Elzahed v State of New South Wales

The notice of appeal

1. Leave to appeal was granted by a Court comprising Payne JA and Sackville AJA, principally on the basis that the question of whether a party should be permitted to give evidence wearing a niqab had not been the subject of appellate consideration in this State and experienced trial counsel before Balla DCJ were not in a position to assist her Honour about the question by reference to relevant authority.
2. In granting leave, the Court permitted the appellant to amend the draft notice of appeal to reflect the arguments sought to be advanced by the appellant in oral submissions. It is regrettable that after leave to appeal was granted, at which time the Court encouraged the appellant to focus an amended notice of appeal closely upon the matters argued on the leave application, instead, the notice of appeal grew to encompass 11 grounds of appeal including multiple sub-grounds. In making those criticisms we do not intend to reflect in any way on Mr Kirk SC who appeared for the appellant before us, having received the brief at a late stage, and whose submissions were of considerable assistance to the Court. The grounds of appeal were: "1. The trial judge erred in: a. failing to permit the appellant to give evidence in a niqab; b. failing to permit the appellant to give evidence via another method, such as a screen, that revealed her face to women but not to men ("an alternative method"); or c. failing to accede to the appellant's application to give evidence in a manner that revealed her face to women but not to men. 2. In ruling that the appellant could only give evidence with her face uncovered ("ruling"), the trial judge erred in failing to have regard to and in failing to apply the test imposed by s 8 by reference to ss 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). 3. In making the ruling, the trial judge erred in failing to have regard to and in failing to apply rr 2.1 and 2.3(k)-(l) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). 4. In making the ruling, the trial judge erred in failing to have regard to and in failing to apply the general law test governing the District Court's power to make orders for the giving of evidence in a manner that impacts upon the principle of open justice - particularly by failing to consider whether such orders were necessary for the proper administration of justice. 5. In making the ruling, the trial judge erred in making the following findings of material fact: a. The trial judge would be impeded in her ability to assess the reliability and credibility of the appellant's evidence if her Honour could not see the appellant's face whilst the appellant gave evidence (TJ [5]); and/or b. To assess the weight to be given to the appellant's evidence, the trial judge needed to see the appellant's face whilst the appellant gave evidence (TJ [7]). 6. In making the ruling, the trial judge erred in failing to find the following material facts: a. The respondent's counsel did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; b. The respondent's counsel stated, in response to counsel for the appellant's suggestion that "she gets in the witness box, reveals her face to [Balla DCJ] and any other women in the Court, and the men look the other way", that "We're content with that"; c. Counsel for the first defendant ("Commonwealth") did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; d. The Commonwealth's counsel suggested that the appellant "could give evidence in some way with a screen, which revealed her presence to [Balla DCJ] but not to counsel"; e. After the Commonwealth's counsel made the suggestion described in paragraph (d) above, the respondents' counsel did not formally object to that course; f. The appellant's evidence was critically significant to her case; g. The respondent and the Commonwealth would have suffered no undue prejudice if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; h. It was inconsistent with the proper administration of justice and necessary to do justice in the present case to permit the appellant to give evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; i. The trial judge was able to make findings about the appellant's demeanour even if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; j. It would not have unduly interfered with the trial judge's capacity to make findings about the appellant's credibility if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method. 7. In making the ruling, the trial judge erred in failing to take into account material considerations, particularly the following: a. The respondent's counsel did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; b. The respondent's counsel stated, in response to counsel for the appellant's suggestion that "she gets in the witness box, reveals her face to [Balla DCJ] and any other women in the Court, and the men look the other way," that "We're content with that"; c. The Commonwealth's counsel did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; d. The Commonwealth's counsel suggested that the appellant "could give evidence in some way with a screen, which revealed her presence to [Balla DCJ], but not to counsel"; e. After the Commonwealth's counsel made the suggestion described in paragraph (d) above, the respondents' counsel did not formally object to that course; f. The appellant's evidence was critically significant to her case; g. The appellant stood to lose her case unless she gave evidence; h. The respondent and the Commonwealth would have suffered no undue prejudice if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; i. Permitting the appellant to give evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; j. The trial judge was able to make findings about the appellant's demeanour even if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; k. It would not have unduly interfered with the trial judge's capacity to make findings about the appellant's credibility if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; l. The significance of broader aspects of the administration of justice beyond the parties' private interests, including the prospect that failing to permit the appellant to give evidence in a niqab or via an alternative method would: 1. Deter Muslim women from giving evidence in court proceedings; 2. Deter Muslim women from making complaints to the police; 3. Deter Muslim women from cooperating with police investigations; 4. Deter Muslim women from instituting civil proceedings; 5. Deter Muslim women from instituting criminal proceedings; 6. Increase the risk of marginalisation of Muslim women in respect of the administration of justice; 7. Inhibit Muslim women from exercising the right to seek access to the courts (see, eg, Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311 at 315-316, 319). 8. The trial judge's decision not to permit the appellant to give evidence with her face covered was unreasonable and plainly unjust. 9. The trial judge erred in failing to accord due weight to the following matters: a. The importance of "demeanour"; b. The fact that her Honour had offered two "other courses" to the appellant neither of which would have hidden the appellant's face from men; c. The respondent's counsel did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; d. The respondent's counsel stated, in response to counsel for the appellant's suggestion that "she gets in the witness box, reveals her face to [Balla DCJ] and any other women in the Court, and the men look the other way", that "We're content with that"; e. The Commonwealth's counsel did not formally object to the appellant's giving evidence with her face covered; f. The Commonwealth's counsel suggested that the appellant "could give evidence in some way with a screen, which revealed her presence to [Balla DCJ], but not to counsel"; g. After the Commonwealth's counsel made the suggestion described in paragraph (f) above, the respondent's counsel did not formally object to that course; h. The appellant's evidence was critically significant to her case; i. The appellant stood to lose her case unless she gave evidence; j. The respondent and the Commonwealth would have suffered no undue prejudice if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; k. Permitting the appellant to give evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; would have accommodated the appellant's genuine religious beliefs whilst doing justice between the parties; l. The trial judge was able to make findings about the appellant's demeanour even if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; m. It would not have unduly interfered with the trial judge's capacity to make findings about the appellant's credibility if the appellant gave evidence: i. In a niqab; or ii. Via an alternative method; n. The significance of broader aspects of the administration of justice beyond the parties' private interests, including the prospect that failing to permit the appellant to give evidence in a niqab or via an alternative method would: i. Deter Muslim women from giving evidence in court proceedings; ii. Deter Muslim women from making complaints to the police; iii. Deter Muslim women from cooperating with police investigations; iv. Deter Muslim women from instituting civil proceedings; v. Deter Muslim women from instituting criminal proceedings; vi. Increase the risk of marginalisation of Muslim women in respect of the administration of justice; vii. Inhibit Muslim women from exercising the right to seek access to the courts (see, eg, Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311 at 315-316, 319). 10. The trial judge's failure to permit the appellant to give evidence via an alternative method was unreasonable and plainly unjust. 11. In all the circumstances, a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice was occasioned."
3. Ground of appeal 2 was not pressed at the hearing. A twelfth ground was added at the hearing as follows: "12. The trial judge erred in not permitted the appellant to be called to explain her position in relation to giving evidence, and to enable her Honour to consider the degree of prejudice the defendants and Court would suffer by way of her giving evidence with her face covered."

Consideration

1. Given the discursive and unhelpful nature of the notice of appeal it is necessary to attempt to group the various complaints together. The helpful speaking note prepared by Mr Kirk SC, who as we have said came into the case at a late stage, will also be addressed where relevant.

The discretionary decision made by the primary judge

1. The primary judge's ruling declined, in the exercise of her Honour's discretion to regulate the conduct of proceedings before her, to allow the appellant to give evidence with her face covered by a niqab. It was common ground that the appellant did not suggest to Balla DCJ that any implication arising from the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (UCPR) or the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) was relevant to the discretionary decision her Honour was asked to make.
2. The appellant's written and oral submissions correctly accepted that Balla DCJ had "broad powers to give directions for the conduct of proceedings, including as to the giving of evidence at the hearing (UCPR r 2.1; r 2.3(k),(l) and (m)), subject to the considerations set out in ss 56-58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)". This is not a promising basis for a successful attack on her Honour's discretionary decision.
3. It is correct, as the appellant submitted, that Part 6 Division 1 of the Civil Procedure Act applied in this case and bound the primary judge to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: s 56(2). It is also the case that the Court was bound to manage the proceedings having regard, inter alia, to the just determination of proceedings: s 57(1)(a). The Court was bound to seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice in making the interlocutory order the subject of this appeal: s 58(1). For the purposes of determining what the dictates of justice are, the Court must have regard to the provisions of ss 56 and 57 and may have regard, inter alia, to the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of the order or direction.
4. It does not follow, however, that any of the matters advanced by the appellant on the appeal involved a material consideration Balla DCJ did not take into account or gave rise to a conclusion which was unreasonable or plainly unjust (being the two principal ways in which the appellant sought to establish House v The King error).
5. Whilst, depending on context, "may" can mean "must", it would be surprising if the matters a court "may" take into account pursuant to s 58(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act were matters a court "must" take into account, given that s 58(2)(a) identifies ss 56 and 57 as the only matters a court "must" take into account and s 58(2)(b) immediately thereafter identifies the matters a court "may" take into account. The legislative choice in addressing the list of factors in s 58(2)(b) as ones a court "may" take into account, in context, tends against the appellant's submission that consideration of the s 58(2)(b) factors is mandatory. Nevertheless, the requirement that a court must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice remains: s 58(1). Whether, in and of itself, s 58(2)(b)(vi) is a mandatory consideration in the ascertainment of the dictates of justice under s 58(1) should await determination in a case where it is necessary to decide the question.
6. Assuming, in the appellant's favour, that the primary judge was required to take into account the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of her order or direction, her Honour plainly did so. The language used by Balla DCJ about the consequences for the appellant of her decision was criticised as being insufficiently emphatic. That criticism should be rejected. In making her ruling, her Honour took into account the degree of injustice likely to be suffered by the parties, including the appellant. The specific reference to "my role to ensure that there is a trial which is fair to all parties" is otherwise inexplicable.
7. The appellant has not established that the ruling of the primary judge failed to engage in some relevant way with the principle of open justice. Accepting, as is obvious, that this principle may be limited where necessary to secure the proper administration of justice, no relevant limitation was here engaged.
8. Ground 3, which alleges the primary judge erred in failing to have regard to and apply rr 2.1 and 2.3(k)-(l) of the UCPR, is without merit. Those rules were not referred to by the appellant as potentially relevant in the discretionary decision her Honour was asked to make. In any event, no error has been shown in the exercise of the broad powers her Honour had to give directions for the conduct of proceedings, including as to the giving of evidence at the hearing. It is common ground that her Honour had the power she exercised. The failure to refer specifically to the source of that power in giving an ex tempore judgment on day two of the six day trial was not an error requiring correction by this Court.

Factual findings

1. To misapprehend the relevant facts may amount to House v The King error. Balla DCJ, having accepted the need to take into account the appellant's religious beliefs, stated that "[o]n the other hand, I must take into account whether I would be impeded in my ability to fully assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence … if I am not afforded the opportunity of being able to see her face when she gives evidence". Having identified the relevant interests, her Honour considered those interests and concluded that fairness to all parties required her to reject the appellant's application.
2. Her Honour did not err in so deciding. In relation to Ground 5(a), the fact that the appellant's face would be covered while she gave evidence was clearly capable of impeding Balla DCJ's ability fully to assess the reliability and credibility of the appellant's evidence. The appellant's counsel below acknowledged as much. It was not an error, of fact or law, for her Honour so to conclude.
3. In relation to ground 5(b), the fact that the appellant's face would be covered was capable of affecting the weight to be given to the appellant's evidence. It was obvious, including to the appellant's counsel at the trial, that the weight to be given to the appellant's evidence would affect the resolution of the conflict in the evidence about what had occurred in the appellant's bedroom on the morning of 18 September 2014. In those circumstances it was open to her Honour to conclude that the impediment she identified in her ability fully to assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence should be taken into account.
4. Both factual findings were not only open to her Honour but clearly correct. Ground 5 should be rejected. It was not an error, of fact or law, for her Honour so to conclude.

The weight accorded to various matters

1. The appellant's related contentions that Balla DCJ erred in failing to find certain facts (ground 6), take certain matters into account (ground 7) and accord due weight to certain material considerations (ground 9) may conveniently be addressed together.
2. Many of the grounds of appeal and a good deal of the appellant's submissions addressed what was said to be the insufficient weight given to particular matters or the absence of "due" consideration of facts which it was accepted were taken into account. Something more must be shown. Giving weight to various considerations is an inherent part of the exercise of a discretionary power. As Latham CJ said in Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513 at 519, an appellate court will not set aside a finding on this ground alone "unless the failure to give adequate weight to relevant considerations really amounts to a failure to exercise the discretion actually entrusted to the court".
3. Dealing first with the suggestion raised in point 6 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, that the appellant should have been permitted to give evidence from behind a screen, only able to be observed by the primary judge, it cannot have been an error for her Honour to act as she did where there was no such application made to her Honour. As we have made clear at the commencement of these reasons, the only application made by Mr Evatt below was for the appellant to be permitted to give evidence with her face covered by a niqab. The same conclusion applies to any other method suggested in the notice of appeal of permitting the appellant to give evidence; no such application was made to the primary judge.
4. Contrary to grounds 6, 7 and 9, her Honour noted, expressly, that "the demeanour of a witness and the viewing of their face is not the only way in which credibility is assessed." It is thus not correct to suggest that the primary judge found that if the appellant gave evidence wearing a niqab her Honour would be deprived of the ability to make findings about the appellant's credibility. Her Honour also correctly recorded that demeanour may be misleading in some cases. Her Honour's finding was that seeing the appellant's face would assist her in the assessment of the appellant's credibility. That finding was correct.
5. Her Honour's reference to being "completely deprived" of the assistance of seeing the appellant's face reveals no error. It is clear that the primary judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant's eyes could be seen through her face covering, describing the appellant as wearing "what I understand is a niqab; that is, her whole body, other than her eyes, is covered".
6. The appellant's contention that it is "often possible to tell" that a witness is laughing simply by looking at his or her eyes, is complete speculation. In any event, no submission was made to Balla DCJ that the ability to view the appellant's eyes was of any relevance to her Honour's ruling. To the contrary, very experienced counsel appearing for the appellant at the trial submitted that "[t]here are difficulties if the face is concealed in my opinion".
7. The appellant's further contention that viewing her face was arguably not necessary and not useful should similarly be rejected. As Balla DCJ found, the appellant would be giving evidence about highly contentious matters. Trial judges have long recognised that the ability to observe a witness' demeanour during the giving of oral evidence can, in some cases, be valuable in assessing both the accuracy and credibility of the witness.
8. Contrary to Ground 9 and point 3 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, her Honour did not give "disproportionate weight" to demeanour in circumstances where her Honour expressly recognised the limitations of taking into account a witness' demeanour as a tool. Her Honour's observation that the "resolution of the likely conflict in the evidence as to exactly what occurred that morning is essential to the determination of the proceedings or the part of the proceedings involving the [appellant] at least …" was correct.
9. It may well be true, as the appellant submitted, that the attitude of Australian courts to demeanour based credit findings is a little different from that adopted in other countries at least to the extent that those attitudes are reflected in those few cases which have considered an application to give evidence whilst wearing a niqab: Police v Razamjoo [2005] DCR 408; R v NS [2012] 3 SCR 726; The Queen v D (R) [2013] EW Misc 13 (CC). It does not follow, however, that her Honour fell into House v The King error in taking demeanour into account in the way that she did.
10. In Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ explained the approach to demeanour to be adopted by Australian courts, which approach binds this Court and the trial judge. Their Honours, at [23], explained that an appeal court must, of necessity, observe the "natural limitations" that exist in the case of any appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record, citing Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 561 and Scott v Pauly (1917) 24 CLR 274 at 278-281. Their Honours identified these limitations as including the disadvantage that the appellate court has when compared with the trial judge in respect of the evaluation of witnesses' credibility and of the "feeling" of a case which an appellate court, reading the transcript, cannot always fully share.
11. Their Honours, at [31], went on to observe that in recent years judges have become more aware of scientific research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of demeanour. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges, both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the appearances of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not eliminate the "established principles about witness credibility"; but it tends to reduce the occasions where those principles are seen as critical.
12. These passages drawn from Fox v Percy make clear that Balla DCJ was entitled to take into account the "established principles about witness credibility", in the qualified way that she did, as an important factor in assessing credibility and thus ensuring that the trial was fair to all parties.
13. No error has been shown in the weight accorded by her Honour to the matters the subject of the notice of appeal.

Impact of the interlocutory ruling on the appellant's case

1. Contrary to point 2 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, the primary judge recognised that if the appellant chose not to give evidence it could have a significant impact on the successful prosecution of her case. The appellant's submissions about a "proper understanding of the degree of injustice" alleged by the appellant should be rejected. It is clear that her Honour took into account the difficulty for the appellant's case if she decided not to give evidence at the trial. So much was obvious to everybody in the courtroom, including Mr Evatt, who immediately made it clear that the appellant's decision not to give evidence would not lead to the abandonment of her claim.
2. The primary judge plainly understood the importance of the issue to the appellant's case. Her Honour granted two adjournments so that the appellant's counsel had "an opportunity to explain to the plaintiff the consequences of different courses".
3. In any event, the case was in its second day when the ruling was made and the appellant's case was in a state of flux. There was an amended pleading filed by the appellant the day after the interlocutory ruling. That pleading contained important amendments to her claim, although she did not abandon the intentional torts which had earlier been identified. In the circumstances faced by her Honour, it was by no means clear that the consequences of her ruling were that the appellant would choose not to give evidence. This is apparent from the fact that on the same afternoon, after the interlocutory ruling was given, there was further discussion between her Honour and counsel about possible ways in which the appellant could give evidence. No suggestion was made by experienced counsel then appearing for the appellant about those suggested courses, including any submission that further consideration of this issue by the Court and the parties was pointless. Thus, at the time her Honour was asked to rule, it was not clear precisely what case the appellant would ultimately advance or what evidence would be led in support of that claim.
4. The appellant's assertions about the just determination of the proceedings focus only on justice for the appellant and fail to appreciate the Court's obligation to effect justice between the parties. As Balla DCJ's judgment makes clear, the potential prejudice to the appellant from a refusal to permit her to give evidence with her face covered by the niqab had to be balanced against the injustice arising to the respondent and the Commonwealth from the appellant being allowed to give evidence about contentious matters with her face covered by a niqab.
5. Contrary to point 4 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, the primary judge did not err in failing to find, take into account and accord "due" weight to the fact that the respondent did not formally object to the appellant giving evidence with her face covered. It is not correct that the respondent did not object, or consented, to the appellant giving evidence with her face covered by the niqab. On a fair reading of the transcript, the respondent firmly opposed the application.
6. In calling the appellant to give evidence, Mr Evatt said: "Your Honour, I'm calling the first plaintiff. There's a slightly unusual religious problem. She can show her face to women, but not to men. What I suggest is that she gets in the witness box, reveals her face to your Honour and any other women in the Court, and the men look the other way."
7. Counsel for the respondent stated "[w]e're content with that". At that point, as subsequently became clear, Mr Evatt was not suggesting that the appellant give all of her evidence, as distinct from being sworn, with her face covered. This is revealed in the following questioning: "HER HONOUR …[f]or the whole of her evidence? EVATT: No. Only for when she's being sworn in, your Honour. HER HONOUR: I don't know if I'm happy with that. Are you proposing that she would have her face covered while she's giving evidence and being cross- examined? EVATT: I'm afraid so. Yes. It's not very satisfactory, your Honour, but it's something we have to live with. … EVATT: Your Honour, I have to correct it. She wants her face concealed for the whole of her evidence. I misunderstood. I just thought it was just for the swearing in. It's for the whole of the evidence. …"
8. When it became clear that the application was for the appellant to give evidence and be cross-examined with her face covered, counsel for the respondent submitted: "Your Honour, facial expressions is a very important part of giving evidence, and as I understand it in these courts, in New South Wales at least, my understanding, or recollection [is] that if you are here, you must show your face. That's what I understand. We're in your Honour's hands, of course, but our preference is that this witness give evidence the normal way." (emphasis added)
9. A short time later counsel for the respondent submitted that the primary judge should "insist that the [appellant] comply with the rules of this Court and give evidence in the normal fashion".
10. The appellant's submission that the application to give evidence wearing a niqab was only "weakly opposed" by the respondent should be rejected.
11. Contrary to Grounds 6, 7 and 9 and point 3 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, the primary judge did not err in failing to find, take into account and accord due weight to the fact that the respondent and the Commonwealth would have suffered "no undue prejudice". These grounds rely on an incorrect premise. The prejudice to the respondent was obvious. A conflict in the evidence as to what had occurred in the appellant's bedroom on 18 September 2014 was inevitable. If the appellant was permitted to give evidence with her face covered by a niqab, the ability of the primary judge to assess the appellant's credibility would be affected, which could in turn affect the resolution of the conflict in the evidence. The suggestion made in oral submissions that the primary judge could have permitted the appellant to give evidence wearing a niqab and drawn inferences contrary to the appellant's interests by reason of her failure to allow her demeanour to be observed should also be rejected. No such proposal was put to her Honour. In any event, adopting that proposal would have involved the unfairness her Honour identified in being denied the opportunity to observe the witness giving evidence.
12. The primary judge did not place inappropriate weight on the fact that she had offered two "other courses" to the appellant in deciding whether to allow the appellant to give evidence with her face covered. The reference to the "other courses" offered to the appellant was part of her Honour's correct and fair summary of the course of the proceedings.
13. Contrary to grounds 7 and 9 and point 5 of the appellant's speaking note on the appeal, the primary judge did not err in failing to take into account and give due weight to the prospect that failing to permit the appellant to give evidence with her face covered would "deter Muslim women from accessing the courts" or "impede/deter other such witnesses or parties approaching or participating in the justice process".
14. Balla DCJ was not making, and did not purport to make, any ruling of general application about access to justice issues involving Muslim women or women of any other faith who choose to cover their faces with a veil. The only question addressed by the primary judge was whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the appellant should be permitted to give evidence with her face covered by a niqab. The additional considerations identified by the appellant were not considerations that the primary judge was required to take into account in determining that application, not least because the appellant did not suggest they were relevant matters for her Honour to consider.
15. As we have said, no evidence was led before the primary judge and no submission was made at the trial that the decision had any broader implications for some or all women of Islamic faith, or women or other faiths more generally. Whilst the precise limits of permissible judicial knowledge are perhaps unclear (compare Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; [2002] HCA 9 at [67]-[68] per McHugh J and [165] per Callinan J) the breadth of matters contended to fall within s144 of the Evidence Act in this case seem to us to be clearly impermissible. For example, to assume the existence of a group of women in Australian society who have strongly held religious beliefs that would not permit them in any circumstances to expose their faces in a courtroom seems to us to require a degree of impermissible speculation. To draw inferences about the effect on the putative group of the ruling by the primary judge seems to us to add another layer of impermissible speculation. The invitation to this Court to take judicial notice under s 144 of the Evidence Act of some wider implications for a group of women in Australia of Islamic faith should be rejected.

Failure to permit the appellant to give evidence in her niqab "or by some other method"

1. There was no error in the primary judge's ruling that the appellant could not give evidence with her face covered by a niqab. The appellant was a party in the case, not merely a witness. The appellant's evidence was strongly contentious. The resolution of the case would require the primary judge to make findings about whether to accept the appellant's evidence or the conflicting evidence of the NSW police officers. Viewing the appellant's face while she was giving her evidence was capable of affecting the resolution of that conflict. The primary judge did not err in concluding that fairness to all parties required her to reject the appellant's application. In drawing this conclusion we refer, without repeating, to our earlier findings about the appropriate steps taken by the primary judge in reaching her conclusion.
2. All of the matters put to Balla DCJ were addressed by her and taken into account. The appellant did not identify any case in the common law world in which a witness (let alone a party) has been permitted to give contested evidence while wearing a niqab. To similar effect, in a recent article (Barker R, "Burqas and Niqabs in the Courtroom: Finding Practical Solutions" (2017) 91 ALJ 225) the author stated, at 234, that: "While…there are circumstances where a woman may appear in court with her face covered, in all of the cases considered in this article the witness has ultimately been ordered to remove her veil in order to give evidence."
3. Finally, in relation to ground 12, while leave to amend the notice of appeal should be granted, the ground should be rejected. The ground is in two parts. The first relates to the circumstances in which the trial judge did not require oral evidence from the appellant. The transcript makes clear that the trial judge did not require the appellant to be called to explain that she refused to give evidence other than with her niqab on. Her Honour made clear that she accepted an assurance from Mr Evatt about that matter, which acceptance is recorded in her ex tempore judgment. There is no basis to conclude that Mr Evatt proposed that the appellant should give evidence about any other topic for the purpose of supporting the application to give evidence wearing her niqab. If experienced counsel had wished to lead evidence from the appellant on any other topic he would have said so. To the extent that the appellant relies on this ground as a rejoinder to the respondent's submission that there was no evidence about many of the matters that the primary judge is now alleged to have overlooked, that rejoinder fails for want of foundation.
4. The second issue addressed by ground 12 is the submission that allowing the appellant to give evidence would have enabled "her Honour to consider the degree of prejudice the defendants and Court would suffer by way of her giving evidence with her face covered". No submission was made to Balla DCJ that her Honour should consider the application only after hearing from the appellant on the voir dire. It was not an error for her Honour to fail to give the appellant an opportunity which her experienced counsel did not request.

Conclusion and orders

1. No error has been shown in the discretionary decision made by Balla DCJ. Her Honour addressed a difficult case with sensitivity and care. In addressing this interlocutory application her Honour was fair to all parties and was at pains to ensure that justice according to law was done. This can be seen in the way her Honour herself raised possible alternative methods of the appellant giving evidence, whilst being fair to all parties. Those alternative methods were rejected by the appellant. No error has been shown in her Honour's decision which was limited to the application actually made by the appellant, to give her evidence with her face covered by a niqab.
2. Even if we were persuaded that error had been established for any reason other than that the appellant was not permitted to give evidence wearing her niqab, this is not a case where any substantial wrong or miscarriage was thereby occasioned: UCPR r 51.53. This is because it is clear on all the evidence now available that whatever the proposal, the appellant would have refused to give evidence at the trial other than while wearing her niqab. For the foregoing reasons, no error has been shown in the determination of the primary judge that the appellant should not be permitted to give evidence while wearing her niqab.
3. The orders of the Court are: 1. Leave to amend the notice of appeal to add ground 12 granted; 2. Appeal dismissed; 3. Appellant to pay the costs of the respondent of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

Amendments 21 May 2018 - 21 May 2018: Typographical errors in [28] and [45] amended. 31 May 2018 - Typographical error in [21] amended. 21 March 2019 - Typographical errors in [19], [21], [56], [69] amended; Case citation errors in cover sheet, headnote, [4], [63] amended DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 March 2019