuaded the order sought for Motion 17 remains relevant or is required at this time. Although the tree is part of the common property and therefore motions about it do remain relevant to owners and the body corporate, it is open to the body corporate to decide to rescind this decision. Further, the decision on Motion 17 is not self-effecting. Before implementing its decision on this motion, the body corporate would be required to first authorise the spending necessary to remove the tree. There is no evidence it has done so.
[45] I have dismissed this part of the application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act.
[46] Motion 16 was submitted by the Majority Owner and proposed that: External contractors to repair + re level all unauthorised yard modifications that were conducted without approval. See original yard pictures attached
[47] The applicant claims the body corporate failed to act reasonably when it decided to pass this motion because: there is no evidence of prior yard work being unauthorised, it is unknown who will be performing the work or the cost of the work, and no quotes were provided for the works. He sought an order that the decision to pass this motion be declared void.
[48] I am persuaded the order sought for Motion 16 is still relevant to the scheme. It concerns the common property of the scheme, which means it remains relevant to all owners. I am also satisfied an order about this motion is required. In the absence of an order about this motion, I consider it likely in the circumstances of this scheme that confusion will persist about what exactly Motion 16 purports to authorise. As a result, I will not dismiss this part of the application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act but will proceed consider whether to make the order sought.
[49] When body corporate decisions are to be made at a general meeting, the legislation requires that owners are given notice of the meeting. Among other things, the notice must include an agenda containing the substance of any motions submitted by the committee and voting papers for all motions.[19] It may include explanatory material given by the committee.
[50] Regarding the notice of a meeting and information to be provided to owners therein, the District Court of Queensland has said:
There is certainly an obligation to give proper notice of what is actually to be considered by the meeting, and to point out the relevant consequences of the approval of the resolution. If there is a failure to give proper notice of the meeting, which may occur if the notice of the proposed resolution is misleading as to what is really proposed, or its effect and implications, then that may well impact on the validity of the resolution, because in such circumstances there was either no valid notice of the meeting or no valid notice of the proposed resolution.[20]
[51] Whether a notice or explanatory materials properly inform owners about a motion should be considered in view of the scheme and in the context of what is being proposed.[21]
[52] In addition, a body corporate is required to act reasonably when making decisions. To do so, it must consider the relevant factors with a material bearing on the issue and ignore irrelevant factors. Where a motion and its explanatory notes fail to include adequate information about what is proposed, it is inherently difficult for a body corporate to comply with its duty to act reasonably.
[53] For Motion 16, I am satisfied the motion and decision likely failed to comply with several legislative requirements.
[54] Firstly, I am satisfied the motion failed, on its face, to give proper notice of what members were to consider at the meeting. It included no information about the nature, location, or extent of the purported "unauthorised yard modifications" to be removed. Although it proposed the use of external contractors, no details were provided about which contractors would do the works, or what qualifications, experience, or licenses they held.
[55] Secondly, without adequate information on which to base a decision, I am also satisfied the body corporate failed to act reasonably and thereby contravened the Act when it decided to pass this motion.
[56] Regarding the order sought, notwithstanding the change in the applicant's ownership of the lot, I satisfied it remains just and equitable to make the requested order and declare this motion invalid and the decision to pass it at all times void. The body corporate will suffer no prejudice if the requested order is made because it remains at liberty to consider another motion - this time with adequate information - about proposed works to common property.
[57] Motion 14 was submitted by the Majority Owner and proposed that: "Unit 3 to pay sewerage pipe rectification, this was damaged due to unauthorised concrete slab and earth works. See quote attached."
[58] The applicant says the minutes for the 2025 AGM record that Motion 14 passed. The applicant says the motion should have been ruled out of order because it conflicts with the Act, the Standard Module, and is unlawful and/or unenforceable. More specifically, citing the relevant sections of the legislation, he says the motion:
[59] For those reasons, the applicant says the motion is invalid and the decision to pass it should be declared void.
[60] The owners of Lot 3 made a submission in support of the application. In relevant part they say that:
... [the Majority Owner claims] that the sewerage replacement for the whole complex is the responsibility of unit 3 our unit, and has claimed that we are also responsible for unauthorized concrete slabs which have caused damage, which is not true. This is purely done to cause harm and force us to sell at below market value ...
[61] Motion 14 purports to deem the owners of Lot 3 responsible for damaging common property infrastructure and to make them wholly liable for the costs of repair. In my view, whether common property has been damaged, who is responsible, and who should be made to pay for the repairs, are issues that remain relevant to the body corporate and all owners.
[62] I also consider the outcome requested in relation to Motion 14 is still required. Issues such as those embedded in Motion 14 are not for self-determination by motion at a general meeting. And, certainly not without any evidence of damage or causation.
[63] In view of the submission from the owners of Lot 3, I also consider the outcome sought is still required. Although arguably the owners of Lot 3 could make their own application to challenge the validity of Motion 14 and the body corporate's decision to pass it, I do not consider it would accord with the principles of natural justice to require them to do so. The body corporate and all owners have been given notice of this application and afforded an opportunity to comment. I consider it would be grossly inequitable to dismiss this application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act because it would have the effect that the owners of Lot 3 would have to start over with a new application.
[64] For the reasons given by the applicant, I am satisfied that Motion 14 is invalid on its face and that it should have been ruled out of order. I consider it just and equitable to make the order sought and have declared that the decision to pass Motion 14 was at all times void.
[65] Motion 11 was submitted by the applicant and proposed that the body corporate: "repair or replace stairs leading to front of my unit 7. Quotes finish off the front common area near the water. The electricity switch board is not legal or compliant and quotes are needed by a licensed electrician."
[66] The applicant submitted that the body corporate was obligated by the legislation to maintain the stairs in structurally sound condition and the electrical switchboard in good condition and it had failed do so. Accordingly, he asserted the body corporate failed to act reasonably when it decided not to pass Motion 11. On 10 September and again on 15 October 2025, I made the Interim Orders which include orders about the investigation and repair of the staircase and the electrical switchboard.[22]
[67] At the time of making the application for final orders on 11 November 2025, the applicant said the interim order about the switchboard was sufficient to resolve the dispute but had not been carried out and would lapse if it was not remade as a final order. He also said the interim order about the staircase, even as varied, is not sufficient as a final order because it did not require the body corporate to engage a contractor to perform the works. He sought a final order requiring the body corporate to maintain the staircase.
[68] On the question of whether final orders about Motion 11, the staircase, and the electrical switchboard remain relevant or required, the owner appointed to act as a joint administrator to implement the interim order about repairs to the staircase[23] submitted that the staircase repairs have since been funded and the works completed. Based on that submission, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the body corporate has undertaken the maintenance works to the staircase and the outcome sought is no longer relevant nor required.
[69] In her submission, the same owner also says special levies have been collected for works to the electrical switchboard and a deposit paid for those works. At or around the same time, however, another owner made a submission about the application for final orders suggesting the Majority Owner has not organised repairs to the switchboard.
[70] For the works to the electrical switchboard, I am satisfied that at some point at or around the time the submissions were made in November 2025, the body corporate raised funds for the works to the electrical switchboard. I am also satisfied that the funds were likely used to pay a deposit to an electrical contractor, with the works to be scheduled subject to the contractor's availability. As such, I am not satisfied the outcome sought for this motion remains relevant or required.
[71] Where subsequent events have overtaken both the proposal in Motion 11 and the outcomes requested, I have made an order dismissing this part of the application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act.
[72] The applicant says the failures of the body corporate to comply with its various statutory obligations relating to the calling and holding of meetings, the maintenance of common property, the budgeting, raising and management of funds, and owners being improperly precluded from exercising their rights, are extreme circumstances that justify the appointment of an administrator.
[73] The applicant says the appointed administrator should be given all of the power and responsibilities of the body corporate, the committee, and the executive members of the committee. Further, that the administrator should be expressly empowered to undertake specific tasks, including preparing budgets, calling general meetings, and inviting submission of owner motions. The applicant proposes a specific firm be appointed as administrator and that it be remunerated as per the terms of its consent.
[74] One of the owners who made a submission generally opposes the appointment of an administrator. She prefers self-management of the body corporate as a more efficient use of funds. She says the body corporate has set a budget and issued notices for ordinary and special levies. In addition, the owner proposes the Majority Owner being limited to a single vote at a general meeting so that poll votes cannot be used to disadvantage other owners. She would also like to see the end of excessive emails and unfounded allegations. Further, based on past experience, the owner specifically opposes the appointment of the particular administrator proposed by the applicant.
[75] In contrast, the owners of the other lot who made a submission support the appointment of an administrator generally and the specific administrator proposed by the applicant. They say an administrator is required to ensure maintenance issues are properly addressed and to prevent the Majority Owner from controlling the scheme to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of other owners.
[76] The decision whether to appoint an administrator with wide-ranging powers to make decisions for a body corporate, or to perform functions that would otherwise fall to a committee or the body corporate, is a significant one. It involves a transfer of power and may involve increased costs for the body corporate.
[77] Arguably, this outcome sought may still be potentially relevant to the body corporate and I could proceed to determine this aspect of the application on its merits. However, even if the outcome sought remains potentially relevant to the body corporate and owners, I am not satisfied the appointment of an administrator - with the broad powers sought by the applicant - is required at this time.
[78] Some months have passed since the application was made. There is evidence of at least some improvement in governance in the intervening period and that the body corporate is taking steps towards compliance with it statutory obligations for financial management and maintenance of common property. One owner reports the body corporate has approved a budget, has issued levy notices, collected funds, and undertaken at least some maintenance of common property.
[79] As a result, I dismiss this part of the application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act.
[80] For completeness, I note that, even if I were to proceed to make a determination about the merits of the applicant's request for the appointment of an administrator, I do not consider it would be just and equitable to make such an order at this point in time.
[81] When the application was made, the evidence may have supported a finding that the body corporate was almost entirely dysfunctional and failing to comply with its obligations. However, since the application was made in late 2025, at least some degree of functionality appears to have been restored.
[82] I am also mindful that there is a new owner at the scheme who has not had an opportunity to make a submission about the appointment of an administrator. As such, I do not consider it would be just an equitable to appoint an administrator - especially one with the broad powers requested by the applicant - at this time.
[83] Finally, if the body corporate falls into severe dysfunction again, nothing in my order dismissing this part of the application prejudices or prevents an owner from making a new application seeking the appointment of an administrator.
[84] The applicant also seeks an order that the body corporate reimburse him in the amount of $308 which he spent on repairs to the common property electrical switchboard.
[85] Notwithstanding the sale of his lot, I am satisfied that the applicant retains a sufficient interest in this outcome (a direct financial interest)[24] and that an order may be potentially required to resolve this part of the dispute.
[86] Where the owner of Lot 3 has represented the reimbursement has been paid, and the Majority Owner in connection with application 1201-2025 has separately represented the amount was reimbursed on 19 November 2025, I am satisfied this requested outcome is no longer required. I have, therefore, made an order dismissing this part of the application pursuant to section 270(1)(e) of the Act.
[87] I have made the above orders for the reasons given herein.
[1] See Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 310 and Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 350 (together, the Interim Orders)
[4] See Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 412 (Emergency Order)
[5] By dealing number 724599091, on 22 December 2025, two new persons became (as joint tenants) the registered owners of Lot 7.
[6] For the purposes of the Act, there are some circumstances in which a "dispute" may involve only one party. See Section 227(2) of the Act
[8] See e.g., Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Limited [2010] HCA 32 at para 16 (referencing the function of similar decision-makers to observe procedural fairness and "employ a rational process of decision-making according to law.")
[10] See Section 276(1) of the Act. An adjudicator may also make an order about a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about engagements of service contractors and body corporate managers and authorisations of letting agents. See Section 276(1)(c) of the Act
[12] See Section 239C of the Act, which can be described as a "saving provision"
[13] That is, the period during which the Commissioner is deciding whether to reject an application or to make a dispute resolution recommendation for an application.
[14] See Section 239C(3) of the Act. If the Commissioner decides to exercise that discretion, she must notify certain persons of the substitution. Id. at 239C(3) and (5)
[15] See Section 239C(7)(a) of the Act
[16] For a survey of orders in which adjudicators have variously decided to dismiss or decide applications following the change in standing of a party, see Nexus Towers [2021] QBCCMCmr 357. See also, more recently, Maartens v Body Corporate for Montague Markets South [2025] QCATA 3 at [37]
[17] See Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 412 at [66]- [67]
[18] Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 310
[19] See Sections 87-90 and 93 of the Standard Module
[20] McGill DCJ in Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 v J Patterson Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] QDC 300, para 50
[21] See Scholer Pty Ltd as Trustee v Gowland and Anor [2021] QCATA 119 at [46]
[22] See Everglades [2025] QBCCMCmr 350
[23] See Scholer Pty Ltd as Trustee v Gowland and Anor [2021] QCATA 119 at [46]
[24] See Maartens v Body Corporate for Montague Markets South [2025] QCATA 3 at [][]