EHG v Law Enforcement Conduct Commission [2026] NSWCATAD 91;

1. The Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) was established under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (LECC Act). The Respondent's functions include detecting, investigating and responding to matters involving police misconduct. Members of the public can complain to the Respondent about the conduct of the NSW Police Force (NSWPF) and its officers and employees. Members of the public can also make complaints about the conduct of the NSWPF to the Commissioner of Police under the Police Act 1990 (NSW).
2. The Applicant has a history of making complaints under both the LECC Act and the Police Act.
3. On 3 August 2020, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant advising that the Respondent had decided to impose a communication restriction on him ("the communication restriction"). The Respondent made this decision under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Policy: Managing Unreasonable Complainant Conduct. The letter to the Applicant included the following (with emphasis retained):

"Restrictions

You have made numerous complaints to the Commission, including the previous NSW police oversight bodies. Further, in total there is in excess of 40 complaints involving you as a complainant on the NSWPF system since 2010. In many of these complaints you are not an affected party nor an interested party.

Dealing with the numerous complaints by you, and your associated requests for information, creates an administrative burden upon the very limited resources of the Commission.

Any future complaints by you will not be responded to by the Commission unless we deem it necessary. This includes complaints in relation to the Commission's oversight of NSWPF complaint investigations.

During the Commission's oversight of [...], you were instructed to send all email correspondence to the email address [...] and not directly to individual officers of the Commission. You did not follow that instruction and continued to email individual officers.

The Commission will be restricting your email communications. Any email sent by you to an address other than [...] will be automatically deleted by the Commission."

1. The communication restriction only applies to email communication. There is no impediment to the Applicant complaining to the Respondent by mail.
2. Since the communication restriction:

(1) On 18 June 2021, the Applicant emailed the Respondent seeking information about the Respondent's decision in relation to a previous complaint he had made. The Respondent subsequently advised the Applicant on 30 June 2021 that the Respondent did not intend to further consider the matter and referred to the communication restriction.

(2) On 3 March 2025, the Applicant copied the Respondent into a complaint he made via email to the NSWPF. Due to the subject matter of the complaint being of a high rank, the complaint was presented to the LECC Complaint Action Panel. The complaint was considered and a decision was made to take no further action. The Police declined to investigate the matter. On 16 July 2025, the Respondent reviewed the Police handling of the matter and closed the complaint. The Respondent maintains that it was the responsibility of NSWPF, and not the Respondent, to advise the Applicant as to the outcome of the complaint.

(3) On 12 March 2025, the Applicant copied the Respondent into a complaint made directly via email to the NSWPF.

1. On 15 March 2025, the Applicant submitted what he refers to as a "formal public interest complaint" via email to the Respondent regarding various matters, and received no response. The Applicant sent follow up emails on 25 March 2025 and 7 April 2025, also with no response.
2. On 8 April 2025, the Applicant emailed the Inspector of the Respondent. The Inspector referred the Applicant to the communication restriction.
3. On 13 April 2025, the Applicant made a complaint under the PPIP Act to the Respondent about the Respondent's "ongoing and inappropriate use of personal information about me to block access to the Commission's statutory complaint processes." The Applicant alleged that the Respondent had breached various Information Protection Principles (IPPs) 1, 2, 9, 10 and 11.
4. The Respondent accepted the privacy complaint as alleged breaches of the following IPPs:

(1) Collection (PPIP Act, ss 8, 9; IPPs 1, 2)

(2) Use (PPIP Act, ss 16, 17; IPP 9, 10)

(3) Disclosure (PPIP Act, s 18; IPP 11).

1. On 1 May 2025, the formal public interest complaint that the Applicant made to the Respondent on 15 March 2025 was considered, and it was decided that no further action would be taken by the Respondent. On 8 May 2025, the complaint was closed by the Respondent. In accordance with the communication restriction, the Respondent did not respond to the Applicant's correspondence about this complaint.
2. On 19 June 2025, the Respondent completed an internal review of the conduct alleged in the privacy complaint, concluding that:

(1) The information in issue was not "personal information" for the purposes of the PPIP Act.

(2) Alternatively, if the information was personal information, the LECC had complied with all of the IPPs, and

(3) Additionally, the LECC was not required to comply with the IPPs pursuant to s 27 of the PPIP Act.

1. Section 55(1) of the PPIP Act gives the Tribunal has power to review the conduct of the Respondent that was the subject of an application under s 53 of the PPIP Act.

55 Administrative review of conduct by Tribunal

(1) If a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53 is not satisfied with -

(a) the findings of the review, or

(b) the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application,

the person may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct that was the subject of the application under section 53.

1. Part 5 of the PPIP Act, which contains s 55, is limited in its application to the following conduct set out in s 52:

52 Application of Part

(1) This Part applies to the following conduct -

(a) the contravention by a public sector agency of an information protection principle that applies to the agency,

(b) the contravention by a public sector agency of a privacy code of practice that applies to the agency,

(c) the disclosure by a public sector agency of personal information kept in a public register.

(2) A reference in this Part to conduct includes a reference to alleged conduct.

(3) This Part does not apply to any conduct that occurred before the commencement of this Part.

(4) Section 53 (Internal reviews) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 does not apply to or in respect of conduct to which this Part applies.

1. On 15 July 2025, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for an administrative review of the Respondent's conduct. As the Applicant is a person who has made an application for internal review (under s 53 of the PPIP Act) and is not satisfied with the findings of the review, he is able to apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) of the conduct that was the subject of his application for internal review.
2. A review of conduct under the PPIP Act is not at large. Unless there is an agreed widening of the scope of an internal review, within the internal review process, the application for internal review, reasonably construed, sets the scope for the review of the conduct by the Tribunal: KO and KP v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 56 at [13].
3. Before I can review the Respondent's conduct to determine whether it was in breach of the relevant IPPs, I need to be satisfied that the alleged conduct that was subject of the internal review occurred. The issues then arising, which I address below, are:

(1) What was the alleged conduct that was the subject of the application under s 53?

(2) Did the alleged conduct occur?

(3) If the alleged conduct did not occur, what is the appropriate order?

What was the alleged conduct that was the subject of the application under s 53?

1. In his application under s 53 of the PPIP Act, the Applicant broadly described the alleged conduct as the Respondent's "ongoing and inappropriate use of personal information about me to block access to the Commission's statutory complaint processes."
2. The following is the alleged conduct that was subject of the Applicant's internal review in respect of IPPs 9 and 10, which is what, in these proceedings, the Applicant seeks that the Tribunal finds the Respondent has breached:

Breach: The LECC did not attempt to review whether the information it used to justify the 2025 exclusion - namely, a record of prior complaints - was still accurate, proportionate, or relevant to the present circumstances. The failure to ensure current accuracy and contextual relevant is a direct breach of IPP 9.

Breach: Personal information about my past complaint activity appears to have been collected for case management or complaint assessment purposes at the time - not for the blanket denial of all future access to statutory complaint channels. Its use in 2025 as a reason to block unrelated complaints is a clearly unauthorised and improper secondary use.

1. In summary, the Applicant alleged that by imposing the communication restriction, the Respondent excluded or blocked him from making complaints in 2025, or denied him access to the complaint process ("the alleged conduct").

1. For the following reasons, I find that the alleged conduct did not occur.
2. The Respondent states that its usual practice where there are restrictions on communication with an individual and the individual files a complaint, is to assess the complaint in accordance with its standard procedures. The Respondent states that this usual practice was followed in the Applicant's case in respect of his 2025 complaints. That is, the Respondent considered the merits of the Applicant's 2025 complaints without regard to the fact that a communication restriction had been imposed on him.
3. The Respondent, however, did not notify the Applicant that his complaint of 15 March 2025 had been assessed and closed (as of 8 May 2025). The Respondent was able to do this under the communication restriction which provides that any complaints by the Respondent will not be responded to by the Respondent unless the Respondent deems it necessary.
4. The Respondent states that the Respondent has not prevented the Applicant from making complaints under the Police Act or under the LECC Act. The Applicant is free to do so, however he must send these complaints to a specific email address in accordance with the communication restriction.
5. It is also open to the Applicant to send complaints via mail to the Respondent. This was confirmed by the Respondent during the hearing.
6. The communication restriction provides that the Respondent will not respond to his complaints unless the Respondent considers it is necessary to do so.
7. The Respondent submits that the Applicant has not characterised the relevant conduct of the Respondent correctly. The Respondent submits that contrary to the Applicant's complaints, the Respondent did not prevent him from making complaints under the Police Act or the LECC Act. The Applicant remains free to send complaints to a specific email address and via mail. The Respondent submits that all it has done is require the Applicant to direct complaints, if sent via email, to a specific email address and informed the Applicant that the Respondent will not respond to his complaints unless it considers it necessary to do so.
8. The alleged conduct said to be in breach of the PPIP Act did not occur. The Applicant is not excluded or blocked from making complaints or denied access to the complaint process because of the communication restriction. As noted above, since the communication restriction, the Applicant has made complaints other than the complaint made on 15 March 2025, which the Respondent has considered.

If the alleged conduct did not occur, what is the appropriate order?

1. Section 55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) provides that the Tribunal may dismiss at any stage any proceedings before it "if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance".
2. This approach of construing "misconceived" as including a misunderstanding of legal principle and "lacking in substance" as encompassing an untenable proposition of fact or law has been applied by the Tribunal in many decisions: BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129 at [63], citing Alchin v Rail Corporation NSW [2012] NSWADT 142 at [26].
3. A range of findings could potentially justify a conclusion that proceedings are "lacking in substance", including that the initiating application was based on an "untenable proposition of fact or law": Davis v NSW Minister for Health [2023] NSWCATAP 211 at [53].
4. The untenable proposition of fact in this case is that the alleged conduct occurred. I find that the Applicant's application is lacking in substance because the application is based on an untenable proposition of fact. As the application is lacking in substance, it should be dismissed.
5. Section 55(1) of the PPIP states:

(2) On reviewing the conduct of the public sector agency concerned, the Tribunal may decide not to take any action on the matter, or it may make any one or more of the following orders -

(a) subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an order requiring the public sector agency to pay to the applicant damages not exceeding $40,000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct,

(b) an order requiring the public sector agency to refrain from any conduct or action in contravention of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(c) an order requiring the performance of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(d) an order requiring personal information that has been disclosed to be corrected by the public sector agency,

(e) an order requiring the public sector agency to take specified steps to remedy any loss or damage suffered by the applicant,

(f) an order requiring the public sector agency not to disclose personal information contained in a public register,

(g) such ancillary orders as the Tribunal thinks appropriate.

1. In this case I have not reviewed the conduct because I have found that the alleged conduct did not occur. In those circumstances, none of the options in s 55(2) of the PPIP Act, including that the Tribunal not take any action on the matter, is appropriate.

1. I find that the alleged conduct the Applicant seeks a review of did not occur. The application is based on an untenable proposition of fact. It follows that the Applicant's application is lacking in substance and should be dismissed.

1. Pursuant to s 55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the proceedings are dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.