EEY18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 7

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (protection visa).
2. For the following reasons, I consider that the IAA's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Writs will therefore issue, quashing the decision and requiring that the matter be redetermined according to law.

1. The applicant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who arrived in Australia some years ago. The applicant applied for a protection visa on 9 March 2017.
2. On 11 December 2017, the Delegate refused the application. The matter was then referred to the IAA for review of the Delegate's decision.
3. On 20 July 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate's decision.

1. The IAA observed that it had received submissions and documents from the applicant's representative. This included new information regarding various matters. Although the IAA found that the requirements of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) were met in relation to certain new information that had been provided, it found that it was precluded from considering other new information by reference to this provision (at [5]-[36]). As this reasoning is the subject of challenge in this proceeding, it will be considered further below.
2. The IAA observed that it had obtained new country information. The IAA found that the requirements for consideration under s 473DD of the Act were met in relation to this information (at [37]).
3. The IAA accepted that:

(a) the applicant was a Tamil from Sri Lanka (at [40]);

(b) the applicant worked in roles for certain organisations, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (at [40] and [43]);

(c) the applicant faced some adverse interest and harassment from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) (at [43]);

(d) the applicant's brother worked in an administrative role for the LTTE and went missing at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in the 1990s (at [44]);

(e) the applicant was related to other people who were involved with the LTTE (at [45]);

(f) the applicant was made to watch war crimes footage at an army camp (at [55]);

(g) the applicant provided certain information to SLA members (at [58]);

(h) enquiries were made of the director of an organisation where the applicant worked after his departure from Sri Lanka (at [61]); and

(i) the applicant had been a low-level participant in Remembrance Day or Heroes Day functions in Australia and may seek to participate in such events upon return to Sri Lanka (at [62]).

(a) the applicant's mental health explained difficulties it had identified in his evidence (at [42]);

(b) the applicant would be imputed with a pro-LTTE family or individual profile on account of his brother or other relatives who were involved with the LTTE (at [46]);

(c) the applicant transported LTTE members on his work-related trips to Colombo or in other circumstances (at [48]);

(d) the applicant or his family were of any interest to the authorities on the basis of LTTE links (at [50]);

(e) the applicant obtained or distributed war crimes footage (at [55]);

(f) anyone from the SLA, Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), or any group came looking for the applicant on account of his possession of such footage (at [55]);

(g) the arrest of an army officer had any implications for the applicant (at [56]);

(h) there was any adverse interest in the applicant on account of war crimes footage or any related matter (at [56]-[57]);

(i) the applicant would face a real chance of harm in relation to war crimes footage (at [65]);

(j) the applicant was of adverse interest to the authorities or would face a real chance of harm on account of failing to provide information on the LTTE or former LTTE members (at [58] and [66]);

(k) certain visits from an SLA member and an EPDP member indicated any threat of harm, or were indicative of the applicant having a profile of concern (at [59]-[60]);

(l) all of the enquires claimed to have been made after the applicant's departure from Sri Lanka occurred (at [61]);

(m) the applicant would be wanted by the authorities on account of any LTTE related matters (at [76]);

(n) the applicant would be perceived as a separatist, even if the authorities knew of his participation in claimed events in Australia (at [76]); or

(o) the applicant would face a real chance of harm on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity, LTTE imputations, Tamil separatist imputations, his familial links, incidents of being questioned, his parents' hosting of an LTTE member, his gender, age or interaction with Tamil community events in Australia, or any other factors (at [77]).

1. The IAA accepted that if the applicant returned to Sri Lanka, he would be treated as a failed or returning asylum seeker from Australia who departed Sri Lanka illegally. It accepted that, as a result of this, the applicant may face investigation, a limited period of detention, a protracted judicial process and a fine. The IAA was not satisfied that this treatment would result in serious or significant harm. Further, the IAA found that such treatment would be pursuant to a non-discriminatory law of general application (at [78]-[87] and [96]).
2. The IAA accepted that the applicant may be visited by the authorities upon return to Sri Lanka. It accepted that he may be monitored on the basis of his refugee status and in the event that he became involved in politically sensitive issues (such as Remembrance Day or memorial events). However, the IAA found that such monitoring would not amount to serious or significant harm (at [88]-[89] and [96]).
3. The IAA accepted that many returnees faced difficulties reintegrating and finding suitable employment. However, the IAA was satisfied that the applicant would have support and that any discrimination he may face would not amount to serious or significant harm (at [90] and [97]).
4. The IAA accepted that the applicant suffered from emotional trauma and sleeplessness. However, the IAA was not satisfied that the applicant's mental health was such that it would result in his having a risk profile upon return, or that he would require treatment that would be withheld from him for any reason. The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious or significant harm in relation to these matters (at [91] and [98]).
5. Having regard to the above, the IAA was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of the protection visa. Accordingly, the IAA affirmed the Delegate's decision (at [92]-[100]).

1. The applicant sought judicial review of the IAA's decision through an application filed on 13 August 2018. The matter remained in the central migration docket for some time before being allocated to my docket more recently and listed for hearing. The applicant ultimately relied upon an amended application, filed on 7 October 2025, in which the following grounds were relied upon:

Ground One is replaced as follows:

The Second Respondent's (the Authority's) assessment of new information under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) was affected by jurisdictional error.

Particulars

Footage of atrocities (paragraph 5-18)

1(a) The applicant provided new information to the Authority, comprising (p 13):

(i) that the footage was both on the laptop/USB and was also uploaded on the applicant's phone;

(ii) that the further information the Priest could not elaborate on in his support letter related to this matter;

(iii) that the images from the applicant had been released to the media;

that he believed S was interrogated and that he would be linked to S and the war images through S' phone; and

(iv) that mobile phones were the source of most war crimes information in Sri Lanka and "No Fire Zone" is an example of this;

b) IAA concluded at [16] made finding that the applicant's evidence contains several inconsistencies regarding the phone/USB and whether he shared the images he claims to have obtained. He has not provided an explanation for why the new information should be viewed as "true representation" to his claims. As a result, the requirements of section 473DD(b)(ii) have not been satisfied.

c) However, it was not open for the IAA to make a credibility finding. All the 'credible' element of s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is that the IAA was satisfied that the 'new information' is capable of being believed, as s 473DD(b)(ii) merely acts as a 'filtering mechanism' (CSR16 at [41]-[42]). By undertaking a lengthy deliberation of the new information's credibility, the IAA exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a higher standard of satisfaction than the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires (CSR16 at [43]). The IAA has asked itself the wrong question and imposed wrong threshold and in a way misunderstood its tasks (CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474). The IAA also did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information under s 473DD(a).

d. Further, the IAA fell into error by omitting a necessary step in applying s473DD(ii) and misconstrued the "credible element" of s 473DD(b)(ii). And the assessment went too far (AZT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 90 -[73])

e. In relation to (iii) and (iv) of the above particulars the IAA incorrectly approached s 473DD of the Migration Act.

ii. did not consider the criteria under s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act;

iii. determined there were not exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information under s 473DD(a) at the outset of its assessment of new information under s 473DD, contrary to the correct approach which is to consider issues relating to s 473DD(b) prior to considering s 473DD(a); and

c) The Authority's errors deprived the applicant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome.

2. In relation to the letter from mental health worker [19]-[25] the Immigration Assessment Authority satisfied itself that s473DD(b)(i) had been satisfied, and then it moved to considering s 473DD(a), but failed to consider whether the information "is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it known, may have affected the consideration of the refereed applicant's claims" within the meaning of s 473D(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Authority's error was "material" in the sense used in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12....

Ground three is replaced as follows

The Authority's failure to consider exercising its power or failure to exercise the power, or its power to get new information from the Applicant or a person under section 473DC of the Act, was legally unreasonable. The reasoning process is illogical, irrational and legally unreasonable.

Further, the finding based on unwarranted assumptions and lacking a probative evidentiary basis.

Particulars

(a) The reasoning process of "post departure claim" (pp32-33) is illogical, irrational and legally unreasonable. The IAA also failed to exercise its s 473DC power to get new information. Further IAA also made a finding based on unwarranted assumptions lacking a probative evidentiary basis.

(b) In relation to the claim of "the letter and related documents from former LTTE co-worker, the IAA failed to exercise its s473DC power to get new information. The process is illogical, irrational and legally unreasonable.

(c) The IAA at [54] stated that "1 have decided not to contact the priest". The failure to contact the priest or invite the Applicant for comment is unreasonable when particularly requested by the applicant to contact the priest.

(d) As the Applicant and his representative have made clear to the delegate and the IAA, the Priest possesses important corroborating evidence of the claims raised by the Applicant with respect to important adverse findings. The IAA should have exercised its discretion to contact the Priest or at the very least attempted to identify the Priest to assess the veracity of its reasoning in declining the Applicant's request to seek this new information. Secondly, it is incorrect to state that the IAA cannot contact third parties.

(As per the original)

1. In relation to ground 1, the applicant raised a number of complaints relating to how the IAA applied s 473DD of the Act. Section 473DD of the Act provided as follows:

473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstances

For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:

(a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and

(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:

(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or

(ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims.

1. I have not been persuaded that the majority of the applicant's complaints under this ground ought to succeed, essentially for the reasons submitted by the Minister. It is unnecessary to set out in detail why those arguments have not been accepted. This is because I accept that the applicant has demonstrated relevant error in relation to one of the categories relied upon. That category concerns new information submitted to the IAA regarding the applicant's mental health.
2. The new information was contained in a report from an "Accredited Mental Health Social Worker" (CB 267-268). Reference was made in the report to protection claims that had been made by the applicant. The report went on to state:

... He admitted to feeling fearful to disclose this information to Australia Immigration authorities during the interview due to fear of deportation followed by potential life threatening situation in Sri Lanka. [The applicant] scored high on K-10 depression Scale and also scored high on anxiety. His symptoms of deterioration in his mental state included poor sleep, significant weight loss, poor appetite, ideas of hopelessness, worthlessness, palpitations, agitation, and forgetfulness. He reported poor concentration at work when the thoughts of his prolonged indefinite separation from his wife and children and the overwhelming fear of returning back to his country surface his mind. This has been posing a major challenging issue for him as his continued poor concentration at work place him at risk of physical injury and his life. His managers have warned him several times that further places at risk of termination from his employment. The worsening above described symptoms has adversely impacted his psychosocial and occupational functioning. His worsening deterioration in his mental state has impacted his memory, concentration and attention that could adversely impact his capacity to narrate his history in a cohesive and comprehensive manner. It is noted that he had missed appointments to attend sessions due to his poor memory.

During my last session he presented with emotional distress whilst discussing his Immigration interview and stated that he experienced difficulties with remembering the details due his deterioration in his memory. He also provided details about him losing his glasses, Wallet, and his mobile phone. He became emotionally distressed whilst disclosing a recent incident when he wore his underwear on the top of his work trousers whilst getting ready to go his work. It is noted that his depression and anxiety has significantly contributed to his worsening poor concentration and distractibility. He also admitted to developing persecutory and paranoid ideas that make him feel fearful and has become hyper vigilant.

I am currently continue to provide him with psychological interventions and psycho education to enable him develop strength based coping strategies and closely monitor his mental state. I have referred him to his Gp to make a referral to Psychiatrist for further review for medication. From my assessment on his psychosocial situation, he is observed to be at significant risk harm to his life if he is forced to return back to Sri Lanka.

In case you need more details, kindly contact me on the above details provided...

1. The IAA reasoned as follows in relation to this material at [19]-[25] of its decision:
   1. The IAA has been provided with a letter written on 5 January 2018 by... an 'Accredited Mental Health Social Worker'. As it post-dates the decision, I am satisfied this letter could not have been provided to the delegate before the decision was made.
   2. The letter attests to the applicant's high anxiety and depression and overall poor mental health which has purportedly affected various aspects of his life including by affecting his sleep, appetite and physical health, and his ability to concentrate, focus and remember details. [The social worker] states the applicant was referred to her by his General Practitioner (GP) in September 2016 when he presented with worsening symptoms of depression and anxiety and that she is continuing to provide him with psychosocial interventions and psycho education and has referred him to his GP to make a referral to a Psychiatrist for further review.
   3. According to [the social worker], the applicant's mental health has been adversely affected by the 'genuine' risk to his life in Sri Lanka. She states he provided her with a detailed narrative history including (inter alia) that he and his brother both worked for the LTTE and his brother disappeared after being arrested by the SLA and that he had video evidence of SLA war crimes. She states he remains a person of interest and faces a significant risk of harm if he is returned.
   4. [The social worker's] letter is broadly corroborative of the applicant's claims but I note the history she provides was obtained from the applicant. With no disrespect to [the social worker] intended, I am not satisfied that she has any firsthand knowledge of the events described to her or that she is well placed to determine what risks the applicant may face arising from these events upon return.
   5. It is relevant too that the applicant had previously disclosed that he suffered emotional trauma and sleeplessness and while this letter indicates a diagnosis of anxiety and depression and provides a more detailed account of these matters, it does not indicate the applicant will face specific or heightened risks upon return as a result of his mental health. It does suggest that his mental health adversely impacted his ability to remember details and to narrate his history in a cohesive and comprehensive manner however it is a general comment; there is no indication of which parts of the applicant's evidence were purportedly so affected. In any event, I have, in assessing his evidence, taken the applicant's mental capacity into account based on his earlier references to suffering ongoing emotional trauma.
   6. Furthermore, no assessment from any doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist has been provided either to the delegate, or to the IAA and while I accept these are [the social worker's] observations and experiences, her report is, for the reasons given above of very limited value.
   7. Overall, I am not satisfied that any exceptional circumstances exist to justify consideration of the letter from the applicant's mental health social worker and the information contained therein.
2. The applicant submitted that the IAA's approach fell afoul of the High Court's decision in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; (2020) 269 CLR 494 (AUS17), in which it was considered at [10]-[11] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler J (as his Honour was), Keane and Gordon JJ (footnotes omitted):
   1. Section 473DD would be at war with itself, and the purpose of s 473DD(b)(ii) would be thwarted, if the circumstance that there was new information from a referred applicant meeting the description in either s 473DD(b)(i) or s 473DD(b)(ii) were able to be ignored by the Authority in assessing the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of that new information in order to meet the criterion specified in s 473DD(a).
   2. Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.
3. I accept the applicant's submissions.
4. I accept, as the Minister submitted, that it has been found that compliance with s 473DD of the Act must occur as a matter of substance rather than form: DDH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 773 at [25] (Goodman J) and _BTK19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affai_rs [2024] FCA 658 (BTK19) at [56] (Perry J). However, I am not persuaded to infer that the IAA considered the criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act in the circumstances of this case.
5. The Minister submitted, by reference to the following, that it could be inferred that the IAA considered that the criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii) were not met:

(a) first, in relation to the applicant's protection claims, the IAA noted that the writer was not "well placed to determine what risks the applicant may face" if returned as she had no personal knowledge of the matters (at [22]);

(b) second, in relation to the suggestion that the information about the applicant's mental health might go to his ability to narrate his history in detail or might have affected his memory, the IAA noted that there was no information as to what, if any, aspects of his claims might have been affected in that regard (at [23]); and

(c) third, the IAA indicated that earlier information about the effect of his mental health on his capacity was already taken into account (at [24]).

1. I accept that the IAA grappled, in a broad sense, with the probative force of the information. However, this appears to have been for the purpose of considering whether or not there were exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 473DD(a) of the Act: see BTK19 at [63]-[71].
2. I am not persuaded that, as part of this analysis, the IAA considered whether the information in question was "credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims". This is in the absence of any express consideration of this criteria in the otherwise detailed analysis that was undertaken in this section of the IAA's decision. The IAA did not undertake this assessment by considering the limitations in the social worker's evidence more generally, nor by considering the report of "very limited value". Having regard to the context and content of the IAA's decision, I consider that the more likely inference is that the IAA, having made its decision before the High Court's decision in AUS17, did not understand that it was required to adopt the approach considered at [11] of AUS17 and that, accordingly, the IAA did not do so.
3. I am also unable to accept the Minister's submission that the error in question was immaterial (and therefore incapable of resulting in jurisdictional error).
4. The Minister submitted that even if the (disputed) error had not occurred, the IAA would still not have taken into account the letter of the mental health social worker, as the IAA would have gone on to find that there were no exceptional circumstances for doing so.
5. I am unable to accept that this result was inevitable. The information in question was capable of being considered "credible personal information" within the meaning of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act, particularly insofar as it concerned the applicant's mental health. Whilst the IAA identified limitations in the information, it did not reason otherwise at [19]-[25] of its decision. The IAA also did not find that the information would have been incapable of affecting consideration of the applicant's claims. Having regard to the IAA's reasons and the nature of the information in question, such a result was not inevitable. It is possible that the IAA may have found that the relatively low threshold under s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act was met in relation to the information, had this been considered by the IAA.
6. If the IAA had found that the information in question met both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act, then it is possible that the IAA may have found that exceptional circumstances justified its consideration. Although the IAA considered the probative value of the information to be limited, it did not dispute that the information potentially had some probative value. In the circumstances of this case, a finding that s 473DD of the Act was not met was not a foregone conclusion. Had the IAA understood the approach to s 473DD of the Act considered in AUS17, then it is possible that it would have found that the requirements of the provision (at the preliminary stage of its reasoning) had been met.
7. In relation to the final decision, the Minister observed that the IAA had noted that it was not apparent what the concerns regarding the applicant's mental capacity went to, but, in any event, the IAA was aware of the issue of the applicant's mental capacity and this was taken into account in assessing the evidence. The Minister observed that the IAA accepted that the applicant had been shown a video of war crimes at [51]-[57] of its decision. The Minister observed that what was not accepted was one or another of the various versions of the claim. The Minister submitted that admitting the letter from the mental health social worker could not have assisted the IAA in choosing which, if any, of the various version of events put by the applicant as to how he viewed the video and what he did with the content afterwards. In these circumstances, the Minister submitted that any error in this regard was immaterial.
8. Again, I am unable to accept the Minister's submissions. Whilst it was not clear to the IAA at the preliminary stage of its reasoning what specific concerns in the applicant's evidence the information went to, it is possible that the IAA may have reasoned otherwise if it had taken the information into account after finding that it met s 473DD of the Act. As set out above, the IAA did not accept all of the applicant's claims. The IAA's rejection of certain of the applicant's claims was based upon difficulties it had identified in his evidence. In particular, in relation to the applicant's claims to face harm on account of war crimes footage, the IAA was unwilling to accept significant aspects of those claims on account of (inter alia) discrepancies it had identified in the applicant's evidence. In particular, the IAA did not accept that the applicant ever obtained the footage (nor buried it or handed it in), or that anyone ever came looking for him in relation to this matter (at [51]-[57] and [65]).
9. The IAA considered, in general terms, whether discrepancies in the applicant's evidence may be explicable by the applicant's mental state at [42] of its decision:
   1. The applicant claims that although he was not physically harmed in Sri Lanka, his experiences were stressful and had an emotional effect on his life. He has suffered emotional trauma and sleepless nights. The submission to the IAA suggests that the applicant's mental state has negatively impacted his memory, concentration and capacity to narrate his history in a cohesive and comprehensive manner. I have taken this into account however I am not satisfied that these factors either individually or cumulatively explain or overcome the material discrepancies and implausibilities and other concerns in the evidence the applicant has provided in certain aspects of his claims. These issues are discussed below.
10. However, this conclusion was reached with the IAA having found that it was unable to take into account evidence of the "Accredited Mental Health Social Worker" that had been enlisted by the applicant. That evidence provided an assessment of the applicant's mental state that went beyond the other material that was otherwise before the IAA. It suggested that the applicant's mental state affected his ability to remember information. Whilst generally expressed, this could (at least potentially) have impacted upon the general analysis conducted by the IAA at [42] and had some bearing upon the IAA's assessment at [51]-[57]. The letter also indicated that the applicant's mental state, at least by the time of the report, had reached a level where the applicant had been unable to effectively dress himself (having worn underwear on top of his work trousers). Had this been considered by the IAA, then it is possible (even if it is not necessarily likely) that it may have viewed submissions regarding the effect of the applicant's mental state upon his evidence differently. This may have led the IAA to have been more favourably disposed to the most recent version of the claim that had been advanced on behalf of the applicant.
11. The threshold for materiality is not a high one: see LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [7]- [16] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ; see also BYT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 157 at [47]- [52] (Stewart J). I accept the applicant's submission that it has been met in the present case.

Ground 3 - legal unreasonableness and illogicality

1. Having regard to the above, it is not strictly necessary to determine ground 3. However, I note that I have not been persuaded that the application ought to succeed on this basis.
2. The ground contended that it was legally unreasonable for the IAA not to have considered exercising, or exercised, its power under s 473DC of the Act to obtain new information. This was said to have occurred in relation to "the letter and related documents from [a] former LTTE co-worker". It was also said to have occurred in relation to the IAA's decision not to contact a Priest.
3. In relation to the co-worker, in written submissions the applicant took issue with the IAA's reasoning at [28] that it did not consider the co-worker "to be an authoritative source as to the likelihood of the applicant being sent for rehabilitation upon return". This was in circumstances where the co-worker claimed that he had been questioned about the applicant. The applicant suggested that the IAA's reasoning "could suggest... unreasonably that it should come to applicant directly from authorities".
4. It is not apparent whether this complaint was pressed following the most recently amended application. In any event, it has not been demonstrated that the IAA's reasoning in this regard was logically closed to the IAA. Whilst the letter referred to the author having undergone rehabilitation and having been questioned about the applicant, it did not explain if or why the author could be considered an authoritative source upon the likelihood of rehabilitation more generally (including in relation to the applicant). The IAA did not, as was submitted by the applicant, suggest that information about the likelihood of rehabilitation ought to come directly from the authorities.
5. It is not clear (a) what information the applicant contends ought to have been sought under s 473DC of the Act in relation to the letter from the co-worker; (b) why it is submitted that an inference ought to be drawn that the IAA failed to consider exercising its discretion in this regard; nor (c) why non-exercise of the discretion under s 473DC could be said to be legally unreasonable. There does not appear to have been any request from the applicant to contact the co-worker (or proposed means of doing so). The IAA did not doubt that the applicant worked for the LTTE. The fact that limitations in information that was otherwise relevant to the applicant's protection claims were identified by the IAA does not mean that it was legally unreasonable for the IAA not to have exercised its power under s 473DC of the Act to obtain further information (whether from the applicant or from the co-worker).
6. In relation to the Priest, the IAA gave the following reasons at [53]-[54] of its decision for not seeking further information:
   1. At the SHEV interview the applicant stated he would obtain a letter from the Priest to support his claims regarding the USB however the letter he later provided makes no mention of any USB and nor does the authoring Priest identify himself as someone the applicant gave information/footage to or confided in in any manner in relation to these claimed events, the information he heard about [a] death nor any other matter. The covering email attaching this letter states the Priest did not want to provide his personal details or elaborate on the events as he feared it may have implications on his life but that he could be contacted by phone if further information was needed. I have concerns about this explanation. I agree with the delegate that while his name does not appear and his signature is illegible, the Priest's identity would be readily traceable from the details in the letterhead should someone wish to find him. I take into account the claimed fear about elaborating but there is no indication that this Priest knows anything about this matter and as such I do not consider the letter to be corroborative of the applicant's claim in this respect.
   2. I have considered whether to exercise my discretion to obtain new information noting the invitation to contact the Priest. However I am satisfied that the applicant has had ample time and opportunity to provide further evidence from this Priest or elsewhere and the IAA does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information even when requested to do so by a referred applicant. It is under no duty to contact third parties to obtain evidence or to seek verification. I have decided not contacted the Priest.
7. I accept the Minister's submission that these reasons provided an intelligible justification for the exercise of discretion. The IAA did not doubt that the Priest's evidence was relevant to the applicant's claims. However, the IAA was not obliged to accept the applicant's explanation that limitations in the evidence were explicable by the Priest being afraid of providing personal details or further information in writing. This was noting the identifying information that had, contrastingly, been provided by the Priest (which concern had also been identified in the Delegate's decision). It was, accordingly, open to the IAA to have considered that the applicant had been provided adequate opportunity to put forward any further evidence that he wished to rely upon in relation to the Priest. Having regard to this and to the particular statutory scheme under which the IAA operated, the IAA declined to contact the Priest.
8. Contrary to what was suggested in the particulars to the ground, the IAA did not indicate in its reasons that it considered itself unable to contact third parties. Rather the IAA correctly observed that it was under no general obligation to contact third parties to obtain evidence and seek verification. This is consistent with the statutory scheme under Part 7AA of the Act (as it was), which provided, as a "default position", for the conduct of a review without accepting or requesting "new information": BTK19 at [44].
9. The applicant has not adequately developed his argument in support of the suggestion in the particulars that failure to contact him for further information, in relation to the Priest's letter, was legally unreasonable. It is not apparent that this was requested of the IAA by the applicant. In the above circumstances, it is not apparent how such an argument could succeed.
10. Under ground 2, the applicant also contended that the IAA erred in relation to the applicant's "post departure" claims at [61] of its reasons. There, the IAA stated:
    1. The applicant claims that after he arrived in Australia, the authorities went and questioned the Priest he worked with... and that in 2016 someone went to his parents' house... looking for him. He has also provided documentation indicating his wife has raised complaints with the police and the HRCSL regarding threats she received at home in late 2017/early 2018 by unidentified persons purporting to be CID members enquiring about her husband, about people posing as archaeologists photographing their house and about the police not accepting her complaints.
       • Given the applicant had interacted with members of the authorities (in particular the SLA) on a regular basis in his [previous] roles it is not implausible that his absence was noticed and enquiries were made with the Priest, who was the [organisation's] director in the region. However I note there is no mention in the Priest's letter of enquiries made through him and I consider this indicative of him not being concerned. I have not accepted the applicant was ever of any adverse interest to the authorities for any reason before he departed and I do not accept the authorities' enquiry with the Priest is indicative of them wanting to detain or harm him, or of having developed an adverse interest in him.
       • I have concerns about the other claimed enquiries made about him through his family... in 2016 and his wife on several occasions in 2017/18. Only vague details have been provided about these incidents, with unknown persons asking after him. There is no suggestion that the visitor... exhibited threatening behaviour or that they returned or made any follow-up enquiries about the applicant elsewhere. As for the visits to the applicant's wife, I note she claimed to the HRCSL that she had been threatened however no details about the nature of such threats have been provided and I have concerns about the plausibility of people suddenly making repeated visits to the applicant's wife and threatening her while looking for the applicant when I have found that he was not of any adverse interest to anyone when he left Sri Lanka in 2013 and there is no evidence that any such approaches were made to her in any of the earlier five years that the applicant had been in Australia and despite the suggestion that the visits and threats had been ongoing for the several months leading up to the HRCSL complaints in January, no mention of this was made until after the delegate's decision. I do not find it credible that the CID, or unknown members of any group would be suddenly targeting the applicant and his family. I do not accept the claimed experiences relating to the applicant's wife in 2017/18 are credible.
11. The applicant contended that this reasoning was illogical, irrational and legally unreasonable. However, much of the applicant's submissions in this regard appeared to be seeking merits review. This Court has no jurisdiction to conduct such a review.
12. I accept, as the applicant submitted, that the IAA's consideration took place against a context in which the IAA had found that exceptional circumstances justified consideration of new information relied upon that was relevant to these claims (at [32]-[33]). It also occurred in a context where the IAA accepted that the applicant had experienced previous interactions with the authorities and that it was not implausible that certain inquiries had been made of him following his departure (at [61]). I accept, as was submitted by the applicant, that "previous non-occurrence does not negate the possibility of current threats arising".
13. However, this does not mean that it was closed to the IAA to have not accepted the claimed visits to the applicant's wife in 2017 or 2018. The IAA was concerned that the evidence provided in this regard was limited in nature. The IAA was also concerned about the plausibility of the applicant's wife suddenly experiencing repeated visits and threats some years after the applicant's departure from Sri Lanka. This was in circumstances where the IAA considered that the evidence before it did not otherwise indicate that the applicant was of adverse interest to the authorities when he had left Sri Lanka some years previously. Limitations in the evidence provided in this regard, combined with its late raising and what was considered to be its contrast with other evidence before the IAA, provided a logically available basis upon which the IAA did not accept the claims in question. Although another decision maker may have reasoned differently, this is not sufficient to meet the high thresholds associated with grounds such as unreasonableness or illogicality: see for example Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131] (Crennan and Bell JJ).
14. The ground also contended that the IAA failed to exercise its s 473DC power to obtain information in relation to the "post departure claim". However, this contention was not fulsomely developed. The applicant has not persuaded me that the IAA was obliged to seek new information in this regard. This is in circumstances where such an opportunity does not appear to have been sought by the applicant in relation to the information in question and the applicant had been given (and taken) an opportunity to provide supporting evidence that he wished to rely upon in relation to his claims.

1. As I accept that relevant error has been demonstrated in relation to ground 1, the application before the Court succeeds.
2. I will hear from the parties in relation to costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing.