EQS20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 271

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Temporary Protection (Class XD) (Subclass 785) visa (protection visa).
2. For the following reasons, the application before the Court must be dismissed.

1. On 11 January 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa.
2. The application was refused by the Delegate on 23 June 2017. The matter was subsequently referred to the IAA for review of the Delegate's decision.
3. On 15 February 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate's decision. That decision of the IAA was subsequently quashed, with orders made remitting the matter for redetermination according to law.
4. On 28 September 2020, the IAA (differently constituted) affirmed the Delegate's decision.

1. The IAA observed that it had been provided with certain new information on behalf of the applicant. The IAA found that the criteria for consideration under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) were met in relation to certain, but not all, of the new information. The IAA observed that it had obtained new information, in the form of country information reports, in respect of which it found that the requirements of s 473DD of the Act were met (at [2]-[11]).
2. The IAA accepted that:

(a) the applicant was a national of Iraq and a moderate Sunni Muslim (at [18] and [32]);

(b) certain details regarding the applicant's residence, schooling, religion and family composition were as claimed (at [19] and [25]);

(c) the applicant and his family had lived in a particular location (Area), to which the applicant would likely return if sent back to Iraq (at [20]);

(d) the applicant's father received a threat in 2006 demanding that his family leave their area of residence in Iraq (at [26] and [32]);

(e) the applicant's family moved to another area (Other Area) in 2006 for some months before returning to their home where the applicant's father resumed his previous employment (at [26] and [32]);

(f) the applicant's family moved from the Area to the Other Area in August 2018 (at [31]);

(g) the applicant knew of several Sunnis from his area who died in the mid-2000's due to sectarian conflict (at [28] and [32]);

(h) the applicant left Iraq legally (at [36]); and

(i) it was possible that it may become known that the applicant had been in Australia (at [36]).

(a) the applicant was from an impoverished family (at [19]);

(b) the applicant was abducted in 2008 (at [27]);

(c) the applicant was targeted by an unknown group about three weeks before he departed Iraq (at [29]);

(d) years after his departure from Iraq, unknown individuals inquired after the applicant at his home (at [30]);

(e) the applicant's family had moved to the Other Area in 2018 for the reasons claimed (at [31]);

(f) the "Asaeb Ahl Alhaq" (AAH) had an adverse interest in the applicant (at [31]);

(g) the applicant's two brothers were held hostage by the AAH until a ransom was paid (at [31]);

(h) the AAH sought further to extort the family (at [31]);

(i) the level of risk of the applicant suffering generalised violence or criminal activity was such that it rose to a real chance (at [33]);

(j) the applicant would be perceived as secularised or wealthy due to his time in Australia (at [36]);

(k) there was a real chance of the applicant suffering harm in accessing and returning to his home area (at [36]);

(l) there would be a real chance that the applicant would be denied the capacity to earn a livelihood, where the denial of such would threaten his capacity to subsist (at [36]);

(m) the applicant would suffer a real chance of harm from Shi'a militias, Sunni armed groups or anyone else if he returned to Iraq (at [36]); or

(n) the applicant had been physically harmed or had "any mental health issue" (at [37]).

1. Having regard to the above, the IAA concluded that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa (at [38]-[44]). Accordingly, the IAA affirmed the Delegate's decision.

1. The applicant sought judicial review of the IAA's decision through an application filed on 2 November 2020. The matter remained in the central migration docket for some years before being allocated to my docket more recently and listed for hearing. The applicant ultimately relied upon an amended application filed with submissions on 15 November 2025, containing the following sole ground of review:

The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was affected by jurisdictional error in that it failed to consider relevant material in respect of the applicant's family's move from [the Area] to [the Other Area] in 2018.

Particulars

(1) At paragraph [31] of its decision, the IAA addressed the applicant's claims regarding the applicant's family's move from [the Area] to [the Other Area] in August 2018.

(2) The IAA accepted the applicant's claim that the applicant's family moved from [the Area] to [the Other Area] in August 2018 but did not accept that the applicant's family moved for the reasons claimed by the applicant (DR [31]), namely that:

(a) the Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) were looking for the applicant and kidnapped the applicant's two younger brothers, necessitating payment of a significant ransom; and

(b) the AAH sought to drive the applicant's family out of [the Area] and extort a large amount of money from them (DR [15]).

(3) The IAA failed to consider relevant information, namely:

(a) DFAT Country Information Report: Iraq, 9 October 2018 paragraphs [2.36] and [3.33]; and

(b) Statement in the letter dated 17 September 2018 (CB 241) noting that the applicant's family had been "displaced from [the Area]";

in making its finding at DR [31] that it did not accept that the applicant's family moved for the reasons claimed by the applicant.

(4) That failure to consider relevant information was a material error in that there is a realistic possibility that, had the IAA's reasoning not been affected by that error, the outcome could have been different.

(5) This error amounted to jurisdictional error.

1. In relation to the letter dated 17 September 2018 (CB 241) (Letter), the applicant observed that the IAA had found that exceptional circumstances justified consideration of the Letter (as new information) (at [5]). However, the applicant submitted that the IAA failed to have regard to the statement within that document that the applicant's family had been "displaced" within the context of its findings at [31].
2. In relation to the country information in the report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) relied upon (2018 DFAT Report), the applicant drew attention to [2.32]-[2.37], which indicated lower levels of insecurity in the Kurdistan Region (an area in northern Iraq). The applicant relied upon [2.36] of the report, in which it was stated:

2.36 The numerous Shi'a armed groups in Iraq include Saraya Al-Salam (SAS, also known as the 'Peace Brigades', and partly made up of former Mahdi Army fighters), Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataib Hizbullah (KH), and the Badr Corps. SAS and the Badr Corps are the military arms of the Sadrist and Badr political movements respectively. Some Shi'a groups have sponsored the formation of local factional Christian and Sunni militias to divide and weaken these communities. Local and international observers have accused some PMF groups of committing abuses against civilians (see Popular Mobilisation Forces (PME or Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi)) and engaging in criminal activities. Violence between different Shi'a armed groups is also frequent, but usually low-level.

(Emphasis added)

1. The applicant placed particular reliance upon [3.33] of the 2018 DFAT Report, which was as follows:

3.33 Anti-Shi'a violence has reduced in 2018 following the defeat of ISIL (see Security situation). However, isolated incidents of violence in Shi'a dominated areas of Iraq, claimed by ISIL, continue to occur. Violence between opposing Shi'a militias (including those in the PMF) also occurs, more often in Shi'a areas, such as Baghdad and southern Iraq. Intra-Shi'a violence is often linked to other criminal activities, including robbery and kidnapping. Local sources report that those who are actively involved in a militia group face a greater risk of intra-Shi'a violence than ordinary civilians, who may be perceived to be part of a militia or tribal group's constituency.

(Emphasis added)

1. The applicant submitted that the IAA failed to consider these parts of the DFAT Report, but merely noted that the DFAT Report of 2020 (2020 DFAT Report) replaced the 2018 DFAT Report (at [7] of its decision).
2. The applicant submitted that the above statements in the 2018 DFAT Report and the Letter corroborated his claims regarding the treatment that he and his family had experienced in 2018. However, the applicant submitted that they were not referred to by the IAA in its reasoning in respect of those claims (at [31]). The applicant submitted that an inference ought to be drawn that the IAA failed to consider this information and that jurisdictional error ought to be found on this basis.
3. The applicant observed that, at [24], the IAA stated:
   1. ... In August 2020 DFAT also reported sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia in Iraq had reduced substantially since the mid to late-2000s, but still occurs occasionally. This report, produced for protection status determination purposes, does not refer to any instances of adverse treatment of Sunnis in [the Area] or elsewhere in southern Iraq. It does however mention some Sunni Arabs displaced from areas once held by IS have been attacked or denied civil documentation when trying to return home... In terms of the current security situation in Iraq, while varying according to location, DFAT considers it is highly unstable and fluid...
4. The applicant submitted that the (then) current situation in Iraq did not inform consideration of the situation in Iraq as at 2018. The applicant submitted that it was the 2018 DFAT Report that was relevant in corroborating the circumstances in which his family fled the Area in 2018. The applicant submitted that, by stating at [7] that the "2020 report replaces the October 2018 version of that report cited in the representative's submission", the IAA was effectively saying that it was putting aside the 2018 DFAT Report in favour of the 2020 DFAT Report because it considered that it was the 2020 DFAT Report that was applicable.
5. I am not persuaded that an inference ought to be drawn that the part of the Letter relied upon by the applicant was not considered by the IAA. The IAA was not required to refer to every aspect of the evidence that was before it. It is apparent from [5], [20] and [31] of the IAA's decision that the Letter was considered. The document itself is limited in content. I am not persuaded that the more likely inference is that the reference to displacement was not considered, simply because this language was not directly referenced in the IAA's decision. I consider that the more likely inference is that the document in its totality was considered, but the IAA did not attribute to the particular wording used the level of significance that is now sought to be attributed by the applicant. This is in circumstances where the Letter did not set out the alleged reasons for displacement and reference to the family being "displaced" was not necessarily inconsistent with the IAA's refusal to accept that this was for the reasons claimed (at [31]).
6. I have also not been persuaded to draw an inference that the country information relied upon by the applicant in the 2018 DFAT Report was not considered.
7. The IAA's reference at [7] to the 2020 DFAT Report "replac[ing]" the 2018 DFAT Report appears to have gone no further than acknowledging the 2020 version as the updated version of the earlier report. The IAA did not find, in this paragraph of its reasons or otherwise, that the 2018 DFAT Report was irrelevant.
8. I accept that the situation in 2018 was relevant to the IAA's consideration of the family's claimed reasons for moving from the Area in August 2018. This was considered by the IAA as follows at [31]:
   1. As discussed above, I accept the applicant's family moved from [the Area] to [the Other Area] in August 2018. However, I am not satisfied that they did so for the reasons claimed, that is because the AAH were looking for the applicant who they suspected had been involved with IS in [the Other Area], that the AAH kidnapped the applicant's two younger brothers necessitating payment of a significant ransom or that the AAH sought to drive the applicant's family out of [the Area] or extort a further large sum of money from them. Country information supports that some Shia militias have committed human rights abuses and been involved in criminal activities, including kidnapping and extortion. Country information also indicates some Shia militias have arrested or killed Sunni males. However, such incidents have occurred in those regions formerly held by IS in central and northern Iraq and involved Sunnis originating from those areas or who were present in those regions when they was occupied by IS between 2014 and 201714. Apart from the applicant's assertion, there is no evidence before me to support that Shia militias have in recent years targeted Sunni males who have been long term residents of southern Iraq or suspected them of being involved with IS, particularly when they have been outside Iraq for some time. Nor does country information support that families with overseas connections have been targeted for extortion. These claims are all the more difficult to believe in view of the significant time gap between the applicant's departure from Iraq and the AAH's purported interest in him. It does not seem credible that the AAH, which is a separate militia with a different leadership and political orientation to the Mahdi Army who the applicant claimed kidnapped him a decade prior (which in any event I do not accept occurred), would some years after he had left Iraq suddenly identify him as a person of interest, speculate he had been involved with IS and target his family, having never had awareness of or interest in him or his family previously. It seems particularly unlikely given the applicant has not claimed that he or any family member has ever had any contact or involvement with IS or any other Sunni militant group or visited [the Other Area] where IS operated since 2006. As I am not satisfied about the AAH's adverse interest in the applicant, and in view of recent country information indicating a low level of abductions in [the Area], I also am not satisfied the applicant's two brothers were held hostage by the AAH until a ransom was paid or that the AAH sought to further extort the family.
9. In [31], the IAA referenced the 2020 DFAT Report, together with other country information reports from 2020 and 2016. However, the applicant has not demonstrated that the extracts relied upon from the 2018 DFAT Report were of such contrast or significance, when considered in relation to the other country information before the IAA, that an inference ought to be drawn that the parts of the report relied upon were not considered because they were not directly referenced in [31].
10. The country information relied upon by the IAA at [31] appears to have primarily been in respect of three propositions:

(a) there was no evidence that Shi'a militias had in recent years targeted Sunni males who were long term residents of southern Iraq, or suspected them of being involved with IS;

(b) country information did not support that families with overseas connections had been targeted for extortion; and

(c) recent country information indicated a low level of abductions in [the Area].

1. It has not been demonstrated that the country information relied upon by the applicant from the 2018 DFAT Report necessarily belied such propositions, to the extent that an inference ought to be drawn that it was not considered.
2. Although [2.36] of the 2018 DFAT Report referred to Shi'a armed groups, and referenced some Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) groups committing abuses against civilians and engaging in criminal activities, the IAA's reasoning at [31] was not to the contrary. Nor was the IAA's reasoning at [31] contradicted by [3.33] of the 2018 DFAT Report. Although that paragraph similarly referred to incidents of violence in Shi'a dominated areas of Iraq, the IAA accepted at [31] that country information indicated that some Shi'a militias had committed human rights abuses and been involved in criminal activities. The IAA's concern (inter alia) was the absence of confirmation that Shi'a militias had, in the years preceding its decision, targeted or relevantly suspected "Sunni males who were long term residents of southern Iraq".
3. I was not taken to any part of the 2018 DFAT Report (whether at [3.33] or otherwise) to the effect that Sunni males from that location in Iraq were targeted or suspected in this manner. Whilst reference was made in [3.33] to "[v]iolence between opposing Shi'a militias" occurring in areas including "southern Iraq", this did not contradict the IAA's finding as to the absence of country information regarding the targeting or suspicion of "Sunni males". Nor did the reference to intra-Shi'a violence being linked to criminal activities. Although, as the applicant submitted, this may have indicated activity by Shi'a groups, and the disruptive effect of this regarding the security situation, the potential for this more generally was not doubted by the IAA in [31]. The IAA was not obliged to find that the corroborative effect of this part of the country information was of such consequence that it required specific reference within the context of its reasoning at [31].
4. As the Minister submitted, there was also a certain amount of overlap between the matters identified in the 2018 DFAT Report and the 2020 DFAT Report. As was observed by the Minister, reference was made in the 2020 DFAT Report to "PMF groups" having "reportedly taken advantage of their freedom of action to establish local crime rings and mafia-like protection rackets" (at [5.11]). This was not doubted by the IAA, which acknowledged such information at [24] of its decision.
5. However, neither this information nor the information relied upon by the applicant in the 2018 DFAT Report necessarily contradicted the specific difficulties identified by the IAA in relation to the applicant's claims at [31]. It is apparent from that paragraph and the balance of the IAA's reasoning that the IAA did not doubt that incidents of violence and criminality occurred in Iraq. However, the IAA did not accept the applicant's specific account of the reasons his family moved in 2018, for the reasons that it gave at [31].
6. Having regard to the material in question, within context, I have not been persuaded to draw an inference that it was not considered by the IAA. It follows that the sole ground relied upon by the applicant is unable to succeed.

1. For the reasons given above, the application will be dismissed.
2. I will hear from the parties in relation to costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing.