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[2010] ACTCA 15
Court of Appeal (ACT)
2010-08-17
Anthony James J
Original judgment source is linked above.
DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN v THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ANTHONY JAMES BESANKO; ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY [2010] ACTCA 15 (17 August 2010)
APPEAL - appeal from order dismissing application for judicial review of refusal to order inquiry into appellant's conviction under s 424 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) - whether refusal to order inquiry is a reviewable decision - whether proper construction of "doubt or question" was applied in refusing to order inquiry - whether refusal to order inquiry was affected by unreasonableness - no errors found - appeal dismissed.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - whether written submissions received from self-represented litigant after the conclusion of a hearing should be considered - no prior leave granted to file further submissions - need to avoid preferential treatment for self-represented litigants - written submissions not considered.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) of refusal to order inquiry - whether refusal to order inquiry a decision - if refusal was a decision, whether it was a decision "made ... under an enactment" - application of Griffith University v Tang test - refusal to order inquiry did not confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations - refusal to order an inquiry into conviction not a reviewable decision.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) of refusal to order inquiry - proper construction of "doubt or question" in considering whether to order inquiry - s 422 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) of refusal to order inquiry - whether refusal to order inquiry was affected by Wednesbury unreasonableness.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 30B
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 313 et seq
Inquiries Act 1991 (ACT)
Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 34B
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)
Criminal Laws Amendment Act 1883 (NSW), ss 383, 384
Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), Pt 5.4 r 5412(2)
Explanatory Memorandum for the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2001 (ACT)
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321
Barton v Walker [1979] 2 NSWLR 740
Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Funding Litigation Partners Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147; (2009) 180 FCR 11
Communications Electrical Electronic Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Blue Star Pacific Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 750
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543
David Eastman v the Honourable Justice Anthony James Besanko (2009) 223 FLR 109; [2009] ACTSC 10
Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Eastman [2002] ACTSC 35; (2002) 130 A Crim R 588
Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Eastman [2002] FCAFC 209; (2002) 118 FCR 360
Eastman v Australian Capital Territory [2008] ACTCA 8; (2008) 227 FLR 279
Eastman v ACT; Eastman v Miles [2008] HCASL 553
Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 15
Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 16
Eastman v Besanko [2009] ACTSC 144
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2003] HCA 28; (2003) 214 CLR 318
Eastman v Miles [2007] ACTSC 27; (2007) 210 FLR 417
Eastman v Miles [2004] ACTSC 32; (2004) 181 FLR 418
Eastman v R [2008] FCAFC 62; (2008) 248 ALR 149
Eastman v R [2008] HCASL 550
Eastman v R [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1
Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9
Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99
Malouf v Malouf [2006] NSWCA 83; (2006) 65 NSWLR 449
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355
Re Jarman & Others; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595
Re The Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex Parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322
Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services & Health & Anor [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 56 FCR 50
Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573
Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2009, 4th ed)
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England
Inquiry under s 475 of the Crimes Act 1900 into the matter of the fitness to plead of David Harold Eastman, 6 October 2005
Decision and Reasons in relation to an Application for an Inquiry under Part 20 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), 4 April 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. ACTCA 4 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
AND: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ANTHONY JAMES BESANKO
AND: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. ACTCA 4 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
AND: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ANTHONY JAMES BESANKO
AND: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
1. Assistant Commissioner Colin Winchester of the Australian Federal Police was shot dead in Canberra on 10 January 1989. David Eastman was found guilty of his murder in November 1995 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Since then, there have been a number of appeals and other applications made in relation to Mr Eastman's conviction (described by Dowsett J at [34] to [37] below), but to date the conviction stands.
2. In February 2005 Mr Eastman sought an order under s 422 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) for an inquiry into his conviction, and in April 2008 Besanko J, an additional judge of the ACT Supreme Court, announced that he had decided not to order an inquiry.
3. Under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) (the ADJR Act), Mr Eastman sought judicial review of the refusal by Besanko J to order an inquiry. In February 2009 Edmonds J, also an additional judge of the ACT Supreme Court, dismissed Mr Eastman's application. Mr Eastman has appealed from that decision.
4. I have had the opportunity to read in draft the carefully-argued judgments of Dowsett and Graham JJ, and rely as indicated on their more detailed descriptions of the background to this matter and the issues that this Court is asked to address.
5. Following a process detailed in the judgment of Graham J at [181] to [188] below and in the judgment of Dowsett J at [41] to [47] below, the grounds of appeal were agreed to be, in effect, that Edmonds J had erred in finding that the decision made by Besanko J on 4 April 2008 under section 424 of the Crimes Act:
(a) was not a decision to which the ADJR Act applied;
(b) was not a decision that entailed an exercise of power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power; and
(c) was not a decision involving errors of law (or otherwise contrary to law) as to the proper construction of the expression "doubt or question" as to the appellant's guilt (as used in ss 422(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Crimes Act).
6. First, before considering the grounds of appeal, I note that after the Court of Appeal had reserved its decision, Mr Eastman sought to make further written submissions without leave to do so having been granted or even sought during the hearing.
7. In reliance on the descriptions provided by Dowsett and Graham JJ at [53] to [56] and [205] to [211] respectively of the circumstances in which Mr Eastman sought to lodge written submissions after judgment had been reserved and after he had expressly declined to take any further part, or to make any further submissions, in the hearing, I agree, for the reasons specified by Dowsett and Graham JJ at [58] to [63] and [212] to [221] below respectively (except that I have not looked at the submissions), that those further written submissions should not be received.
Appeal ground (a): Was Besanko J's decision subject to judicial review?
8. Next, I consider that Edmonds J was correct in finding that Besanko J's decision was not subject to judicial review under the ADJR Act. For the reasons set out below, I consider that the decision was not a "decision under an enactment" as defined in Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99 (Tang) and that there is a clear legislative intention that it not be a reviewable decision.
Was there a "decision ... made ... under an enactment"?
9. The phrase used in the ADJR Act definition of "decision to which this Act applies" (set out in the Dictionary to the ADJR Act), namely "decision ... made ... under an enactment", would on its face appear to describe exactly a decision made by the Supreme Court under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act to order an inquiry. I shall return shortly to the question whether a refusal to order an inquiry is such a decision.
10. However, assuming for the moment that Besanko J's conclusion that there was no occasion for him to order an inquiry was a decision for ADJR Act purposes, judicial interpretation of the phrase "made ... under an enactment" has established that it is not enough that the decision in question should be "expressly or impliedly required or authorised" by the enactment; as set out by Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in Tang at [89]:
... the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. ... It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice.
11. The meaning of the requirement that "in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment" emerges more clearly from earlier parts of the joint judgment in Tang, in particular the following (at [79]-[81]):
The decision so required or authorised must be "of an administrative character". This element of the definition casts some light on the force to be given by the phrase "under an enactment". What is it, in the course of administration, that flows from or arises out of the decision taken so as to give that significance which has merited the legislative conferral of a right of judicial review upon those aggrieved?
The answer in general terms is the affecting of legal rights and obligations. Do legal rights or duties owe in an immediate sense their existence to the decision, or depend upon the presence of the decision for their enforcement? To adapt what was said by Lehane J in Lewins, does the decision in question derive from the enactment the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations? Are legal rights and obligations affected not under the general law but by virtue of the statute?
If the decision derives its capacity to bind from contract or some other private law source, then the decision is not "made under" the enactment in question. [references omitted] [emphasis added]
12. Interpreted by reference to the comments set out at [11] above, the second element of the test may be expressed as in turn having two elements, such that the whole test is as follows:
(a) the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment;
(b) the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations (whether existing or otherwise and whether or not owing their existence to the enactment); and
(c) the effect on legal rights or obligations must itself derive from the enactment.
13. In this case I am satisfied (for the reasons set out by Edmonds J in the decision now appealed from, David Eastman v The Honourable Justice Anthony James Besanko [2009] ACTSC 10 at [12] to [16] and summarised in the judgment of Graham J at [201] below) that if Besanko J made a decision, that decision was authorised by the enactment concerned, but:
(a) that the decision not to order an inquiry did not "itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations"; and
(b) that the decision, therefore is not, within the criteria set down in Tang, a "decision made under an enactment".
14. I note in passing that while the making of an application to the Supreme Court for an inquiry in relation to a particular doubt or question does preclude the ordering of an inquiry pursuant to a subsequent application in relation to that doubt or question (s 422(1)(f) of the Crimes Act), there does not appear to be any similar restriction, arising out of an earlier application or call for an inquiry, on the power of the Executive under s 423 to order an inquiry.
15. As mentioned at [9] above, there is a question in my mind whether what Besanko J did with the application for an inquiry even amounted to a decision for ADJR Act purposes.
16. Counsel for the Intervenor conceded that Besanko J had made a decision not to order an inquiry without conceding that it was a decision to which the ADJR Act applied. However, I am not convinced that s 3A(1)(a) of the ADJR Act, which defines "the making of a decision" to include "making ... or refusing to make an order" is effective to turn deciding not to order an inquiry, or refusing to order an inquiry, into the making of a decision under Pt 20 of the Crimes Act.
17. It is useful to consider this issue together with the submission made by counsel for the appellant, before his retainer was terminated, that the right potentially affected by any flaw in Besanko J's decision-making process was in fact the right to have the application for an inquiry dealt with according to law. This submission was significant given the comments of Edmonds J mentioned at [13] above about the effect of Besanko J's conclusions on Mr Eastman's "rights" in relation to an inquiry and given the provisions of s 425 of the Crimes Act.
18. Several aspects of Pt 20 of the Crimes Act seem to me to indicate not only that, as I have already concluded at [13] above, the decision does not affect any legal rights or obligations, but also that the enactment itself does not confer any rights or obligations on an applicant, including in particular that it does not confer any rights in relation to how the application is dealt with once it has been made. Rather, Pt 20 emphasises that once the application has been made, the applicant has no further role or significance in any dealings with the application.
19. First, I note the scope under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act for an application to be made "by someone else on the convicted person's behalf". It is not clear what "on the convicted person's behalf" actually requires, or whether such an application could be made without the consent of the convicted person, but the absence from Pt 20 of any further role for the applicant as such in the inquiry process suggests that the role of the applicant under s 424(1) is purely to bring the matter before the Supreme Court, and in particular does not include acquiring any ongoing rights or obligations in relation to the processes thereby set in train.
20. Secondly, s 422(1)(f) of the Crimes Act, in ruling out the ordering of an inquiry if there has been a previous application in relation to the doubt or question concerned, whether or not that previous application was made by the current applicant or by someone else, suggests that whatever the legal consequences of an application in relation to a particular doubt or question, they do not have any special significance in relation to the applicant.
21. Thirdly, I note the absence of any explicit provision for the applicant to be heard, or even to have written submissions taken into account, on consideration of the application. There appears to be no obstacle to the application being accompanied by written submissions, and I do not consider that s 424(3) of the Crimes Act, in specifying that the Supreme Court is permitted to consider written submissions from the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions or both, implies that an applicant's original submissions are not to be considered; however there is no provision for the applicant to make submissions in reply.
22. Fourthly, s 422(3) of the Crimes Act makes it clear that in setting limits on the scope of any inquiry it orders, the Supreme Court is not in any way restricted by anything in the application.
23. Finally, there is no requirement for the applicant to be notified of anything in relation to the Supreme Court's consideration of the application, and in particular there is no concept of the application being refused or of any refusal being notified; this contrasts with the requirement in s 430(3) of the Crimes Act that the convicted person (who may or may not have been the applicant) must receive a copy of any order made by the Full Court of the Supreme Court after considering the report of a board that has conducted the inquiry.
24. The complete absence of the applicant under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act as a player in any of the consequences of that application is the basis on which I reject counsel's submission that s 424 confers on an applicant a right to have an application dealt with according to law. It is also the basis on which I incline to the view, without needing to decide the question for present purposes, that the only "decision" that could be made under s 422 is a decision to order an inquiry, not a decision not to do so (whether a decision to order an inquiry is itself susceptible to judicial review under the ADJR Act is a separate question on which I make no comment).
25. These observations about whether there is a "decision" not to order an inquiry are consistent with those made by Gray J in Eastman v Miles [2004] ACTSC 32; (2004) 181 FLR 418 at [49] to [53] about the operation of the then s 475 of the Crimes Act, a predecessor of Pt 20 which was replaced by the current provisions (initially with different numbering) in 2001, and the availability of judicial review in relation to the power conferred by that section. Of particular relevance is what Gray J referred to as "pertinent" reasoning by Gummow J in Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services & Health & Anor [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 56 FCR 50 at 90, who said in relation to the Secretary's power to give a direction on becoming aware of certain things:
One is returned to the fundamental point that without imputing to the Secretary an awareness which did not exist, it could not be said that the ground had been laid for the exercise of the power to direct that the trials be stopped. If the power was not exercisable at all, then the omission so to do could not, within the meaning of the ADJR Act, involve a refusal to make a decision. Otherwise, the ADJR Act would involve the Court in a process of review in which the complaint was that the decision-maker failed to make a decision in exercise of a power which was, in truth, not open for exercise by the decision-maker.
26. Gray J's approach, and my conclusion about whether there is a decision not to order an inquiry, also seem to be consistent with Dowsett J's proposition, with which I agree, at [119] below that if a doubt or question identified in an application for an inquiry is resolved as a result of the Court's evaluation of the available material, then no doubt or question remains and there can be no inquiry.
Was the legislation intended to give a right to judicial review?
27. The relevant provisions of the Crimes Act were enacted in 2001, before the High Court's decision in Tang, but that decision followed a line of reasoning dating back some years requiring that a "decision under an enactment" affects legal rights or obligations. I have no doubt that s 425(1) of the Crimes Act, in conjunction with the other aspects of Pt 20 already mentioned, was intended to ensure that, while an application under s 424 was required before the Supreme Court could exercise its power under that section, the application did not give the applicant any further rights (or indeed obligations) in relation to the Supreme Court's subsequent dealings with the application. My conclusion is consistent with, but does not need to rely on, the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum for the precursor of s 425 (Explanatory Memorandum for the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2001, page 13, in relation to proposed s 557E) that the purpose of the section was "to make it clear that decisions about ordering an inquiry are purely discretionary and are not subject to appeal or review".
28. Accordingly, I consider that Edmonds J was correct in finding that Mr Eastman's application was not competent.
Appeal ground (b): the reasonableness of Besanko J's decision
29. At the appeal hearing Mr Eastman, when pressed, made a grudging attempt to provide particulars of this appeal ground by referring the Court to material from earlier proceedings, but in the end he declined to argue the unreasonableness ground at the hearing. As indicated at [7] above, Mr Eastman's belated submissions, which among other things seek to pursue the unreasonableness ground, are not to be received. In these circumstances, I consider that it is neither necessary nor desirable to express any views on this ground.
Appeal ground (c): the proper construction of "doubt or question" as to guilt
30. As to the meaning of "doubt or question" as to guilt, I agree with Dowsett J's conclusions (and the reasons for them) that:
(a) Besanko J did not misconstrue the words "doubt or question" (see [119] below);
(b) Mr Eastman's submissions on the distinction between guilt in fact and guilt as evidenced by conviction must fail to the extent that they depend on the allegation of non-disclosure by the prosecution of material going to the credit of a key Crown witness, because there is no evidence of any non-disclosure affecting material that was available to the prosecution at a relevant time (see [123] below); and
(c) in this case there is no distinction between guilt in fact and guilt as evidenced by conviction (see [126] below) (but without expressing any view on whether such a distinction could ever be significant).
31. Accordingly, I find that the first and third grounds of appeal fail, and that the second ground has not been made out.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of her Honour, Justice Penfold.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. ACTCA 4 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
AND: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ANTHONY JAMES BESANKO
AND: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
33. On 10 January 1989, Colin Stanley Winchester, an Assistant Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police and the highest ranking police officer in the Australian Capital Territory (the Territory), was found dead in the driver's seat of his car. The car was parked near his home in the Canberra suburb of Deakin. He had been shot twice at close range - once in the back of the head, and once in the face on the right hand side. An inquest into his death commenced in May 1989, resulting in an open finding. The inquest was re-opened in November 1992 and further evidence was heard. As a result, on 24 December 1992 the appellant, David Harold Eastman, was committed for trial on a charge of murder. The trial commenced on 16 May 1995 before Carruthers AJ and a jury. On 3 November 1995 the appellant was found guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appellant has sought, in numerous ways, to have his conviction set aside. A history of these proceedings appears below.
34. Following his trial and conviction, the appellant appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. That appeal was dismissed: Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 (Eastman (FC)). The High Court granted special leave to appeal from that decision, which appeal was heard together with a constitutional challenge. The appellant was unsuccessful in both proceedings: Eastman v R [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1 (Eastman (HC)) and Re The Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex Parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322. The appellant later moved in the Federal Court for an order that his appeal be re-opened. The motion was denied by the Full Court of the Federal Court: Eastman v R [2008] FCAFC 62; (2008) 248 ALR 149. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused: Eastman v R [2008] HCASL 550.
35. In June 2000, the appellant applied for a judicial inquiry pursuant to s 475 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). On 7 August 2001 Miles CJ granted his application and ordered that a Magistrate conduct the inquiry. The Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP) challenged that decision in two separate proceedings in this Court. In the first the DPP sought a declaration that the proposed inquiry was beyond the power conferred by s 475. In the second the DPP sought, pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) (the ADJR Act), review of the decision to order the inquiry. Both applications failed at first instance: Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Eastman [2002] ACTSC 35; (2002) 130 A Crim R 588. An appeal against the decision concerning judicial review was allowed by a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court: Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Eastman [2002] FCAFC 209; (2002) 118 FCR 360. That decision was reversed by the High Court: Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2003] HCA 28; (2003) 214 CLR 318 (Eastman (ADJR-HC)).
36. Ultimately, Miles CJ conducted an inquiry into the question of the appellant's fitness to plead at his trial, concluding that save for one short period, the appellant was fit to plead. Accordingly, his Honour did not recommend any executive action to set aside the conviction. His Honour's report is described as Inquiry under s 475 of the Crimes Act 1900 into the matter of the fitness to plead of David Harold Eastman and is dated 6 October 2005. Miles CJ resigned as a member of this Court at some time prior to the delivery of his report, but that fact has no present relevance.
37. The appellant challenged the outcome of the inquiry in a number of ways. First, he unsuccessfully sought, pursuant to the ADJR Act, to challenge the decision by Miles CJ to limit the scope of the inquiry to the issue of fitness to plead: Eastman v Miles [2004] ACTSC 32; (2004) 181 FLR 418. Subsequent to the inquiry, he unsuccessfully sought review of the final report and recommendations of Miles CJ: Eastman v Miles [2007] ACTSC 27; (2007) 210 FLR 417 (on appeal: Eastman v Australian Capital Territory [2008] ACTCA 8; (2008) 227 FLR 279; special leave to appeal to the High Court refused: [2008] HCASL 553). He also unsuccessfully sought review of the decision of the Executive not to take any further action as a result of the report: Eastman v Attorney-General (ACT) (2007) 210 FLR 410 (on appeal: Eastman v Australian Capital Territory (2008) 227 FLR 262; special leave to appeal to the High Court refused: [2008] HCASL 553).
38. Section 475 has been repealed and replaced by Pt 20 of the Crimes Act. The Pt 20 regime is similar in concept to the former s 475 in that, broadly speaking, it provides a mechanism for an inquiry into a conviction if there is a "doubt or question" concerning the person's guilt. Notwithstanding the previous inquiry pursuant to s 475, it is accepted that the appellant was entitled to apply pursuant to the new regime. On 2 February 2005 he made such an application. That application was heard by Besanko J, the first respondent in this matter. On 4 April 2008 his Honour concluded that an inquiry should not be ordered. His Honour's report is described as Decision and Reasons in relation to an Application for an Inquiry under Part 20 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
39. On 6 May 2008 Mr Eastman sought review of that decision under the ADJR Act and, presumably by way of an order pursuant to s 34B of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), "prerogative relief". The ground of the application was that:
... the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power given by the enactment under which it was purported to be made.
40. The Attorney-General intervened in the proceedings. The application was heard by Edmonds J on 7 and 8 July 2008, the appellant being self-represented. On 18 February 2009, his Honour ordered that the application be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Intervenor's costs: David Harold Eastman v The Honourable Justice Anthony James Besanko [2009] ACTSC 10. His Honour concluded that the decision of Besanko J had not altered or otherwise affected any right of the appellant, and that the decision was therefore not "made under an enactment" for the purposes of the ADJR Act. His Honour concluded that the claim to prerogative relief similarly failed because the decision did not have any legal effect or legal consequences. As to the "merits" of the case, Edmonds J concluded that no aspect of the reasoning process adopted by Besanko J demonstrated "any exercise of power which can be described as being so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power."
41. By a notice of appeal filed on 17 March 2009 the appellant appealed from the decision of Edmonds J. The purported grounds of appeal were then as follows:
(a) to which the A.C.T. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 applied; and
(b) which entailed an exercise of a power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.
42. The appellant sought an order that the matter be referred back to Besanko J for reconsideration and decision according to law. When he filed the notice of appeal, he was unrepresented. However, on 24 April 2009, a notice of solicitor acting was filed by Peter Alan Jackson of Jackson Lalic Lawyers.
43. On 22 October 2009 the appellant "lodged" an amended notice of appeal which omitted the second ground contained in paragraph 5(b) of the original notice of appeal (the unreasonableness ground) and inserted in lieu a ground alleging that Edmonds J erred in finding that the decision of Besanko J was not a decision:
involving errors of law (or otherwise contrary to law) as to the proper construction of the expression 'doubt or question' as to the Appellant's guilt, as that expression is used in ss 422(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Crimes Act 1900 ACT.
A declaration that the first defendant made errors of law or otherwise acted contrary to law.
45. Under the rules, the appellant could only amend his notice of appeal by leave. Such leave has not been granted. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant initially appeared by counsel. When the Court sought to identify the grounds of appeal upon which the appellant wished to rely, counsel informed the Court that notwithstanding the purported amended notice of appeal and counsel's outline of argument dated 19 October 2009, Mr Eastman did not wish to abandon the unreasonableness ground.
46. Counsel applied for leave to amend the notice of appeal by adding the proposed ground 5(b) from the purported amended notice of appeal as ground 5(c), and inserting in paragraph 6 the proposed declaration as an additional order sought by the appellant. The effect was that the unreasonableness ground remained intact. Leave to amend the notice of appeal was granted shortly after 2.30 pm on 22 October 2009, the first day of the hearing. As finally amended the grounds were that:
(a) to which the A.C.T. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 applied;
(b) which entailed an exercise of a power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power; and
(c) involving errors of law (or otherwise contrary to law) as to the proper construction of the expression 'doubt or question' as to the Appellant's guilt, as that expression is used in ss 422(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Crimes Act 1900 ACT.
47. Counsel for the appellant indicated that he did not propose to argue the unreasonableness ground, and that the appellant would personally present that aspect of the case. The Court agreed to that proposal. It was said that the appellant's submissions on that aspect would take about 45 minutes. The estimate was later increased to one hour.
48. To the extent that the appellant sought prerogative relief, he was bound to fail. In Re Jarman & Others; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595 at 610, the High Court held that a superior court of record cannot send a prerogative writ to one of its members. Although certain provisions of Pt 20 make the matter rather more complex than was the position in that case, I consider that this Court should follow that decision. In any event, I do not understand the claim to prerogative relief to have been pressed on appeal. Further, the availability of such relief would depend upon the appellant's establishing the same matters as he would have to establish in order to obtain relief pursuant to the ADJR Act.
49. At approximately 4.04 pm on 22 October 2009, the first day of the hearing, Mr Eastman terminated the retainer of his counsel, Dr Renwick. Dr Renwick was, at that time, presenting his submissions on the grounds in paragraphs 5(a) and (c) of the amended notice of appeal. Mr Jackson's instructions were also withdrawn. Both were allowed to withdraw. I should set out the circumstances which apparently led to the appellant's dismissal of his legal advisers.
50. The transcript suggests that the appellant may have been dissatisfied with the way in which his counsel and, perhaps, the Court were dealing with an application to extend orders made by Higgins CJ on 7 October 2009, relating to the appellant's conditions of imprisonment. Those orders were due to expire at midnight on the first day of the hearing. Dr Renwick was addressing the matter (commencing at TS 71 l 33) when, at TS 75 l 16, the appellant interjected. The following exchange ensued:
Appellant: I'm opposed to interject, but we're spending so much on time on this. I believe I could answer all of these objections before her Honour Penfold J, including her jurisdiction to make the orders in a general jurisdiction as a Supreme Court judge. Confirmed by a previous Court of Appeal ...(indistinct)...
Penfold J: All right. Thank you, Mr Eastman. Well, thank you for that, Mr Harris - - -
...
Penfold J: - - - because that does ... change the environment that we're operating in. Dr Renwick, is there anything you want to add?
Dr Renwick: No, except that my instructions are that Mr Eastman wishes the orders to continue until Monday. But I don't wish to say anything more.
Penfold J: Until Monday?
Dr Renwick: Apparently Mr Eastman thinks it's possible that he may wish to put in some written submissions in addition until Monday.
Penfold J: But no one's given any leave - - -
Dr Renwick: I understand that.
Penfold J: - - - for anyone to put in any written submissions.
Dr Renwick: I understand that.
Penfold J: So at the moment - the most we would be contemplating at the moment would be recognising that we're coming on tomorrow and that Mr Eastman possibly has some work to do overnight.
Dr Renwick: There's nothing more I can say, your Honour.
Penfold J: All right. Thank you. We'll just go again briefly.
51. After an adjournment, the hearing resumed at 3.44 pm. Penfold J stated (TS 76 ll 17-19) that "in the light of the instructions that Mr Harris has passed on to the court, we don't propose to deal further today with the request for an extension of the Chief Justice's order". Dr Renwick then made further submissions in relation to the grounds in paragraph 5(a) and (c) of the notice of appeal. In the midst of these submissions, at TS 84 l 8, Dr Renwick stated: "I'm sorry, my retainer has just come to an end I've been told... I had no notice of that. May I have leave to withdraw?" Leave was given. After a brief adjournment, the appellant sought to make submissions as to why the orders made by Higgins CJ should be extended. The Court indicated that it would hear those submissions at 4:15 pm and asked the appellant to give particulars of his assertion that the decision of Besanko J was unreasonable. The matter was left on the basis that the appellant would provide such particulars on the following day.
52. At approximately 4.20 pm the appellant commenced to make submissions concerning his request for an extension of the orders made by Higgins CJ. Ultimately, the Court declined to extend the orders, giving reasons. While the Court was giving its reasons, the appellant interjected, asking to withdraw and expressing displeasure at the Court's decision (TS 108 l 45 - TS 109 l 10). The appellant was excused.
53. When the hearing resumed on 23 October 2009 the appellant appeared in person but did not provide any particulars of his allegation of unreasonableness, either orally or in writing. Instead, he asked each of the Judges constituting the Full Court to disqualify her- or himself for "actual bias". The appellant outlined his concerns about each of the Judges. Penfold J and I each indicated that we did not propose to withdraw and would give reasons at a later stage. We have done so: Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 15 and Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 16. Graham J also declined to disqualify himself and gave ex tempore reasons: Eastman v Besanko [2009] ACTSC 144.
54. The appellant then announced his intention to take no further part in the proceedings. The following exchange occurred (TS 14 l 38 - TS 15 l 29):
Appellant: ... I seek to be excused because I do not wish to make any further submissions to the court.
...
Graham J: (B)efore you depart, may I understand that you have, through your counsel yesterday and through your supplementary oral submissions put to the court all matters upon which you wish to rely in support of your grounds of appeal?
Appellant: I have nothing further to say to the court ...
Penfold J: ... Mr Eastman do you wish to remain in court?
Appellant: No, I wish to be excused please.
Penfold J: Well, we have every intention of going on and hearing Mr Harris.
Appellant: Yes, I have no objection to that.
...
Penfold J: ... you don't wish to make any submissions ...
Appellant: No further submissions to make. ... I seek leave to be excused.
Penfold J: Yes, all right, you're excused. ...
55. The appellant withdrew at about 11:00 am. Senior Counsel for the Intervenor then made his submissions, addressing the Court until about 1:00 pm, and then from about 2:00 pm until shortly before 3:00 pm. The Court reserved its decision.
56. On 26 October 2009 the appellant advised the registry by telephone that he wished to resile from his previous decision to make no further submissions. He sought leave to file written submissions. This request was declined by letter dated 30 October 2009. On 4 November 2009 he again applied for leave to file further submissions, at the same time forwarding his proposed submissions (the belated submissions). I have not yet decided whether to receive them.
57. This appeal requires determination of the following issues:
(a) Should the Court receive the belated submissions?
(b) Did Edmonds J err in holding that the decision under s 424 of the Crimes Act was not a decision to which the ADJR Act applied?
(c) Did Besanko J err in his construction of the words in s 422 "a doubt or question about whether the person is guilty of the offence"?
(d) Did Edmonds J err in not finding that the decision of Besanko J was so unreasonable as to be beyond jurisdiction?
58. In Communications Electrical Electronic Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Blue Star Pacific Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 750 Reeves J said at [63]:
Before leaving this matter, I should record that after I reserved my decision on 16 June 2009, Mr Boyce submitted some further written submissions. I did not give him any prior leave to do this and he did not seek leave before doing so. I rejected those submissions and have not considered them in this decision. In my view, this practice should be strongly condemned. As the High Court said in Re Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) (2005) 214 ALR 422; [2005] HCA 18 at [54]:
Where leave has not been given publicly for supplementary submissions and evidence, the provision of such material to court registries without permission of the court, publicly signified, is a derogation from the principle of the open administration of justice. It should not occur. If new points of importance arise in the case whilst a matter stands for judgment, the proper course (unless statute or court rules permit otherwise) is for the proceeding to be relisted so that an application to enlarge the record can be made and determined in open court.
See also: Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1980) 147 CLR 246.
59. In Malouf v Malouf [2006] NSWCA 83; (2006) 65 NSWLR 449 at 452 Bryson JA said, concerning the need to avoid preferential treatment for self-represented litigants:
Courts should not go so far in accommodating the positions of unrepresented litigants as to make it an advantageous procedural step to dismiss one's lawyers or to retain none. Nor should courts slip from unreadiness to shut a party out from litigating an issue which is fairly arguable into incapacity to close off procedural opportunities which are not taken. Without procedure, procedural directions and compliance, justice will not be done at all. The time, patience, resources and willingness to behave appropriately of those who do comply should have a place in consideration of what the court should do when a party who has not complied with earlier directions seeks an extension of time, or some procedural indulgence by which earlier directions are disregarded. The compliant also have an entitlement to consideration, and their compliance should not be disregarded, or mocked, by treating their opponent's obligation to comply with the court's directions as less than important or as superfluous.
60. In Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] HCA 28; (2003) 214 CLR 318 the appellant:
informed the Registry that he had withdrawn his instructions to senior counsel who had represented him on the hearing of the appeal. He also forwarded to the Court a seven page document that he described as "Appellant's Supplementary Submissions" (see p 330).
61. In relation to such submissions, McHugh J observed, at 330, that:
[p]arties to matters before the Court need to understand that, once a hearing in the Court has concluded, only in very exceptional circumstances, if at all, will the Court later give leave to a party to supplement submissions. Parties have a legal right to present their arguments at the hearing. If a new point arises at the hearing, the Court will usually give leave to the parties to file further written submissions within a short period of the hearing... . But a party has no legal right to continue to put submissions to the Court after the hearing. In so far as the rules of natural justice require that a party be given an opportunity to put his or her case, that opportunity is given at the hearing.
62. In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 ("Aon Risk Services") Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said at [94], [102] and [112]:
94 ... Waller LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Worldwide Corporation Ltd v GPT Ltd [[1998] EWCA Civ 1894], said that such a concern [regarding the need to ensure that justice is not sacrificed] did not pay sufficient regard to the fact that the courts are concerned to do justice to all litigants. Where a party had had a sufficient opportunity to plead his or her case, it may be necessary for the court to make a decision which may produce a sense of injustice in that party, for the sake of doing justice to the opponent and to other litigants.
...
102 ... It is the extent of the delay and the costs associated with it, together with the prejudice which might reasonably be assumed to follow and that which is shown, which are to be weighed against the grant of permission to a party to alter its case. Much may depend upon the point the litigation has reached relative to a trial when the application to amend is made. There may be cases where it may properly be concluded that a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead their case and that it is too late for a further amendment, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates. ...
...
112 A party has the right to bring proceedings. Parties have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed. But limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced. That is why, in seeking the just resolution of the dispute, reference is made to parties having a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they seek to agitate.
63. The appellant clearly abandoned his right to make further submissions. It is reasonable to infer that he did so as a mark of his displeasure at some aspect of the proceedings. To permit him to resile from his decision would give tacit approval to conduct which amounted to little more than contempt. In any event, I have had regard to the content of those submissions and conclude that they do not add anything to the appellant's case. I will explain this conclusion later in my reasons. The appeal should be resolved on the basis of the submissions as they were presented to the Court prior to the reservation of judgment.
Is the decision of Besanko J amenable to judicial review under the ADJR Act?
5 Applications for review of decisions
A person aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies may apply to the Supreme Court for an order of review in relation to the decision
65. The term "decision to which this Act applies" is defined in the Dictionary to the ADJR Act (the Dictionary) as follows:
decision to which this Act applies means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made or required to be made (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) under an enactment, other than a decision mentioned in schedule 1.
In the circumstances of this case schedule 1 has no relevant application.
66. The relevant decision for present purposes is the decision of Besanko J not to order an inquiry into the appellant's conviction. That decision is said to have been made pursuant to s 424(1) of the Crimes Act. Section 424 relevantly states:
(1) The Supreme Court may order an inquiry on application by the convicted person, or by someone else on the convicted person's behalf.
...
(4) Proceedings on an application are not judicial proceedings.
(1) This division does not create a right to the order of an inquiry, and does not create a duty to order an inquiry.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), there is no right of appeal in relation to a decision whether to order an inquiry.
68. Section 422 provides:
(1) An inquiry may be ordered under this part into the conviction of a person for an offence only if -
(a) there is a doubt or question about whether the person is guilty of the offence; and
(b) the doubt or question relates to -
(i) any evidence admitted in a relevant proceeding; or
(ii) any material fact that was not admitted in evidence in a relevant proceeding; and
(c) the doubt or question could not have been properly addressed in a relevant proceeding; and
(d) there is a significant risk that the conviction is unsafe because of the doubt or question; and
(e) the doubt or question cannot now be properly addressed in an appeal against the conviction; and
(f) if an application is made to the Supreme Court for an inquiry in relation to the conviction - an application has not previously been made to the court for an inquiry in relation to the doubt or question; and
(g) it is in the interests of justice for the doubt or question to be considered at an inquiry.
Example for par (a) to (e)
John has been convicted of murder. Expert evidence that blood found on John's jacket shortly after the murder was almost certain to be the victim's blood was the main evidence connecting John with the murder.
Later DNA testing, by a method developed after all proceedings in relation to the conviction had been finalised (and the time for making any appeal had lapsed), shows that the blood is almost certainly not the victim's blood. This gives rise to a doubt or question about the blood evidence that could not have been (and cannot now be) properly addressed in any relevant proceeding in relation to the murder, and a significant risk that the conviction is unsafe.
(2) The inquiry is limited to matters stated in the order for the inquiry.
(3) If the inquiry is ordered by the Supreme Court, the court may set limits on the inquiry under subsection (2) despite anything in the application for the inquiry.
69. These provisions should be read and understood in their historical and statutory context. Part 20 of the Crimes Act provides a mechanism for inquiry into a conviction, which mechanism may be initiated by the convicted person or on his or her behalf. The following history of provisions of this kind is of some interest. It is largely drawn from the judgment of Heydon J in Eastman (ADJR-HC).
70. In 1883, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen published A History of the Criminal Law of England, in which he identified the very limited ways in which a conviction could, at that time, be challenged under English law. Stephen observed that:
However unsatisfactory... a verdict may be... [a]ll that can be done in such a case is to apply to the Queen... for a pardon for the person supposed to have been wrongly convicted. This is one of the greatest defects in our whole system of criminal procedure. To pardon a man on the ground of his innocence is in itself, to say the least, an exceedingly clumsy mode of procedure; but not to insist upon this, it cannot be denied that the system places every one concerned, and especially the Home Secretary and the judge who tried the case... in a position at once painful and radically wrong, because they are called upon to exercise what really are the highest judicial functions without any of the conditions essential to the due discharge of such functions. ... The evil is notorious, but it is difficult to find a satisfactory remedy.
71. In the same year that the above comments were published, the New South Wales Parliament sought to provide a more satisfactory procedure. It enacted the Criminal Laws Amendment Act 1883 (NSW). Sections 383 and 384 of that Act provided:
383. Whenever after the conviction of a prisoner any doubt or question arises as to his guilt or any mitigating circumstance in the case or any portion of the evidence therein it shall be lawful for any Justice by direction of the Governor on the petition of the prisoner or some person on his behalf representing such doubt or question -- or by direction of a Judge of the Supreme Court of his own motion -- to summon and examine on oath all persons likely to give material information on the matter suggested. Provided that where on such inquiry the character of any person who was a witness on the trial is affected thereby the Justice shall allow such person to be present and to examine any witness produced before such Justice and such Justice shall transmit every deposition taken by him under this section as soon as shall be practicable to the Governor if the inquiry was directed by him or to the Judge directing the inquiry and the matter shall thereafter be disposed of as to the Governor on the report of such Judge or otherwise shall appear to be just.
384. The attendance of every person so summoned may be enforced and his examination compelled and any statement made by him wilfully false shall be punishable in like manner as if he had been summoned by or been duly sworn and examined before the same Justice in a case lawfully pending before him. Provided that every deposition taken under the last section shall be stated in the commencement to have been so taken and in reference to what case and in pursuance of whose direction mentioning the date thereof.
72. These provisions were superseded by s 475 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the NSW Act) as follows:
(1) Whenever, after the conviction of a prisoner, any doubt or question arises as to his guilt, or any mitigating circumstance in the case, or any portion of the evidence therein, the Governor on the petition of the prisoner, or some person on his behalf, representing such doubt or question, or a Judge of the Supreme Court of his own motion, may direct any Justice to, and such Justice may, summon and examine on oath all persons likely to give material information on the matter suggested.
(2) The attendance of every person so summoned may be enforced, and his examination compelled, and any false statement wilfully made by him shall be punishable, in like manner as if he had been summoned by, or been duly sworn and examined before, the same Justice, in a case lawfully pending before him.
(3) Where on such inquiry the character of any person who was a witness on the trial is affected thereby, the Justice shall allow such person to be present, and to examine any witness produced before such Justice.
(4) Every deposition taken under this section shall be stated in the commencement to have been so taken, and in reference to what case, and in pursuance of whose direction, mentioning the date thereof, and shall be transmitted by the Justice, before whom the same was taken, as soon as shall be practicable, to the Governor if the inquiry was directed by him, or to the Judge directing the inquiry, and the matter shall thereafter be disposed of, as to the Governor, on the report of such Judge, or otherwise, shall appear to be just.
73. In 1909 those provisions were adopted for the Territory by virtue of s 6 of the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cth) (the SOGA Act).
74. Criminal appeals were introduced in New South Wales in 1912, pursuant to the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). In England such appeals had been introduced five years earlier. Criminal appeals were introduced in the Territory in 1927 when s 30B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) came into effect. However the inquiry procedure has been retained. It now appears in Pt 20 of the Crimes Act. The use of these provisions is generally limited to circumstances in which the statutory right of appeal has been exhausted.
75. The appellant submits that the provisions of Pt 20 are cast in beneficial terms, and that a conclusion that decisions under s 424 are not subject to review would mean that decisions infected by fraud or bias would stand unchallenged. He further submits that removing a right to judicial review would usually require a clear privative or ouster provision, and that no such provision is to be found in Pt 20. These submissions may sound appealing, but they overlook the following considerations:
• that the inquiry process almost invariably follows a trial and an appeal, including the possibility of an appeal by special leave to the High Court;
• that the inquiry process was originally adopted as a process for facilitating exercise of the royal prerogative; and
• that such an approach leads to an outcome which is quite inconsistent with received views as to the structure and operation of superior courts of record, in that one Judge of this Court would be obliged to review the decision of another.
76. As to the first consideration, one may accept that the trial and appellate processes are not perfect. Nonetheless, they generally provide a comprehensive system of safeguards against wrongful conviction. The appellate process provides access, or the possibility of access, to review by appellate courts at state or territory level and by the High Court. It cannot seriously be argued that the inquiry process is intended to allow general review of a conviction that has emerged from the trial process and survived the appellate process. Finality is a fundamental objective of the criminal justice system. The inquiry process is exceptional. It is entirely understandable that it should be limited in its availability so that the objective of finality is not substantially undermined.
77. This view is re-inforced by the history of the inquiry process. Whilst it may have been designed to avoid some of the less satisfactory aspects of an inscrutable exercise of the royal prerogative by the executive arm of government, it does not follow that the intention must necessarily have been to abandon the advantage of such an exercise, namely that it was generally final.
78. Pursuant to s 424(4) of the Crimes Act proceedings on an application for an inquiry are "not judicial proceedings". Nonetheless the power to order an inquiry is vested in this Court pursuant to s 424(1). It is not a power conferred upon an individual Judge as persona designata. It seems that any order will be that of the Court, although made by a single Judge. This concept is typical of decisions of superior courts. Some of the difficulties attending review of such a decision appear from observations made in Barton v Walker [1979] 2 NSWLR 740 at 749-750 concerning a Judge's decision to disqualify, or not disqualify him- or herself from sitting in a particular case. To similar effect are the remarks of Dawson J in Re Jarman (supra). At 610, his Honour said:
But the jurisdiction of a superior court of record exercised by a single judge is still the jurisdiction of the court; there are not two courts, one comprising the single judge and one comprising all the judges. Nor does the provision of an appeal from a single judge to a full court alter the situation, for an order made on appeal is made in the exercise of a jurisdiction which is different from that of the judge at first instance. For a court to grant prerogative relief against one of its own judges is for it to grant relief against itself in the exercise of the same jurisdiction as that exercised by the judge, a situation which has been described as "rather ludicrous".
79. In order to avoid such an outcome, the High Court, in Re Jarman, effectively read down a statutory provision which seemed to empower a superior court of record to review the decision of one of its members. It is even less likely that the legislature intended that one Judge of this Court could review the decision of another.
80. As I have observed, s 424 confers the relevant power on the Court, and any order pursuant thereto will be an order of the Court. This arrangement is to be contrasted with the provisions concerning an inquiry ordered pursuant to s 424. Such an inquiry is to be conducted by a board comprising a Judge of this Court or a Magistrate. The report will be that of the board, not the Court of which the relevant Judge or Magistrate is a member.
81. The explanatory memorandum to the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2001 (ACT) relevantly states, concerning s 557B (now s 422):
Grounds for an inquiry
The purpose of this section is to detail the grounds for holding an inquiry into a conviction.
...
It is expected that the inquiries power would be used only in exceptional cases... It is not intended that the inquiries power be used as an alternative to the appeals process or as a means of endlessly challenging a conviction. ...
Rights and duties in relation to orders for inquiries
The purpose of this section is to make it clear that decisions about ordering an inquiry are purely discretionary and are not subject to appeal or review. This reflects the intention that inquiries be ordered only where all other ways of addressing the matter have been exhausted and where there are compelling reasons for reconsidering the conviction.
83. Whilst the wording of s 425 may arguably leave open the possibility of review under the ADJR Act, the intention to exclude both appeal and review is clear enough when one has regard to the explanatory memorandum. Further, when one keeps in mind the fact that the whole procedure is intended to be an exceptional supplement to the appellate process, and to provide a statutory regime to take the place of the exercise by the Executive of the royal prerogative, it seems most unlikely that the Legislature intended that a person who had no right to an order for an inquiry should nonetheless be able to seek review of a decision that there be no inquiry.
84. The appellant at least implies that such an approach involves the abrogation of a fundamental common law right, and that the Court should conclude that in the absence of express language or necessary implication, such abrogation was not intended. See Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [11] and [43]. However this case is not concerned with fundamental common law rights. It is rather concerned with the combined operation of the ADJR Act, the Crimes Act and, to a lesser extent, the Supreme Court Act. The three Acts must be given effect. Further, I observe that an unsuccessful application pursuant to s 424 would not preclude an inquiry pursuant to s 423.
85. The Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) governs the construction of Territory legislation. The relevant provisions of the Legislation Act apply to Pt 20 of the Crimes Act. Part 14.2 of the Legislation Act contains provisions which deal with "working out the meaning of an Act". Relevantly, "working out the meaning of an Act" is defined in s 138 to include "confirming or displacing the apparent meaning of [an] Act" and "finding the meaning of [an] Act when its apparent meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable". Section 141 of the Legislation Act provides that "material not forming part of the Act may be considered" in working out the meaning of an Act. Section 142 indicates that such material may include explanatory memoranda. Section 139 states that "[i]n working out the meaning of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation."
86. These provisions are consistent with, but perhaps go further than the High Court's decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [78], where McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ observed:
However, the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.
87. If the appellant is entitled to judicial review of a Judge's decision pursuant to s 424, then it is difficult to see that s 425 has any significant effect other than to exclude a direct appeal to the Court of Appeal, substituting for that well-understood process, the novel idea of statutory review by another Judge of the same Court and an appeal from that decision to the Court of Appeal. The better view is that the Legislature intended to exclude a challenge to a decision under s 424 by way of appeal or review. That purpose is achieved, albeit clumsily, by s 425, which provides that there is no right to an order that there be an inquiry, no duty to order an inquiry, and that no appeal lies from a decision under s 424. Whilst, as a matter of common legal terminology, an appeal is distinct from an application for review, it is not impossible that the word "appeal" was used to encompass review. Any other approach seems to produce a very curious result.
88. As to s 138 of the Legislation Act, the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (6th ed, 2007) defines the word "absurd" to mean "(o)ut of harmony with reason or propriety; incongruous, inappropriate; unreasonable; ridiculous, silly". The word "unreasonable" means "(n)ot endowed with reason; irrational ... . Not based on or acting in accordance with reason or good sense". I have little difficulty in so describing an outcome which requires review of the decision of one member of the Court by another, with a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.
89. I should mention one other matter. The ADJR Act contains provisions which identify decisions to which that Act does not apply or applies in a limited way. The Executive may, by regulation, exempt other decisions from review. See ss 20 and 21. It is arguable that where there are express exceptions to the operation of a statute and/or provision for exemption from such operation, there is no warrant for a narrow construction of the relevant statute so as to avoid apparently inappropriate outcomes. See Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Funding Litigation Partners Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147; (2009) 180 FCR 11 at [29]. However, in this case, the extreme inappropriateness of the outcome and the clear expression in the explanatory memorandum of the legislative intent outweigh considerations of that kind. I conclude that the ADJR Act does not authorise review of a decision under s 424 of the Crimes Act. The appeal must fail.
90. It may also be arguable that a decision pursuant to s 424 is not a decision of an administrative character as required by the definition of the term "decision to which this Act applies" in the Dictionary. Although s 424(4) provides that proceedings pursuant to s 424(1) are not judicial proceedings, it may not necessarily follow that any decision is administrative in nature for the purposes of the ADJR Act. The separation of legislative, judicial and administrative functions is of importance for reasons associated with constitutional theory. However that taxonomy should not be applied as if it were an immutable constitutional principle, necessarily regulating all aspects of government in the relevant polity. The terms "legislative", "judicial" and "administrative" may mean different things in different constitutional arrangements and in legislation made under such arrangements. This well-understood, but flexible terminology should not be used in construing a statute so as to produce an unlikely result.
91. I should also say something about the High Court's decision in Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99. In reaching his decision in the present case, Edmonds J, at [16], held that the decision not to order an inquiry pursuant to s 424 did not "confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations" in the sense that those words were used by Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [89] in Tang. Their Honours said that for a decision to be made under an enactment it must not simply be "expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment" but must also "confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations".
92. Edmonds J held that the decision of Besanko J did not so confer, alter or affect legal rights or obligations. This conclusion may reflect an unduly restrictive view of the reasoning of the majority in Tang. A decision under s 424 may, as submitted by Dr Renwick, affect rights and duties under the Crimes Act. For example, in the event that an inquiry is ordered pursuant to s 424, certain statutory duties arise under ss 427-431. It seems that the convicted person would be able to enforce performance of such duties, or at least obtain declaratory relief as to their existence. An interested party would, presumably, be entitled to apply for an order pursuant to s 429(2). Whilst it may not be necessary to apply to the Court in order to engage the powers and duties conferred and imposed by s 430, one might readily construe the section as conferring a right on the convicted person to have the report considered and acted upon by the Court, observing the procedure prescribed in s 431. The exclusion of any right to an order pursuant to s 430(2)(b) or s 430(2)(d) suggests that the convicted person may have a right to an order pursuant to s 430(2)(c) in the event that the report points to that outcome.
93. A decision under s 424 derives "from the enactment the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations" (Tang at [80]). See further Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2009, 4th ed), p 81. It is difficult, in general terms, to see how a decision under s 424(1) could be described as being other than a decision under an enactment. However it is not necessary that I decide this question. I have concluded that the appellant is not entitled to seek review of the decision of Besanko J. Although I need not consider the purported grounds of review, I will do so for the sake of completeness.
Was the respondent's decision infected by errors of law?
94. Besanko J concluded at [126] to [148], [198] to [200], [212] to [213] and [221] to [223] that the relevant preconditions to the making of an order, as set out in s 422, were not established. On that basis, his Honour refused to order an inquiry. Although the point was not raised before Edmonds J, the appellant now seeks to challenge this conclusion on the basis that Besanko J erred in construing the words "doubt or question" and the word "guilty" in s 422. The Intervenor does not object to the appellant raising the proper construction of the words "doubt or question" on appeal, but objects to his raising the proper construction of the word "guilty".
95. The appellant seeks to make out such errors solely by reference to the way in which Besanko J dealt with criticisms of the evidence of the witness B who claimed expertise in the area of gunshot residue. The appellant firstly submits that his Honour failed to recognize that a relevant question may be raised although no relevant doubt has yet been demonstrated. The appellant points to certain criticisms made of B's evidence and of his methodology as raising such a doubt or question. Some of these criticisms came from Dr Wallace, a ballistics expert consulted by the appellant and his legal advisers before, during and, apparently, after the trial in connection with the appeal. He did not give evidence at the trial, but the appellant sought, on appeal, to rely on "fresh" evidence from him. The Full Court refused to receive that evidence.
96. The appellant has also become aware of other criticisms of B (the Victorian material). It is contained in two appellate judgments, a Coroner's report and an associated scientific report, and three memoranda from the Director of the Victorian Forensic Science Centre. The Director's criticism arose out of B's former employment as a senior scientist by VicPol, presumably the Victorian Police. Evidence of these criticisms was not led at trial. The submission seems to be that such criticisms necessarily raise a question as to the appellant's guilt, and that had Besanko J not misconstrued the words "doubt or question" in s 422, his Honour would necessarily have concluded that there was a question as to guilt.
97. Secondly, the appellant submits that Besanko J failed to appreciate that the word "guilty" means "guilty as evidenced by conviction", not "guilty in fact". This submission depends upon the further submission that the prosecution ought to have disclosed the Victorian material to the appellant at some relevant time. The appellant submits that the failure to do so was an irregularity in the trial process which would have led his Honour to conclude that there was a question as to guilt, had he not misconstrued the meaning of the word "guilty" in s 422. In a sense, both limbs of this construction argument comprise an alternative approach to the appellant's assertion that the decision by Besanko J was so unreasonable that it must have been infected by jurisdictional error.
98. The Intervenor submits that Besanko J, at [12], expressly acknowledged and adopted the distinction between "doubt" and "question" as explained by Heydon J in Eastman v DPP at [134], and that the appellant's submission seems to assume that if any identifiable question is raised, it will necessarily lead to an inquiry being ordered. The Intervenor submits that the criticism concerning his Honour's construction of the word "guilty" is not made out. He submits that the criticism depends upon the implicit assertion that the prosecutor was aware of the Victorian material at some relevant time, and that there is no evidence to this effect. Thus the factual basis for the argument has not been established. In those circumstances, the Intervenor submits that the appellant should not be allowed to raise the matter on appeal.
99. These construction points must be seen in light of B's evidence, the various criticisms of it and the approach taken by Besanko J to his task pursuant to s 424. I commence with a discussion of the relevant parts of B's evidence as identified by Besanko J.
100. Although the murder weapon was never found, it was identified as a weapon which had been sold by one Klarenbeek. The rifle (the Klarenbeek rifle) had been adapted to take a silencer. Mr Klarenbeek was offering it for sale in December 1988. There was some evidence which suggested that Mr Klarenbeek was offering it for sale with a silencer. He died after giving evidence at the committal hearing and before trial. Thus there was no evidence of actual sale of the Klarenbeek rifle and the silencer to the eventual purchaser. The prosecution case was that both the rifle and the silencer were sold to the appellant, and that he used them to kill Mr Winchester. There was some direct evidence identifying the appellant as the purchaser, but it was of a complicated nature and, in some respects, was arguably unreliable. Besanko J summarizes this evidence in his reasons. However evidence concerning the Klarenbeek rifle was also capable of implicating the appellant.
101. Spent cartridges of a particular brand, which were found at the murder scene, bore markings which were caused by characteristics of the rifle from which they were discharged. Similar marks were found on spent cartridges located at sites at which the Klarenbeek rifle had been test-fired prior to its coming in to Mr Klarenbeek's possession and thereafter. It appears to have been accepted that the similar markings demonstrated that the spent cartridges found at the test-firing sites had been discharged from the same weapon as that from which the cartridges found at the murder scene had been discharged.
102. Gunshot residue found on Mr Winchester's body, in his car and in the appellant's car was consistent with having been produced by the discharge of cartridges of the brand found at the murder scene, save that in each case the residue contained fragments described as "chopped disc particles". Such particles would not have resulted from discharge of that brand of cartridge. However they would have been produced in the discharge of other brands of cartridge suitable for use in the Klarenbeek rifle. Some of the cartridges found at the test firing sites were of brands which would have yielded the chopped disc particles.
103. Mr Winchester's wife had, at the time of the murder, heard sounds which may have been consistent with shots being fired from a weapon fitted with a silencer. B considered that the chopped disc particles may have been the product of previous firing of the Klarenbeek rifle whilst it was fitted with a silencer, using ammunition which produced such particles. B suggested that particles may have become lodged in the silencer and then dislodged in the murder, ending up in the gunshot residue. He carried out tests which provided some support for the theory. Other experts either accepted this theory or did not discount it. Dr Wallace concedes that B's theory is possible but does not accept it as probable.
104. One aspect of Dr Wallace's statement should be noted. Besanko J understood him to assert that one type of ammunition which may have produced chopped disc particles was the Remington brand, and that evidence in the case suggested that Remington brand ammunition had been test-fired from the Klarenbeek rifle before it was adapted to take a silencer. Obviously, chopped disc particles could not have been retained in the silencer as a result of that test-firing. In the absence of a careful examination of Dr Wallace's statement and the other evidence in the case, this observation might appear to undermine B's theory. However the evidence indicated that CCI brand ammunition, possibly Remington ammunition and possibly Sterling ammunition may produce chopped disc particles. The evidence at the trial indicated that a previous owner, Mr Caldwell, had fired the Klarenbeek rifle using Remington ammunition. It had not, at that time, been adapted to take a silencer. He had recovered spent cartridges from a test-firing site and handed them to the police. Some of the cartridges recovered were Remington brand. It seems that Dr Wallace's reference to test-firing with Remington ammunition prior to the adaptation of the rifle to take a silencer was to Mr Caldwell's test-firing.
105. Mr Caldwell sold the rifle to a man named King who sold it to Mr Klarenbeek. By that time it had been adapted to take a silencer. Mr Klarenbeek also test-fired the rifle. He recovered seven spent cartridges and handed them to the police. Two of them were Sterling brand and one was CCI brand. Hence they may have produced chopped disc particles in the course of the test-firing. If the silencer was fitted, they may have become lodged in it. In light of this evidence, Dr Wallace's statement concerning test-firing of the Klarenbeek rifle before its adaptation, using Remington ammunition is a mere distraction.
106. The spent cartridges found at the murder scene and at the test firing sites, together, linked the Klarenbeek rifle to the murder but said nothing about whether the appellant was the purchaser of the rifle or the murderer. The presence of the chopped disc particles may, in some circumstances, have cast doubt upon whether ammunition of the kind found at the scene had been produced in the course of the murder, although such a view of the facts is somewhat unlikely. In this case there seems to have been no real challenge to the proposition that the spent cartridges found at the murder scene had been so produced, or that the Klarenbeek rifle was the murder weapon. The question was whether the appellant had used it to kill Mr Winchester.
107. In this regard the finding of the chopped disc particles on Mr Winchester's body, in his car and in the appellant's car was of substantial importance. If the presence of such particles could be explained in a way which was consistent with the spent cartridges found at the scene having been produced in the course of the murder, then the presence of residue consistent with that brand of ammunition and the chopped disc particles, both in the appellant's car and at the scene, might strongly suggest a further link between him and the murder.
108. Although the appellant had access to Dr Wallace before and during the trial, he was not called to give evidence. However, at the hearing of his appeal, the appellant sought unsuccessfully to lead "fresh" evidence from him. See Eastman (FC) at 105-108. At 107-108, the Court observed:
Dr Wallace makes no reference to the testing and data accumulated by [B] which led [B] to the conclusion that some of the particles found at the murder scene and in the appellant's car were produced by firing through a silencer. The opinion expressed by Dr Wallace as to other explanations also ignores the substantial forensic evidence called from experts from around the world which was corroborative of [B's] test methodology and the conclusions based on those results.
There is nothing in the affidavit of Dr Wallace in terms of his professional opinion which was not available, or could not with reasonable diligence have been available on the trial. On the authorities although this does not automatically and inflexibly exclude receipt of the evidence, it is a circumstance telling heavily against its reception. What is required in such a situation is evidence of sufficient strength to justify interference with the verdict. In the present case, the bare opinions of Dr Wallace, when considered against the evidence of [B], the other substantial forensic evidence called on the trial, and the other circumstantial evidence linking the appellant with the murder weapon and the crime scene, lack the cogency to support a conclusion that the jury would have been likely to entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant if the evidence of Dr Wallace had been before it.
109. This passage suggests that B's silencer theory and his methodology were attacked in Dr Wallace's proposed evidence. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how the appellant could satisfy s 422(1)(c) in order to rely on Dr Wallace's statement for the purposes of s 424, particularly having regard to the definition of the term "relevant proceeding" in s 421. The term includes the prosecution at first instance and on appeal. If any further material became available after the trial, it could have been raised in the Full Court at any time up until the dismissal of the appeal. Besanko J seems not to have treated any aspect of Dr Wallace's statement as being "fresh".
110. I turn to the Victorian material. Its content is outlined by Besanko J at [188] - [196]. At [197] his Honour notes that B has been offered no opportunity to answer those criticisms. The Victorian material consists of two criminal appeal judgments delivered on 7 June 1989 and 10 August 1995, a coroner's report dated 22 May 1996 (including an associated expert's report) and three memoranda dated 1995 and 1996 from the Director of the Victorian Forensic Science Centre.
111. I do not propose to give a detailed outline of the criticisms contained in this material. In one case, the Court considered that B's evidence had been undermined in cross-examination and contradicted by other experts. In the other case, the Court considered that B's evidence as to gunshot residue was not a sufficient basis to support the conviction. In the case of the Coroner's report, B's evidence was said to be capable of being misunderstood and so capable of misleading. The evidence concerned gunshot residue. There was said to have been a risk of contamination which had not been thoroughly investigated. The other criticisms (from the Director of the Victorian Forensic Science Centre) dealt with B's employment as a senior scientist from January 1987 to November 1993. The criticisms concerned his failure to comply with "the required parameters and quality control systems". It seems that after leaving VicPol B took other government employment, but left it in 1994 to establish a private forensic consultancy. The Director suggested that in one trial he had said "several incorrect things". It was apparently thought that in future cases, attempts should be made to discredit his evidence. In another memorandum the Director expressed concern that B's possibly unreliable work had been used in earlier cases, and suggested that they be further investigated. In the third memorandum, the Director identified the need for systemic changes "to prevent ... totally unacceptable operational behaviour ... ."
112. The appellant made three submissions to Edmonds J concerning Dr Wallace's statement and the Victorian material:
• that his counsel did not understand or properly utilise Dr Wallace's evidence;
• that had he been aware of it, the Victorian material may have led to his successfully excluding B's evidence on the basis of lack of expertise; and
• that a comparison of Dr Wallace's opinions with those of B, in light of the Victorian material, might have led the jury to prefer the former over the latter.
113. The appellant submits that for these reasons, Besanko J ought to have found that there was a relevant question as to guilt, and ordered an inquiry. He further submits that his Honour's failure so to do reflects a failure to recognise that for the purposes of s 422, a relevant question may not necessarily raise a doubt about guilt, but may simply pose a question for further inquiry. In considering this submission it is necessary that I consider his Honour's approach to the matter.
114. At [9] to [17] his Honour points out that the cumulative effect of the various paragraphs in s 422(1) necessarily limits the circumstances in which the procedure may, in practice, be invoked. Thus he observes that the relevant doubt or question "must arise from information (to use a broad term) which was not evidence before the jury". This view is based upon the observation that the Pt 20 "process" is "not an alternative or substitute for the normal appeal process". That proposition emerges from the combined operation of ss 422(1)(b), 422(1)(c) and 422(1)(e). The reference to the breadth of the term "information" may be of some importance.
115. Section 422(1) must be construed so that each paragraph performs some appropriate function. Clearly, a doubt or question about guilt for the purposes of s 422(1)(a) is not sufficient to justify an inquiry. The other paragraphs must also be satisfied. Sections 422(1)(d) and 422(1)(g) are of particular significance in this regard. Not only must there be a doubt or question about guilt. There must also be a significant risk that the conviction is unsafe because of that doubt or question, and it must be in the interests of justice that the doubt or question be considered at an inquiry. These provisions involve a process of evaluation.
116. The appellant's criticism of his Honour's approach to the words "doubt or question" is not easy to follow. He seems to accept the conclusion that there was no relevant doubt, but nonetheless to submit that there was a question about his guilt which should have led to an order for an inquiry. As the Intervenor suggests in his outline of argument, the submission must be that a question, once raised by the convicted person, cannot be resolved in considering whether there should be an inquiry. Such an approach would effectively deprive the Court of any evaluative role. It would also mean that it would never be necessary to demonstrate a doubt. A question would be sufficient to create the need for an inquiry.
117. I accept the distinction between "doubt" and "question" advanced by Heydon J in Eastman (ADJR-HC) at [134] and adopted by Besanko J. I accept that "(p)articular information can stimulate a question without any particular answer being pointed to". However I do not accept that every question identified by a convicted person is to be accepted at face value and made the subject of an inquiry. Such a view is contrary to the structure of s 422, especially ss 422(1)(d), 422(1)(g), 422(2) and 422(3).
118. I am inclined to think that use of the word "doubt" reflects the significant role which it has long performed in the description of the criminal standard of proof. Use of the word "question" is, as suggested by Heydon J, probably intended to extend the circumstances in which an inquiry may be ordered so as to include circumstances in which a doubt may arise if the question is further investigated.
119. In my view, the conferment of power upon this Court to determine whether there is a relevant doubt or question and the other matters prescribed by s 422 necessarily requires it to evaluate the available material. In so doing, a doubt or question (which will generally be initially identified by the convicted person) may be resolved. If so, then no doubt or question remains, and there can be no inquiry. Besanko J adopted this approach, concluding that there was no relevant doubt or question. I see no basis for the proposition that his Honour misconstrued the words "doubt or question".
120. The appellant also submits that had Besanko J appreciated that the relevant doubt or question was as to guilt evidenced by conviction and not guilt in fact, his Honour:
... would have considered whether a doubt or question arises from the evident failure of the prosecution to advise the Appellant or his lawyers of matters of which they were unaware, going to the credit of key Crown witness [B], namely the comments adverse to him made by courts in other cases and the criticisms of him by the Director of the Victorian Forensic Science Centre.
121. The Intervenor opposes the appellant's being permitted to make this submission on appeal, submitting that no factual basis has been laid for it. The submission seems to place undue emphasis upon the alleged non-disclosure, effectively submitting that such an irregularity in the trial process must raise a relevant question as to guilt. If relevant matters were not known to an accused person at the time of trial then, on appeal, he or she might, in certain circumstances, be allowed to lead evidence of those matters, in the hope that they will lead to the conviction being set aside. If the convicted person discovers such information after he or she has exhausted all avenues of appeal, then an application may be made pursuant to Pt 20 on the basis of that information. In either process the convicted person must satisfy the tests which apply in the relevant forum - the appellate court or before the Judge hearing the s 424 application. Non-disclosure by the prosecution may go to the capacity of the convicted person to have discovered the matters at an earlier time.
122. Non-disclosure may also lead to some expression of the Court's displeasure. However the conviction will only be upset if the information leads to that result pursuant to the law applying to appeals or Pt 20 applications. In that sense the alleged non-disclosure is irrelevant to the appellant's capacity to take advantage of evidence which he has recently discovered. In this context "recently" means "since exhaustion of the appellant's right of appeal", in this case, his right of appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The High Court cannot receive fresh evidence in a criminal appeal: Eastman (HC) (per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The alleged non-disclosure is irrelevant for present purposes.
123. In any event, to the extent that the present submission depends upon the prosecution's alleged non-disclosure, it must fail in limine. The appellant has not demonstrated that at any relevant time the prosecution was aware of the Victorian material. As I have said, for present purposes, the relevant time was any time prior to the exhaustion by the appellant of his access to the appellate process in the Full Court.
124. Even if the prosecution's obligation includes disclosure of information of which it should have been aware, as the appellant submits in his belated submissions, I see no basis for inferring that the prosecution should have been aware of this information at any relevant time. As far as I know, the two judgments were unreported. One was delivered prior to the appellant's trial, the other, during it (on 10 August 1995). The Coroner's report was delivered after the trial. It is not clear that the associated report was ever made public. In any event it seems to have been the basis for the Coroner's comments concerning B's evidence. Of the three memoranda by the Director of the Victorian Forensic Science Centre, only one was generated during the trial (6 September 1995). The others were dated 27 November 1995 and 5 February 1996. All documents pre-dated the dismissal of the Full Court appeal. However none of the criticisms would necessarily have come to the notice of the prosecution prior to that time, nor is there any basis for asserting that it should have been aware of them. Further, as the Intervenor points out, there is no evidence as to when the appellant became aware of them, which matter would also be relevant to the operation of s 422(1)(c).
125. In any event, I do not consider that the distinction between guilt in fact and guilt as evidenced by conviction is of any significance in this case. In Eastman (ADJR-HC), the proposed inquiry pursuant to s 475 was to address only the question of fitness to plead. The DPP submitted that such question was not as to the appellant's guilt but as to the fairness of the trial. This position could only sensibly be maintained by distinguishing between the question of actual guilt and that of guilt evidenced by conviction. In most cases, that distinction will not be of any significance. An inquiry will generally address the evidence and proceedings which led to conviction, as informed by any new material. The questions of guilt in fact and guilt as evidenced by conviction will be effectively the same. Fresh and cogent evidence may suggest a doubt or question about both guilt in fact and guilt as established by the conviction, leading to the verdict being set aside.
126. In Eastman (ADJR-HC) at [138] Heydon J concluded that in the context of s 475, there was no distinction between guilt in fact and guilt as evidenced by conviction. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ concurred in that view. I consider that at least in this case, there is also no relevant distinction to be drawn for the purposes of s 422.
127. The submission that Besanko J misconstrued the term "guilty" in s 422 is based solely upon the alleged non-disclosure by the prosecution. For the reasons which I have given, it must fail.
128. In his belated written submissions the appellant seems to rely on the alleged non-disclosure as a separate basis for a doubt or question about his guilt, as distinct from its being a basis for the construction argument advanced by his counsel. Such a submission was not made before Besanko J or Edmonds J. The Intervenor does not consent to such an argument being raised on appeal. In any event it must fail in the absence of evidence as to when the prosecution became aware of the information in question. I should add that the appellant also relies on the various criticisms of B, his evidence and methodology as supporting the unreasonableness ground. I turn to that ground.
The unreasonableness ground and the appellant's submissions
129. I have previously indicated that I will not receive the belated submissions. I have also indicated that in any event, I do not consider that they would assist the appellant's case. I should briefly set out my reasons for that view.
130. Counsel told the Court that the appellant would address, in person, only the issue of unreasonableness. However his belated submissions also address the availability of other relief pursuant to the ADJR Act. Those submissions take the matter no further than did his counsel's submissions. He also addresses the alleged non-disclosure by the prosecution. I have dealt with that matter. In his belated submissions the appellant mistakenly describes the unreasonableness ground as being ground 5(c) in his notice of appeal.
131. He submits that the decision of Besanko J was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the relevant power, relying upon s 5(1)(e) and s 5(2)(g) of the ADJR Act. As I have said, in the course of the hearing the Court asked for particulars of this allegation. In the belated submissions, the appellant asserts that particulars were given to Edmonds J at the hearing of the application for review, referring to AB 118 l 44, AB 127 l 37, AB 141 l 23 and AB 156 l 9. Those pages in the appeal book are the points in the transcript of proceedings before Edmonds J at which the appellant commenced to deal with each of the four aspects ventilated before Besanko J, namely:
• that there is a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence, it being that Mr Winchester was killed by somebody else for reason of his involvement in an operation targeting organized crime;
• that Dr Wallace's evidence and the Victorian material concerning B, his evidence and methods give rise to a relevant doubt or question;
• that the evidence of the witness Webb is arguably unreliable or incorrect; and
• that evidence of statements made by the appellant, and recorded using a listening device, were arguably not voluntary.
132. I take the appellant's so-called "particulars" to be an invitation to read the whole of his submissions to Edmonds J in respect of these four aspects, and then to examine both his Honour's reasons and those of Besanko J with a view to determining whether or not the latter's decision was unreasonable. I do not understand that to be the role of this Court. It was for the appellant, at the hearing, to identify the asserted unreasonableness in his Honour's decision. I do not propose, myself, to assemble an argument to support the appellant's assertion of unreasonableness. I have, however, read the reasons of Besanko J and those of Edmonds J, the appellant's submissions before the latter and, of course, the appellant's belated submissions. I will make some short comments on this aspect of the case.
133. This submission depends upon the theory that Mr Winchester was murdered because of his involvement in an operation against organized crime.
134. At the trial and on appeal, the appellant had access to a number of documents which had been generated by law enforcement agencies. Some parts of those documents were sensitive for operational reasons. Three of those documents were described as "MFI 23", "MFI 97" and "MFI 130". Document MFI 23 was compiled by the Australian Federal Police (the AFP). Document MFI 130 was compiled by the Australian Bureau of Crime Intelligence (the ABCI). Both are before us. The genesis of document MFI 97 is unclear, but as it comments on document MFI 23, it may have been produced by the AFP. Before Besanko J, the appellant seems to have focussed primarily on documents MFI 23 and MFI 130. Document MFI 130 advances, in very general terms, a theory as to a possible connection between Mr Winchester's murder and organized crime. Document MFI 23 is much more detailed. It contains information which strongly suggests such a link. However it seems that perhaps the most significant passage was based upon a misunderstanding or mistranscription of an intercepted conversation. This error was identified in document MFI 97 which is not before us. In Eastman (FC) at 66, the Full Court said:
The significance of the ruling upon the failure of the appellant to make use of the available information in MFI 23, and to make any attempt to identify an issue at trial that would have justified the trial judge in reconsidering his provisional ruling, must be assessed in light of the existence of MFI 97 and MFI 130 and the fact that those documents were in the possession of the appellant, and his lawyers. Interchanges between Mr Terracini and the trial judge on 1 August 1995 make it plain that these documents were before counsel, and that it was known that MFI 130 had been released from suppression orders.
MFI 97 is entitled "Supplementary Report Suspicion of Calabrian Organised Crime Involvement in the Murder of Assistant Commissioner Colin Stanley Winchester". It is dated 26 April 1990. It explains that the transcription of the tape recording referred to in MFI 23 of the man who it was thought had admitted a killing had been interpreted relatively quickly. Subsequently better equipment and techniques had been used to interpret the tape, and on reassessment the conversation did not contain such an admission. Significantly, the report said the "reassessment reveals that the product ... (that is, the taped conversation) is not sinister in any way and does not allude to any evidence or information that will assist the overall investigation of the murder".
When MFI 23 and MFI 97 are read together, they show, contrary to the theme of the defence case, that lines of inquiry unrelated to the appellant had been the subject of very extensive police investigation, and had failed to produce evidence suggesting that the murder had been committed by the people or organisation the subject of the investigation.
135. The Full Court concluded that the documents offered no basis for a rational hypothesis inconsistent with the appellant's guilt. Before Besanko J the appellant relied upon documents MFI 23, MFI 130 and two facsimile messages passing between Mr Ian Barker QC and Mr John Boersig dated 13 May 1998 (the Foster material). The two men were acting as legal advisers to the appellant. The Foster material contained an account of statements by a man called Foster, a former member of the AFP. The appellant told Besanko J that Foster is now dead. Foster claimed to have been involved in the investigation of Mr Winchester's murder. He expressed the view that the question of the appellant's involvement in the murder had not been properly investigated. He said that the police hierarchy would be embarrassed if links were established between the murder and the "Calabrians", and that such possible links were not adequately investigated. He also said that the AFP had been trying to send the appellant "nuts" and had been harassing him with telephone calls and otherwise (the alleged harassment).
136. Besanko J concluded that Foster's role in the investigation was unclear, and that his statements concerning the quality of the investigation were, at best, opinions unsupported by any identified facts. His Honour further concluded that the Foster material did not advance the theory that organised crime was involved in Mr Winchester's death beyond the issues raised in documents MFI 23 and MFI 130. As to the question of harassment, his Honour considered that it was relevant only to the question of the voluntariness of certain statements by the appellant, said to be incriminatory. They had been intercepted by a listening device installed at his home. This is the fourth aspect of the case identified above and discussed below. His Honour considered the alleged harassment in the course of considering that aspect. I agree with that approach and will adopt it.
137. Besanko J concluded that although the AFP and the ABCI had postulated the involvement of organized crime in Mr Winchester's murder, no firm factual basis for that theory had been discovered. His Honour also considered that the requirements of s 422(1)(c) had not been satisfied as both documents MFI 23 and MFI 130 were available to the appellant at his trial. Before Edmonds J the appellant simply asserted that no reasonable person, reading those documents and the Foster material, could have come to any conclusion which was inconsistent with the postulated theory.
138. Documents MFI 23 and MFI 130 were considered by the Full Court in the appellant's criminal appeal. The Full Court also referred to other documents including document MFI 97, observing that the appellant had access to a complete version of document MFI 23 from some time prior to 25 August 1995 when a ruling was made by Carruthers AJ suppressing parts of it. The appellant was permitted to keep his unredacted copy and effectively told that the suppression order might be reconsidered in the course of the trial. Carruthers AJ concluded that the appellant had read the document: Eastman (FC) at 63. The Full Court concluded that documents MFI 97 and MFI 130 were "before counsel" at the trial, in the sense that the appellant's lawyers were aware of them: Eastman (FC) at 66. It seems that at the trial, they were not used for any significant purpose. On appeal the Full Court rejected the appellant's attempt to rely on these documents on the ground that he had chosen not to rely on them at trial, so that no factual basis was laid for a suggestion to the jury that Mr Winchester was killed because of his involvement with organised crime: Eastman (FC) at 65-68.
139. In light of the Full Court's decision any doubt or question arising out of documents MFI 23 and MFI 130, cannot now be raised. Any such doubt or question should have been raised at the trial or on appeal. At least some aspects of the documents were so raised. As I have said, the Foster material takes the matter no further. In fact, documents MFI 23 and MFI 97 demonstrate that, contrary to the assertion in the Foster material, there was a substantial investigation of the possibility that organised crime was involved in the murder. The Full Court recognized this: Eastman (FC) at 66. As to Foster's criticism of the investigation of the case against the appellant, in the absence of specific criticism, the conviction, upheld on appeal, demonstrates an investigation which produced a sufficiently strong circumstantial case. No unexplored line of inquiry has been identified.
140. The appellant also asserts that at trial, his relationship with his counsel was so bad that this part of the case was not pursued as it should have been. However different counsel appeared for the appellant on appeal. If there was a valid criticism of counsel's conduct, it was capable of resolution in the Full Court. The appellant also appears to assert that neither he nor his counsel was aware, at the trial, of document MFI 130, although he accepts that it was in his possession. The appellant was certainly aware of it at the appeal, and, as I have demonstrated, the Full Court concluded that it was before counsel at the time of the trial.
141. I see no unreasonableness in any aspect of the way in which Besanko J dealt with this aspect of the case.
142. I have previously identified these criticisms. I accept that such criticism of an expert witness may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a doubt or question about the guilt of a person who is convicted upon the evidence of that witness. However the criticisms must be shown to be relevant to the case in a legal sense, and not merely likely to provoke unreasonable prejudice in a lay tribunal of fact.
143. The appellant and his legal advisers had access to Dr Wallace and other forensic scientists both before and during the trial. He was not called as a witness. On appeal, the appellant sought, unsuccessfully, to rely on allegedly "fresh" evidence from Dr Wallace. The statement of Dr Wallace which was relied upon before Besanko J, seems to have gone to issues which were either alive at the time of the trial or were dealt with by the Full Court.
144. The history of Dr Wallace's involvement with the defence team at trial appears at [177]-[187] of the reasons of Besanko J. That the appellant's lawyers were aware, during the trial, of the issue concerning the chopped disc particles appears at [186]. Clearly, they decided upon the way in which they would deal with evidence concerning this question. That decision did not include calling Dr Wallace to attack B's evidence, either generally or as to the silencer theory. It is also clear that, at least at the time of the appeal, Dr Wallace was critical of B's methodology. In those circumstances, any doubt or question arising out of Dr Wallace's statement ought to have been addressed at trial or on appeal. It may be that since the appeal Dr Wallace has added to his criticisms of B. Nonetheless it is clear that he was always concerned about the silencer theory, the reliability of B's evidence and his methodology.
145. As to the Victorian material, its relevance to the unreasonableness ground depends upon the use which the appellant might have made of it. The appellant seems to believe that he may have successfully attacked B's qualifications and so excluded his evidence. Even the most ambitious counsel would think twice before taking such a course. There is no doubt that B had the relevant specialist training and/or experience. The real challenge was to his competence. Assuming that the trial Judge was willing to embark on a voir dire in order to determine whether the witness was relevantly qualified, it would not have been sufficient for the appellant simply to tender Dr Wallace's statement and the Victorian material. It would have been necessary that the alleged incompetence be explored. The trial Judge would almost certainly have concluded that the criticisms went to weight rather than admissibility.
146. Use of the Victorian material before the jury may have been even more problematic. If the appellant were permitted to put the criticisms to B in cross-examination, he would generally have been bound by his answers. It is most unlikely that the trial Judge would have allowed the appellant to try to prove the truth of the criticisms as that course would have involved the jury in the resolution of numerous collateral matters.
147. In practice, the only potential value of these criticisms to the appellant was that they would have put him on notice of the possibility that B's evidence was suspect. Dr Wallace had obviously raised that possibility. The Victorian material would have added little or nothing to the appellant's case. In any event, the dispute between Dr Wallace and B concerned the likelihood of the silencer theory. Other expert evidence offered some support for B's theory. I should say a little more about the relevance of that theory.
148. In Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 576, Mason CJ observed that in a circumstantial case, an intermediate fact which is an indispensable basis for inferring guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. At 579 Dawson J said that in such a case, when the ultimate inference of guilt depends upon some intermediate factual conclusion, "it may well be appropriate to tell the jury that the fact must be found beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference can be drawn".
149. In this case, the ultimate question of guilt did not depend upon proof that the appellant purchased the rifle from Klarenbeek, although proof of that matter would have greatly strengthened the prosecution case. Nor did the case depend upon showing how the appellant may otherwise have come into possession of the Klarenbeek rifle. Nonetheless, the prosecution case seems to have been that he was the purchaser and the actual offender, in that the appellant was the person who fired the fatal shots.
150. Presence of gunshot residue (other than the chopped disc particles) in the appellant's car, which residue was consistent with production from the brand of cartridges found at the murder scene, suggested that a rifle capable of firing that brand of ammunition had been in the boot at some time. The presence of similar gunshot residue at the murder scene and the spent cartridges suggested that a rifle capable of firing such cartridges was the murder weapon. The marks on the spent cartridges and the cartridges retrieved from the test firing sites suggested that the Klarenbeek rifle was the murder weapon. However the jury had to consider other possible explanations.
151. The presence of chopped disc particles at both sites had potentially positive and potentially negative effects for both prosecution and defence. From the appellant's point of view, their presence at the murder scene may have raised doubts as to whether the spent cartridges found at the scene were related to the murder, seriously undermining the whole prosecution theory. However that proposition seems unlikely and seems not to have been pressed at the trial. From the prosecution's point of view, it was desirable that it offer an explanation for the presence of the chopped disc particles. If the jury accepted such explanation, the fact that the chopped disc particles were present at the murder scene and in the appellant's car said much about his possible involvement. The similar contamination of residue from the same brand of cartridge at the murder scene and in the boot of the appellant's car suggested that the weapon which had been in the boot was the murder weapon.
152. The jury had to weigh those matters in determining whether it was satisfied as to guilt, but that question had to be determined on all of the evidence. As I have said there was other evidence identifying the appellant as the purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle, although such evidence was also the subject of criticism. There was also evidence of motive and evidence that the appellant's car was in the vicinity of Mr Winchester's house two nights before his murder. There was evidence of recorded statements made by the appellant to himself at his home, which statements were arguably incriminating. The importance of the gunshot residue in the appellant's car, and the presence of the chopped disc particles there and at the murder scene, depended upon the inferences which the jury was willing to draw from the other evidence. It was not necessary in order that the jury be satisfied as to guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that it be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that B's silencer theory was correct. Although the silencer theory was important to the prosecution case, it was not critical to it. In those circumstances, differences between Dr Wallace and B as to the degree of probability were of little significance, particularly given the fact that other experts accepted, or did not reject it.
153. I see nothing unreasonable in the way in which Besanko J dealt with this aspect of the case.
154. Mr Webb testified that he saw the appellant at Mr Klarenbeek's house between 8.00 am and 8.15 am on 31 December 1988. Mr Klarenbeek was then offering the Klarenbeek rifle for sale. The appellant makes three points concerning this evidence:
• it is inconsistent with a statement made by Mr Klarenbeek that he could not identify the appellant as the person who had purchased the rifle;
• Mr Webb made numerous statements in which he failed to mention the fact that he had seen the appellant at Mr Klarenbeek's home; and
• other evidence suggested that Mr Webb's account was untrue.
155. The first point depends upon a statement made by Mr Klarenbeek which was in evidence at the trial, but not for the purpose of proving its truth. The appellant could have led such evidence for that purpose, but he did not do so. Had he done so, the prosecution would have led evidence of other statements by Mr Klarenbeek which inculpated the appellant. In the circumstances, the question was capable of resolution at the trial. The appellant cannot satisfy s 422(1)(c) in this regard.
156. As to the second point, the Full Court held that Mr Webb's evidence was properly admitted, and that adequate directions were given as to the general and specific dangers that his identification might be mistaken. Section 422(1)(c) prevents further consideration of those matters for the purposes of s 424.
157. The third point depends upon evidence from a man called Dorigo and statements by a man called Hall and his son. Mr Dorigo went to Mr Klarenbeek's house between 10.00 am and 10.30 am on 31 December 1988 and was offered the Klarenbeek rifle for sale. He did not buy it. The statements from Mr Hall and his son were to the effect that they went to Mr Klarenbeek's house shortly before lunch time on that day. Mr Klarenbeek told them that the Klarenbeek rifle had been sold, and that the purchaser had gone to get the purchase money. The appellant submits that it is inconsistent with Mr Webb's evidence that he saw the appellant at Mr Klarenbeek's house (presumably at the time at which he allegedly bought the rifle) that at 10.00 am - 10.15 am, it was still being offered for sale to Mr Dorigo when, at about lunch time, he said that it had been sold.
158. The alleged significance of this evidence lies in the apparent difference between Mr Klarenbeek's state of mind when he was speaking to Mr Dorigo and when he was speaking to the Halls. If Mr Klarenbeek was consistent in his attitudes then, had the rifle been sold when Mr Dorigo saw him, he would have said so. In fact he tried to sell it to him. The appellant invites the inference that the rifle had not been sold at that time (10.00 am - 10.15 am) but was sold before lunch time.
159. The appellant submits that Mr Webb's identification of the appellant as the person seen at that time is unreliable. However his line of reasoning leads only to the conclusion that the rifle had not been sold at that time. That inference also depends upon the assumption that Mr Klarenbeek would necessarily have told Mr Dorigo that the rifle had been sold, had that been the case. In any event it would not be sufficient for the appellant's purposes that the rifle had not been sold at 8.00 am - 8.15 am. The sighting of the appellant at Mr Klarenbeek's home would be sufficient for the prosecution's purposes, establishing a link between Mr Klarenbeek and the appellant on the day on which the rifle was sold. It may be that knowledge of what Mr Klarenbeek would have said, had he given evidence at the trial, limited the capacity of the prosecution to advance an alternative theory as to when the appellant bought the rifle on 31 December 2008. However the point is that the combined evidence by Mr Dorigo and the Halls did not necessarily undermine Mr Webb's identification of the appellant as the person whom he saw at 8.00 am - 8.15 am. At best it may have suggested that he had not then bought the rifle, but that inference would depend upon the inferences which the jury was willing to draw as to whether Mr Klarenbeek would necessarily have been consistent in his loyalty to the purchaser who had gone to get the purchase money.
160. Obviously, Mr Hall's statement and that of his son are vital to the appellant's line of reasoning. If there was no evidence that the rifle had been sold by lunch time, then there was no basis for criticizing Mr Webb's evidence on this ground. At the trial the appellant objected to such evidence being led. He now seeks to depart from that tactical decision. Once again, the question was resolved at the trial. In this regard, the appellant cannot satisfy s 422(1)(c).
161. I see nothing unreasonable about the way in which Besanko J dealt with this aspect of the matter.
162. Before Besanko J the appellant seems to have challenged receipt in evidence of his intercepted and recorded statements on the ground that they were involuntary. See his Honour's reasons at [214]. However at [221], his Honour observes that there was no arguable case that the statements were not voluntary or were wrongly admitted, suggesting that some other ground for exclusion was also raised. Before Edmonds J, the appellant seems to have limited his case to voluntariness. See AB 159 ll 11-14 and 28-32.
163. Voluntariness and other grounds of exclusion were addressed at trial and on appeal. See Eastman (FC) at 108-114. The appellant now seeks to rely upon the Foster material concerning the alleged harassment as advancing his argument for exclusion of the statements. Foster said that a police officer had told him that the AFP was deliberately harassing the appellant in order to provoke him into saying something incriminating which would be recorded. To the extent that there was any doubt about whether the alleged harassment occurred, Foster's statement may have supported the appellant's claims. However, as Besanko J pointed out, the Full Court concluded that there was no demonstrated link between the alleged acts of harassment and the purportedly incriminating statements. The appellant, in his submissions to Edmonds J, submitted that the evidence of Foster provides such a link.
164. The Full Court's conclusion may have related specifically to the question of voluntariness, but as far as I can see, all bases upon which the appellant could have opposed the admission into evidence of his recorded statements depended upon such statements being caused by the alleged harassment. The Foster material does not assist the appellant because it does not remedy the lack of causal connection.
165. Again I find no unreasonableness in the way in which Besanko J dealt with this matter. Taking all four aspects together, I see nothing unreasonable about his Honour's decision.
I certify that the preceding paragraphs numbered thirty-three (33) to one hundred and sixty-six (166) are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. ACTCA 4 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
AND: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ANTHONY JAMES BESANKO
AND: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
167. The matter presently before the Court is an appeal from a judgment of this Court on an application by the appellant for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) (the ADJR Act).
168. The decision in respect of which review was sought was the respondent's decision made on 4 April 2008 refusing to make an order under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) that an inquiry be held into the appellant's conviction on 3 November 1995 for an offence of murder.
169. The application for review was filed on 6 May 2008.
170. On 18 February 2009 the primary judge ordered that the application be dismissed and ordered the plaintiff (now the appellant) to pay the Intervenor's costs.
171. The original Notice of Appeal from the primary judge's decision was lodged on 17 March 2009.
172. A threshold issue at first instance was the competency of the appellant's application for judicial review. The primary judge held that the application was not competent as the respondent's decision was not a decision 'made ... under an enactment' within the meaning of the ADJR Act.
173. I agree. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed and the applicant should be ordered to pay the Intervenor's costs.
174. On 3 November 1995 the appellant was found guilty of murdering Assistant Commissioner Winchester, the highest ranking police officer in the Australian Capital Territory, on 10 January 1989. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
175. On 2 February 2005 the appellant made an application to the Court for an inquiry into his conviction in accordance with s 424(1) of the Crimes Act. On 4 April 2008 the respondent, who has filed a submitting appearance in the proceedings presently before the Court, decided not to order an inquiry into the appellant's conviction.
176. On 6 May 2008 the appellant sought review of the respondent's decision under the ADJR Act. The application, which was lodged for filing on that day, sought orders under s 17 of the ADJR Act quashing the decision of the respondent and directing the respondent to order an inquiry under s 424 of the Crimes Act. It also sought orders of, or in the nature of, certiorari quashing the respondent's decision and mandamus directing the respondent to order an inquiry under s 424 of the Crimes Act.
The grounds of the application were expressed as follows:
... the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power given by the enactment under which it was purported to be made.
A more elaborate way of expressing the ground as it was developed below was that the decision of the respondent was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.
177. The reasons for decision of the respondent were recorded in 224 paragraphs on 66 typed pages.
178. It was not suggested that there were extreme circumstances warranting a conclusion that the respondent's decision did not constitute a bona fide attempt to exercise the power conferred by s 424(1) of the Crimes Act. A mere incorrect assessment would not demonstrate an absence of bona fides.
179. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that the respondent's decision did not relate to the subject matter of Part 20 of the Crimes Act or that the decision was not reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the Supreme Court by s 424(1) of the Crimes Act.
180. The application for judicial review was heard by the primary judge on 7 and 8 July 2008, the appellant being self-represented, and decided on 18 February 2009. As previously indicated, His Honour ordered that the application be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Intervenor's costs.
181. By a Notice of Appeal filed 17 March 2009 the appellant appealed from that decision. The grounds recorded in the Notice of Appeal were as follows:
5 ... [the primary judge] erred in finding that the decision made by [the respondent] on 4th April 2008 under section 424 of the A.C.T. Crimes Act 1900 was not a decision:-
(a) to which the A.C.T. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 applied; and
(b) which entailed an exercise of a power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.
182. The Notice of Appeal sought orders that the matter be referred to the respondent for reconsideration and decision according to law.
183. When the Notice of Appeal was filed the appellant, who had by then become an experienced litigant, was self-represented. However, on 24 April 2009 a Notice of Solicitor Acting was filed by Peter Alan Jackson of Jackson Lalic Lawyers informing the Court that he acted for the appellant 'in this proceeding'.
184. On 22 October 2009 the appellant 'lodged' an Amended Notice of Appeal which omitted the second ground of appeal covered by the original paragraph 5(b) and inserted in lieu a ground alleging that the primary judge erred in finding that the decision of the respondent was not a decision:
185. The Amended Notice of Appeal sought an additional order as follows:
186. Under Part 5.4 r 5412(2) of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) it was not open to the appellant to amend his Notice of Appeal without the leave of the Court.
187. When the Court sought to identify the grounds of appeal upon which the appellant wished to rely, on 22 October 2009, counsel for the appellant, after taking instructions, informed the Court that the appellant did not wish to abandon the second ground of appeal specified in the Notice of Appeal filed 17 March 2009 notwithstanding that in the appellant's counsel's Outline of Argument of 19 October 2009 he had indicated that the Wednesbury unreasonableness ground was 'no longer pressed'.
188. In the circumstances, a formal application was made by counsel for the appellant for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal filed 17 March 2009 by adding the proposed ground 5b from the Amended Notice of Appeal as ground (c) and inserting in paragraph 6 the proposed declaration as an additional order sought by the appellant. Leave to so amend the Notice of Appeal was granted shortly after 2.30 pm on 22 October 2009.
189. Given the unwillingness of counsel for the appellant to argue the Wednesbury unreasonableness ground in view of his ethical obligations to the Court, he made an application on behalf of the appellant for leave to be afforded to the appellant to personally present submissions to the Court in relation to that ground at the conclusion of his submissions. Such leave was granted and it was indicated that the time required by the appellant to present his submissions on the Wednesbury ground would be approximately 45 minutes. Later it was indicated that it might be as long as one hour.
190. For reasons which it is difficult to comprehend the appellant withdrew his counsel's retainer when he was in full flight in presenting his submissions on the grounds in paragraph 5(a) and (c) of the Notice of Appeal as amended and which were addressed in his Outline of Argument of 19 October 2009.
191. No sooner was the Court informed of the withdrawal of the appellant's counsel's retainer than the Court was further informed that Mr Jackson's instructions had been terminated.
Leave was then granted to the solicitor for the appellant to withdraw from the record in the proceeding forthwith.
192. The appellant was then called upon by the Court to present such further submissions as he may wish to rely upon. He commenced his submissions by expressing his astonishment at the Court's requirement that at the commencement of the hearing on 23 October 2009 he provide particulars of his allegation of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
193. Section 5(1) of the ADJR Act empowers the court to review 'a decision to which this Act applies'. In the circumstances, a threshold issue going to jurisdiction was whether or not the decision of the respondent of 4 April 2008 was a decision to which the ADJR Act applied. The primary judge held that the respondent's decision of 4 April 2008 was not a decision to which the ADJR Act applied. Accordingly, his Honour found that the application for review of the decision was incompetent.
194. The Dictionary to the ADJR Act (see s 2) defined 'decision to which this Act applies' to mean:
a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made or required to be made (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) under an enactment, other than a decision mentioned in schedule 1.
195. In the circumstances of this case Schedule 1 had no relevant application.
196. The definition of 'enactment' in the Dictionary to the ADJR Act included:
An 'Act' was defined in the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 7, as 'an Act of the Legislative Assembly' being 'a law (however described or named) made by the Legislative Assembly under the Self-Government Act.'
197. It has not been suggested that the Crimes Act is not, relevantly, an Act for the purposes of the ADJR Act.
198. The primary judge referred to and relied upon the joint judgment of Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99 at [89].
199. It is clear that the respondent's decision of 4 April 2008 was authorised by s 424 of the Crimes Act.
200. It would appear that the appellant submitted that the decision altered or otherwise affected his legal rights in that whereas he previously had the potentiality of an inquiry into his conviction, following the decision that potentiality was 'definitively removed'. So understood, the plaintiff submitted the decision could be seen to be '... final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration ...' rather than '[a] conclusion reached as a step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision ...': Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 337 per Mason CJ, with whom Brennan and Deane JJ agreed.
201. The primary judge considered that there were a number of difficulties with the plaintiff's submission namely:
(a) s 425(1) of the Crimes Act made it clear that Division 20.2 (ss 422-425 inclusive) did not create a right to the order of an inquiry nor did it create a duty to order an inquiry. His Honour said at [13]:
Thus, both before and after the decision the [appellant] had no right to the order of an inquiry. No such rights of the [appellant] were altered or otherwise affected.
(b) the potentiality of an inquiry into the appellant's conviction was not 'definitively removed' by any decision made by the respondent. Rather, that potentiality was removed by the appellant making his application to the Court for an inquiry into his conviction on 2 February 2005. The primary judge said at [14]-[15]:
It is to be observed that it is not the decision which 'shuts out' the potentiality to which the plaintiff points, but the application itself. Once the plaintiff made the application the subject of the decision, he had effectively 'shut out' the potentiality of making a further application which might satisfy all the conditions precedent that must be satisfied, including that in para (f) of subs 422(1).
That was the situation both before and after the making of the decision. The decision itself did not alter or affect this potentiality.
... I am of the view that the decision does not confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations and the decision therefore does not satisfy the second criteria in Tang for it to be a decision 'made ... under an enactment'. It is not, therefore, a decision to which the ADJR Act applies.
203. Part 20 of the Crimes Act headed 'Inquiries into convictions' relevantly provided:
422(1) An inquiry may be ordered under this part into the conviction of a person for an offence only if -
(a) there is a doubt or question about whether the person is guilty of the offence; and
(i) any evidence admitted in a relevant proceeding; or
(ii) any material fact that was not admitted in evidence in a relevant proceeding; and
(c) the doubt or question could not have been properly addressed in a relevant proceeding; and
(d) there is a significant risk that the conviction is unsafe because of the doubt or question; and
(e) the doubt or question cannot now be properly addressed in an appeal against the conviction; and
(f) if an application is made to the Supreme Court for an inquiry in relation to the conviction - an application has not previously been made to the Court for an inquiry in relation to the doubt or question; and
(g) it is in the interests of justice for the doubt or question to be considered at an inquiry.
John has been convicted of murder. Expert evidence that blood found on John's jacket shortly after the murder was almost certain to be the victim's blood was the main evidence connecting John with the murder.
Later DNA testing, by a method developed after all proceedings in relation to the conviction had been finalised (and the time for making any appeal had lapsed), shows that the blood is almost certainly not the victim's blood. This gives rise to a doubt or question about the blood evidence that could not have been (and cannot now be) properly addressed in any relevant proceeding in relation to the murder, and a significant risk that the conviction is unsafe.
(2) The inquiry is limited to matters stated in the order for the inquiry.
(3) If the inquiry is ordered by the Supreme Court, the court may set limits on the inquiry under subsection (2) despite anything in the application for the inquiry.
424(1) The Supreme Court may order an inquiry on application by the convicted person, or by someone else on the convicted person's behalf.
(2) The registrar must give a copy of an application for an inquiry to the Attorney-General.
(3) The Supreme Court may consider a written submission by the Attorney-General or the director of public prosecutions (or both) in relation to the application.
(4) Proceedings on an application are not judicial proceedings.
(5) If the Supreme Court orders an inquiry, the registrar must give a copy of the order to the Attorney-General.
425(1) This division does not create a right to the order of an inquiry, and does not create a duty to order an inquiry.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) there is no right of appeal in relation to a decision whether to order an inquiry.
427(1) If an inquiry is ordered, the Executive must appoint a board of inquiry under the Inquiries Act 1991.
428(1) After finishing an inquiry, the board must give a copy of a written report of the inquiry to the registrar.
429(1) The registrar must give a copy of the report of a board of inquiry appointed under division 20.3 to the Attorney-General and the convicted person, together with a copy of any order under this section.
430(1) The Full Court [the Supreme Court constituted by a Full Court] must consider the report of a board into an inquiry.
(2) Having regard to the report, the Full Court must, by order -
(b) confirm the conviction and recommend that the Executive pardon the convicted person or remit the convicted person's sentence under section 433 (Grant of pardon) or section 434 (Remission of penalties); or
(3) The registrar must give a copy of the order, together with any reasons given for the order, to the Attorney-General and the convicted person.
(4) This section does not give the convicted person a right to an order of the Full Court mentioned in subsection (2) (b) or (d), or to an Executive pardon or remission.
431(1) In considering whether to make an order under this part about a report, the Supreme Court -
(a) may have regard only to matters stated in the report, or to documents or things given to the registrar with the report; and
(2) The consideration of whether to make an order under this part is not a judicial proceeding.
204. The power of the ACT Executive to pardon a convicted person is to be found in ss 313 et seq of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).
205. When the hearing of the appeal presently before the Court resumed on 23 October 2009 the appellant was self-represented.
206. The appellant failed to provide any particulars of his allegation of Wednesbury unreasonableness either orally or in writing. The appellant chose not to proceed with his submissions but rather made a series of ex tempore applications to each of the judges constituting the Full Court calling on them to disqualify themselves for 'actual bias'. After addressing each of the judges in turn with details of the matter relied upon, Graham J declined to recuse himself (see Eastman v Besanko [2009] ACTSC 144), Dowsett J indicated that he did not propose to accede to the appellant's application that he should withdraw from the proceedings (see Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 15) and Penfold J indicated that she had no intention of disqualifying herself from the proceedings (see Eastman v Besanko [2010] ACTSC 16).
207. At this stage the appellant announced his intention to take no further part in the proceedings. The following exchange took place:
Appellant: I seek to be excused because I do not wish to make any further submissions to the court.
Graham J: Before you depart, may I understand that you have, through your counsel yesterday and through your supplementary oral submissions put to the court all matters upon which you wish to rely in support of your grounds of appeal?
Appellant: I have nothing further to say to the court ...
Penfold J: ... Mr Eastman do you wish to remain in court?
Penfold J: Well, we have every intention of going on and hearing Mr Harris.
Penfold J: ... you don't wish to make any submissions ...
Appellant: No further submissions to make. ... I seek leave to be excused.
208. Upon the appellant withdrawing from the hearing of his appeal at about 11 am on 23 October 2009 the Court entertained submissions from senior counsel for the Intervenor when the Court resumed after a morning adjournment at about 11.30 am. Senior counsel for the Intervenor addressed the Court until about 1 pm and again from about 2 pm to shortly before 3 pm when the Court reserved its decision.
209. In the end result the Court had the benefit of the helpful submissions of counsel for the appellant dated 19 October 2009 which were directed to the grounds of appeal (a) and (c), the oral submissions of counsel for the appellant dealing in particular with ground of appeal (a) and the brief oral submissions of the appellant in person late in the day on 22 October 2009. The Court then had the advantage of the Intervenor's written summary of argument of 22 October 2009 and the oral submissions of senior counsel for the Intervenor of 23 October 2009.
210. In essence the Intervenor submitted that the primary judge had not fallen into error in the manner alleged and that accordingly the appeal should be dismissed.
211. The Intervenor submitted that the primary judge correctly decided that the decision of the respondent was not a decision under an enactment. In addition the Intervenor submitted that the decision was not a decision 'of an administrative character' within the meaning of the ADJR Act. It was a quasi-judicial decision rather than an administrative decision. Thirdly it was submitted that s 425 of the Crimes Act was intended to exclude decisions of the Supreme Court under s 424 of the Crimes Act from review by the Supreme Court in proceedings such as those instituted by the appellant under the ADJR Act.
The receipt of further submissions following the conclusion of a hearing
212. Subsequent to the reservation by the Court of its judgment on the appeal on 23 October 2009 the appellant has had second thoughts and now wishes to present further submissions to the Court.
213. In Communications Electrical Electronic Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Blue Star Pacific Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 750; (2009) 186 IR 82 Reeves J said at [63]:
Before leaving this matter, I should record that after I reserved my decision on 16 June 2009, Mr Boyce submitted some further written submissions. I did not give him any prior leave to do this and he did not seek leave before doing so. I rejected those submissions and have not considered them in this decision.
In my view, this practice should be strongly condemned. As the High Court said in Re Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) [2005] HCA 18; (2005) 79 ALJR 881 at [54]:
Where leave has not been given publicly for supplementary submissions and evidence, the provision of such material to court registries without permission of the court, publicly signified, is a derogation from the principle of the open administration of justice. It should not occur. If new points of importance arise in the case whilst a matter stands for judgment, the proper course (unless statute or court rules permit otherwise) is for the proceeding to be relisted so that an application to enlarge the record can be made and determined in open court.
See also: Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1980) 147 CLR 246.
214. True it is that the appellant became a litigant in person after he withdrew his counsel's retainer towards the end of the day on 22 October 2009 and proceeded to terminate his solicitor's instructions shortly thereafter. However, it must be remembered that the appellant has become an experienced litigant in person.
215. In this regard it is timely to refer to the observations of Bryson JA in Malouf v Malouf [2006] NSWCA 83; (2006) 65 NSWLR 449 at [183] about the need to avoid preferential treatment for self-represented litigants, in fairness to the other parties. His Honour said:
Courts should not go so far in accommodating the positions of unrepresented litigants as to make it an advantageous procedural step to dismiss one's lawyers, or to retain none. Nor should courts slip from unreadiness to shut a party out from litigating an issue which is fairly arguable into incapacity to close off procedural opportunities which are not taken. Without procedure, procedural directions and compliance, justice will not be done at all. The time, patience, resources and willingness to behave appropriately of those who do comply should have a place in consideration of what the court should do when a party who has not complied with earlier directions seeks an extension of time, or some procedural indulgence by which earlier directions are disregarded. The compliant also have an entitlement to consideration, and their compliance should not be disregarded, or mocked, by treating their opponent's obligation to comply with the court's directions as less than important, or as superfluous.
216. In a postscript to his reasons for judgment in Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions of the Australian Capital Territory [2003] HCA 28; (2003) 214 CLR 318 (Eastman v DPP) McHugh J, with whose reasons for judgment Gummow J agreed, said at [27]-[31]:
27 On 28 March 2003 after I had circulated my reasons in this appeal to other members of the Court, the appellant informed the Registry that he had withdrawn his instructions to the senior counsel who had represented him on the hearing of the appeal. He also forwarded to the Court a seven page document that he described as "Appellant's Supplementary Submissions".
28 I have had no regard to these "submissions". They should not have been forwarded to the Court. The Rules of the Court gave no authority for them to be forwarded. Nor did the Court give leave to the appellant to file them. If leave had been sought, I would have refused it. If the Court gave leave, it would have to give leave to the other parties in the appeal to file replies - with consequent delay in the business of the Court.
29 Parties to matters before the Court need to understand that, once a hearing in the Court has concluded, only in very exceptional circumstances, if at all, will the Court later give leave to a party to supplement submissions. Parties have a legal right to present their arguments at the hearing. If a new point arises at the hearing, the Court will usually give leave to the parties to file further written submissions within a short period of the hearing - ordinarily seven to fourteen days. But a party has no legal right to continue to put submissions to the Court after the hearing. In so far as the rules of natural justice require that a party be given an opportunity to put his or her case, that opportunity is given at the hearing.
30 This is not the first time that this Court has had to emphasise that the hearing is the time and place to present arguments. In Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd [No 1_]_, Mason J said:
"The material was submitted without leave having been given by the Court. The impression, unfortunately abroad, that parties may file supplementary written material after the conclusion of oral argument, without leave having been given beforehand, is quite misconceived. We have to say once again, firmly and clearly, that the hearing is the time and place to present argument, whether it be wholly oral or oral argument supplemented by written submissions."
31 Once the hearing has concluded, the workload of the Court makes it impossible for the Court to give leave to file further submissions - with all the attendant delay in the Court's business by a fresh round of submissions. Efficiency requires that the despatch of the Court's business not be delayed by further submissions reflecting the afterthoughts of a party or - as perhaps is the case in this appeal - some dissatisfaction with the arguments of the party's counsel.
(footnote omitted)
217. In the same case Heydon J, with whose reasons for judgment Gleeson CJ, Kirby J, Hayne J and Callinan J agreed, as did Gummow J also, said in respect of the appellant's supplementary submissions in that case:
143 On 28 March 2003 the appellant informed the Registry that he had withdrawn his instructions from the counsel who represented him at the hearing of the appeal. He supplied a seven page document entitled "Appellant's Supplementary Submissions". No leave was sought or given for the supply of this document, and it does not state any reason why it should now be received. Accordingly, it is rejected.
(footnote omitted)
218. In my opinion the appellant's application to now rely upon further submissions should be rejected. No reason for allowing such application was advanced.
219. Whilst Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 was concerned with a late amendment to a pleading, it is also appropriate to note what was said by Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ at [94], [102] and [112] as follows:
94 ... Waller LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Worldwide Corporation Ltd v GPT Ltd [[1998] EWCA Civ 1894], said that such a concern [regarding the need to ensure that justice is not sacrificed] did not pay sufficient regard to the fact that the courts are concerned to do justice to all litigants. Where a party had had a sufficient opportunity to plead his or her case, it may be necessary for the court to make a decision which may produce a sense of injustice in that party, for the sake of doing justice to the opponent and to other litigants.
...
102 ... It is the extent of the delay and the costs associated with it, together with the prejudice which might reasonably be assumed to follow and that which is shown, which are to be weighed against the grant of permission to a party to alter its case. Much may depend upon the point the litigation has reached relative to a trial when the application to amend is made. There may be cases where it may properly be concluded that a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead their case and that it is too late for a further amendment, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates. ...
...
112 A party has the right to bring proceedings. Parties have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed. But limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced. That is why, in seeking the just resolution of the dispute, reference is made to parties having a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they seek to agitate.
(Emphasis added)
220. Just as there may be cases where it may properly be concluded that a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead their case and that it is too late for a further amendment, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates, there will be other cases where like considerations should be applied to the presentation of further submissions after a hearing has concluded where no such submissions were in contemplation when the hearing concluded. The appellant's clear abandonment of any desire to present further submissions when the hearing resumed in the absence of his legal representatives on 23 October 2009 was such that he ought not be permitted to 'have a second bite at the cherry' and put the Intervenor to further expense because of his change of heart. His disregard for what had been said by the High Court in Eastman v DPP (supra) is incomprehensible.
221. This matter should be decided on the basis of the submissions as they were presented to the Court prior to the reservation by the Court of its judgment on the Amended Notice of Appeal.
Whether a decision of the 'Supreme Court' under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act is reviewable
222. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2001 (ACT) relevantly stated in relation to the section which has now become s 422 of the Crimes Act:
Grounds for an inquiry
The purpose of this section is to detail the grounds for holding an inquiry into a conviction.
...
It is expected that the inquiries power would be used only in exceptional cases... It is not intended that the inquiries power be used as an alternative to the appeals process or as a means of endlessly challenging a conviction. ...
223. In relation to the section which has now become s 425, the Explanatory Memorandum stated:
Rights and duties in relation to orders for inquiries
The purpose of this section is to make it clear that decisions about ordering an inquiry are purely discretionary and are not subject to appeal or review. This reflects the intention that inquiries be ordered only where all other ways of addressing the matter have been exhausted and where there are compelling reasons for reconsidering the conviction.
224. In my opinion a decision of the 'Supreme Court' (in this instance, that of the respondent) on an application for inquiry was a decision of an administrative character which was not open to review or appeal because of s 424(4) and 425 of the Crimes Act.
225. Whilst the decision of the respondent was, in my opinion, a decision of an administrative character, contrary to the submission of the Intervenor, nevertheless it was not a decision made under an enactment as that expression is properly understood.
226. In Griffith University v Tang on which the primary judge relied, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ said at [89]:
227. A decision to order or not to order an inquiry under s 424 of the Crimes Act was undoubtedly 'authorised' by the Crimes Act. However, where ss 422-425 do 'not create a right to the order of an inquiry' and do 'not create a duty to order an inquiry', it seems to me that the decision of the respondent not to order an inquiry did not itself bear upon any legal rights or obligations of the appellant. Thus, the decision did not derive from the enactment. In my opinion the test laid down in Griffith University v Tang has not been satisfied.
228. In these circumstances, it is of no moment that a decision under s 424(1) of the Crimes Act is not listed as a decision excluded from review under Schedule 1 to the ADJR Act.
229. It may also be observed that the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2001 (ACT) post-dated the enactment of the ADJR Act.
230. Not only was the respondent's decision not to order an inquiry not a decision made under an enactment as explained by Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in Griffith University v Tang, it is clear that the appellant was not a 'person aggrieved' by the respondent's decision. The appellant had no interests that were or could be adversely affected by the decision of the Supreme Court (see s 3B(1) of the ADJR Act). The Supreme Court was under no duty to order an inquiry and the appellant had no right to the order of an inquiry. At its highest the appellant had an 'opportunity' to apply for an inquiry (see s 424(1) of the Crimes Act) and he was not denied that opportunity.
231. Importantly, s 425(1) is a privative provision which denies rights to a dissatisfied applicant. It provided:
425(1) This division [ss 422-425] does not create a right to the order of an inquiry, and does not create a duty to order an inquiry.
(emphasis added)
232. Given that s 425(2) commenced with the words 'Without limiting subsection (1)', it seems to me that the legislature clearly intended to provide a mechanism for the possible instigation of inquiries without there being any rights of review or appeal in respect of a decision not to order an inquiry.
233. 'Proceedings' on an application for an inquiry to be ordered are not judicial proceedings (see s 424(4)) nor is consideration by a Full Court of the report of a board of inquiry under s 430 a judicial proceeding (see s 431(2)).
234. A decision whether to order an inquiry is one in respect of which 'there is no right of appeal' (see s 425(2)).
235. Presumably, the exclusion of a right of appeal in relation to a decision whether to order an inquiry was only to apply to inquiries for which an order was sought on an application to the Supreme Court by a convicted person or by someone else on the convicted person's behalf.
236. In my opinion s 425(2) was not intended to have any application in respect of a failure by the Executive to 'order an inquiry on its own initiative'.
237. In reaching the foregoing conclusions I have made the following more general observations on Part 20 of the Crimes Act which deals with 'Inquiries into convictions':
(a) Part 20 comprises 12 sections (ss 421-432 inclusive).
(b) Part 20 confers powers and obligations upon the 'Supreme Court' and upon the 'Executive'. Neither the 'Supreme Court' nor the 'Executive' are defined expressions under the Crimes Act.
The Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) includes a dictionary at the end thereof and under s 2 of that Act:
The dictionary at the end of this Act is part of this Act.
When one goes to the dictionary in the Legislation Act it is apparent that it is divided into two parts. Part 1 has a heading 'Meaning of commonly-used terms' and Part 2 has a heading 'Terms for Legislation Act 2001 only'.
Part 1 of the dictionary to the Legislation Act commences with the words 'Terms that are defined only for this Act are set out in pt 2'.
Terms that apply to all Acts and statutory instruments are set out in pt 1.
Under Part 1 of the dictionary to the Legislation Act 'Supreme Court' is defined to mean 'the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory'. The definition is followed by a Note reading:
The Supreme Court is established by the Supreme Court Act 1933, s 3. The Self-Government Act, s 48A deals with the jurisdiction and powers of the court.
Part 1 of the dictionary to the Legislation Act defines 'Executive' to mean 'the Australian Capital Territory Executive'.
The definition of 'Executive' is followed by a Note reading:
The Executive is established by the Self-Government Act, s 36
(c) Section 421 of the Crimes Act contains a definition of 'Full Court' as 'the Supreme Court constituted by a Full Court'.
(d) Section 421 also includes a definition of 'registrar' as 'the registrar of the Supreme Court'.
(e) Importantly, s 423 empowers 'The Executive' to 'order' an inquiry on its own initiative and s 424(1) empowers the Supreme Court to 'order' an inquiry 'on application by the convicted person' or on application 'by someone else on the convicted person's behalf'.
(f) If an inquiry is ordered, the Executive must appoint a 'board of inquiry under the Inquiries Act 1991'.
(g) Under s 427(3) the board of inquiry must be constituted by 'a judge of the Supreme Court or a magistrate'.
(h) Under s 427(2) the appointment of a board of inquiry must state that the inquiry is 'to be in relation to the matter stated in the order, and in relation to no other matter'.
(i) Under s 422(2) an inquiry is limited to matters stated in the order for the inquiry and under s 422(3) if the inquiry is ordered by the Supreme Court, the Court may set limits on the inquiry under s 422(2) 'despite anything in the application for the inquiry'.
(j) Section 424(3) of the Crimes Act contemplates that in addressing an application for the Supreme Court to 'order an inquiry', the Supreme Court may consider a written submission by the Attorney-General or the director of public prosecutions (or both) in relation to the application.
(k) Section 425(2) provides that there should be no right of appeal in relation to 'a decision whether to order an inquiry'.
(l) Sections 426-428 deal with inquiry procedure and the production of a report of the inquiry by the board of inquiry to the registrar of the Supreme Court.
(m) Under s 428(2) the board of inquiry must also give to the Registrar of the Supreme Court 'for safe-keeping', any documents or things held by the board for the purpose of the inquiry.
(n) Section 429(2) of the Crimes Act empowers the Supreme Court to make orders in respect of the non disclosure, limited disclosure and partial disclosure of a report produced by a board of inquiry.
(o) Section 430 of the Crimes Act deals with consideration and action upon a report of a board of inquiry. Section 430(1) requires the Full Court of the Supreme Court to consider the report of a board into (sic) an inquiry. Section 430(2) of the Crimes Act then requires the court '[h]aving regard to the report' to order confirmation of the conviction, confirmation of the conviction with a recommendation for a pardon or remission of sentence, quashing the conviction or quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.
Section 430(4) of the Act denied a convicted person a right to an order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the character identified in the second and fourth alternatives.
(p) Presumably the reference to 'the Supreme Court' in s 431(1) was intended as a reference to the 'Full Court', 'whether to make an order under this part about a report' in s 431(1) was intended as a reference to whether an order should be made under s 429 or s 430 and the reference to 'whether to make an order under this part' in s 431(2) was intended as a reference to whether or not an order should be made under s 429 or s 430. Given the terms of s 424(4) and s 431(2) it is hardly likely that 'under this part' where used in s 431(2) was intended to embrace a decision on whether to order an inquiry under s 424.
238. In my opinion the primary judge correctly found that the appellant's application was not competent. In the foregoing circumstances the appeal should be dismissed and the appellant should be ordered to pay the Intervenor's costs.
239. In my opinion it is unnecessary and inappropriate in the circumstances of this case to address whether the respondent misconstrued the words 'doubt or question about whether the person is guilty of the offence' in s 422(1)(a) of the Crimes Act and whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the making by the respondent of his decision was an improper exercise of the power given by s 424(1) of the Crimes Act, an exercise of a power that was 'so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power'.
I certify that the preceding paragraphs numbered one hundred and sixty-seven (167) to two hundred and thirty-nine (239) are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Graham.
Counsel for the Appellant: J G Renwick until approximately 4:05pm on 22 October 2009
Solicitor for the Appellant: Jackson Lalic until approximately 4:05pm on 22 October 2009
Counsel for the Intervenor: J D Harris SC and D J C Mossop
Solicitor for the Intervenor: ACT Government Solicitor
Eastman
The Honourable Justice Anthony James Besanko and Attorney-General for the Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACTCA 15
(2009) 239 CLR 175
(1990) 170 CLR 321
(2009) 180 FCR 11
(2002) 213 CLR 543
(2009) 223 FLR 109
(2002) 118 FCR 360
(2008) 227 FLR 279
(2003) 214 CLR 318
(2007) 210 FLR 417
(2004) 181 FLR 418
(2008) 248 ALR 149
(2000) 203 CLR 1
(1997) 76 FCR 9
(2005) 221 CLR 99
(2006) 65 NSWLR 449
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1997) 188 CLR 595
(1999) 200 CLR 322
(1995) 56 FCR 50
(1990) 170 CLR 573
(2007) 210 FLR 410
(2008) 227 FLR 262
(2005) 214 ALR 422
(1980) 147 CLR 246
(2009) 186 IR 82
(2005) 79 ALJR 881