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[2026] HCA 33
respondent. Application dismissed with costs; extension of time refused.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The High Court found no legal error in the delegate’s refusal to restore EGH19’s cancelled protection visa. EGH19’s forms pointed generally to information already held by the Department, but did not identify particular documents for the delegate to consider. The delegate had considered the Tribunal decision he referred to. The Court also found that the delegate understood EGH19 could not then be removed to PNG, that there was no present prospect of removal to a third country, and that he would be released on a bridging visa. The decision was not unreasonable merely because removal was not then possible. Because the challenge was late and disclosed no jurisdictional error, the Court refused an extension of time and dismissed the application with costs.
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2,657 words · generated 03/10/2026
The High Court of Australia, constituted by Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ, dismissed EGH19’s application with costs. The plaintiff also needed an extension of time to bring his judicial review application. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the delegate’s decision not to revoke the cancellation of his protection visa and concluded that the circumstances did not justify extending time [1], [14], [81]-[82].
EGH19 was born in Papua New Guinea in 1989 and arrived in Australia in 2000, aged 11, as a dependant on his father’s student visa. He had not left Australia since April 2004. In 2006 he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years and six months’ imprisonment. After his release on parole in January 2018, he was taken into immigration detention [2].
Following a series of protection visa proceedings, EGH19 was granted a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa on 26 October 2022 and released from detention. The delegate made a protection finding relating to PNG under s 197C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) [3]-[5]. After further domestic violence offending and convictions in 2024, his protection visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) on 20 May 2024. He was invited to make representations seeking revocation under s 501CA(4) [6]-[8].
In January 2025, the Department invited him to comment on his updated criminal history, sentencing remarks and the replacement of an earlier ministerial direction by Direction No 110. It also asked him to comment on s 197C and removal to PNG. He did not respond [9].
On 1 April 2025, a delegate decided not to revoke the cancellation. The reasons considered the primary and other considerations in Direction No 110. The delegate found that EGH19 did not pass the character test because of his substantial criminal record, and that there was no other reason to revoke the cancellation [17]-[18], [38]-[39]. A separate delegate granted him a Bridging R (Subclass 070) visa, or BVR, on the same day, and he was released from detention [10]-[11].
EGH19 applied to the High Court on 2 October 2025, seeking certiorari to quash the non-revocation decision and mandamus requiring a lawful redetermination. His amended application alleged three broad errors: failure to consider Department-held information, unreasonable treatment of community protection given that he could not then be removed, and failure to consider legal consequences, including his likely BVR status [12]-[13].
The Court rejected each ground by examining both the materials EGH19 submitted and the delegate’s written reasons.
First, the delegate was not required to search the Department’s files for unparticularised material. The Court relied on the principles set out in Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs. A s 501CA(4) decision-maker assesses the case made through the representations. They must read, identify, understand and evaluate those representations, and do so rationally and reasonably. But the effort required depends on the representations’ length, clarity and relevance. A decision-maker need not pursue claims that are not clearly articulated or that do not clearly arise from the material. Generally, the person making the representations must identify the personal facts and circumstances relevant to the decision [51]-[52].
EGH19’s forms referred to the Department already having relevant information and asked it to update its records. They also referred to the 2022 Tribunal Decision, although the date he gave was incorrect [46], [49]. But he did not list particular documents he wanted considered in the forms’ supporting-document sections [47], [50]. The Personal Circumstances Form expressly said it was in the person’s interests to provide relevant information and that, if no response was provided, the decision-maker would rely on information the Department held [48]. The delegate did consider and refer to the Tribunal Decision, as well as a Section 197C Protection Finding Advice [16], [55], [57].
The Court also considered four alleged omissions: earlier family and friend statements, an earlier expression of remorse, a 2017 Corrective Services document and a 2020 psychologist’s report. It found no jurisdictional error in the delegate’s treatment of those materials. Among other things, the earlier documents predated significant changes, including further convictions, and the psychologist’s report did not address risk at the time of the decision. The delegate referred to that report and considered the Tribunal’s criticisms of its limits [59]-[62].
Second, the delegate’s community-protection assessment was not unreasonable because removal was not then practicable. EGH19 argued that the delegate treated non-revocation as if it would eliminate the risk to the Australian community, despite acknowledging that there was no real prospect of removing him in the reasonably foreseeable future [64]-[66].
The Court rejected the premise that cancellation can protect the community only by immediately removing the person from Australia. The Migration Act provides for removal in specified circumstances and detention pending removal, but NZYQ establishes that detention is not lawful where there is no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Court explained that visa cancellation may nonetheless preserve the person’s availability for removal if it later becomes practicable. In the meantime, a BVR may be granted subject to conditions aimed at protecting the community [67].
The Court then assessed the actual reasons as a whole. The delegate had recorded that PNG was not a country to which EGH19 could be removed under s 197C(3), that removal could only be to a third country, and that there was presently no real prospect of such removal. The reasons also recorded that he would be released and that the Minister would separately consider the visa type and its conditions [69]. The Court inferred that the delegate understood EGH19 would be released into the community as a BVR holder, not that non-revocation itself would remove all risk [70]-[71].
Third, the delegate did not fail to consider the legal consequences. The Court rejected the claim that the delegate overlooked that EGH19 would become an unlawful non-citizen but would not remain detained. It was readily inferable from the reasons that the delegate understood the immediate consequences and expected release on a visa. The agreed circumstances showed that a BVR was being considered and was granted on the same day [73]-[75].
The Court also rejected the argument that the delegate had to spell out the likely BVR conditions. The delegate had recognised that EGH19 would be released on a BVR. The law did not require express reference to every consequence of a discretionary executive decision, including mandatory visa conditions [77]-[79]. The statement that the delegate had “not speculated” about ministerial intervention concerned possible future visa applications, not whether a BVR would be granted [79].
The judgment applies existing statutory and case-law principles; it does not purport to replace them with a new statutory test.
For s 501CA(4), the Court applied Plaintiff M1/2021. That decision’s approach is that the representation is the starting point for the assessment. The obligation is not a general obligation to reconstruct and investigate every possible argument from everything held by the Department. Rather, the decision-maker must engage with what the person has put forward, with the intensity of engagement depending on its form and content [51]-[55].
On the community-protection issue, the Court applied NZYQ’s rule concerning the limits of detention where removal is not reasonably foreseeable. It then explained how cancellation and release on a BVR can operate in that setting: cancellation can preserve the prospect of removal later, while a BVR can regulate the person’s conduct in the community in the interim [67]-[71]. The Court’s explanation is tied to the statutory framework and the facts before it.
The judgment also reaffirmed the importance of reading administrative reasons as a whole rather than treating each paragraph as a disconnected decision. The Court referred to Ismail and SSVJ in explaining that a decision-maker is not presumed to have forgotten other parts of the reasons when addressing a particular consideration [68].
The reasons note that conditions imposed on BVRs are directed to regulating conduct and protecting the community, but also flag a limit. Footnote 51 states that curfew and ankle-monitoring conditions 8620 and 8621 cannot lawfully be imposed, referring to EGH19 v The Commonwealth (2026) 100 ALJR 400; 428 ALR 467. Footnote 60 similarly recognises that there are limits on BVR conditions. The present judgment’s conclusions should therefore not be read as endorsing every possible condition; its point is that the delegate could understand a BVR to be part of the relevant legal and practical setting [67], [71].
For extensions of time, the Court applied s 486A and Tu’uta Katoa. It identified the relevant inquiry as whether an extension is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice, with the length and explanation for delay and the merits among the relevant considerations [80]. Here, the absence of an arguable jurisdictional error weighed against an extension [81].
At [52], the Court said a decision-maker must “read, identify, understand and evaluate” the representations. In plain English, the delegate must genuinely grapple with what the person has put forward, rather than merely receive it. But the scope of that task is shaped by how clearly and specifically the person states the case.
At [53], the Court considered, without deciding in EGH19’s favour, the possibility of submissions that might require a decision-maker to sift Department files for relevant material. It held that the forms in this case did not impose that burden. In plain English, a general statement that the Department already has information is not necessarily the same as identifying the documents or issues the decision-maker should examine.
At [67], the Court said cancellation “may serve the purpose of protecting the Australian community” even if removal is not then reasonably practicable. In plain English, the Court treated cancellation as capable of having a continuing role in the statutory system: it can preserve the possibility of removal later, while the person is released under a separate visa arrangement in the interim.
At [68], the Court instructed that the delegate’s reasons must be read “fairly and as a whole”. In plain English, a court should not isolate one sentence and assume it expresses the delegate’s entire understanding where the rest of the reasons addresses related matters.
At [70], the Court inferred that the delegate understood EGH19 would be released as a BVR holder. The significance is factual and interpretive: the Court rejected the allegation that the delegate assessed community protection as if cancellation meant immediate removal.
At [78], the Court said there was no obligation to make express reference to every consequence of a discretionary executive decision. In plain English, the reasons need not list every likely operational detail, provided the reasoning does not show that a legally relevant consequence was misunderstood or ignored.
At [81], the Court concluded that there was no basis to extend time because the application disclosed no jurisdictional error. In plain English, the late application did not meet the statutory interests-of-justice threshold on the case presented.
The decision is most directly relevant where a person seeks revocation of a mandatory character-based visa cancellation under s 501CA(4), and their representations refer generally to records already held by the Department without identifying the particular evidence or arguments they want the decision-maker to address. It indicates that the adequacy of consideration will be assessed by reference to the actual representations, their clarity and relevance, and the reasons as a whole [51]-[57].
It is also relevant where a person argues that an assessment of community protection is illogical because the person cannot presently be removed. The judgment says that present irremovability does not, by itself, make cancellation irrelevant to community protection, particularly where future removal may become practicable and a BVR may be granted in the interim [67]-[71]. The statutory detail matters: here the delegate had recognised the protection finding concerning PNG, the absence of a present third-country removal prospect and the prospect of release.
The decision also has relevance where a challenge claims that the decision-maker failed to address a likely bridging visa or its consequences. The Court examined the contemporaneous decision-making arrangements, the delegate’s reasons, and the agreed fact that a BVR was granted the same day. It did not establish that every possible BVR grant or condition can be presumed in every case. Its conclusion depended on the evidence and circumstances before it [73]-[79].
Finally, the judgment concerns late judicial review applications under s 486A. It is relevant to the relationship between the merits of a proposed challenge and an extension request, but it does not determine an extension application without regard to the particular delay, explanation and proposed grounds [80]-[81].
The supplied judgment does not report any later judicial treatment of EGH19 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship itself. Its date is 9 September 2026, and the text provides no subsequent case history. It would therefore be unsupported to describe how later courts have treated this decision.
The judgment does, however, identify authorities it used or distinguished. It applies Plaintiff M1/2021 to the proper engagement with s 501CA(4) representations [51]-[55], and relies on NZYQ for the detention and removal framework [67]. It refers to Ismail and SSVJ in relation to reading reasons as a whole [68]. It distinguishes KFTJ because the facts about when a BVR referral occurred differed from the circumstances in EGH19’s case [76]. It also adopts reasoning from Plaintiff S22/2025 concerning the likelihood of a BVR and the need for express reference to discretionary consequences [75], [78].
The footnotes additionally cite XKTK and Plaintiff S22/2025 on the function of BVR conditions, while expressly recording limits on the conditions that may lawfully be imposed [71]. Those citations show the framework the Court considered, but they are not evidence of subsequent treatment of the judgment itself.
The judgment leaves several matters dependent on future facts and statutory context.
First, it does not define precisely what level of particularity in a representation would require a delegate to examine specific Department-held records. The decision establishes that the forms and general references here did not impose a duty to trawl through all the material, but the Court did not set a universal threshold for more focused references or requests [53]-[57].
Second, the judgment does not comprehensively determine how much detail a delegate must give about a likely BVR grant or its conditions in every case. It holds that express reference to the conditions was unnecessary on these facts, where the reasons recognised likely release on a BVR and the BVR was granted the same day [74]-[79]. Different evidence about whether a BVR is genuinely likely, or about what conditions are legally available, may raise different issues.
Third, the decision recognises that BVR conditions may aim to protect the community, but it does not resolve the full limits of those conditions. The footnotes expressly note that some conditions, including curfew and ankle monitoring conditions identified there, cannot lawfully be imposed [71 nn 51, 60]. The scope and lawfulness of any particular condition therefore remain distinct questions.
Fourth, the Court says cancellation can serve a community-protection purpose even where removal is not presently practicable, but the judgment does not decide what weight that consideration must receive in different factual settings. Here, the delegate had considered the plaintiff’s offending, the risk of reoffending, his ties to Australia, the interests of his daughter, and the consequences of non-revocation [20]-[38]. The weight in another decision remains a matter for the applicable statutory and Direction No 110 framework.
Finally, the Court’s refusal of an extension of time rested on the application before it, which disclosed no jurisdictional error. The judgment identifies delay, its explanation and the merits as relevant factors, but does not provide a general outcome for applications with different delay periods or different merits [80]-[81].
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: the High Court of Australia (www.hcourt.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GORDON, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ
EGH19 PLAINTIFF
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP DEFENDANT
EGH19 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship
[2026] HCA 33
Date of Judgment: 9 September 2026
S147/2025
ORDER
Application dismissed with costs.
Representation
The plaintiff is represented by Zarifi Lawyers
The defendant is represented by Australian Government Solicitor
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
EGH19 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship
Administrative law – Judicial review − Where plaintiff's Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa cancelled on character grounds ("Cancellation Decision") − Where plaintiff made representations to Minister seeking revocation of Cancellation Decision referring to material already held by Department − Where no real prospect of plaintiff being removed from Australia in reasonably foreseeable future − Where delegate decided not to revoke Cancellation Decision ("Non-revocation Decision") − Where plaintiff granted Bridging R (Subclass 070) visa ("BVR") − Whether Non-revocation Decision affected by jurisdictional error − Whether failure to have regard to information provided by plaintiff in connection with previous decision-making – Whether cancellation of protection visa would remove risk posed by plaintiff to Australian community in circumstances where plaintiff would be released on BVR.
Words and phrases – "cancellation decision", "character grounds", "constitutional writ", "extension of time", "illogically", "irrationally", "judicial review", "jurisdictional error", "legal consequences", "non-revocation decision", "no real prospect of removing", "protection visa", "reasonably foreseeable future", "risk to the Australian community", "unlawful non‑citizen", "unreasonably".
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 189, 196, 197C(3), 198, 486A, 501(1), 501(3A), 501CA(4).
EGH19
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship
The plaintiff was born in Papua New Guinea ("PNG") in 1989. On 30 June 2000, the plaintiff arrived in Australia, aged 11 years, as a dependant family member on his father's student visa. The plaintiff has not left Australia since April 2004. On 10 November 2006, the plaintiff was convicted of murder in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and sentenced to 17 years and six months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years and six months. On 7 January 2018, the plaintiff was released from prison on parole and taken into immigration detention under s 189 of the Act.
On 21 December 2017, the plaintiff applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa. On 9 February 2018, a delegate of the Minister1 refused to grant the plaintiff a protection visa as the delegate was not satisfied the plaintiff met s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The then Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") set aside the delegate's decision. The Tribunal found that the plaintiff met the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and remitted the matter for reconsideration by the Minister.
On 5 May 2022, a delegate of the Minister refused the plaintiff's application for a protection visa pursuant to s 501(1) of the Act. The plaintiff sought review of that decision in the Tribunal. On 28 July 2022, the Tribunal set aside that delegate's decision and, in its place, decided not to refuse the plaintiff's protection visa application pursuant to s 501(1) of the Act ("the 2022 Tribunal Decision").2
On 26 October 2022, a delegate of the Minister decided to grant the plaintiff a protection visa (the "Protection Visa"). In making that decision, the delegate made a protection finding for the plaintiff with respect to PNG within the meaning of s 197C of the Act. The plaintiff was released from immigration detention.
On 2 April 2024, the plaintiff was convicted in the Local Court of New South Wales in Armidale of "stalk/intimidate intend fear physical etc harm (domestic)" against his partner's father and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, commencing on 23 February 2024.
On 20 May 2024, the plaintiff's Protection Visa was cancelled by a delegate of the Minister under s 501(3A) of the Act ("the Cancellation Decision"). The plaintiff was in prison. The letter notifying the plaintiff of the Cancellation Decision invited the plaintiff to make representations to the Minister about revoking the Cancellation Decision pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act. The plaintiff made representations to the Minister in support of his request for revocation of the Cancellation Decision.
On 3 July 2024, the plaintiff was convicted of four further domestic violence offences in the Local Court of New South Wales in Maitland, namely "stalk/intimidate intend fear physical etc harm", "destroy or damage property", and two counts of "assault occasioning actual bodily harm" against his partner. He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 months ending on 22 December 2024.
On 17 January 2025, the Department of Home Affairs ("the Department") wrote to the plaintiff and sought his comment on his updated criminal history and the sentencing remarks of 2 April and 3 July 2024. The letter also notified the plaintiff that the previous ministerial direction had been replaced by Direction No 110: Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA ("Direction No 110") and invited the plaintiff to comment on the new direction, as well as the operation of s 197C of the Act in relation to his removal to PNG. The plaintiff did not respond.
On 1 April 2025, a delegate of the Minister made the Non-revocation Decision, deciding not to exercise the power under s 501CA(4) of the Act to revoke the decision to cancel the plaintiff's Protection Visa. At the time of the Non‑revocation Decision, there were no processes underway for the Minister or a delegate to consider the grant of any visa to the plaintiff other than a Bridging R (Subclass 070) visa ("BVR").
Also on 1 April 2025, a different delegate of the Minister decided to grant the plaintiff a BVR under reg 2.25AB(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The plaintiff was released from immigration detention. As at 1 April 2025, the effect of the grant of a BVR was that the plaintiff would be eligible to receive limited assistance from the Status Resolution Support Services Program of the Department, including limited accommodation, healthcare and financial services or referral support.
On 2 October 2025, the plaintiff filed an application for a constitutional or other writ in this Court seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Non-revocation Decision and a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to determine whether to revoke the Cancellation Decision according to law. The plaintiff requires an extension of time to file that application.3
On 10 March 2026, the plaintiff filed an amended application. By that amended application, the plaintiff sought to contend that the Non-revocation Decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the delegate:
(1) failed to have regard to relevant information held by the Department and thereby (a) constructively failed to exercise their jurisdiction by failing to consider the plaintiff's representations in the manner required by s 501CA(4) or (b) engaged in an unreasonable decision-making process;
(2) failed to identify how the Australian community would be protected by cancelling the plaintiff's Protection Visa and thereby (a) failed to comply with para 8.1 of Direction No 110 or (b) reasoned unreasonably, illogically or irrationally; and
(3) failed to consider in a legally reasonable way the legal consequences of the Non-revocation Decision.
Section 501CA(4) of the Act provides that the Minister may revoke a decision to cancel a person's visa under s 501(3A) on the grounds that they do not pass the character test if: (1) the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation given under s 501CA(3)(b); and (2) the Minister is satisfied that either: (i) the person passes the character test,4 or (ii) there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. Where a delegate of the Minister is authorised to exercise the power under s 501CA(4), they must comply with Direction No 110, given by the Minister under s 499 of the Act, which relevantly requires a delegate to take account of certain "primary considerations"5 and "other considerations".6
As outlined above, on 1 April 2025, a delegate of the Minister made the Non-revocation Decision, in which they decided not to exercise the power under s 501CA(4) in relation to the plaintiff's Protection Visa. Annexed to that decision is an "index of relevant material", which is said to have been "considered by the decision maker" and which relevantly includes the 2022 Tribunal Decision and a "Section 197C Protection Finding Advice" dated 17 June 2024. The delegate provided a written statement of reasons, which it is necessary to summarise in some detail.
Necessarily, the delegate was not satisfied that the plaintiff passed the character test as required by s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act. This was because the plaintiff had a "substantial criminal record" for the purpose of s 501(6)(a) of the Act due to his 2006 murder conviction.7
The delegate therefore considered whether there was "another reason" why the decision to cancel the plaintiff's Protection Visa should be revoked for the purpose of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act.
The delegate's reasons recorded that Direction No 110 states that the safety of the Australian community is the government's highest priority.8 The delegate also stated that, consistent with the Direction, in considering whether there was "another reason" to revoke the Cancellation Decision, the delegate considered the nature and seriousness of the plaintiff's conduct and the risk to the Australian community should the plaintiff reoffend or engage in other serious conduct.9
Under the sub-heading "Nature and seriousness of conduct", the delegate found that the plaintiff's offending was "very serious", the plaintiff having been convicted of murder and of family violence offences. The delegate had a number of other concerns. In relation to family violence offences, the delegate was concerned by the frequency of the plaintiff's offending, having been convicted a significant number of times in the relatively short period since his release from detention in 2022. The delegate also considered it a matter of serious concern that the plaintiff had continued offending despite being aware of the potential impact of that offending on his immigration status. The delegate considered that, because the plaintiff's protection visa application was refused on character grounds on 11 September 2019 and he received a copy of the decision and the reasons for refusal, the plaintiff would have been "acutely aware" of the potential impact of criminal offending on his visa status and yet he continued to commit family violence offences from October 2019.
Next, under the sub-heading "Risk to the Australian community", the delegate found that, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's past offending, they considered that any future offending by the plaintiff of a similar nature would have the potential to cause "physical and psychological injury, or death, to members of the Australian community".
In assessing the likelihood of the plaintiff reoffending in the future, the delegate also considered factors that may have assisted to explain the plaintiff's past conduct, as well as his more recent conduct, remorse and rehabilitation. This included detailed consideration of the 2022 Tribunal Decision, including the evidence that was before the Tribunal at the time of its decision and the Tribunal's assessment that the plaintiff would pose a "material risk" to the Australian community if he was released. The delegate noted that, since the 2022 Tribunal Decision, the plaintiff had committed further family violence offences and continued to engage in alcohol abuse, which had been identified as a significant factor in his reoffending.
The delegate was satisfied that there was a "real and ongoing risk to the Australian community", as there was a likelihood that the plaintiff would reoffend. Given the nature and seriousness of the plaintiff's conduct and the potential harm to the Australian community should the plaintiff commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct, and taking into account the likelihood of the plaintiff reoffending, the delegate found that the need to protect the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct weighed "significantly against revocation".
The delegate then considered whether the plaintiff had engaged in any conduct constituting "family violence" as defined in Direction No 110.10 The delegate found that the plaintiff had engaged in that conduct.
In considering the seriousness of the plaintiff's family violence offending, the delegate found that the plaintiff had "demonstrated a trend of increasing seriousness of family violence" progressing to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, which had on one occasion involved a threat to the safety of a child, and that the plaintiff's family violence offending fell "towards the top of the range of such conduct". The delegate attributed this consideration "significant weight against revocation".
The delegate then considered the strength, nature and duration of the plaintiff's ties to Australia as required by Direction No 110.11 The delegate was satisfied of, and afforded "particular weight" to, the fact that the plaintiff had been resident in Australia from April 2004, from the age of 14 years and 10 months. The delegate noted that the plaintiff began offending soon after arriving in Australia and again on his return to the community in October 2022. The delegate recorded that the Direction advises that these circumstances should be taken as reducing the weight to be given to the time the person has spent in Australia.
In relation to the requirement that the delegate consider "any impact of the decision on the non-citizen's immediate family members in Australia",12 the delegate noted that the 2022 Tribunal Decision had found that the plaintiff had a "strong and continuing relationship" with his parents, and accepted that they would suffer some emotional hardship in the event of a non-revocation decision. The delegate, however, did not accept that the plaintiff was currently in a relationship with his former partner or that she would suffer any adverse impact from a non-revocation decision. The delegate did accept that his former partner, having custody of his minor daughter, could benefit from having the plaintiff working and contributing towards her maintenance but considered that the plaintiff did not need to be physically in Australia, "or indeed hold a protection visa", in order to do so.
The delegate accepted that the plaintiff had developed social ties in Australia and that a decision not to revoke his visa cancellation would have some adverse impacts on his other family and friends. The delegate also accepted that the plaintiff had made some limited contribution to the Australian community through his employment from 2022 to 2024. The delegate concluded that the strength, nature and duration of the plaintiff's ties to Australia weighed "moderately in favour of revocation of the [Cancellation Decision]".
At the outset, the delegate recorded that they were aware that under s 198 of the Act, an unlawful non-citizen was liable to be removed from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable, but that s 197C(3) of the Act provides that s 198 does not require or authorise removal of a person to a country in relation to which a "protection finding"17 has been made in the course of a protection visa application.
The delegate recorded that a protection finding had been made in relation to the plaintiff with respect to PNG and that, accordingly, removal of the plaintiff to PNG was "neither required nor authorised" by the Act. The delegate recorded that the plaintiff could therefore only be removed to a third country.
The delegate recorded that the "legal effect" of this Court's decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs18 was that "detention of the non-citizen will no longer be supported by ss 189 and 196 of the Act where there is no real prospect that it will be practicable to remove the non‑citizen in the reasonably foreseeable future". As there was presently no real prospect of removing the plaintiff to a third country, the delegate recognised that he would not be subject to indefinite detention pending his removal and would instead be released from detention. The delegate stated that the Minister would "separately consider the type of visa on which [the plaintiff] should reside and conditions to be imposed on that visa, following further advice from the Department". As will be discussed, the visa ultimately granted was a BVR.
The delegate then stated that they were aware that if a non-revocation decision was made "there would be significant restrictions on [the plaintiff's] ability to apply for another visa". In particular, the delegate stated that the plaintiff would be prevented by s 48A of the Act from making a further application for a protection visa while he was in the migration zone, unless the Minister determined under s 48B that s 48A of the Act did not apply to the plaintiff. The delegate found that, without leaving the migration zone, the plaintiff would not be able to apply for any visa other than a BVR, for which he could only apply in response to an invitation. The delegate gave this consideration weight in favour of revocation of the Cancellation Decision. In making that decision, the delegate specified that they had "not speculated on the likelihood of a Minister intervening under any of the provisions mentioned above, or the consequences for [the plaintiff] following any such intervention".
In the exercise of the delegate's discretion, the delegate stated that they had given the "highest priority" to the safety of the Australian community and the need to protect its safety. On balance, the delegate found "the factors that weigh against revocation of the [C]ancellation [D]ecision outweigh the factors in favour of revocation".20 The delegate concluded that there was not "another reason" to revoke the Cancellation Decision pursuant to s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Since the delegate was not satisfied that the plaintiff passed the character test or that there was another reason to revoke the Cancellation Decision, they concluded that the power in s 501CA(4) was not enlivened.
The plaintiff contends that the Non-revocation Decision was legally unreasonable, or the delegate failed to lawfully consider the plaintiff's representations, because the delegate failed to have regard to information provided by the plaintiff to the Department in connection with previous decision-making, including the 2022 Tribunal Decision. As the plaintiff put it, the "crux" of his claim is that, despite the plaintiff's request for revocation of the Cancellation Decision referring to information the plaintiff had supplied in relation to the 2022 Tribunal Decision, and despite indications that the delegate would have regard to material held by the Department, the delegate "selectively had regard to such information". That is, the plaintiff contends that the delegate limited their consideration to the 2022 Tribunal Decision and thereby constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction. Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that the delegate's selective reference to only some of the relevant information held by the Department resulted in unreasonableness in the decision-making.
The letter providing the plaintiff notice of the Cancellation Decision included an invitation, pursuant to s 501CA(3)(b) of the Act, for the plaintiff to make representations as to why the Cancellation Decision should be revoked.21 The notice provided that representations were required to be made in accordance with instructions outlined in the notice. The instructions included, among other things, that the plaintiff provide a statement of the reasons on which he relied in support of his representations.22
The notice enclosed a "Request for revocation of a mandatory visa cancellation under s 501(3A)" form ("Revocation Request Form"). The plaintiff completed and signed this form on 24 May 2024, together with an accompanying "Personal circumstances" form ("Personal Circumstances Form"). It is these documents that the plaintiff relies upon in support of this ground of review. It is necessary to consider each in some detail.
The first page of the Revocation Request Form explained: "If you wish to request revocation of your visa cancellation please complete all parts of this request form, as well as the 'Personal Details Form', which was attached to your notice of cancellation".
The second page included a section headed "Consent to collect, use and disclose information". That section of the form relevantly stated:
"It may be necessary for the Department to collect further information about you, or use … information about you … to assist the Minister or his/her delegate [to] assess your request for revocation. This information may be your personal information (including sensitive information) for the purposes of privacy legislation, and may include prison and parole reports."
The plaintiff was asked whether he consented to the Department, relevantly, collecting and using his "personal or sensitive information, where doing so is relevant to, and will assist with, the processing of your request for revocation". The plaintiff ticked the box indicating his consent and signed below.
The third page of the Revocation Request Form included a box for the plaintiff to insert hand-written responses and a request that he "provide [his] reasons as to why the Minister or his/her delegate should revoke the mandatory cancellation of [his] visa". The form explained that if the plaintiff needed "more room to set out [his] reasons" the plaintiff could "attach additional pages to this notice". This section of the Revocation Request Form also informed the plaintiff, among other things, that "a delegate of the Minister must use Ministerial Direction No 99 as a guide when making their decision" and encouraged the plaintiff to "read it thoroughly". The plaintiff was subsequently informed that this ministerial direction had been replaced by Direction No 110 and invited to provide further comment, but he did not do so.23
Under the heading "Reasons for Revocation", the plaintiff stated:
"I have already been successful with the [Tribunal] on 26 October 2022 on the very basis in which the visa is AGAIN been cancelled ... You the Department already have all the information from when I was released."
The plaintiff asked that the Department "[u]pdate your (Department) Information" and referred to "26/10/2022 – (Decision) AAT". It is common ground that the date provided by the plaintiff was incorrect. The Tribunal's decision was dated 28 July 2022. The plaintiff was granted a visa and released from immigration detention on 26 October 2022.
The first page of the Personal Circumstances Form stated that its completion was not mandatory, "[a]lthough it is in your interests to provide relevant information in response to your s 501 case that you wish the decision‑maker to take into account". The form then explained the consequences of not providing a response as follows: "if you choose not to provide a response, the decision-maker will rely upon information the Department currently holds when making his/her decision".
In completing this form, the plaintiff referred to the fact that the Department already held a significant amount of information about him and that he sought to rely upon that information in response to the invitation. For example: (1) in response to a question about the date and place of his first arrival in Australia, the plaintiff said "The Department alread[y] has all the information"; (2) in response to questions about relationships he had with a spouse or partner, the plaintiff said "You already have all this information. Please refer to AAT Decision 26 October 2022"; (3) in response to a question asking the plaintiff to outline any factors to help explain his offending, the plaintiff said "I have already been through all of this with the department after spending 5½ years in immigration. I have been successful with [the Tribunal] in October 2022"; (4) in response to a question about medical treatment, the plaintiff said "You the department have all my medical record already"; (5) in response to a question about what concerns or fears the plaintiff might have if he was returned to his country of citizenship, the plaintiff said "I will die, the department is already aware of this from when I won my case [on] 26 October 2022".
The final page of the Personal Circumstances Form contained a list of "suggested documents to support your claims", with boxes for the plaintiff to tick next to each of the documents provided. The plaintiff did not tick any of these boxes or provide any of the suggested documents.
In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs,24 it was explained that the statutory scheme for the revocation of a decision to cancel a person's visa for failure to satisfy the character test under s 501(3A), of which s 501CA(4) forms a central part, "commences with a former visa holder making representations". The decision-maker, in determining whether they are satisfied that there is "another reason" why the original decision should be revoked for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), undertakes their assessment "by reference to the case made by the former visa holder by their representations".25
The decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate those representations, and bring their mind to bear on the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward.26 The decision-maker's engagement with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness.27 What the decision-maker must do will "necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations", and "[t]he requisite level of engagement – the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker – will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations".28 There is no obligation on the decision-maker to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the material,29 and not every statement within the representations is a mandatory relevant consideration.30 Further, "it is generally for the person making the application to identify the personal facts and circumstances relevant to the decision".31
Even assuming that the plaintiff could have fashioned submissions that required the delegate to trawl through all of the material held by the Department in order to sift out what might be relevant, determine what might possibly be made of that material and then take that material into account, the Revocation Request Form and the Personal Circumstances Form did not impose such a burden.
In relation to the Revocation Request Form, the parts relied upon by the plaintiff concerned the plaintiff giving consent to the collection, use and disclosure of the plaintiff's personal information.32 That portion of the form did not convey to the plaintiff that he did not need to provide representations or documents in support of revocation of the Cancellation Decision under s 501CA(4). Indeed, the Personal Circumstances Form emphasised that it was in the plaintiff's interests to "provide relevant information in response to your s 501 case" that the plaintiff wished the decision-maker to take into account.33 The plaintiff did not do that.
It is common ground that the plaintiff referred to the 2022 Tribunal Decision in both the Revocation Request Form and the Personal Circumstances Form. As is apparent from the summary of the Non‑revocation Decision,34 the delegate read, considered and referred to that decision. The plaintiff did not refer to any particular document or material that was before the Tribunal that the plaintiff wanted the delegate to consider or which the Tribunal did not refer to in its reasons for decision. In the "supporting documents" section of the Revocation Request Form and "suggested documents to support your claims" section of the Personal Circumstances Form, the plaintiff did not list any document he wished the delegate to consider.35
On 17 January 2025, the Department wrote to the plaintiff enclosing a copy of the plaintiff's updated criminal history and sentencing remarks and sought comments on those matters, as well as the matters identified in Direction No 110.36 The plaintiff did not respond. As the Minister submits, at that time the plaintiff's personal circumstances had significantly changed since the 2022 Tribunal Decision. In that three-year period, the plaintiff had been convicted of seven further offences relating to family violence, at least some of which concerned the person who was his partner at the time of the 2022 Tribunal Decision,37 the plaintiff indicated in the Personal Circumstances Form that he would not be living with his former partner on release, and the plaintiff had become a father to a daughter. The Personal Circumstances Form did not refer to any other family members or describe any impact on those persons of the Cancellation Decision.38 The delegate's decision reflected those facts.39
The plaintiff's further complaint that the delegate had no basis to justify their "selective reference" to the 2022 Tribunal Decision and the "Section 197C Protection Finding Advice" among the material held by the Department is rejected.40 The first was referred to by the plaintiff in the Personal Circumstances Form. The second the delegate was required to consider under Direction No 110 in considering the legal consequences of the decision.41
Finally, the plaintiff identified four matters that he contends the delegate failed to consider. A failure of the delegate to consider those matters, either taken alone or in combination, would not involve jurisdictional error.
The first complaint was that the delegate found that the plaintiff "did not list any family members in Australia in his representations" in his Personal Circumstances Form, when in fact the plaintiff had previously provided statements by "family members and friends" in 2018, 2021 and 2022. The delegate's statement was accurate. The plaintiff did not list any family members other than his daughter in the Personal Circumstances Form. Given what had transpired since the previous statements held by the Department were made in 2018, 2021 and 2022,42 the delegate was not required to assume that information would still be relevant. In any event, the delegate was prepared to accept that the plaintiff had developed some family and social ties and that a non-revocation decision would have some adverse impact on those persons.43
The second complaint was that the delegate stated that they considered "it curious and concerning that [the plaintiff] did not express any remorse for any of his criminal offending in his representations dated 24 May 2024". The plaintiff submits that this overlooks statements he made in 2017 acknowledging the seriousness of his offending, apologising and accepting responsibility for it. However, the delegate's statement that in May 2024 – immediately after the plaintiff's visa had been cancelled, and in the context of responding to the Cancellation Decision – the plaintiff did not express remorse for his offending was accurate. The fact that the plaintiff might have made some statement of remorse in 2017 does not undermine the delegate's statement. The plaintiff had offended repeatedly since 2017, so the plaintiff's statements in 2017 plainly did not reflect the circumstances at the time of the Non-revocation Decision.
The third complaint was the failure of the delegate to refer to a document from Corrective Services New South Wales. Again, that document was from 2017 and contained no more than a one-sentence reference to the plaintiff having completed the "Getting Smart" program in July 2014. No details about that program were given. Insofar as the program addressed drug and alcohol use, as the delegate observed, the plaintiff increased his drug use from 2018.
The fourth complaint was that the delegate failed to consider a report of Patrick Sheehan, a psychologist, dated 19 November 2020 ("the Sheehan Report"). The Sheehan Report was provided more than four years before the Non-revocation Decision and prior to the plaintiff offending a further seven times and receiving further sentences of imprisonment. The Sheehan Report did not address the plaintiff's circumstances, or risk of recidivism, at the time of the Non‑revocation Decision. Further, the delegate carefully considered the 2022 Tribunal Decision, which was critical of the Sheehan Report, noting Mr Sheehan's lack of awareness of the full extent of the plaintiff's violent behaviour and observing that the gap in Mr Sheehan's knowledge "seriously undermines the veracity of his report".44 The delegate referred to the Sheehan Report and, in the circumstances, it was not legally unreasonable for the delegate not to further engage with it.
This ground of review is rejected.
The plaintiff contends that the delegate erred jurisdictionally by reasoning "as if deciding not to revoke the cancellation of the plaintiff's visa would completely remove the risk posed to the Australian community of the plaintiff reoffending and in attributing weight to that consideration on that basis". The plaintiff submits that that reasoning was unreasonable in circumstances where the delegate had "elsewhere concluded that there was no real prospect of removing the plaintiff from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future".45 Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that Direction No 110 required the delegate to apply para 8.1 "where relevant",46 and that the delegate mechanically applied para 8.1 "without accounting for the plaintiff's irremovability".
Paragraph 8.1 of Direction No 110 identifies the protection of the Australian community as the "highest priority of the Australian Government". The plaintiff contends that it is implicit in this paragraph that protection of the Australian community is achieved only by "removing the non-citizen from the Australian community" and a decision-maker would therefore "ordinarily need to account for the fact of irremovability" when assessing para 8.1 and the weight to be given to it. The plaintiff contends that did not occur here.
The plaintiff's contentions are rejected. The reasoning of the delegate in assessing para 8.1 of Direction No 110 was not illogical, irrational or unreasonable.
First, contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, cancellation of a visa may serve the purpose of protecting the Australian community even though removal from Australia may not be reasonably practicable at the time the decision is made. The Act creates an enforceable duty to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia "as soon as reasonably practicable" in a range of specified circumstances,47 and a duty to detain such persons pending removal.48 As this Court held in NZYQ,49 executive detention of an alien who has failed to obtain permission to remain in Australia ceases to be lawful when there is "no real prospect of removal of the alien from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future". However, the power to detain will be re‑enlivened if and when a state of facts comes to exist giving rise to a real prospect of the alien's removal from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. Visa cancellation ensures that such persons are available for removal if it becomes reasonably practicable and may therefore serve the purpose of protecting the Australian community, even though removal from Australia may not be reasonably practicable at the time the decision is made. In the interim, a bridging visa such as a BVR may be granted subject to conditions aimed at protecting the Australian community.50
Second, and in any event, there was nothing illogical, irrational or unreasonable in the delegate's assessment of protection of the Australian community as a primary consideration. The delegate's reasons must be read fairly and as a whole. The reasons for the Non-revocation Decision are structured in the manner described above: in sequence with different topics under separate headings. Read as a whole, the Court would not infer that, in dealing with one topic, the delegate had forgotten the substance of what was stated elsewhere in the reasons or had quarantined the assessment of one topic from every other topic.51 The decision-maker should not be thought to have approved each paragraph of the statement of reasons in isolation, before moving on to the next paragraph.52
As has been explained, under the heading "Legal consequences of the decision" the delegate made the following six findings or statements: the delegate (1) accepted that the plaintiff was a person in respect of whom Australia had non-refoulement obligations and, pursuant to s 197C(3) of the Act, the plaintiff could not be removed to PNG;53 (2) acknowledged that the plaintiff could only be removed to a country other than PNG;54 (3) referred to NZYQ and observed that, where there is no real prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, a non-citizen must be released from immigration detention;55 (4) stated that, as there was "presently" no real prospect of removal to a third country, non-revocation of the Cancellation Decision would lead to the plaintiff being "released from detention";56 (5) stated that the Minister would separately consider the "type of visa on which he should reside" and the conditions to be imposed on that visa (the only "type" of visa that could be granted to the plaintiff was a BVR, which, as the delegate foreshadowed, was subject to both mandatory and discretionary conditions);57 and (6) observed that a non-revocation decision would result in there being "significant restrictions" on the plaintiff's ability to apply for any other visa in the future.58
In sum, it can be readily inferred that the delegate made the Non-revocation Decision (including the assessment of the protection of the Australian community for the purposes of para 8.1 of Direction No 110) on the understanding and basis that, if the plaintiff's visa remained cancelled, the plaintiff would be released into the Australian community as the holder of a BVR, which would be subject to conditions.
Indeed, conditions imposed on a BVR regulate the holder's conduct in Australia and are designed to offer protection to the Australian community.59 Those conditions do not apply to the Protection Visa previously held by the plaintiff (which would have been reinstated if a decision to revoke the cancellation had been made). By operation of s 76AAA of the Act, a BVR ceases to be in effect once removal of the plaintiff becomes reasonably practicable because of a third country granting the plaintiff a right to enter and remain in that country.60 The grant of a BVR made the plaintiff available for removal from Australia, should removal to a third country become reasonably practicable at some future point in time.
The delegate did not fail to consider that, as a result of the Non-revocation Decision, the plaintiff would become an unlawful non-citizen but would not be detained. The delegate recorded that they were aware that ss 198 and 197C of the Act applied to the plaintiff and of the further restrictions on the plaintiff applying for any other form of visa.61 In the circumstances, it is readily to be inferred that the delegate was aware that the immediate result of the Non‑revocation Decision was that the plaintiff would become an unlawful non‑citizen.
The plaintiff's further contention, that the delegate failed to consider that the plaintiff would remain an unlawful non-citizen in the community but without a visa, is rejected. It was an agreed fact that the Minister had referred the plaintiff to the relevant part of the Department for consideration of the grant of a BVR and there was no process underway for consideration of a grant of any other visa to the plaintiff. Indeed, the delegate expressly observed that the Minister was considering the grant of a visa, which in context must have been a BVR.62 Further, it was an agreed fact that a BVR was granted to the plaintiff the same day as the Non-revocation Decision and the plaintiff accepts that departmental emails around this time evidence an intention to coordinate between the delegate responsible for the Non-revocation Decision and the delegate responsible for the BVR decision. Indeed, the plaintiff's own position in his submissions, and the second way he attempts to frame this error, proceeds on the basis that the grant of a BVR was "a sufficiently certain legal consequence".
In sum, the delegate did not fail to consider a legal consequence of the Non‑revocation Decision by not addressing the possibility of the plaintiff residing in the community as an unlawful non-citizen without a visa. To adopt and adapt what was said by Gageler CJ, Edelman and Jagot JJ in Plaintiff S22/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,63 "[i]t must be inferred that the unstated alternative if the plaintiff was not granted the BVR, that he would reside in the community without a visa as an unlawful non-citizen, was not mentioned by the delegate because [they] knew that the grant of the BVR was the overwhelming likelihood".
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v KFTJ,64 on which the plaintiff places significant reliance, is distinguishable. To take just one basis for distinction, in that case the Minister had had put to them at the time of making a decision to cancel a visa under s 501BA of the Act the "option" of referring consideration of whether to grant KFTJ a BVR to a delegate, which the Minister had circled on the same day that they signed the s 501BA cancellation decision and the statement of reasons.65 The Court inferred that the Minister made the decision to cancel his visa before referring the case to a delegate to consider granting a BVR. The plaintiff's position in this proceeding is factually different.
As noted, the plaintiff's second framing of this error was to contend that the grant of a BVR, with at least the mandatory conditions applicable to it, was a "sufficiently certain legal consequence" which the delegate was required to consider. That contention also fails.
The delegate was required to consider the legal consequences of the exercise of power in question or the consequences visited by Australian law on the persons whom the decision affects. Having recognised the likelihood that a non-revocation decision would lead to the plaintiff's release into the Australian community on a BVR, the delegate's reasons do not reveal any failure to appreciate that the BVR would be subject to any mandatory conditions of such a visa.66 Again, to adopt and adapt what was said by Gageler CJ, Edelman and Jagot JJ in Plaintiff S22/2025,67 "[a]lthough the delegate made no specific reference to the consequences of the grant of a BVR, including the imposition of mandatory monitoring conditions, there was no obligation upon the delegate to make express reference to those consequences (however probable) of a discretionary exercise of executive power while the plaintiff was being detained or after release".
The plaintiff sought to impugn the delegate's statement that, in making the decision, they had "not speculated on the likelihood of the Minister intervening under any of the provisions mentioned above, or the consequences for [the plaintiff] following any such intervention".68 The plaintiff contends that in this paragraph the delegate expressly refused to speculate on whether the plaintiff "would most likely be the subject of a grant of the BVR including the mandatory conditions to which such visas are subject".69 That contention misreads the delegate's statement, which in context addresses the immediately preceding two paragraphs that deal with the plaintiff's limited ability himself to apply, in the future, for another visa. What the delegate declined to speculate about was the possibility of the Minister intervening under s 48B of the Act to lift the s 48A bar that would otherwise prevent the plaintiff from making a visa application. The delegate's statement does not address the likelihood of a grant of a BVR, which could be granted without the plaintiff applying.70
The plaintiff was required to make his application for a constitutional or other writ within 35 days of the date of the Non-revocation Decision.71 The plaintiff did not do so. The Court must be satisfied that it is "necessary in the interests of the administration of justice" to extend the 35-day period.72 In deciding that question, relevant considerations include the length of and reasons for the delay and the merits of the putative application for judicial review.73
The circumstances in this case do not justify a grant of an extension of time. The application fails to disclose any jurisdictional error in the Non-revocation Decision.
References to "the Minister" in these reasons are to the Minister administering the Act on the relevant day: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 19(1) Item 1. ↩
SQHG and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 2810. ↩
Act, s 486A. ↩
As defined by s 501 of the Act. ↩
The protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct; whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence; the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia; the best interests of minor children in Australia; and the expectations of the Australian community: Direction No 110, paras 6, 8. ↩
The legal consequences of the decision; the extent of impediments if removed; and any impact on Australian business interests: Direction No 110, paras 6, 9. ↩
Act, s 501(7)(c). ↩
Direction No 110, paras 5.2(2), 8.1(1). ↩
Direction No 110, para 8.1. ↩
Direction No 110, para 4(1) definition of "family violence", para 8.2. ↩
Direction No 110, para 8.3. ↩
Direction No 110, para 8.3(1). ↩
Direction No 110, para 8.4. ↩
Direction No 110, para 8.5(1). ↩
Direction No 110, para 9(1)(a)-(b). The delegate recorded that there was no suggestion that the cancellation of the plaintiff's visa would impact on Australian business interests for the purposes of para 9(1)(c) of Direction No 110. ↩
Direction No 110, para 9.1. ↩
Defined in s 197C(4)-(7) of the Act. ↩
(2023) 280 CLR 137. ↩
Direction No 110, para 9.2. ↩
The listed factors in favour of revocation were the best interests of the plaintiff's minor child, the plaintiff's ties to Australia and some of the legal consequences of the decision. ↩
See [7] above. ↩
As required by Migration Regulations, reg 2.52(4). ↩
See [9] above. ↩
(2022) 275 CLR 582 at 594 [14]-[15]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 598 [22]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 598 [24]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 599 [25]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 599 [25]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 599 [25]. ↩
Plaintiff M1/2021 (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 598 [23]. ↩
Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 265 at 277 [23]. ↩
See [44] above. ↩
See [48] above. ↩
See [16]-[39] above. ↩
See [47] and [50] above. ↩
See [9] above. ↩
See [8] above. ↩
In the section of the form titled "Family details", the plaintiff did not list any family members. However, he did provide details of his daughter. ↩
See [21], [28], [30] above. ↩
See [16] above. ↩
Direction No 110, para 9.1. ↩
See [56] above. ↩
See [29] above. ↩
2022 Tribunal Decision at [90]. ↩
See [35] above. ↩
Direction No 110, para 6. ↩
Act, s 198. See generally NZYQ (2023) 280 CLR 137 at 148-149 [12]-[13], 162 [55]. ↩
Act, ss 189(1), 196(1). ↩
(2023) 280 CLR 137 at 162 [55], 166-167 [73]. ↩
See, generally, Migration Regulations, regs 2.25AA, 2.25AB, Pt 070 of Sch 2, Sch 8. But note that curfew and ankle monitoring conditions (conditions 8620 and 8621) cannot lawfully be imposed: EGH19 v The Commonwealth (2026) 100 ALJR 400; 428 ALR 467. ↩
Ismail (2024) 280 CLR 265 at 286 [50]. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SSVJ (2026) 315 FCR 435 at 443 [27]. ↩
SSVJ (2026) 315 FCR 435 at 443 [27]. ↩
See [33]-[34] above. ↩
See [34] above. ↩
See [35] above. ↩
See [35] above. ↩
See [35] above. ↩
See [36] above. ↩
XKTK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 311 FCR 539 at 562 [107]. See also Plaintiff S22/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1382-1383 [15]‑[17], 1384 [25]; 425 ALR 79 at 85, 88. But note that there are limits on the conditions that may be imposed on a BVR to protect the community: EGH19 (2026) 100 ALJR 400; 428 ALR 467. ↩
Plaintiff S22/2025 (2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1385 [27]; 425 ALR 79 at 88-89. The BVR ceases to be in effect immediately after notice is given to the non-citizen: Act, s 76AAA(4). ↩
See [33]-[36] above. ↩
See [35] above. See also Plaintiff S22/2025 (2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1382-1383 [15]-[17]; 425 ALR 79 at 85. ↩
(2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1383 [18]; 425 ALR 79 at 86. ↩
(2026) 316 FCR 273. ↩
KFTJ (2026) 316 FCR 273 at 286 [45]-[46]. See also 285 [44], 286-287 [47]-[49]. ↩
See [35]-[36] above. ↩
(2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1382 [14]; 425 ALR 79 at 85. See also SSVJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 954 at [27]. ↩
See [36] above. ↩
cf Plaintiff S22/2025 (2025) 99 ALJR 1378 at 1382 [13]; 425 ALR 79 at 84. ↩
Migration Regulations, regs 2.25AA(2), 2.25AB(2). ↩
Act, s 486A(1). ↩
Act, s 486A(2). ↩
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579 at 588-589 [11]-[12], 599-600 [40]. ↩
(2024) 280 CLR 265
(2026) 100 ALJR 400
(2026) 315 FCR 435
(2025) 311 FCR 539
(2025) 99 ALJR 1378
(2026) 316 FCR 273
(2022) 276 CLR 579
Application dismissed with costs; extension of time refused.