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[2025] NSWCA 271
procedural. Both notices of motion were dismissed. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the 11 December 2025 motion and the respondent's costs of the 17 November 2025 motion from 19...
The Court had earlier paused enforcement of a possession judgment because the applicants promised to pay $850,000 into court within a limited period. They did not pay. They then asked for more time, offering to pay a larger amount by 2 February 2026, but the evidence did not show a reliable path to that payment. The Court also remained concerned about other debts secured over the property and the resulting uncertainty about its equity. It refused to change the undertaking and dismissed both motions. The applicants were ordered to pay specified parts of the respondent's costs.
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2,509 words · generated 06/10/2026
This is an urgent procedural ruling by Free JA in the NSW Court of Appeal. The applicants, Sandra Henri Edmonds and David James Edmonds, sought to delay enforcement of a judgment for possession in favour of Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd. The possession judgment was made by Faulkner J on 6 August 2025, and a writ of possession was issued on 25 August 2025 ([1]).
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The applicants' 17 November 2025 notice of motion sought a stay of execution until the final determination of their application for leave to appeal. When that motion came before Free JA on 18 November, their counsel offered an undertaking: if execution were stayed for 21 days, the applicants would pay $850,000 into court within that period. If they did not pay, they would deliver up possession and agree to release to the respondent any amount they had paid into court ([1]).
Free JA granted a time-limited stay on the basis of that undertaking. The judgment and writ were stayed for 22 days from 18 November, with the period expiring on 10 December 2025 ([2]). The difference between the undertaking's 21-day payment period and the 22-day stay period appears in the reasons themselves. The judgment also refers to the applicants needing to pay by 9 December when discussing their expected ability to comply ([9], [16]).
The applicants paid nothing into court. On 11 December, they sought to be released from the original undertaking and replace it with a varied one: payment of $875,000 by 2 February 2026. That request came in circumstances of urgency. The respondent had arranged for the Sheriff to attend the next day to take possession ([4]).
The Court found that the applicants' evidence did not show a reliable basis for extending the deadline. It was unclear what funds they had available when they gave their original undertaking, whether borrowing efforts were progressing, whether proposed family assistance would actually be provided, and when the money might arrive ([10]–[15]). The amount secured against the property by other mortgages also remained uncertain, leaving unresolved questions about the equity available to the respondent ([18]–[22]).
Free JA dismissed both motions. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the 11 December motion and costs of the 17 November motion from 19 November onwards ([27]).
The central question was not whether the proposed appeal would succeed. The respondent submitted that the appeal grounds were weak but accepted that the application should not be decided on the basis that there were no arguable grounds. Free JA adopted that approach and said it was consistent with the approach taken on 18 November ([5]–[6]). The ruling therefore focused on whether the applicants had justified changing the undertaking on which the earlier stay had been granted.
The Court treated the undertaking as a serious promise to the Court, not a provisional expression of intention. Free JA said that if the applicants did not appreciate its gravity, the fault was theirs; and if they gave it without a firm foundation for expecting to be able to pay, that too was their responsibility ([9]). This assessment informed the Court's view of the later request for more time.
The evidence did not explain the applicants' position when the original undertaking was given. There was no evidence of how much money was then available to them. There was only superficial evidence of steps taken after 18 November to raise funds ([10]). The Court did not have enough detail about contact with a financial broker to assess what steps had been taken, how any borrowing application had progressed, or whether the applicants had acted responsibly and efficiently. Nor could the Court find a realistic prospect of a particular sum, let alone the full amount, becoming available by 2 February ([11]).
The proposed assistance from relatives was also uncertain. A nephew, Robert Freeman, was apparently prepared to contribute $680,000 once an inheritance due at the end of January became available. But his email appeared to assume that the respondent would accept $680,000 in satisfaction of its claim. Free JA considered that understanding erroneous. The evidence did not establish that Mr Freeman would lend the money once he understood the actual position, including the other mortgages over the property ([12]–[13]). The Court also had no reliable evidence that another family member, Mr Andrew Bell, would provide a particular amount, on what terms, or when. The fact that a property was said to be unencumbered did not establish the funds that might be raised against it ([14]–[15]).
The Court concluded that the applicants had not shown a relevant change in circumstances since giving their undertaking. It accepted that the proposed extension was relatively short and that the respondent might not face substantial additional prejudice from that factor alone. But the timing was not decisive: the applicants still had not given a credible account of how the payment would be made ([16]–[17]).
A separate concern was the uncertain equity in the property. Even assuming the property was worth $3 million, as the applicants asserted and the respondent apparently did not dispute, there were three mortgages. The amount owed to Murray Laws was unclear. Documents obtained by the respondent indicated that the applicants owed more than $1 million, excluding interest, and the relevant agreements appeared to provide for a high monthly interest rate ([18]–[20]). An email from Murray Laws referring to willingness to accept $750,000 did not, on the Court's assessment, establish a binding agreement capping the secured debt ([20]–[22]).
Finally, the Court considered the livestock on the property. The respondent's evidence did not identify a specific plan for dealing with the livestock if it took possession. However, the applicants knew that their failure to pay would require them to deliver possession under their undertaking. They had not sought an orderly variation in advance and apparently had not made a livestock plan. The respondent had indicated it would act cooperatively. In those circumstances, the livestock issue did not justify further indulgence ([23]–[26]).
The judgment does not purport to change or comprehensively restate the law governing stays pending appeal, undertakings, or possession proceedings. It identifies no case authorities and does not set out a general doctrinal test. Its reasoning is an application of the circumstances and evidence before Free JA.
The position immediately before the ruling was that execution had been temporarily stayed on the basis of the applicants' undertaking to pay $850,000 into court within the specified period. The undertaking also addressed the consequence of non-payment: the applicants were to deliver up possession, and any sum paid into court could be released to the respondent ([1]–[2]). By 10 December the stay period had expired, and no payment had been made ([2], [4]).
After the ruling, neither motion remained on foot: both were dismissed. The Court did not grant the proposed replacement undertaking extending the payment deadline to 2 February 2026. Its reasons make clear that it was not satisfied that the applicants had established a reliable payment plan or resolved uncertainties about the secured debts and remaining equity ([8], [16]–[22]). The formal orders also imposed costs consequences ([27]).
The significance of the ruling is therefore case-specific and evidential. It illustrates how, in this instance, an applicant's failure to comply with an undertaking and deficiencies in evidence about an alternative payment plan weighed against a further stay. It should not be read as establishing that every missed undertaking automatically leads to the same result. The judgment gives no universal rule about variations, nor does it resolve how a different evidentiary record or different prejudice balance would be treated.
At [8], Free JA described the evidence supporting the proposed extension as “wholly deficient”. In plain English, the Court considered that the applicants had not provided enough reliable information to justify believing that the proposed $875,000 would be paid by 2 February.
At [10], the Court highlighted the absence of evidence about how much money the applicants had available when they gave their undertaking on 18 November. This mattered because the application sought further indulgence after the applicants failed to honour that promise. The Court wanted an explanation of the original expectation of payment, not simply a description of later attempts to raise money.
At [11], the Court said it could not assess the borrowing process because key details were missing. The applicants referred to a financial broker, but the evidence did not show how far the application had progressed or whether a realistic amount was likely to be available in time. In other words, mentioning that finance had been explored did not establish that finance was likely to be secured.
At [13], the Court examined the nephew's proposed contribution. His email appeared to proceed on a mistaken view that the respondent would accept $680,000 in satisfaction of its claim. The Court also considered the existence of other mortgages important to whether he would lend on the security of the property. The passage shows that a proposed source of funds was not treated as reliable merely because a relative had expressed willingness to help.
At [16], Free JA said extending the deadline would be “an exercise in hope over reasonable expectation”. The plain-English point is that the Court saw a gap between a possible source of funds and evidence showing a reasonable basis to expect that the money would actually be available by the proposed date.
At [21], the Court described the Murray Laws email as no more than an “invitation to treat” on the amount of the debt, rather than evidence of a binding agreement capping it. The judgment's point is narrow: the email did not remove the uncertainty about the secured amount.
At [25], the Court said the applicants could not benefit from having “apparently shut their eyes to reality”. In context, this refers to their failure to act in advance despite apparently appreciating that they would not meet the payment deadline. The Court considered the absence of timely notice and planning relevant to the request for further relief.
The ruling is most directly relevant to a procedural situation where a party obtains a temporary stay on the strength of a specific undertaking to pay money into court, does not pay within the agreed period, and then seeks a variation or further delay. The judgment demonstrates the importance Free JA placed on evidence explaining both the original undertaking and the proposed revised timetable ([8]–[16]).
A similar issue may arise where a party relies on anticipated borrowing, a broker's involvement, or family assistance. In this case, the Court examined whether those funding sources were sufficiently detailed and committed to support a realistic expectation of payment by the proposed date. It found that evidence of contact with a broker, an expected inheritance, and a possible line of credit did not establish the likely amount, timing, terms, or commitment necessary to support the application ([11]–[15]).
The case also involved uncertainty about competing secured debts and the property's equity. That issue mattered because the respondent claimed prejudice from delay in enforcing the writ, and the Court lacked clear evidence about the amount owing to another mortgagee ([18]–[22]). The judgment is consequently relevant to applications where the value of property alone may not disclose the net equity available, because debts secured over that property remain uncertain.
The livestock issue formed part of the prejudice assessment, but it was not determinative. The Court acknowledged a gap in the respondent's evidence about its specific plan for the animals. It nonetheless found that this did not justify varying an undertaking that was otherwise unsupported, particularly given the applicants' failure to plan for the consequence of default and the respondent's stated cooperative approach ([23]–[26]).
The decision does not establish that these facts will always lead to refusal. It is a procedural ruling based on the evidence and circumstances described in the reasons. The judgment itself leaves open how a case with firm funding commitments, timely notice, clearer evidence of secured debts, or a different balance of prejudice might be assessed.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later courts' treatment of this decision. It was decided on 16 December 2025, and the text provides no subsequent judgments, citations, or history of appellate review. No conclusion about whether it has been followed, distinguished, or otherwise treated can be drawn from the supplied material.
The reasons do refer to Free JA's own earlier judgment in the same proceedings, delivered on 18 November 2025 and published on 20 November 2025. That earlier ruling had granted the temporary stay on the undertaking and contained background findings about prejudice. The present judgment says that those reasons should be consulted for the background, but does not reproduce them ([2]–[3]). This is not a later-court treatment of the present decision; it is the present ruling's reference to an earlier procedural decision in the same matter.
The judgment cites no other cases. Accordingly, this source does not support claims about broader precedential reception or the relationship between this ruling and other authorities.
Several matters are expressly or implicitly left unresolved. First, the judgment does not decide the merits of the proposed appeal. Free JA noted the refined draft grounds and accepted the respondent's position that the motion should not be determined on the basis that there were no arguable grounds. The proposed grounds were not examined in detail ([5]–[6]).
Second, the precise amount owed to Murray Laws remained unclear. The Court referred to documents suggesting more than $1 million was owed, excluding interest, and to an email indicating willingness to accept $750,000 subject to counsel's fees. It did not find that the debt was finally quantified or that the email created a binding cap ([18]–[22]).
Third, the Court did not determine whether Mr Freeman or Mr Bell would ultimately provide funds. It found that the evidence did not establish a firm commitment, amount, timing, or terms sufficient to support the requested extension ([12]–[15]). The ruling concerns the adequacy of the evidence before it, not a final finding about what either relative might later do.
Fourth, the respondent's specific plan for the livestock if it took possession was not in evidence. Free JA regarded that deficiency as unfortunate, but not sufficient to warrant a variation in the circumstances ([23]–[26]). The judgment does not set out what arrangements were ultimately made for the livestock.
Finally, the decision does not formulate a general test for varying undertakings or stays pending appeal, and it does not explain how a different balance of prejudice would affect the result. Its reasoning is grounded in the applicants' failure to pay, the weaknesses in the proposed funding evidence, unresolved mortgage uncertainty, the lack of advance planning, and the imminent execution of the writ.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Edmonds v Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 271
Hearing dates: 11 December 2025
Date of orders: 11 December 2025
Decision date: 16 December 2025
Before: Free JA
Decision: (1) Notice of motion filed on 17 November 2025 is dismissed.
(2) Notice of motion filed on 11 December 2025 is dismissed.
(3) The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Motion filed on 11 December 2025.
(4) The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Motion filed on 17 November 2025, in respect of costs from 19 November 2025 onwards.
Catchwords: APPEALS — procedure — stay pending appeal — urgent stay of execution upon judgment for possession and writ of possession — stay previously granted following undertaking to pay money into court within 21 days — money not paid — application to vary undertaking to extend time — evidence to explain failure to pay deficient — evidence about prospects of payment by alternative date deficient --- application refused
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Sandra Henri Edmonds (First applicant)
David James Edmonds (Second applicant)
Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
S Burchett (Applicants)
M R Pesman SC (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Leaf Legal (Applicants)
Ark Legal (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/335127
If the Court grants an order staying execution of the writ of possession for the next 21 days, the Applicants will:
(a) within 21 days, pay $850,000 into court to abide any final determination by the Court or to be paid out in accordance with the written agreement of the parties; and
(b) in default of making the payment into court deliver up possession of the mortgaged property to the respondent and agree to the release to the respondent of any amount paid into court.
I gave judgment on 18 November 2025, and subsequently published my reasons for judgment on 20 November 2025. I relevantly ordered that upon that undertaking, the writ of possession and judgment be stayed for 22 days from 18 November 2025. That period of 22 days expired on 10 December 2025.
The background to the proceedings and my findings, including about the respective prejudice asserted by each party, is contained in that judgment and I do not repeat it here. However, reference should be made to that judgment to understand the background to my reasoning today and the considerations of prejudice that I take into account. Also on 18 November 2025 I stood over the notice of motion filed on 17 November 2025 for directions before the registrar on 10 December 2025. That was on the basis that by that date, according to the undertaking, money would have been paid into court as per the undertaking, or in the absence of that occurring, the parties would address how to proceed.
The applicants, as events transpired, failed to pay any money into court in accordance with the undertaking they gave to the Court. Under the terms of that undertaking, they are now required to deliver up possession of the property to the respondent, Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd. The applicants now seek that the existing undertaking be released, in favour of a variation of the undertaking, the effect of which would be to extend until 2 February 2026 the time for payment, and an increase in the amount to be paid to $875,000. This application for a variation of the undertaking was first raised yesterday when the matter came before the registrar. The matter came before me today for hearing, as on the last occasion, in circumstances of urgency. The respondent has organised for the Sheriff to attend to take possession of the property tomorrow, that is, 12 December 2025. As such, there is a need for urgent resolution of the application to vary the undertaking.
The applicants have provided to the Court today a draft notice of appeal and application for leave to appeal. This reflects a substantial refinement of the proposed grounds of appeal as compared with what was put before me on 18 November 2025. It is unnecessary for the purposes of resolving the notice of motion to address the proposed grounds of appeal in any great detail.
Mr Pesman SC, who appeared for the respondent, submitted that the appeal grounds, while weak, were not such that I should determine this application on the basis that there were no arguable grounds of appeal. I adopt that approach, which is consistent with the approach I took on 18 November 2025.
The respondent opposes the application to vary the undertaking. As I have mentioned, the respondent has made arrangements with the Sheriff to take possession tomorrow of the property and it has not deviated from that course in light of the attempt to vary the undertaking. The respondent complains, legitimately in my view, that this is the latest in a series of occasions on which the applicants have effectively moved at the 11th hour forestall possession without fair and orderly notice to the respondent and without, it seems, any good explanation for why matters could not have been done in a more fair and orderly way.
I propose the following orders:
Notice of motion filed on 17 November 2025 is dismissed.
Notice of motion filed on 11 December 2025 is dismissed.
The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Motion filed on 11 December 2025.
The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Motion filed on 17 November 2025, in respect of costs from 19 November 2025 onwards.
**********
Edmonds
Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd
Both notices of motion were dismissed. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the 11 December 2025 motion and the respondent's costs of the 17 November 2025 motion from 19 November 2025 onwards.
I am not satisfied that there is a proper basis to vary the undertaking to provide the further indulgence that the applicants seek. The evidence that the applicants now put before the Court in an attempt to explain what has transpired and in an attempt to give some comfort that they will be in a position to pay $875,000 into court by 2 February 2026 is wholly deficient.
The applicants through their counsel provided a solemn undertaking to the Court on 18 November 2025. If the applicants did not appreciate the gravity and solemnity of the undertaking that they were giving, the fault unfortunately is entirely theirs. Equally, if the applicants gave that undertaking in circumstances where they did not have a firm foundation to expect that they would be in a position to pay the amount in question into court by 9 December 2025, the fault lies with the applicants.
Unfortunately, the evidence provided by the applicants today provides no explanation of how it was that the applicants expected, if they did, as of 18 November 2025, that they would be in a position to fulfil the undertaking that they gave on that day. No evidence is given as to the amount of money that was then available to the applicants to pay into Court. There is merely evidence of an entirely superficial nature that the applicants took some steps after 18 November 2025 to seek to raise funds.
Contact was apparently made with a financial broker with a view to borrowing funds, but no detail is provided that would allow the Court to understand the steps taken to advance that process or how the applicants and the broker have progressed any application for borrowing. The Court cannot be satisfied that the applicants acted responsibly and efficiently to seek to borrow funds, nor can the Court be satisfied on the limited available evidence that there is a realistic prospect of any particular amount of funds, let alone sufficient funds, becoming available through this process between now and 2 February 2026.
Reference is made in the applicant’s evidence to funds being provided by two relatives. A nephew, Robert Freeman, is apparently prepared to contribute an amount of $680,000 towards the required payment into Court as per the undertaking, once an inheritance due to him at the end of January 2026 is forthcoming. The email that is in evidence from Mr Freeman implies that he expects that this would be a loan secured by a transfer of the mortgage currently held by the respondent. But the same email records an understanding, which on its face is erroneous, that the respondent is prepared to accept $680,000 in satisfaction of its claim.
There is in fact no firm basis emerging from this evidence to expect that Mr Freeman will in fact provide $680,000 before 2 February 2026, once he understands the true position of the applicants and the respondent. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are other mortgagees with claims over the property, which one would expect would lead Mr Freeman, if he is acting rationally, to at least have pause before lending $680,000 on the security of the property. There is no evidence that Mr Freeman is aware of the true security position and is nevertheless prepared, let alone committed, to lend $680,000.
These are all deficiencies, which, as with the other matters I referred to in this judgment, the applicants ought to have been aware of and ought to have addressed in their evidence. Nor is there any satisfactory explanation of where the balance of the funds would come from, even if Mr Freeman does lend $680,000. There is reference to another family member, a Mr Andrew Bell, assisting with arranging a line of credit secured by a family member’s unencumbered property. The relevant correspondence to which that evidence refers suggests that it is Mr Bell’s own property.
There is no evidence, however, of how much money Mr Bell is prepared to lend or gift, as the case may be, to the applicants, let alone evidence that he is committed to lending or gifting any such amounts. Mr Burchett, who appears for the applicants, asked the Court to infer that an unencumbered property is likely to be of significant value. That is a difficult inference to draw, at least at any level of relevant specificity, in circumstances where there is no evidence whatsoever about the type of property. But, even if one assumes the property is likely to be of substantial value, there is no evidence about how much money would then be forthcoming for the applicants, or the terms that would attach to that, or the time at which it is likely to be provided.
Given these circumstances, the Court must now proceed on the basis that the undertaking was given on 18 November 2025 without the applicants having any firm foundation at that time for expecting that they would, in fact, be in a position to comply. The applicants, in seeking the indulgence of a further period of time by way of a variation of the undertaking, must have appreciated that it was incumbent on them to provide a clear and reliable account of their plan for meeting the extended timetable for payment that they sought. They have conspicuously failed to do so. To vary the undertaking to extend the time for payment would now be an exercise in hope over reasonable expectation.
In those circumstances, I do not accept the submission advanced by the applicants that there has been a relevant change in circumstances since the undertaking was given on 18 November 2025. There are other factors that also tell against acceding to the variation to the undertaking. The applicants point out, correctly, that the further time being sought is relevantly short in duration. It might be said, in that connection, that the respondent does not face any substantial further prejudice by a variation to the undertaking, and an extension of the time for payment. While there is some force in that approach, there are other factors that make an extension inappropriate, in my view.
There remains a significant uncertainty about the remaining equity in the property. Even assuming that it is worth $3 million, as asserted by the applicants and seemingly not disputed by the respondent, there are three mortgages over the property. Most significantly, as explained in my judgment published on 20 November 2025, Murray Laws is owed substantial funds by the applicants secured against the property. The position in relation to Murray Laws has, at least, been normalised in one respect, in that Mr Smits of Murray Laws is no longer the solicitor on the record acting for the applicants in these proceedings.
However, the amount owing to Murray Laws remains uncertain. The respondent has, pursuant to the orders I made on the last occasion, obtained documents indicating that through a combination of legal costs and borrowings, the total amount owed to Murray Laws by the applicants, not taking into account interest, is over $1 million. Murray Laws has an entitlement, on the face of the relevant agreements, to interest in an aggressive monthly rate, which is submitted to be equivalent to something in the order of 60% per annum.
The applicants have been aware for some months that the ambiguity surrounding the debt owed to Murray Laws is a matter of significance, in particular as a factor affecting the position of the respondent and any prejudice to it through delay in enforcement of the writ of possession. Despite this, the applicants have failed to take the opportunity to provide clear and reliable evidence about the amount that is definitely owing. Before me today, the applicants relied on an email from Mr Smits of Murray Laws, and it is an email of 11 December 2025 at 11.03am. It says, “as just requested by Mrs Edmonds, we confirm our willingness to accept $750,000 in satisfaction of the secured debt owing to us by Mr and Mrs Edmonds, subject to payment of counsel’s fees.”
Mr Pesman of Senior Counsel indicated that he placed no particular reliance on the qualification relating to the payment of counsel’s fees in circumstances where, over the course of proceedings, the applicants have not substantially involved counsel. However, he points out as to the balance of the email, in my view correctly, that the most that could be said of the email is that it amounts to an invitation to treat about the amount owed to Murray Laws. It does not record or evidence a reliable binding agreement capping the amount owing at $750,000.
In the circumstances, there remains ongoing uncertainty, which the applicants could and should have resolved, about the true equity position affecting the property and the risks facing the respondent in any ongoing deferment of their execution of the writ of possession.
As I explained in my judgment of 18 November 2025 published on 20 November 2025, there is a significant issue about the welfare of the livestock on the property which is raised by any change in possession. Here, there is an element of deficiency in the evidence advanced by the respondent in that the Court does not have evidence of any specific plan for the treatment of the livestock if the respondent takes possession of the property tomorrow as currently proposed.
However, as Mr Pesman submitted, the applicants bear the primary responsibility in this regard. The applicants have known since 18 November 2025 that if they did not pay the money into court, they would be obliged on their own undertaking to deliver up possession of the property. As Mr Pesman reminded me, I made pointed remarks in my judgment about what the applicants could expect if they did not comply with the undertaking.
On the evidence, which is now available to the Court, the applicants must have appreciated long before 9 December 2025 that they would not be in a position to comply with the undertaking by paying the required money into court. They took no steps to approach either the respondent or the Court to explain the position in anticipation of their default and to seek an orderly variation of the undertaking. Nor, it seems, on the evidence, did they make any plan for how the livestock should be treated if the applicants were, in fact, required to deliver up possession shortly after 10 December 2025. The applicants cannot now have the benefit of having apparently shut their eyes to reality.
The respondent has indicated that it will adopt a cooperative approach to the treatment of the livestock, and in the circumstances, the Court can only proceed in the expectation that this will occur. The lack of more specific evidence or undertakings in this regard, while unfortunate, is not, in my view, a sound reason for giving the applicants a variation to the undertakings in circumstances where their application in that regard is otherwise wholly lacking in merit. For these reasons, I dismiss the notice of motion filed in Court today, and also the notice of motion filed on 17 November 2025.