"On Wednesday the 20th of November I spoke to [GIB] on the phone, but this was short due to us both being occupied with other tasks. The next day on the 21st after not hearing from [GIB] I knew that something was wrong because this was out of character. Friends located his truck the same day and were able to sight [GIB] inside the truck. I was contacted by Police shortly after and notified of his death."

1. On 12 January 2021, the applicant declared a statutory declaration, which is found at page 7 of the ARDW. At the time, she was 34-years-old, unemployed, and receiving a carer's pension (which she had received for five or six years) in order to care for the second respondent. Her last employment had been on 21 November 2019 (after giving her resignation notice earlier) at Canberra Sand and Gravel Company, where she had worked since 2017, and where she earned around $1,000 per week nett. She had resigned from the company as she was "moving back in with [GIB] in Albury".
2. The worker had commenced his employment with the first respondent before she met him, and he continued in that employment during their relationship. She describes the first respondent as a family business, owned by the worker's parents. She says:

"[GIB] did all of the sourcing of the work, he did all of the driving, the moving of the stock and his name was on the door of the truck, but all of the financials went through his parent's bank accounts...The way that [GIB] was paid was messy. He would get paid certain amounts into his bank accounts to cover whatever costs that needed to be paid. This would be allocated by his mother [FLO]...[GIB] never did his own tax returns. His parents, mainly his mother [FLO], handled it all...[GIB] never submitted invoices to be paid for the hours that he worked at all and he never received any payslips either...When I first met [GIB], he was paid $1000 a week in the hand, which was paid into one account and he would then live off that. Then over time, he was still getting paid roughly $1000 week in the hand, but [FLO] would allocate that money into [GIB]' different accounts as outlined...Regardless of what the company earnings were, [GIB] would get paid a similar amount every week...[The] Table Top Albury property where [GIB] was residing when he died, had actually been purchased in March 2019, and was our property together, brought [sic] on behalf of both of us by [GIB]' parents [FLO] and Pat...They paid for the property, but it was supposed to have been our property. This was done this way due to the way that the financials were set up and how [GIB] was paid for his work...It is very complicated to describe, but part of [GIB]' pay for his work was paid into his bank account to pay for the loan on this property."

"As stated, [GIB] was living at the Table Top Albury address, which was supposed to be both of ours, but was in his parent's name...That property had a mortgage which was being paid as part of how [GIB] was paid by his parent's. I don't know how much the mortgage was, however the house was worth $725,000.00 when it was purchased, minus the deposit...It had been the same with the previous house at Uranquinty, on the outskirts of Wagga Wagga. That house had been in [GIB]' name only, yet we had both owned that property from 2016 until May 2018...That house had cost $625,000.00 in 2016 and was sold for $660,000.00 from memory in 2018, and so when it was sold in May 2018, there was no loan on the property after that as it was paid off."

1. She says that she has four children (being the sixth respondent, the fourth respondent, the third respondent, and the second respondent), and while the worker was only the father of the second respondent, "he also raised all of my other three children as well when we were together".
2. She says that the second respondent and the third respondent had always lived with her and the worker. The fourth respondent also lived with them until 2017, when the fourth respondent moved to live with her sister. After this move, the applicant and the worker still paid for the fourth respondent's medical needs and "less regular things like shoes, clothes and things like that", but the fourth respondent's day-to-day expenses were covered by her sister. The sixth respondent lived with her and the worker from 2008 to 2010, and for periods of around six months each in 2014 and in 2018. He otherwise lived with her parents. When he lived with the parents, the parents met all his needs, and when he lived with her and the worker, they met all his needs.
3. She says the worker had not been previously married, and he had no children other than the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent. His parents were alive, and he had one brother, [DAA].
4. She says that there were "complications" during her marriage to the worker which were usually due to "family dynamic issues" involving his parents. These issues resulted in two periods of separation - a separation for three months in 2009, and they "also separated on

1 July 2019 and then got back together on 1 November 2019, although we were still living separately at that time". 5. Both the second respondent and the third respondent had been living with the worker and her prior to the separation on 1 July 2019, and they both then moved to Canberra with her. She says:

"When [GIB] and I separated on 1 July 2019, it was because he was not being so nice to me, so I left. Throughout our relationship we could both be nice to each other, then nasty to each other and then nice again...The house I was living in in Canberra was owned by the Domestic Violence Refuge as I was escaping Domestic Violence from [GIB] at the time. It was not physical violence, but as stated, he was being not nice to me and at time it was not a very nice situation, which is why I left...At the time that [GIB] and I separated, there was no property settlement at all as everything was in his parent's name. Plus, we were also getting back together."

1. During the period between 1 July 2019 and 1 November 2019, she says:

(a) the worker was not in a relationship with anyone else;

(b) she took the second respondent and the third respondent to see the worker every second weekend at Table Top - or he would otherwise visit them in Canberra every second weekend;

(c) when he visited them in Canberra, he would generally stay at her residence;

(d) she stayed at his residence at Table Top on "a couple of times" also;

(e) after she and the worker had decided to "get back together", they would see each other every weekend either in Canberra or Table Top;

(f) he stayed with her "on and off" from 6 November 2019 to 17 November 2019, and

(g) there were no formal arrangements between them in relation to maintenance or custody of the second respondent or the third respondent - he "would just let me take money out of his account to pay for things for the kids that I could not pay for" - such as "clothes, glasses, school things, medical appointments and things like that".

1. She says that when the worker and her were living together at Table Top (prior to

1 July 2019), "both of our incomes contributed to all of our expenses". Her income from her carer's pension would pay for groceries, sometimes fuel, internet expenses and general living expenses. The worker's income would pay for car expenses, health insurance, mortgage repayments, and general living expenses. They shared the medical expenses for the family, including the expenses for the second respondent and the fourth respondent to see specialists in relation to autism spectrum disorders. They did not have cleaning or gardening expenses, as they attended to those tasks between themselves. 2. The worker was also paying off a personal loan (which amounted to about $8,000 when he died). He owned three motor vehicles (loans for which had all been paid off before he died) and the applicant was currently using one of those motor vehicles (a Toyota Landcruiser) when she declared her statutory declaration. He had a superannuation account of around $8,000, but he and the applicant had no other savings nor investments. 3. She then explains that after the worker's death, she began a relationship with [BXX] ([BXX]), and she describes:

"[BXX] was a friend whom I had stayed with in Temora after [GIB] had died. I had known [BXX] for about 3 months prior to [GIB] dying. We had met socially at a field day during the time that I had been separated from [GIB] after July 2019...At the time that I met [BXX], the plan was to form a relationship with him, however long story short, my husband [GIB] did not want me until somebody else did, so I didn't start a relationship with [BXX], I went back to [GIB]...I only started my relationship with [BXX] about 12 weeks after [GIB] died, when we were staying with him. That relationship was on again and off again from then, however I then mostly ended the relationship with [BXX] in July 2020, due to violence issues. I still have contact with him now, but we are not in a relationship and [BXX] does not pay for anything for me at all."

1. The applicant then provides a third statement dated 8 August 2025 - found at page 1 of the applicant's second ALAD. This statement largely responds to matters raised in statements provided by the fifth respondent and [HLM], and will be detailed when detailing those statements (see paragraph 66 below).
2. The ARDW also contains 173 pages of bank statements (found between pages 51-223). In accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the Rules), I do not propose to consider those statements in detail unless aspects of them are specifically referred to in submissions made by a party. However, I do note that the statements evidence:

(a) deposits from the worker's bank account in favour of the applicant on 1 July 2019, 4 July 2019, 8 July 2019, 23 July 2019, 7 August 2019, 16 August 2019,

19 August 2019, 23 August 2019, 26 August 2019, 27 August 2019, 2 September 2019, 10 September 2019, 11 September 2019, 16 September 2019, 23 September 2019, 25 September 2019, 26 September 2019, 1 October 2019,

2 October 2019, 7 October 2019, 14 October 2019, and 15 October 2019 - the relevant statements in this regard do not continue beyond 15 October 2019, and

(b) credits to the applicant's bank account from the worker on 2 September 2019,

10 September 2019, 11 September 2019, 16 September 2019, 23 September 2019, 26 September 2019, 1 October 2019, 2 October 2019, 7 October 2019,

14 October 2019, 15 October 2019, 29 October 2019, 4 November 2019,

6 November 2019, 11 November 2019, 12 November 2019, 18 November 2019, and 19 November 2019 - the relevant statements in this regard do not start until

2 September 2019.

1. The ARDW further contains numerous other documents claimed to be evidence of a shared life between the applicant and the worker. Most of these documents however only refer to either the applicant or the worker. Again, in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to consider these documents in detail unless aspects of them are specifically referred to in submissions made by a party. However, I do note the following:

(a) page 224 - a fuel card in the applicant's name, but bearing an account in the name of the worker, and bearing an expiry date of July 2022;

(b) page 225 - a 2018-2019 motor vehicle comprehensive insurance contract tax invoice addressed to both the worker and the applicant;

(c) page 231 - a plumbing receipt paid by the worker, dated 8 May 2017;

(d) page 240 - an invoice made out to the worker in relation to the servicing of the applicant's Toyota Landcruiser, dated 11 October 2019;

(e) page 246 - an email from Megan Hollingworth dated 8 April 2019 and addressed to both the applicant and the worker, attaching a report regarding the second respondent, and

(f) page 248 - a tenant history ledger (relevant to the period between

4 February 2015 and 20 June 2016) in relation to a Yass property, which refers to both the applicant and the worker as the tenants.

1. The remainder of the evidence relied upon by the applicant which I find to be relevant, is as follows:

(a) the marriage certificate of the applicant and the worker dated 23 October 2009 - found at page 48 of the ARDW;

(b) the worker's death certificate dated 28 September 2019 - found at page 50 of the ARDW;

(c) some of the worker's clinical notes from The Surgery at Jerra - found from page 281 of the ARDW - most of the notes though are not particularly relevant to the specific issues requiring determination by me, except:

(i) 30 July 2019 - "Wife [EEW] seen - [GIB] was on the phone (speaker) during consult...They are separated - he is in Albury, she is living in a women's refuge here with the kids...She is 'trying to help him'...He was unable to get an appointment soon with psychol in Wagga...He has an appt to see a psychol in Albury tomorrow - referral amended...Wife tells me that his mood can be v volatile...He gets v angry and can be violent...She is worried he will 'kill someone' - she feels he could 'snap' and just attack someone for little or no reason...She says she has told him to go to mental health but he refuses as he is worried he will lose his truck licence...She says he needs a psychiatrist, not a psychologist";

(ii) 19 August 2019 - "He was getting on well with [EEW] but last few days the relationship has deteriorated again - he is not sure why";

(iii) 16 September 2019 - "Major issues with ex partner - she is denying him access to the kids, telling them he is not their father accusing him of hitting her";

(iv) 14 October 2019 - "Feeling much better...Relationship with [EEW] is now civil. Has been allowed to see the kids", and

(v) 6 November 2019 - "Seen with wife - they are getting on better...Will stay with wife";

(d) the worker's 2018 taxation return - found at page 5 of the applicant's first ALAD - referring to him receiving an annual wage of $15,500 from the first respondent during that financial year.

1. The first Reply largely contains evidence used by the first respondent in order to eventually concede liability for compensation flowing from the worker's death. I have considered that evidence but do not see that it generally assists me in relation to the issues requiring determination by me. I do however note the following:

(a) there is a 'question and answer' document from page 21 - the document is said to detail answers to questions addressed to the worker's parents by an investigator ([GIB] Payne) - the document however is not signed or adopted by anyone, and it appears that it was sent to the investigator by the parents' solicitor (see the statutory declaration from [GIB] Payne declared 17 March 2021 - at page 32) - in those circumstances, I do not intend to afford any weight to any comments in the document;

(b) there is a signed statement from Senior Constable Mitchell Cox dated

22 January 2020 at page 57 (within the brief sent by the Police to the Coroner in relation to the worker's death) - the statement largely deals with the circumstances surrounding the death, but also explains significant animosity between various members of the worker's family (especially the worker's sister-in-law, [HLM]) and the applicant - the senior constable says at various points:

"Upon checking my emails I noticed I had received multiple missed calls from various family members of the deceased. I got into contact with most of them who informed me of their suspicion and dislike towards the deceased ex-partner, [EEW]. I spoke to [HLM], the deceased Sister in law, and requested that she speak to the various family members and collect notes into a single email, outlining their concerns...Throughout the email, there is an underlining suspicion on the deceased ex-partner, [EEW] and her involvement in the deceased death. I contacted the Wagga Coroner's office for advice who stated to include this email in the brief of evidence and the coroner may read over it and evaluate its relevance...In conclusion, I believe there is [sic] numerous amounts of family disagreements which somehow, they believed I could assist with. I believe this is mostly to do with grieving/looking for someone to blame. After speaking with the family members and reading the email, it appears the family isn't accepting that suicide is the cause of death and fuelled by the hatred towards [EEW], can't help but believe she is involved. There is no evidence from a Police point of view, that leads me to believe [EEW] was involved. I am of the opinion that due to the evidence gathered and the history of the deceased that this is a suicide related death.";

(c) there are call logs from the worker's phone on 19 November 2019, 20 November 2019, and 21 November 2019, from page 844 - these demonstrate:

(i) the worker received at least 22 missed calls from the applicant on

21 November 2019, and

(ii) there was at least a number of attempted telephone contacts both by the worker to the applicant, and by the applicant to the worker, on

19 November 2019 and 20 November 2019 - there is only specific evidence however that there was an actual telephone discussion between them for 37 minutes on the evening of 20 November 2019;

(d) there are text messages between the applicant and the worker from 7.40am on 20 November 2019 to 3.35pm on 21 November 2019, from page 867 - having read these messages, in my opinion, they show a fractious relationship between the applicant and the worker, but also one where love was clearly still present from both parties - they regularly refer to each other as "mum" and "dad" - the worker clearly wants the applicant to continue their relationship and the applicant confirms that she had told him that she was coming home - the applicant however gets quite frustrated at the worker and the worker seems to realise this frustration and is quite desperate for the frustration to be overcome (texting - "yep I dint want to make you angry just want to love you" and "Wish it was just straightforward of I love you and you love me nothing in between") - the worker accepts blame for the applicant's frustration, and the applicant texts that she loves him - then, the text messages reveal the applicant's increasing desperation and real concern on 21 November 2019 at not being able to contact the worker.

1. There are three statements in evidence from the second respondent's tutor, [GMU]. The first statement is dated 10 October 2024 and found at page 1 of the second Reply.
2. As at that date, she says that the second respondent was living with the applicant. He was in Year 7 at school (attending Temora High School) and was dependent upon her for care both emotionally and financially. He was "incredibly intelligent", and she had no doubt that he would eventually undertake tertiary studies. This was despite the fact that he had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, for which he took medication, consulted with paediatric specialists, and required additional support at school.
3. She had known the worker and the applicant since 2013, and had therefore known the second respondent for most of his life. She says that prior to the worker's death, he and the third respondent had always lived with the applicant and the worker in their family home.
4. She relevantly also says:

"I had always witnessed [GIB] treat [BZH] and [ECC] as his own children. You wouldn't have known [BZH] and [ECC] weren't his children...Ramika did not live in the family home and I believe he lived with [EEW]'s mother in Nowra. [GIB] and [EEW] had talked about wanting Ramika to live with them."

"Since I have known [GIB] and [EEW], they have been in a romantic relationship. I knew there was some difficulties in their relationship over the years but they would always come back together."

1. [GMU] then provides an updated statement dated 17 April 2025, which is found at page 1 of the second respondent's first ALAD.
2. She says that the applicant was arrested on 29 October 2024 and remained in jail until March 2025. She was asked by the applicant to collect the second respondent on

29 October 2024, and since then the second respondent had been in the care of herself and her husband. She had enrolled him into Yass High School and he seemed to be "going reasonably well other than some issues relating to his behaviour". The Department of Communities and Justice had formally placed him in the care of herself and her husband until 13 May 2025, and she was in discussions with the Department to obtain long-term care of him. She says:

"I am prepared to continue to act as [CSE]'s tutor in the Personal Injury Commission proceedings. I have discussed the proceedings with [CSE] and he has expressed a desire for me to continue as his representative in the proceedings. I have every intention of instructing and supporting [CSE]'s best interests."

1. [GMU]'s final statement is dated 9 October 2025, and is found at page 1 of the second respondent's third ALAD.
2. In this statement, she confirms that she is still the second respondent's primary care giver, and she also confirms his medical diagnoses and treatment needs:

(a) autism spectrum disorder - requiring paediatric reviews every six months and physiotherapy treatment (due to his continuous toe walking);

(b) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder - requiring Ritalin medication;

(c) oppositional defiant disorder;

(d) metabolic associated steatotic liver disease - requiring reviews with Dr Storman, and

(e) terminal ileitis.

1. The second respondent also attends his general practitioner when required, and takes medication for emotional regulation, sleep difficulties, and gastrointestinal symptoms.
2. The second respondent's diagnoses impact his behaviour, emotional regulation and learning requirements both at home and at school. They cause fatigue and discomfort in educational settings, and their treatment interrupts his in-class learning time at school.
3. The second respondent has been suspended from school for fighting and the use of inappropriate language, which she says is linked to his diagnoses. He has a National Disability Insurance Scheme plan due to the diagnoses, but still requires further support within his school environment, which has led to Yass High School developing an Individual Learning Plan and a Behaviour Support Plan for him, as well as obtaining funding for him to receive one lesson per day of support via a School Learning Support Officer. She attaches to her statement the relevant documentation in this regard, and she confirms that his learning requirements include short breaks during lessons, time-out options when overwhelmed, psychological support, assistance during longer or group tasks, learning support strategies, regular teacher check-ins, classwork time extensions, and task modifications where necessary.
4. There are also statements relied upon by the second respondent from various other family members of the worker's.
5. His sister-in-law, [HLM] (married to his brother, the fifth respondent), has provided a statement dated 23 April 2025 - found at page 2 of the second respondent's first ALAD.
6. In the statement, she makes the following allegations:

(a) the applicant and the worker were separated as at the date of his death and had not been in a romantic relationship for some time;

(b) the applicant was receiving a 'single parent payment' through Centrelink as at

9 July 2019 - she attaches to her statement Centrelink correspondence dated

9 July 2019 in this regard, but I note that that correspondence refers to the applicant receiving a carer's pension;

(c) the worker was paying the applicant child support from 23 April 2019 - she attaches to her statement Department of Human Services correspondence in this regard;

(d) the applicant had entered into a romantic relationship with [BXX] from

31 December 2018 - she attaches to her statement some print-outs allegedly from the applicant's Facebook account which seem to show she announced that she was in a relationship with [BXX] on 31 December 2018, she was sent flowers by [BXX] on 20 November (year not identified), and she was encouraging [BXX] to take her to an event on 18 March 2020;

(e) the worker's parents paid all living expenses in relation to the Table Top property, "such as rent or mortgage payments, electricity, water, Internet, council rates, insurances, etc" - these expenses were paid "as the property was purchased outright by them for [GIB]' benefit";

(f) on 7 July 2020, she was required to collect the second respondent from [BXX]' house - she attaches to her statement a text message that she sent to the worker's mother that "[BXX] apparently given him a touch up" - the second respondent then stayed with the worker's parents for three to four months;

(g) on 14 February 2023, she was required to collect the second respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent from a police station when "[EEW] had left them there" - the second respondent then stayed with the worker's parents until 29 October 2024;

(h) the applicant was arrested on 29 October 2024 and then again in January 2025 - the second respondent has been in the care of [GMU] and her husband since 29 October 2024;

(i) the applicant had not had custody of the sixth respondent since

31 December 2010 - she attaches to her statement a statutory declaration from the applicant's parents ([CUN] and Henry Wright) dated

31 December 2010 which she claims evidences that the applicant "signed over sole custody [of the sixth respondent] to her mother", but I note that the statutory declaration is not declared by the applicant and only relevantly declares:

"[FDA] as of the 31st of Dec 2010 will reside permanently with [CUN] and Henry at Ulladulla...At any time [EEW] can contact [FDA] or if she wishes to have [FDA] for visits or holidays can contact [FDA] by phone or text message.";

(j) there had been times when the third respondent had lived away from the applicant and the worker, but the worker and he still had "a father and son type relationship", and

(k) the fourth respondent was not living with the applicant and the worker for some time prior to the worker's death - she says that she had access to the worker's phone "and the only messages between them were more than 12 months prior to his passing".

1. The worker's brother, the fifth respondent, has also provided a statement dated 18 April 2025 - found at page 31 of the second respondent's first ALAD.
2. He also alleges that the worker and the applicant "were not in a relationship at the time of his passing".
3. He also confirms that the worker treated the third respondent and the fourth respondent as his own children, and that the sixth respondent had not been living with the worker and the applicant for some time prior to worker's death.
4. He otherwise says:

(a) apart from the worker's maternal grandmother ([GCH]), the worker's other grandparents are deceased;

(b) the worker's parents (also his parents) are [FLO] and [EAA];

(c) the worker only had one sibling, being himself;

(d) the worker had not been married prior to his marriage to the applicant;

(e) the worker had only one biological child, being the second respondent, and

(f) the worker had no grandchildren.

1. The fifth respondent then proceeds to state that he was not wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker, and therefore does not make any claim for any portion of the "death benefit" payable as a result of the worker's death.
2. As indicated earlier (see paragraph 42 above), the applicant's 8 August 2025 statement largely responds to the allegations made by [HLM] and the fifth respondent. Relevantly, the applicant says:

(a) she confirms that whilst she and the worker were living separately, "we were still in a romantic relationship at the time of his passing" - she also alleges that neither the worker nor her were on speaking terms with either the fifth respondent or [HLM] for around seven years prior to the worker's death - indeed, the worker had not met his neice from their relationship, who was aged four when he died;

(b) she confirms her receipt of a carer's pension from Centrelink, rather than a 'single parent payment';

(c) she confirms that the worker "paid child support to assist with the cost of [CSE]'s care for the brief time that him and I were separated";

(d) she maintains that she only met [BXX] on 25 October 2019 and that she made it clear to him on 1 November 2019 that she was returning to be with the worker - she confirms that she and [BXX] only formed a relationship after the worker's death - she says that relationship was "very abusive" and she stopped living with him in March 2020 except for moving back "in with him for one small period after this but it was just chaos";

(e) she agrees that the worker's parents bought the Table Top property for the worker, and claims that they had agreed to transfer ownership of it into the worker's name at a later date - she maintains that she and the worker paid rates and electricity expenses in relation to the property, and that she paid relevant internet expenses;

(f) she alleges that after 7 July 2020, the second respondent was only in the worker's parents' care for two days - she claims that his school records at Temora West Public School would reflect that he was back in her care after these two days;

(g) she alleges that after 14 February 2023, the second respondent was only in the worker's parents' care until May 2024, when he returned to her care after telephoning her to advise of difficulties with his grandfather;

(h) she maintains that the third respondent had been in her care from the date of his birth until 2020;

(i) in relation to the fourth respondent, she advises that the fourth respondent's access to a telephone had been limited due to the fourth respondent being previously groomed online - she maintains that the worker paid for "things [BZH] needed", such as shoes, clothes, and medical assessments, and that the fourth respondent spent time with the worker and her over school holidays in 2019, on special occasions such as at Christmas time, and at a house warming that they held in 2019;

(j) she advises that she currently resides with the fourth respondent in a property rented by the fourth respondent - after being released from jail, she had not been able to find employment, and she had no possessions as [BXX] had disposed of them while she was in jail;

(k) she advises that she tendered her resignation from her employment with Canberra Sand and Gravel Company on 1 November 2019 as she had reconciled with the worker and was returning home to live with him at Table Top - in relation to her time in Canberra during her separation from the worker, she says:

"Up until the time of [GIB]' passing, I was still very heavily reliant on [GIB] financially. He was still transferring me money to pay for my living costs and other expenses such as work clothes, shoes and my glasses as well as money for the kids right up until the time he passed. [GIB] would often offer to transfer me money or I would ask him for money when I needed it, and this was done sporadically. From time to time, I would also send money to [GIB] if he needed it.";

(l) she advises that she was considering applying for an apprehended violence order against [HLM] prior to the worker's death as she was aware of "threatening messages she had sent to [FLO] stating she would burn my house down with me in it", and

(m) she finally explains that the worker's funeral was a devastating time for her, especially in relation to the way that she was then treated by the worker's family (his parents, the fifth respondent, and [HLM]), and the way she was then prevented from having any active role at the funeral.

1. The remainder of the evidence relied upon by the second respondent which I find to be relevant, is as follows:

(a) at page 33 of the second respondent's first ALAD - a statutory declaration from the worker's father ([EAA]) declared on 16 April 2025 - in which he declares that he was not wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker, and therefore does not make any claim for any portion of the "death benefit" payable as a result of the worker's death;

(b) at page 35 of the second respondent's first ALAD - a statutory declaration from the worker's mother ([FLO]) declared on 16 April 2025 - in which she declares that she was not wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker, and therefore does not make any claim for any portion of the "death benefit" payable as a result of the worker's death;

(c) at page 37 of the second respondent's first ALAD - a statutory declaration from the worker's grandmother ([GCH]) declared on 23 April 2025 - in which she declares that she was not wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker, and therefore does not make any claim for any portion of the "death benefit" payable as a result of the worker's death;

(d) at page 39 of the second respondent's first ALAD - the Department of Communities and Justice placement order dated 11 November 2024 which placed the second respondent with [GMU] as his carer - see paragraph 4 above;

(e) at page 40 of the second respondent's first ALAD - a handwritten note from the applicant dated 29 October 2024 delegating "full parental responsibility" for the second respondent to [GMU] and [BXX], while she was in jail;

(f) between pages 41 and 54 of the second respondent's first ALAD - some medical records in relation to the second respondent's paediatric treatment (which largely confirms the information found in the statement from [GMU] dated

9 October 2025 - see paragraphs 53-57 above) - in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to consider these records in further detail unless aspects of them are specifically referred to in submissions made by a party;

(g) at page 11 of the second respondent's second ALAD - the second respondent's school registration history summary, which evidences a staggering 19 changes of school during his 9 years of schooling so far, and

(h) between pages 12 and 54 of the second respondent's second ALAD - some school enrolment forms in relation to the second respondent (which also largely confirm his schooling difficulties referred to in the statement from [GMU] dated 9 October 2025 - see paragraphs 53-57 above) - in accordance with

cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to consider these documents in detail unless aspects of them are specifically referred to in submissions made by a party.

1. There are two statements in evidence from the third respondent. The first was signed on

5 March 2025 and is found at page 1 of the third Reply. 2. He says that he did not have any relationship with his biological father while he was growing up. The worker was his step-father, whom his mother had married when he was three-years-old. He then lived with the worker and his mother continuously until he moved out with his mother in July 2019. He refers in his statement to the worker as "Dad", and confirms that the worker "treated me like his own son". 3. He also says that he is close to the worker's parents and still visits them. He calls them "Nan" and "Pop". 4. He explains that while he was growing up, he attended a number of different schools due to family moves. 5. In relation to the period of separation between the worker and the applicant after July 2019, he advises:

"Following the separation Mum moved to Queanbeyan. Mum took [CSE] and I with her to Queanbeyan. Dad stayed living at Tabletop. I recall Mum asking if I wanted to stay with Dad and I said yes. However I was still taken to Queanbeyan with Mum...On some weekends we would go back to Tabletop to see Dad. Mum would drive [CSE] and I half way and meet Dad and he would take us back to Tabletop for the weekend. I remember Dad coming to Queanbeyan to see us. We would also go to Dad's Mum and Dad's place, Nan and Pop where Dad was staying...Sometime shortly before Dad died I remember Dad coming over to Queanbeyan. This was the last time I saw Dad."

1. After the worker's death, he advises that a "short time later", he moved with the applicant to live with [BXX] at Temora. He says that there was "a lot of conflict in the home", and he also had difficulties at the time dealing with his schooling due to restrictions caused by the COVID pandemic. In the middle of 2020, he asked the applicant if he could stay with the worker's parents, and she agreed.
2. The following year, he moved out of the worker's parents' home, and lived with the applicant's parents and "other family members". He ended up living with his maternal grandmother. He says that he "lost interest in school and life generally", and then left school.
3. He returned to live with the applicant and obtained employment as a labourer. He then returned to live with the worker's parents again and worked for two tyre fitting companies. He says that he "loved living with my Nan and Pop", but was asked to leave by them after an incident in November 2024. He says:

"On having to leave Nan and Pop's I fell into a hole. I was caught up in something I had no control over and lost my home, because of it and my relationship with Nan and Pop has been affected. I was mentally affected by this and at the time I needed to find a house and left my job. I don't have access to a vehicle nor someone with a full licence to help me get my hours up."

1. He is currently not working, and living with three other friends. He does not pay rent as he helps out around the house. He has very little savings, but receives some financial support from a former girlfriend, as well as from [BXX]. He still remains in contact with the worker's parents, although not with the applicant. He says that if the worker was still alive, he would probably be living with the worker.
2. He says he has a vision impairment and is blind in his left eye. He has to wear glasses, which the applicant and the worker used to pay for. He also says:

(a) he has a problem with the structure of his left ear, which resulted in many ear infections as he was growing up - he had tests in this regard when he was young, but has not had any treatment recently;

(b) early in 2025, he had headaches and heart pains and was referred to a heart specialist - he has not yet followed up this referral however, and

(c) he has arthritis issues with his knees, for which he took medication when he was young - he is not however "clear on the specifics of this".

1. In relation to his dependency on the worker, he also says:

(a) before his father died, "Dad paid for or contributed to any expenses relating to me including school fees, my uniforms, and anything else I needed for school";

(b) his father "provided our family with a home", and "any medical expenses were also paid for such as glasses, appointments and specialists for my health issues";

(c) his father set up a 'Spriggy Card' for him - the relevant statement in relation to expenditure on this card is found at page 172 of the third Reply;

(d) his father helped the applicant around the house;

(e) his father bought him two motorbikes;

(f) he was covered by private health insurance arranged by his father and the applicant, and

(g) his father attended his school events if his father's work commitments allowed it.

"I believe if Dad was still alive I would have remained living with him until I was in a position to move out of home. My life would have been very different...I believe I would have remained at school...Dad would have supported me in getting my hours up to get my license so that I was independent and able to drive to and from jobs. Dad would have continued to emotionally and financially support me as he did when he was alive."

1. The third respondent's second statement was signed on 12 August 2025 and is found at page 42 of the third respondent's ALAD. He advises that since his first statement:

(a) he currently resides in emergency housing - and also receives assistance with "meals and general practical support";

(b) he remains unemployed - and receives Centrelink benefits, and

(c) he remains in contact with the worker's parents, who recently paid for him to be supplied with new glasses.

1. The third respondent's ALAD also contains various documentation regarding his medical issues:

(a) at page 1 - a report from an optometrist (Janine Hobson) dated 9 May 2025 - advising that the third respondent has a significant vision impairment in his left eye with or without glasses, but that his right eye vision impairment can be corrected with glasses - he required yearly optical check-ups when he was seen by the optometrist on 23 September 2021, but he has not followed her up in this regard;

(b) at pages 4 and 5 - reports from a paediatrician (Dr Snyman) dated

30 October 2012 and 19 November 2012 - advising in the initial report that the third respondent has a "profile consistent with" a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and recommending in the initial report Ritalin medication, occupational therapy, speech therapy, psychological review, and a hearing assessment - and advising in the second report that the third respondent had had a good response to the Ritalin medication and required a six monthly review;

(c) between pages 7 and 16 - various reports from a paediatrician (Dr Powell) between 14 February 2013 and 30 March 2016 - advising as to the monitoring of the third respondent's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, for which she had prescribed Concerta rather than Ritalin - she is generally happy about how the third respondent was progressing, although she does note literacy difficulties and some behavioural difficulties - on 30 March 2016, she also makes a diagnosis of recent post-streptococcal arthritis (specifically in the third respondent's left knee), for which she prescribes medication and advises that it is "a self-limiting autoimmune condition which does not cause long-term joint damage", and

(d) at page 17 - a report from a clinical psychologist (Nicole Daly) dated

7 September 2012 - confirming (after the administration of various tests) the third respondent's diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and recommending review of him by a paediatrician (with a view to the prescription of medication); support with his education in general, and specifically with reading, mathematics, and handwriting; techniques to use to assist his working memory, as well as treatment with a child psychologist.

1. The evidence relied upon by the third respondent further includes some statements in relation to his Centrelink payments, some school records of his, and some Medicare records of his. I have perused all of these documents, but in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to consider the documents in detail unless aspects of them are specifically referred to in submissions made by a party. In this regard, during the third respondent's oral submissions, he emphasised his following school records:

(a) a file note from Janelle Jeffery (School Psychology Services, Lismore High School Campus) dated 30 March 2021 - referring to him being legally blind in his left eye, a diagnosis of dysgraphia, a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and a "low attendance" school record;

(b) a referral to a school counsellor dated 30 March 2021 - advising that he required support at school;

(c) another file note from Janelle Jeffery dated 30 March 2021 - referring to his recent absence from school for 2 ½ months;

(d) a file note from an unidentified person dated 20 March 2020 - suggesting that he be investigated for a potential diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder;

(e) another referral to a school counsellor dated 20 March 2020, and

(f) an assessment report dated 4 February 2020 - in which he comments "I can think about things but I just cannot write them. I had a computer at my last school. I have dysgraphia".

1. There are three statements in evidence from the fourth respondent. The first is signed but not dated, and is found at page 1 of the fourth Reply.
2. She says:

"Most of my life I lived with my mother and with [GIB] Moore, the deceased. It was for that reason that I use the name Moore on my surname. I regarded [GIB] Moore as my father and always referred to him and still refer to him as dad."

1. She moved however to live with her aunt (the applicant's sister) in 2017 when she was 14-years-old.
2. Then, after the worker's death, she returned to live with the applicant. She completed Year 9 of her schooling, but left school when she was in Year 10. Since leaving school, she has either received Centrelink benefits or been able to find work as a shop assistant. She is currently unemployed.
3. She and the applicant became homeless for a month or two in early 2023 before they found a home to live in at Culcairn. She then moved out to stay with her boyfriend's parents in November 2023, before finding her own apartment in March 2024. She struggles however to pay her rent, as well as her other living expenses, and has been receiving some assistance from the applicant in this regard. She says:

"If dad was still alive I would have asked him for help as well and he would have given it to me as he always had helped me before."

1. She says that she has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, and saw a number of doctors in this regard as she was growing up. She no longer however sees any doctors or takes any medication, but she says that she still has issues in reading people's emotions. She also has some difficulties with writing, and often needs to read whatever she is reading three or four times to help her understand it.
2. She says that since the worker's death, she has been diagnosed as suffering from anxiety and depression. She continues to seek medical attention in this regard, as well as taking medication.
3. She says that apart from talking to him on the telephone occasionally, she has "not had much to do with my biological father during my life".
4. The fourth respondent's second statement was signed on 16 July 2025 and is found at page 1 of the fourth respondent's first ALAD. She advises that since her first statement:

(a) she moved into live with her boyfriend in June 2025, and

(b) since January 2025, she has worked part-time as a shop assistant - she attaches to her statement a payslip indicating that she earned $13,036.90 nett in this employment up to 26 June 2025 (approximately $500 per week nett).

1. She also confirms that for approximately 12 months prior to the worker's death, she was refused access to a mobile telephone "for my safety". Nevertheless, she spoke to the worker on many occasions during this period as she was able to access other telephones for that purpose.
2. The fourth respondent's third statement was signed on 18 August 2025 and is found at page 1 of the fourth respondent's second ALAD. She confirms that:

(a) she continues to be treated and to take medication for her anxiety and depression;

(b) she continues to "deal with issues" arising from her autism spectrum disorder;

(c) she has eyesight issues, and

(d) she has learning issues which have limited her ability to firstly obtain and then keep employment.

1. Also attached to the fourth respondent's second ALAD (at page 2) is a psychological assessment report upon her dated 2 March 2018, completed by Deni Fowle (senior psychologist) and Elizabeth Vellar (speech therapist). The report includes the results of various assessments and advises that the fourth respondent's presentation is consistent with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. The report recommends obtaining funding to assist her through the National Disability Insurance Scheme, as well as treatment with a paediatrician or psychiatrist, with a psychologist (to assist with emotion regulation skills, complex social relationships, problem-solving skills, and protective behaviours), and with an occupational therapist. The report advises:

"Overall, [BZH] presents with appropriate language skills however presents with social skill deficits that correlate with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Such characteristics include reduced conversation skills such as tangential speech, "over sharing" information with new acquaintances, and difficulties engaging in two-way dialogue with others by asking personal questions back to her listener."

1. The remainder of the evidence relied upon by the fourth respondent which I find to be relevant, is as follows:

(a) confirmation that she left school on 26 April 2021 - found at page 1 of the fourth respondent's third ALAD, and

(b) confirmation that she enrolled in a TAFE course (in relation to skills for work and vocational pathways) dated 30 July 2021 - found at page 2 of the fourth respondent's third ALAD - I am not sure however whether she completed this course.

1. The sixth respondent has provided a statement which he signed on 15 July 2025. It is found at page 6 of the sixth Reply.
2. He says:

"I was around 6 years old when the deceased, [GIB] Moore, came into my mum's life. He essentially took us in, allowed us to escape a terrible living situation and took us kids in as his own...From then on, I saw [GIB] as my only father figure and called him Dad."

1. He lived with the applicant and the worker until 2011, when he commenced to live with his grandmother. He says that he then recalls "being back and forth a lot between mum and dad's house and Nan's". His preference was "always to be living with Mum and Dad". He says:

"Mum and Dad would provide whatever they could for me and would pay for all my living expenses whenever I was living with them. They bought me my first motorbike when I was around 16...We spent Christmases together each year. Mum and Dad would come and see me at Nan's house and bring 'presents' for me which were made up of daily necessities such as clothes, shoes, socks, deodorants, shampoos and the like. This was essential for me and would set me up for the year ahead with a whole lot of essentials that I wouldn't have to pay for myself. I came to rely on this as a yearly occurrence."

1. He moved to Western Australia for about a year after he turned 15-years-old, and when he returned to New South Wales, he lived with various family members and did not have stable accommodation.
2. He says that he visited the applicant and the worker (as well as his other siblings) as much as he could, especially on special occasions, such as for birthdays and at Christmas time. He says he knew that he could go back to living with the applicant and the worker if he needed to. He says that since the worker died, "I no longer have that safety net of knowing I can rely on him for emotional or financial support."
3. After the worker's death, he has continued to see the applicant as much as possible in order to provide emotional support to her. When he obtained a rental property in 2021, she paid the relevant bond as well as two weeks rent. He says that this is the "kind of support that [GIB] also would have provided to me if he was still alive".
4. He says that he had a "really bad mental decline" in 2022 when he became unemployed and was evicted from his rental premises due to his inability to pay the rent. He says:

"This is a situation I would have leant on Mum and Dad if he was still around for financial support. Mum has had a really hard time since Dad died, so she wasn't able to support me much during this time...I strongly believe that if [GIB] was alive, I would have had his emotional and financial support during that 2022 period and maybe could have avoided my financial circumstances causing such a drastic decline of my mental health."

1. All parties have provided written submissions, and supplemented those submissions with oral submissions at the conciliation/arbitration on 16 October 2025. I will not summarise any of the submissions in detail, as they all form part of the Commission's record, the oral submissions having been recorded on 16 October 2025.
2. In the applicant's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions:

(a) she refers me to the principles enunciated in TNT Group 4 Pty Ltd v Halioris (1987) 8 NSWLR 486 (Halioris), Aafjes v Kearney [1976] HCA 5 (Aafjes), and Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWWCCPD 43 (Richardson), and submits:

"It is trite law that the fact that a dependant is not in receipt of support at the time of a deceased's death is not [emphasis in original] determinative of whether partial dependency exist. Patently, the law requires an assessment of potential future events and the reasonable expectations of the dependant in question to be supported in the future.";

(b) she confirms that the worker treated each of the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent as his own children;

(c) she submits that despite underlying hostility issues between herself and members of the worker's family, there is still no direct or positive evidence that traverses her evidence as to the relationship between herself and the worker, including her evidence that their intention prior to his death was to resume living together;

(d) she concedes that the relationship was "volatile and complex" due in part to those hostility issues, but she emphasises that the relationship had endured for 12 years "during which they navigated shared residences and financial arrangements intertwined with [GIB]'s parent's family business" - [GMU] also confirms that while their relationship had difficulties, they would "always come back together" - they jointly managed household expenses and child-rearing responsibilities, the worker providing the family's primary income, which was however supplemented by the applicant's carer's pension payments and occasional employment earnings;

(e) she maintains that during the period of separation between herself and the worker from July 2019:

(i) they remained in constant contact - and by October 2019, they were working through their previous relationship problems;

(ii) there were no formal custody or maintenance arrangements in place in relation to either her or their children - however, the worker continued to provide financial assistance to her for their benefits;

(iii) she attended medical appointments with the worker - confirmed by medical records (see paragraph 45(c) above);

(iv) on 1 November 2019, they decided to resume their relationship, which would have involved her moving back in with the worker on 22 November 2019 - she needed to resign from her employment to make this move possible, and she did so;

(v) there were a large number of text messages and telephone calls between her and the worker on 19 November 2019 and 20 November 2019 (see paragraphs 46(c) and 46(d) above) - "the couple shared a number of text messages expressing love for one another, [EEW] confirming on a number of occasions that she was 'coming home' and both going through the emotions of reconciling a relationship" - the text messages reveal the nature of the "complicated" relationship between her and the worker, but they also make the love between them clear, as well as her intention to resume their relationship;

(vi) she "increasingly frantically" attempted to contact the worker by telephone and text message on 21 November 2019, and

(vii) the evidence therefore "points overwhelmingly to a reconciliation of that relationship and intention to recommence cohabiting and repair of the family unit" - confirmed in her formal statement to the Police signed on 17 July 2020;

(f) she submits that despite the opaqueness and irregularity regarding how the worker was paid in his employment, the evidence records that he nevertheless provided financial assistance to the applicant and their children in a flexible and unstructured manner, but covering general living expenses and reflecting "a pattern of mutual interdependence within the marital unit" - she would have expected this to continue into the indefinite future;

(g) she submits that any submission by any respondent that she was not dependent on the worker is simply not tenable on the evidence;

(h) she submits that while the worker would have provided ongoing support in their adult years for the various needs of the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, their expectations in this regard have to be considered to be limited by the worker's monetary ability - she submits that most of the worker's monies would have been expected to go to his household for the benefit of himself and the applicant, after all four children had reached adulthood, and

(i) she finally submits:

"Generally, the spouse or de facto partner of a deceased worker is entitled to the predominant share of any apportionment given the expectation that the de facto partner would not only rely on the deceased on an ongoing basis whilst the children remained at home but could also reasonably expect that a larger proportion of the income derived by the deceased would be directed towards the de facto over time as children reached adult age, entered the workforce, started their own families and generally made their own way in life...Nevertheless, the evidence makes it plain that the deceased remained married to [EEW], continued to provide ongoing financial assistance to [EEW] throughout 2019 and had recoupled with [EEW] after a short period of separation. Whilst the age of the Children is relevant to the determination to be made, the Applicant supports the proposition that the deceased had every intention [emphasis in original] of continuing to provide reasonable emotional and financial support to each of the children...The Applicant has no interest in seeking to diminish or otherwise downplay that position and, on that basis, takes an extremely reasonable position that the death benefit sum should be apportioned on a 50% basis to the Applicant and 50% basis to the children."

1. The first respondent's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions solely deal with the other parties' entitlement to interest on amounts awarded to them, pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act. Having regard to the agreements referred to at paragraphs 21(b) and 21(d) above, the submissions are only relevant to the dispute between the first respondent and the third respondent referred to at paragraph 21(c) above. The first respondent submits:

(a) a dependant is only entitled to interest on an amount awarded from the date when his or her claim is "duly and properly made" - per Kaur v Thales Underwater Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWWCCPD 6 (Kaur);

(b) a claim cannot be duly made until full particulars of a dependant's actual dependency have been given - this requires actual evidence from a dependant in the form of a statement or statutory declaration, and

(c) the third respondent only provided full particulars of his dependency when the third Reply (which included his 5 March 2025 statement discussed at paragraphs 69- 79 above) was lodged on 7 March 2025 - an earlier letter from his solicitors to the first respondent's solicitors dated 10 February 2025 (found at page 176 of the third respondent's ALAD) did not provide the necessary particulars as, apart from advising as to the specific claims for compensation that he was making, it solely advised:

"Our client is a step child of the late [GIB] Moore ('the worker'). Our client was three years of age at the time his mother, the Applicant and the worker were married on 23 October 2009. For as long as our client can remember he called the worker 'Dad' and was treated as a son by the worker...At the time of the worker's death on or around 21 November 2019, our client was 13 years old and a dependent child of the worker. He was financially and non-financially dependent upon Dad and this dependence was expected to continue into the future...Following the death of the worker to the best of our client's recollection he remained a full time student until he left school sometime during Year 11. On this basis given his date of birth it is expected our client would have been in school at the start of the 2022 school year."

1. In the second respondent's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions:

(a) he also refers me to Halioris and the proposition that a determination as to dependency is not limited to solely reviewing past circumstances, but to also reviewing future probabilities and the likely expectation of support into the future;

(b) he commences:

"The second respondent submits that there is an abundance of evidence that supports that the deceased provided financial and emotional support to the second respondent. The second respondent was dependent upon the deceased. That dependency was likely to have continued but for the death of the worker. That dependency was unlikely to cease even when the second respondent attained 18 years of age.";

(c) he emphasises that even though he did not reside with the worker after July 2019, he continued to receive financial and emotional support from the worker;

(d) he emphasises that since the worker's death, he has regularly had to move home and been cared for by different persons - his carer is currently not a relative but a family friend, and this should be borne in mind when apportioning the relevant lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act;

(e) he emphasises his medical needs in relation to his diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder - see paragraphs 54 and 55 above;

(f) he emphasises that he is still at school and is not working, being still only 14-years-old - he also emphasises the special plans which have been put in place to support him in his schooling, and to deal with his behavioural issues and his lack of school attendance - see paragraph 57 above;

(g) he submits that there was no reasonable expectation that the applicant could have expected ongoing support from the worker into the future - she and the worker had been separated since July 2019 and she had commenced a new romantic relationship - any support given by the worker to her after July 2019 was for the benefit of the second respondent and the third respondent - further, an inference can be drawn from the text messages between the applicant and the worker on 20 November 2019 and 21 November 2019 (see paragraph 46(d) above) that in fact there was no reconciliation of their relationship pending;

(h) he submits that neither the fourth respondent nor the sixth respondent were dependent on the worker, but he concedes that the third respondent was partially dependent, and

(i) he submits that he should be entitled to 70% of the relevant lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act.

1. In the third respondent's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions:

(a) he refers me to Wratten v Kirkpatrick & Ors [1996] NSWCC 2 (Wratten) in order to submit that "the exercise of power to determine the correct amount to be apportioned to each dependant requires an examination of all relevant facts including the extent of past dependence, the anticipated future dependence, the ages of the dependants, their health, special needs, lifestyle etc";

(b) he submits that the relevant lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act should be apportioned - 50% to the second respondent, 40% to him, and 10% to the fourth respondent;

(c) he notes that having regard to their ages, at the date of the worker's death, the second respondent was around 9.5 years from attaining majority, he was around 4 years from attaining majority, and the fourth respondent was around 2.5 years from attaining majority - they would be expected to be dependent on the worker at least until they achieved majority;

(d) he argues that in relation to the applicant, the available evidence suggests that she remained separated from the worker at the time of the worker's death - the text messages between the applicant and the worker on 20 November 2019 and 21 November 2019 (see paragraph 46(d) above) evidence the applicant's reluctance to move back in with the worker and her continued anger at the worker - he further submits:

"There is no definitive evidence provided in support of the Applicant's statement that she had resigned from her job in Canberra and was returning to live with the deceased worker. Further no evidence is available supporting notice had been given on the property she occupied or a change in schools for the Second and Third Respondents...Further contrary evidence exists in respect of the Applicant's relationship with [BXX] and that at the time of death the Applicant had moved on...The determination by the Applicant to separate from the deceased and continue a relationship with the new boyfriend ([BXX]) is evident from July 2019 to date of death and the evidence supports the continuity of that relationship even after date of death...The Applicant was not totally deprived of support by the death of the deceased due to her ability to work and support herself financially. She has demonstrated a capacity for full-time work without restriction.";

(e) he argues that any monies paid by the worker to the applicant after their July 2019 separation were for the benefit of the second respondent and the third respondent, and not for the benefit of the applicant;

(f) he submits that when considering the worker's clinical notes from The Surgery at Jerra (see paragraph 45(c) above), as well as the text messages between the applicant and the worker on 20 November 2019 and 21 November 2019 (see paragraph 46(d) above), a "distinct inference" can be drawn that the relationship between the applicant and the worker was in fact going backwards even though the worker expressed his wish for the relationship to continue - although there is evidence of an intent by the applicant and the worker to continue their relationship, I could equally infer that any such relationship would not have endured past November 2019;

(g) in relation to his dependency upon the worker, he emphasises:

(i) he is estranged from his biological father;

(ii) the worker had always been in his life "as a father figure";

(iii) he was and remains close to the worker's parents;

(iv) he had a history of moving between schools - which was challenging as he had learning issues;

(v) when the applicant and the worker separated in July 2019, he moved with the applicant "against his wishes";

(vi) he continued to visit the worker after the separation - and the worker also visited him;

(vii) after the worker's death, he lived with the applicant and [BXX] for a period of time, and then (after experiencing conflict whilst living with the applicant and [BXX]) with either the worker's parents or family members of the applicant's;

(viii) he had significant schooling difficulties - see the records referred to at paragraph 82 above;

(viii) he completed his schooling in mid-December 2021;

(ix) his medical issues are outlined in various reports - see paragraph 81 above;

(xi) he has experienced accommodation issues since November 2024 (and he refers to the extract from his first statement quoted at paragraph 75 above) - he says that he would have been living with the worker but for the worker's death, and

(xii) considering the history of support provided to him by the worker and the close relationship between them, he expected that support to continue having regard to his needs both healthwise and in relation to his learning difficulties - he had a significant future expectation that support would have been provided to him by the worker especially considering that his life has been "one of turmoil" since the worker's death - his father would have helped him to obtain a driving license, supported him to obtain employment, provided him with the stability of permanent housing, and provided him with monetary assistance in relation to his medical needs (including his visual loss, his left ear structural issues, the pains in his knees, his learning issues, and his possible heart condition);

(h) he concedes that the fourth respondent was partially dependent on the worker, but emphasises:

(i) at the date of the worker's death, she had not lived with the applicant and the worker since 2017 - she was also over 18 months older than the third respondent;

(ii) there is no evidence of the financial or emotional support offered to her by the worker since 2017 - there is however evidence from [HLM] (see paragraph 60(k) above) that there were no records of telephone conversations between her and the worker in the 12 months prior to his death;

(iii) since the worker's death, she has generally not had any accommodation issues, and (after leaving school part way through her Year 10) has been able to obtain regular casual or part-time employment, and

(iv) although she has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, there is a lack of medical evidence in relation to her claimed anxiety and depression or any other health conditions of hers;

(i) he submits that the sixth respondent was not dependent on the worker, arguing that there is "little evidence of financial or emotional support offered by the deceased since he was nine years old and living with the deceased and Applicant";

(j) (upon questioning by me) he argues that the second respondent and the third respondent will in fact require similar degrees of financial need in their adulthood, and

(k) (upon questioning by me) he concedes that he will obtain assistance from his grandparents to some degree into the future.

1. The third respondent also submitted orally on 16 October 2025 regarding the dispute between him and the first respondent (see paragraph 21(c) above) in relation to the period during which it would be required to pay interest on any amount awarded to him, in accordance with s 109 of the 1998 Act. He referred me to the letter from his solicitors to the first respondent's solicitors dated 10 February 2025 (found at page 176 of the third respondent's ALAD and addressed by the first respondent in its submissions at paragraph 105(c) above) and submitted that that letter in fact provided full particulars of his claim, such that his entitlement to interest should commence from the date of the letter.
2. In the fourth respondent's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions:

(a) she emphasises the applicant's evidence (see paragraph 33 above), [GMU]'s evidence (see paragraph 50 above), as well as her evidence (see paragraph 84 above) - regarding the worker raising her as if she was his own child;

(b) she emphasises the applicant's evidence (see paragraph 34 above) that the worker and the applicant provided ongoing support to her after she moved in 2017 to live with the applicant's sister;

(c) she refers to the effects of her autism spectrum disorder diagnosis, and says:

"Her prospects of ongoing employment are likely to be much as it has been to date; she will occasionally obtain work as a retail assistant but will probably have lengthy periods of unemployment. She has difficulty with reading and writing and she would have had likely prospects of requiring continuing care from the deceased worker.";

(d) she submits that objectively (and on the basis of the limited medical evidence available to me), the second respondent, the third respondent, and herself all share similar medical issues - she specifically draws my attention to her psychological assessment report discussed at paragraph 94 above;

(e) she concedes that the third respondent "had the most disrupted childhood of all the siblings and appears to have bounced around" in his living and schooling arrangements - he has also only been intermittently employed and has a number of psychological and physical impairments - however, she still submits in her written submissions that his dependency "appears to be substantially lower" than hers, as she appears "to have the most likely long term need for support given her developmental issues";

(f) she submits in her written submissions that the relevant lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act should be apportioned - 50% to the applicant, 20% to the second respondent, 7.5% to the third respondent, 20% to her, and 2.5% to the sixth respondent, and

(g) she submits orally in relation to a different apportionment - there would be no reason why her level of dependency would be different to the third respondent's; and the second respondent should receive a marginally larger apportioned share due to being younger.

1. In the sixth respondent's written (dated 8 August 2025) and oral submissions:

(a) he concedes that he did not live continuously with the applicant and the worker prior to the worker's death, but emphasises that he lived with them until 2010, and then again for six months in 2014 as well as for six months in 2018 - he also emphasises the other support provided by the applicant and the worker when he was not living with them - see the quotation from his statement referred to at paragraph 98 above;

(b) he further emphasises his statement evidence (see paragraphs 100-102 above) regarding his expectations as to how the worker would have supported him into the future - as the evidence establishes that the worker treated the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent all as his own children, it is reasonable to infer that he would have helped them all out from time to time in the future as needed and as he was able to, and

(c) he concedes that the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent were more dependent upon the worker than him, and submits therefore that an appropriate apportionment to him of the relevant lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act would be 10%.

"(1) If death results from an injury, the amount of compensation payable by the employer under this Act shall be-

(a) the amount of $750,000 (the 'lump sum death benefit'), which is to be apportioned among any dependants who are wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker or (if there are no such dependants) paid to the worker's legal personal representative..."

The amount of $750,00 has been indexed, and the parties have agreed that the correct amount to be awarded as at 21 November 2019 was $816,500.

1. Section 4 of the 1998 Act then defines a 'dependant' as follows:

"'dependants' of a worker means such of the members of the worker's family as were wholly or in part dependent for support on the worker at the time of the worker's death, or would but for the incapacity due to the injury have been so dependent..."

The section also separately defines 'member of a family' as follows:

"'member of a family' means spouse (including wife or husband), father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, stepmother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister."

1. In the High Court in Aafjes, Barwick CJ stated (at [11]):

"There has been a good deal of divergence in judicial opinion as to what dependency means. There has been a disposition to draw highly refined distinctions, and the decisions arrived at and the reasons for them have not been always consistent. I think that this tendency and its consequences will be lessened if it is borne firmly in mind that the question is always primarily one of fact, on which the conclusion of the arbitrator ought only to be set aside, if it is apparent that there was no evidence to support it, or if error in law appears on the face of it."

"In Kauri Timber Co. (Tas.) Pty. Ltd. v. Reeman, I accepted that one person is dependent on another for support if the former in fact depends on the latter for support even though he does not need to do so and could have provided some or all of his necessities from another source. I adhere to that view but it does not follow from it that a person who in fact receives some support from one person cannot properly be said to be wholly dependent on another. It is not the mere fact of receipt of support but the dependence or reliance upon another to provide it that matters. The question whether there is in fact dependence or reliance at the date of death is not to be answered by looking only to the circumstances as they existed at that date; 'past events and future probabilities' have to be considered."

"Upon finding that the deceased had made a promise to support the applicant when he turned eighteen years of age, it was open to his Honour to make the further finding that the applicant was partially dependent on the deceased. Dependency is a question of fact: Potts v Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co Ltd [1913] AC 531 at 539, 542; Aafjes v Kearney (1976) 50 ALJR 454 at 456, 457, 459; 8 ALR 455 at 456, 458, 463; [1976] WCR (NSW) 18 at 20, 22, 25. It is concerned with actual and not theoretical support. A person claiming dependency need not be in actual receipt of support at the date of death. It is enough that, as at that date, he or she had a reasonable expectation of support in the future. Dependency may exist at the date of death although actual support cannot or is unlikely to occur until a future time."

1. In accordance with Aafjes and Halioris, I have considered both past events and reasonable future expectations regarding the relationships between the worker and the applicant, the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent. As a result, I find that they were all to differing degrees dependent on the worker for support.
2. In relation to the applicant, she was still married to the worker when he died, and even if there had not been an intention for them to end their separation, she was receiving financial support from him during the separation (as evidenced not just by her statement evidence but also by the bank records discussed at paragraph 43 above) and would have had a reasonable expectation that that support would have continued until a final financial settlement was reached between the two of them.
3. I do however accept and find that prior to the worker's death, there was an intention on behalf of both of them to end their separation and commence living together again. In such circumstances, the applicant would have had a reasonable expectation to receive the financial and other support that the worker had provided to her previously during their years of marriage since 23 October 2009 and their period of being in an intimate relationship before that marriage.
4. In relation to the second respondent, he had lived continuously with the worker and the applicant for his entire life until he moved with the applicant in July 2019. He was a school-age minor and had total dependency upon the two of them. He is the biological son of the worker, and even if the applicant and the worker had not decided to end their separation, he had a reasonable expectation of receiving financial and other support from the worker until he finished his schooling and indeed afterwards, according to his needs and the worker's ability.
5. In relation to the third respondent, he had lived continuously with the worker and the applicant since the two of them began living together, until he moved with the applicant in July 2019. He was a school-age minor and had total dependency upon the two of them. The evidence from the applicant (see paragraph 33 above), [GMU] (see paragraph 50 above), and the third respondent (see paragraph 69 above) is that the worker treated him as the worker's own son. This fact is also clear from his uncontested statement (see paragraph 78 above) regarding how the worker supported him. Even if the applicant and the worker had not decided to end their separation, having regard to the extent of this past support and the clearly close relationship between him and the worker, he had a reasonable expectation of receiving financial and other support from the worker until he finished his schooling and indeed afterwards, according to his needs and the worker's ability.
6. In relation to the fourth respondent, she had lived continuously with the worker and the applicant since the two of them began living together, until she moved to live with her aunt in 2017. She was a school-age minor and continued to rely financially upon the applicant and the worker after this move in relation to her medical needs and "less regular things", although her aunt covered her day-to-day expenses after the move (according to the applicant's specific statement evidence, which is not contested - see paragraph 34 above). In my opinion, she had a reasonable expectation of this financial support from the worker continuing until she finished her schooling and indeed afterwards, according to her needs and the worker's ability. Again, the evidence suggests a close relationship between the worker and her, and that the worker treated her as the worker's own daughter - see her evidence (at paragraph 84 above), the evidence from the applicant (at paragraph 33 above), and the evidence from [GMU] (at paragraph 50 above).
7. In relation to the sixth respondent, although he had rarely lived with the applicant and the worker since 2010 or 2011, the evidence again suggests a close relationship between the worker and him, according to his statement evidence (at paragraph 97 above) and the applicant's statement evidence (at paragraph 33 above). He says (see paragraphs 100-102 above) that he would have been able to rely upon the worker into the future in relation to support such as accommodation/rental assistance. He also explains (see paragraph 98 above) the living expenses and the gifts that the worker and the applicant provided to him notwithstanding that he was not living with them. Again, this specific evidence is not contested, and in my opinion, it necessitates a finding of dependency in relation to the sixth respondent, when considering 'past events and future probabilities'.
8. It now remains for me to determine whether there were any other persons who were dependent on the worker for support. In this regard, I note the following evidence:

(a) apart from [GCH], the worker's grandparents are deceased - see the fifth respondent's statement discussed at paragraph 64(a) above;

(b) [GCH] has provided a statutory declaration in relation to her lack of dependency on the worker - see paragraph 67(c) above;

(c) the worker's parents ([EAA] and [FLO]) have both provided statutory declarations in relation to their lack of dependency on the worker - see paragraphs 67(a) and 67(b) above;

(d) apart from the fifth respondent, the worker had no other siblings - see the fifth respondent's statement (discussed at paragraphs 64(c) and 65 above) in which he also states that he was not dependent on the worker;

(e) apart from his marriage to the applicant, the worker had not been married - see the fifth respondent's statement discussed at paragraph 64(d) above;

(f) apart from the second respondent, the worker had no other biological children - see the fifth respondent's statement discussed at paragraph 64(e) above, and

(g) the worker had no grandchildren - see the fifth respondent's statement discussed at paragraph 64(f) above.

1. Relying upon this evidence, I am satisfied that apart from the applicant, the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, there were no grandparents, parents, siblings, spouses, partners, children or others dependent on the worker for support.

How should the amount of $816,850 be apportioned between the applicant, the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, pursuant to s 29 of the 1987 Act

"(1) The compensation payable under this Division to each dependant of a deceased worker may be apportioned by the Commission or by the NSW Trustee.

(1A) The lump sum death benefit payable under this Division is not to be apportioned if a deceased worker leaves only one dependant (whether wholly or partly dependent on the worker for support) and the whole of the lump sum death benefit is to be paid to that one dependant.

(1B) In apportioning the lump sum death benefit payable under this Division between 2 or more dependants, the whole lump sum death benefit is to be apportioned among those dependants (so that the sum of the apportioned amounts equals the full lump sum death benefit).

(2) Application for apportionment may be made by or on behalf of a person entitled to the compensation--

(b) to the Commission (whether or not an application has been made to the NSW Trustee or the NSW Trustee has made a decision).

(3) The NSW Trustee may decline to deal with an application for apportionment and advise the parties to apply to the Commission.

(4) The NSW Trustee is not to deal with an application for apportionment of compensation if an application for apportionment of the same compensation is before the Commission.

(5) A decision by the NSW Trustee to apportion compensation under this Division is subject to any decision made by the Commission with respect to the matter.

(6) If there are both total and partial dependants of a deceased worker, the compensation may be apportioned partly to the total and partly to the partial dependants.

(b) if a claim has been made, before an agreement or award has been arrived at or made,

the legal personal representative of the dependant has no right to payment of compensation, and the amount of compensation shall be calculated and apportioned as if that dependant had died before the worker.

(8) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the publication of applications for apportionment and any other matter connected with apportionment."

1. The section provides me with a wide discretion as to how to apportion the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act in these proceedings. Guidance as to how to apply the section was provided in Wratten as well as in Kaur v Thales Underwater Systems Pty Ltd [2011] NSWWCCPD 6 (Kaur).
2. In Kaur, President Judge Keating explained (at [125-126]):

"Whilst the respective length of the marriage of the deceased to Gurmeet and Harbendar may be a relevant matter, it is not determinative of the existence or extent of dependency at the date of death. The extent of dependency depends on many things. In Wratten v Kirkpatrick [1996] NSWCC 2; 15 NSWCCR 32 at 34, it was held:

'The exercise of power to determine the correct amount to be apportioned to each dependant requires an examination of all relevant facts including the extent of past dependence, the anticipated future dependence, the ages of the dependants, their health, special needs, lifestyle etc.'

The question whether there is in fact dependence or reliance at the date of death is not to be answered by looking only to the circumstances as they existed at that date; 'past events and future probabilities' have to be considered. (Aafjes v Kearney 180 CLR 199; [1976] HCA 5; 8 ALR 455; 50 ALJR 454, 456, 457 and 459 (Aafjes))."

1. As previously discussed, I have accepted that prior to the worker's death, both he and the applicant intended to end their separation (which commenced in July 2019) and live together again. I agree with the applicant's submissions (see paragraph 104(c) above) that there is no specific evidence to the contrary.
2. I accept the applicant as a witness of truth. I do not find any significant inconsistencies in her evidence, and I also find multiple aspects of corroboration for her evidence.
3. The applicant confirms the intention of herself and the worker to end their separation in her initial formal statement to the Police which she signed on 17 July 2020, even advising the precise date of 22 November 2019 for her to move back (see paragraph 27 above). She confirms their regular contact and that they were "on and off" during their period of separation since July 2019. During that period, she attended medical appointments with the worker. The worker's clinical notes from The Surgery at Jerra (see paragraph 45(c) above) confirm these attendances and they also confirm the "on and off" nature of the separation. Importantly, the clinical note on 6 November 2019 records that the worker "will stay with wife".
4. During the period of separation, she confirms that there were periods when they stayed with each other (see paragraph 38 above), especially when she took the second and third respondents to visit him, or when he visited them. This contact is consistent with the details provided in the third respondent's statement evidence (see paragraph 72 above).
5. Further, during the period of separation, the bank accounts of both the applicant and the worker (see paragraph 43 above) show numerous transactions where the worker paid money to the applicant. The applicant states (see paragraph 66(k) above) that she was financially "heavily reliant" on the worker during the period of separation, and the monies paid by the worker in this regard were used for both her benefit and the benefit of the second and third respondents.
6. The applicant concedes that there were "complications" in her marriage to the worker (see paragraph 36 above). This is corroborated by [GMU] (see paragraph 50 above), who was obviously very close to them both (and had known them since 2013) as she has now assumed care of their one biological child, the second respondent. [GMU] saw difficulties in their relationship but states that "they would always come back together".
7. The fractious nature of the relationship between the applicant and the worker is most borne out in the text messages between them on 20 November 2019 and 21 November 2019. I disagree with the submissions made by the second respondent and the third respondent (see paragraphs 106(g) and 107(f) above) regarding these text messages. I have explained my interpretation of them at paragraph 46(d) above. While they may reveal some reticence on the applicant's part regarding her moving back in with the worker, they still confirm her intention in this regard. Importantly, they confirm the enduring nature of the worker's love for the applicant, and her reciprocation of that love. There is no doubt in my mind having read the text messages that the worker was desperate for the applicant to move back in with him.
8. The applicant's love for the worker is then clear with her many increasingly desperate attempts to contact him on 21 November 2019 - see paragraph 46(c) above.
9. I also note the uncontradicted evidence from the applicant (see paragraph 31 above) that she had resigned from her employment with Canberra Sand and Gravel Company, so that she could move back in with the worker.
10. The statement evidence from [HLM] attempts to cast doubt upon the applicant's evidence that she was about to move back in with the worker prior to his death. I reject that evidence however insofar as it attempts to impugn the credit of the applicant. In this regard:

(a) it is clear from the statement of Senior Constable Mitchell Cox (see paragraph 46(b) above) that there was significant animosity between the applicant and [HLM] - it was even suggested by [HLM] to the Police that the applicant had some "involvement" in the worker's death - the senior constable states there was no foundation for that suggestion which was "fuelled by the hatred towards [EEW]" from [HLM] and other family members;

(b) [HLM] (at best carelessly and at worst with an intention to mislead) states that the applicant receiving a 'single parent payment' through Centrelink was evidence of her permanently separating from the worker (see paragraph 60(b) above) - however, the document that she provides in order to prove this refers specifically to the applicant instead receiving a carer's pension (a pension received by the applicant since around 2015 - see paragraph 31 above);

(c) [HLM] attaches Facebook print-outs to her statement suggesting that the applicant was in a relationship with [BXX] on 31 December 2018 (see paragraph 60(d) above) - such a date however is incompatible with not only the evidence of the applicant (who says that she only met [BXX] on 25 October 2019 - see paragraph 66(d) above) but also the evidence of the third respondent (who despite living continuously with the applicant and the worker until July 2019 and then with the applicant in Canberra, does not mention [BXX]' presence until after the worker's death - see paragraph 73 above);

(d) [HLM] states that "there had been times when" the third respondent had lived away from the applicant and the worker (see paragraph 60(j) above) - this is contradicted however by the applicant (see paragraph 66(h) above), [GMU] (see paragraph 49 above), as well as the third respondent himself (see paragraph 69 above);

(e) the worker provides a detailed statement dealing with the allegations made in [HLM]'s statement (see paragraph 66 above) - there are as a result discrepancies between the two statements, especially regarding the financial arrangements in relation to the Table Top property as well as the periods during which the third respondent stayed with the worker's parents after the worker's death - these discrepancies could have been resolved with the obtaining of further evidence (especially from the worker's parents) but unfortunately I do not have such evidence, and

(f) in her statement, the applicant (see paragraph 66(a) above) casts doubt on [HLM]'s ability to provide useful information regarding the worker, as he had not been on speaking terms with her or her husband for around seven years.

1. Having accepted the applicant's evidence that she was going to move back in with the worker on or around 22 November 2019, I find that her future probabilities or expectations of support from him would have been similar to the past support that he provided to her in this regard (during 10 years of marriage and a period of being in an intimate relationship before that marriage), prior to their separation in July 2019.
2. She provides details as to how the worker and herself supported each other prior to July 2019 (see paragraphs 39-40 above). She was provided with a motor vehicle by the worker, and they otherwise used their mutual incomes (from her carer's pension and from his work with the respondent) to pay all of their living expenses. Mutual support for each other was also provided as they performed cleaning and gardening tasks themselves.
3. She also provides some documentation, albeit limited, evidencing the shared life between herself and the worker - see paragraph 44 above.
4. She explains that the way that the worker was paid by the first respondent was "messy" (see paragraph 32 above) but generally involved him receiving $1,000 per week nett from his mother. The Table Top property had also been purchased by his parents for the benefit of him and her (and his parents were paying the mortgage on the property). [HLM] confirms that the Table Top property was bought by the worker's parents for the worker's "benefit" (see paragraph 60(e) above).
5. The worker's 2018 taxation return (see paragraph 45(d) above) suggests that he only received around $300 per week gross from the first respondent. It would seem therefore that his renumeration for working for the first respondent was not limited to his declared taxable income. In this regard, the applicant says that the worker's mother "handled" his taxation responsibilities.
6. However "messy" the way that the worker was paid by the first respondent was, it can be inferred from the evidence that the worker and the applicant were able to meet their family's financial and accommodation needs together. These needs included the needs of the second and third respondents who lived with them up until July 2019, the needs of the fourth respondent who lived with them up until 2017, and the occasional needs of the sixth respondent when he lived with them for six months each in 2014 and 2018. I accept the applicant's submissions at paragraph 104(f) above in this regard.
7. In their submissions, the second and third respondents (see paragraphs 106(g) and 107(d) above) both suggest that the applicant was in a relationship with [BXX] as at the date of the worker's death. I reject those submissions as the only substantive evidence regarding the applicant's relationship with [BXX] comes from the applicant herself. There is no evidence from [GMU] (a close family friend of the applicant's and the worker's) in this regard, and the third respondent (who continuously resided with the applicant) only mentions [BXX] when he talks about moving in with [BXX] and the applicant "a short time" after the worker's death (see paragraph 73 above). Further, I have already rejected the accuracy of the dating of the Facebook print-outs attached to [HLM]'s statement, in the light of the applicant's evidence.
8. The applicant says, and I accept, that she made it clear to [BXX] on 1 November 2019 that she was returning to be with the worker (see paragraph 66(d) above). She then only formed a relationship with [BXX] after the worker's death. That relationship did not last very long.
9. In the circumstances, I generally accept the thrust of the applicant's submissions at paragraphs 104(h)-104(i) above. The applicant was in the process of moving back in with the worker prior to his death, and reasonably expected future support from him as he had supported her (and her children) for over 10 years in the past. He was only 35-years-old at the time of his death, and there was therefore longevity in the support reasonably expected by the applicant. As submitted by her, there was also a reasonable expectation that as the children grew up and left school, there would be more support in this regard flowing to her.
10. I accept as submitted by her, that she is entitled to the predominant portion of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act, which (considering the ages of her children) would normally be in the vicinity of 65%.
11. However, taking into account the sometimes fractious history of the relationship between her and the worker (conceded by her and also witnessed by [GMU]), I infer that marital difficulties and periods of separation (without the full support otherwise provided by the worker) were 'future probabilities', although unlikely to be permanent. In this regard, I come back to [GMU]'s statement (see paragraph 50 above) that the applicant and the worker "would always come back together". Nevertheless, I consider that an adjustment down to an apportionment of 55% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act is appropriate in this regard to take into account these 'future probabilities'.
12. I also note that the portion payable to her will be lower if other dependants (as I will find in relation to the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent) have health issues or other special needs in relation to which they could have reasonably expected some assistance from the worker on an ongoing basis into their adulthood, so that the portions payable to them are greater than they otherwise would have been. In this regard, I take into account the extra 4% apportionment that I will be finding is appropriate for each of the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent to receive regarding their health issues and other special needs.
13. I therefore apportion 43% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act to the applicant.
14. In relation to the remainder of the apportionment required, I will be approaching it on the basis that the worker considered each of the applicant's four children to be his own also. This proposition is uncontentious on the evidence. It is also uncontentious on the evidence that (as noted in the third respondent's submissions - see paragraph 107(c) above) the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent were school-age minors when the worker died with reasonable expectations of receiving support from him during at least their school years and their reaching of majority age.
15. In relation to the sixth respondent, the evidence is:

(a) the applicant says (see paragraph 34 above) that he lived with her parents after 2010, save for two periods of around six months each in 2014 and 2018 - during these periods, the applicant and the worker supported him;

(b) [GMU] says (see paragraph 50 above) that the worker and the applicant wanted him to live with them;

(c) [HLM] attaches a document to her statement (see paragraph 60(i) above) in relation to the applicant's parents having custody of him from 31 December 2010 but the applicant being able to contact him at any time for visits or holidays;

(d) he says (see paragraph 97 above) that he saw the worker as his "only father figure";

(e) he says (see paragraph 98 above) that after 31 December 2010, he was still "back and forth a lot" between living with the applicant and the worker, and living with the applicant's parents - he often spent Christmas time with the applicant and the worker, they bought him a motorbike, and they provided him with presents on a yearly basis that he found to be essential, and

(f) he says (see paragraphs 100-102 above) that if the worker had not died, he would have been able to rely upon the worker for emotional and financial support that would have prevented his accommodation and mental decline issues experienced by him since the worker's death.

1. Having regard to this evidence, I think it is reasonable to assume that, considering the close relationship between the sixth respondent and the worker, there was a reasonable expectation that he would receive some support from the worker into the future, encompassing at least the presents that he refers to (or similar), but also the ability to live with the worker and the applicant if required.
2. However, the sixth respondent does not have the health issues or other special needs being experienced by the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent. He had also finished his schooling by the time of the worker's death. In these circumstances, having regard to the criteria outlined in Kaur and Wratten, I consider his level of dependency to be far less than the levels of dependency of the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent.
3. I therefore apportion 2% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act to the sixth respondent.
4. In relation to the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent, I will be apportioning between them having regard to the following general principles:

(a) the worker would have supported them substantially during their school years and until they reached their majority;

(b) the worker would have continued to help them out generally from time to time after this period, according to their needs and the worker's ability - however they would have then also been able to obtain support from organisations such as Centrelink;

(c) although they all had health issues and special needs in relation to which they could have reasonably expected some assistance from the worker on an ongoing basis, there is a limit to the assistance that the worker would have been able to provide in this regard financially, and

(d) their individual medical issues (while different) were likely to be supported by the worker to the same degree in relation to each of them - I accept the fourth respondent's submissions in this regard (see paragraph 109(d) above).

1. I should point out at this stage that a great deal of the submissions made by the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent, concentrate upon their needs and how they have fared since the worker's death. However, it is reasonable expectation that is relevant when it comes to dependency, and not necessarily needs. How the respondents have fared since the worker's death has little relevance. The degree of their dependency is to be based upon their reasonable expectations for support from the worker, as at the date of the worker's death.
2. Having regard to their ages as at the date of the worker's death, the second respondent is entitled to receive a greater apportionment than the third respondent, and the third respondent is entitled to receive a greater apportionment than the fourth respondent. Having regard to their health issues and their special needs, there needs to be an extra equal allowance in the relevant apportionments.
3. I assess this extra allowance to each of them to be 4% of the relevant lump sum to be apportioned. I take into account in this regard the significant needs of the second respondent, the third respondent and the fourth respondent, but I also note that during their adulthood, the 'future probability' would have been a situation where the worker and the applicant would have been together, and their priority would have been supporting their own household, being the two of them. I accept the applicant's submissions at paragraph 104(h) above in this regard.
4. There is no doubt in my mind, having regard to the evidence of the applicant, [GMU], the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, that both the applicant and the worker would have attempted to assist all of their children (or step-children) in their adulthood to the best of the applicant's and the worker's abilities, but the priority of both the applicant and the worker would have been to their own household, especially in circumstances where Centrelink or other organisations would have been able to assist their children (or step-children).
5. I have assessed the extra 4% allowance to be the same for the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent, relying upon the following evidence:

(a) the second respondent's diagnoses (which have especially affected his learning requirements thus far) - as outlined by [GMU] (see paragraphs 54-57 above) and as supported by the documentation discussed at paragraphs 67(f)-67(h) above - his schools have developed learning plans for him and he receives National Disability Insurance Scheme assistance - I appreciate his submissions outlined at paragraphs 106(d)-106(f) above in this regard;

(b) [GMU]'s statement (see paragraph 48 above) however that even with these diagnoses, she considers the second respondent to be "incredibly intelligent" - she expects him to undertake tertiary studies;

(c) the third respondent's diagnoses - as outlined in his statement (see paragraph 77 above) and as supported by the documentation discussed at paragraph 81 above;

(d) the third respondent's difficulties obtaining employment and accommodation since he left school - I appreciate his submissions outlined at paragraph 107(g) above in this regard;

(e) the third respondent's ability however to obtain support:

(i) from the worker's parents - he says that he remains close to them (see paragraph 70 above); he was able to live with them for a while (see paragraphs 73 and 75 above), and they recently paid for his glasses (see paragraph 80(c) above);

(ii) from Centrelink - see paragraph 80(b) above, and

(iii) in the form of emergency housing - see paragraph 80(a) above;

(f) the fourth respondent's diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder - as outlined in her statement (see paragraphs 88 and 93 above) and as supported by the documentation discussed at paragraph 94 above - significant ongoing support (especially regarding the fourth respondent's social skills) and National Disability Insurance Scheme assistance is recommended in that documentation, and

(g) the fourth respondent's ability however to obtain employment (albeit sporadic) and generally have housing, since she left school - I accept however her submissions at paragraph 109(c) above.

1. It is always extremely difficult to assess as at the date of a worker's death, the degree to which children would have been supported in their adulthood due to their health issues and special needs. In relation to the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent, I do not believe that I have sufficient evidence to allow me to find that the needs of one of them in this regard would have been greater than the needs of the others, so as to make it reasonable for him or her to have an expectation of greater support from the worker. Further, the evidence is clear that the worker treated the three of them equally, and it is therefore unlikely that he would have supported one of them to a greater degree unless it was absolutely clear that that one's needs were significantly greater, a proposition that I do not believe is available to me on the evidence before me.
2. In relation to the assistance that would have been expected by the second respondent, the third respondent, and the fourth respondent during their school years, I note that in fact, both the third respondent and the fourth respondent left school before attaining their majority. This may of course have been different had they not experienced the difficulties that they did subsequent to the worker's death. Further, even if they were not at school, until they attained their majority, the worker and the applicant would still have had significant ongoing parental responsibility for them. I intend therefore to apportion on the basis that they would have received substantial support from the worker not just during their school years but until attaining their majority.
3. As pointed out in the third respondent's submissions (see paragraph 107(c) above), as at the date of the worker's death, the fourth respondent had around 2.5 years before she attained her majority. She was not living with the applicant and the worker at the date of his death, but the evidence is that they were still providing support to her, not necessarily with daily expenses but with "less regular things" - see the applicant's evidence discussed at paragraphs 34 and 66(i) above. I believe an appropriate allowance in relation to her reasonable expectation that this support would continue for 2.5 years is 3% of the lump sum to be apportioned.
4. I should note in this regard that the evidence of [HLM] (see paragraph 60(k) above) in relation to the apparent lack of telephone contact between the worker and the fourth respondent in the 12 months prior to his death, is explained by both the applicant (see paragraph 66(i) above) and the fourth respondent (see paragraph 92 above). I accept that explanation, especially considering my reluctance to place weight upon [HLM]'s evidence.
5. I therefore apportion a total of 7% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act to the fourth respondent.
6. As previously found (see paragraphs 118-119 above), both the second respondent and the third respondent were totally dependent on the worker and the applicant at the date of his death. As pointed out in the third respondent's submissions (see paragraph 107(c) above), as at that date, the second respondent had around 9.5 years to attain majority and the third respondent had around 4 years to attain majority. Their reasonable expectations of support from the worker in this regard should be considered accordingly, with the second respondent receiving therefore around 2 1/3 times more of an apportionment than the third respondent.
7. Mathematically, this amounts to the second respondent receiving 28% of the lump sum to be apportioned, and the third respondent receiving 12% of the lump sum to be apportioned, in relation to their mutual reasonable expectations for support from the worker during their school years and until they attained their majority.
8. I therefore apportion a total of 32% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act to the second respondent.
9. I therefore apportion a total of 16% of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act to the third respondent.

Are the applicant, the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent entitled to interest on the amounts awarded to them, pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act

"(1) In any proceedings before the Commission, the Commission may order that there is to be included, in any sum to be paid, interest at such rate as the Commission thinks fit on the whole or any part of the sum for the whole or any part of the period before the sum is payable, subject to the limitations imposed by this section.

(a) on any compensation payable under Division 4 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act, or

(b) on any compensation payable under this Act for any period before a claim for the compensation was duly made, or

(c) on any compensation payable under this Act for any period during which proceedings before the Commission were adjourned on the application of the claimant for the compensation or pursuant to section 102.

(a) authorise the giving of interest upon interest, or

(b) apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or otherwise."

1. As indicated at paragraph 21(d) above, the parties have all agreed as to the interest rates per annum (from time to time) that should be paid by the first respondent upon the amounts awarded to them. There is also no dispute between the first respondent and the applicant, the second respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent regarding the period during which interest is to be paid (see paragraph 21(b) above).
2. The power of the Commission to award interest is however discretionary. The relevant interest rate to be awarded is also within the discretion of the Commission.
3. In Pheeney v Doolan (No 2) [1977] 1 NSWLR 601 (Pheeney), the Court of Appeal said that it was necessary to determine in what respect a party has been financially disadvantaged by delay in the payment of (in that case) damages so as to make an appropriate allowance of interest. Reynolds JA, Moffitt P and Mahoney JA agreeing on point, said:

"It provides an ancillary power akin to an order for costs, and its purpose is to aid the court to do more complete justice between the parties than is otherwise possible ... It is not designed to compensate a plaintiff for loss arising out of the cause of action, but to provide compensation where it is otherwise appropriate to do so for the circumstance that a sum of money has been outstanding to him for a period of time."

1. Applying this reasoning, and considering the agreement of the first respondent to pay interest to the applicant, the second respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to award interest.
2. In relation to the interest rate to be applied, I have no hesitation in agreeing with the rates proposed by the parties. In doing so, I note the purpose behind interest awards per Pheeney. I also note that the agreed rates are 2% greater than the relevant Reserve Bank cash rates, from time to time.
3. I also consider that the first respondent, together with the applicant, the second respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent have agreed as to the correct period for interest to be awarded, that is, the period from the date when each party's dependency was fully particularised to the first respondent - see Kaur as well as Mudgee Explorer Tours Pty Ltd v Clarke [2021] NSWPIC 41 (Clarke), Hu v Rongfar Property Service Pty Limited [2021] NSWPIC 95 (Hu), and Youseph v Homebush Unit Trust t/as Primo Smallgoods [2021] NSWPIC 299 (Youseph).
4. In relation to the third respondent, the third Reply (which included a comprehensive statement from him regarding his dependency) was lodged with the Commission on 7 March 2025. The first respondent submits (see paragraph 105 above) that interest should only be awarded to him from this date, however he submits that interest should be awarded to him from the date of his solicitors' letter to the first respondent's solicitors dated 10 February 2025.
5. In Kaur, President Judge Keating stated (at [139]):

"Section 109(2)(b) of the 1998 Act prohibits interest on any award of compensation payable under the Act for any period before a claim for the compensation was duly made. I accept the submission that the claim for compensation on behalf of the appellants was not duly made until the day of the arbitration. I therefore accept Thales's submission that, as at the arbitration, the appellants could not be entitled to interest pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act."

1. Kaur has been applied by the Commission in Clarke, Hu, and Youseph, as requiring a claim for dependency to be fully particularised before interest can be awarded in relation to the claim pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act - Senior Member Capel (as he then was) stating in Youseph (at [171]):

"Replies were subsequently filed that attached statements, with the last Reply filed on 23 June 2021. In my view, this was the first time that the first respondent had full particulars of all of the claims of each dependant. Accordingly, I consider that the first respondent should only be liable for interest from that date until the date of this determination."

1. The third respondent submits (see paragraph 108 above) that the letter from his solicitors dated 10 February 2025 provided full particulars of his claim. I have quoted the relevant parts of that letter at paragraph 105(c) above. In my opinion, the letter cannot be said to be providing the first respondent with anything other than the barest information regarding his dependency on the worker. It provides no details as to the financial and non-financial support provided by the worker to him. It is stark in its comparison to the detailed information regarding his dependency contained within his statement attached to the third Reply. I therefore agree with the submissions of the first respondent, and I find that full particulars of the third respondent's dependency were only provided by him when the third Reply was lodged with the Commission on 7 March 2025.
2. The third respondent will be entitled to interest on the amount awarded to him in these proceedings, from 7 March 2025 to the date of this certificate of determination, in accordance with the interest rates agreed to by all parties (including him - see paragraph 21(d) above).

1. I find that the worker died on 20 November 2019 or 21 November 2019, as a result of injury arising out of or in the course of his employment with the first respondent, pursuant to s 4 of the 1987 Act.
2. I find that the applicant was dependent on the worker for support.
3. I find that the second respondent was dependent on the worker for support.
4. I find that the third respondent was dependent on the worker for support.
5. I find that the fourth respondent was dependent on the worker for support.
6. I find that the sixth respondent was dependent on the worker for support.
7. I find that there were no other persons dependent on the worker for support.
8. I find that the first respondent is liable to pay the amount of $816,850 pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the 1987 Act.
9. I find that the amount of $816,850 is to be apportioned as follows, pursuant to s 29 of the 1987 Act:

(a) applicant - 43% - $351,245.50;

(b) second respondent - 32% - $261,392;

(c) third respondent - 16% - $130,696;

(d) fourth respondent - 7% - $57,179.50, and

(e) sixth respondent - 2% - $16,337.

1. I find that the first respondent is to pay interest on the amounts awarded to the applicant, the second respondent, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, pursuant to s 109 of the 1998 Act, at the following rates per annum:

(a) up to 18 February 2025 - at 6.35%;

(b) 19 February 2025 to 20 May 2025 (91 days) - at 6.1%;

(c) 21 May 2025 to 12 August 2025 (84 days) - at 5.85%, and

(d) 13 August 2025 to 26 November 2025 (106 days) - at 5.6%.

1. I find the relevant interest to be awarded to the applicant to be the amount of $25,560.09 (in relation to the period between 12 September 2024 and 26 November 2025 inclusive).
2. I find the relevant interest to be awarded to the second respondent to be the amount of $17,702.68 (in relation to the period between 11 October 2024 and 26 November 2025 inclusive).
3. I find the relevant interest to be awarded to the third respondent to be the amount of $5,523.25 (in relation to the period between 7 March 2025 and 26 November 2025 inclusive).
4. I find the relevant interest to be awarded to the fourth respondent to be the amount of $3,773 (in relation to the period between 21 October 2024 and 26 November 2025 inclusive).
5. I find the relevant interest to be awarded to the sixth respondent to be the amount of $342.25 (in relation to the period between 15 July 2025 and 24 November 2025 inclusive).
6. Due to the age of the second respondent, I find the first respondent liable to pay management fees on the amounts awarded to him (inclusive of the interest awarded to him), in accordance with s 25(1A) of the 1987 Act.
7. In accordance with s 85 of the 1987 Act, I will be ordering that the amount awarded to the second respondent be paid to the NSW Trustee and Guardian on trust for his benefit.
8. In relation to the applicant, the third respondent, the fourth respondent, and the sixth respondent, I am given a wide discretion in accordance with s 85A of the 1987 Act in relation to how I authorise the payment of the amounts awarded to them. There is no reason why I would not order that each of them receive the amounts payable to them, and I will do so.
9. Considering my findings, there will be awards that the first respondent pay:

(a) an amount of $351,245.50 together with interest of $25,560.09 to the applicant;

(b) an amount of $261,392 together with interest of $17,702.68 as well as management fees of $22,798.83 to the NSW Trustee and Guardian on trust for the benefit of the second respondent;

(c) an amount of $130,696 together with interest of $5,523.25 to the third respondent;

(d) an amount of $57,179.50 together with interest of $3,773 to the fourth respondent, and

(e) an amount of $16,337 together with interest of $342.25 to the sixth respondent.

1. I will grant leave to the parties to approach the Commission on or before 10 December 2025, should any of them disagree with the mathematical calculations which I have made regarding these awards.
2. In accordance with the agreements reached between the parties (see paragraph 17 above), there will also be awards that:

(a) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation in respect of the second respondent to the NSW Trustee and Guardian from 7 July 2020 to 31 October 2020 and from 1 May 2024 to 7 September 2024, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide;

(b) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation to the applicant in respect of the fourth respondent from 21 November 2019 to 31 July 2021, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide;

(c) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation to the applicant in respect of the third respondent from 21 November 2019 to 25 June 2020 and from 3 September 2021 to 3 December 2021, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide;

(d) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation to [FLO] in respect of the third respondent from 26 June 2020 to 5 February 2021 and from 28 May 2021 to 8 August 2021, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide;

(e) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation to [DTM] in respect of the third respondent from 20 April 2021 to 27 May 2021, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide, and

(f) pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act, the first respondent is to pay weekly compensation to [CUN] in respect of the third respondent from 9 August 2021 to 2 September 2021, at the rates specified from time to time in the SIRA Benefits Guide.

1. In relation to the complexity uplift sought by the first respondent (see paragraph 21(h) above) in accordance with table 4 item 4 to schedule 6 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016, I grant that uplift and determine it to be 30% having regard to:

(a) the variety of legal issues and the multitude of claims that needed to be addressed in these proceedings;

(b) the extent of the evidence required by it in order for it to eventually concede liability for compensation flowing from the worker's death;

(c) the fact that the proceedings were listed for three preliminary conferences, as well as a conciliation/arbitration on 12 August 2025 and a further conciliation/arbitration on 16 October 2025, and

(d) the fact that I requested written submissions from it.

1. In relation to the de-identification application by the second respondent (see paragraph 21(i) above), I grant that application and order that all persons (save for legal representatives) mentioned in this decision be de-identified. In this regard, and in accordance with cl 132(4) of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021, I have taken into account:

(a) that s 105 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 applies to the second respondent and reads as follows:

"(1) The name of a child or young person--

(a) who appears, or is reasonably likely to appear, as a witness before the Children's Court in any proceedings, or

(a1) who is involved, or is reasonably likely to be involved, in any capacity in any non-court proceedings, or

(b) with respect to whom proceedings before the Children's Court are brought or who is reasonably likely to be the subject of proceedings before the Children's Court, or

(c) who is, or is reasonably likely to be, mentioned or otherwise involved in any proceedings before the Children's Court or in any non-court proceedings, or

(d) who is the subject of a report under section 24, 25, 27, 120, 121 or 122,

must not be published or broadcast in any form that may be accessible by a person in New South Wales whether the publication or broadcast occurs before any proceedings have commenced, during the proceedings or after they are disposed of.

(1AA) The name of a child or young person who is or has been under the parental responsibility of the Minister or in out-of-home care must not be published or broadcast in any form that may be accessible by a person in New South Wales, in any way that identifies the child or young person as being or having been under the parental responsibility of the Minister or in out-of-home care (however expressed).

(1B) This section applies to the publication or broadcast of a child or young person's name to the public, or a section of the public, by publication in a newspaper or periodical publication, by radio or television broadcast or other electronic broadcast, by the internet, or by any other means of dissemination.

(1C) The publication of information to a website that provides the opportunity for, or facilitates or enables, dissemination of information to the public or a section of the public (whether or not the particular publication results in the dissemination of information to the public or a section of the public) constitutes the publication of information to the public or a section of the public for the purposes of this section.

(4) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the name of a child or young person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material--

(a) that identifies the child or young person, or

(b) that is likely to lead to the identification of the child or young person."

(b) considering the evidence which has been presented in these proceedings (especially regarding the relevant family conflicts which have emerged, as well as the difficulties which the second respondent has experienced, since the worker's death), I am of the opinion that the second respondent's identity is likely to be revealed (even if de-identified in this decision) unless all persons (save for legal representatives) mentioned in the decision are also de-identified;

(c) that there is not likely to be any prejudice to the proper administration of justice if all persons (save for legal representatives) mentioned in this decision are de-identified;

(d) that, although I do not have any specific medical evidence, I can still infer that (considering the issues of family conflict, parental responsibility, and childhood medical treatment discussed in this decision) identification of the persons mentioned in the decision could possibly affect their safety, health and well-being;

(e) that no party to these proceedings has opposed any de-identification order, and

(f) as a result, in my opinion, the public interest for a de-identification order to be made outweighs the public interest in open justice.

1. Finally, I note that there will be no award entered in favour of the fifth respondent by this decision. He has been found to be not dependent for support on the worker (see paragraphs 122-123 above), and his only entitlement to compensation in respect of the worker's death (pursuant to s 26 of the Act) was determined by way of an earlier certificate of determination in these proceedings dated 14 August 2025 - see paragraph 15 above.