The facts
16 The applicant gave evidence. The bulk of his evidence-in-chief was given by way of affidavit and he was cross-examined by counsel for the respondents. He was in 1997 and remains obsessed by what he perceives to be the injustice involved in the way in which he was treated by the ATO, officers of the ATO and others. He tended to focus on matters which were not directly relevant to the issues in the proceeding. He is convinced that there was a conspiracy against him led by the third respondent. A good deal of his evidence was irrelevant to the issues raised in this proceeding and other "evidence" in his affidavits was in reality submissions about why I should find that the third respondent was motivated by improper considerations. I approach the applicant's evidence with considerable caution and I accept the evidence of the respondents where there is a conflict. For reasons I will give, I reject the applicant's evidence that he was given an access privilege to the ATO computer system in May 1997. Further, some of the evidence he gave directed to establishing possible innocent explanations for certain system violations was confusing, but even if accepted, did not rise anywhere near a level sufficient to establish an error of the type identified in s 5 of the ADJR Act.
17 In reaching these conclusions I have had regard to all the evidence in the case including the documentary evidence and I have borne in mind that before me the applicant was not legally represented.
18 The applicant called Ms Erin Holland as a witness. She is a Commonwealth public servant who is employed in the ATO. She appeared under subpoena. She was an honest and straightforward witness and I accept her evidence. However, for reasons I will give, her evidence does not assist me in resolving the issues in the proceeding
19 The respondents each gave evidence. The bulk of their evidence was contained in affidavits each of them had sworn. Each respondent was cross-examined at some length by the applicant. Each respondent was an honest and straightforward witness and I accept the evidence they gave. The respondents called Mr John Molineux and Mr David Pasch as witnesses. Mr Molineux is a Commonwealth public servant who is employed in the ATO. He took notes of an important meeting held on 4 June 1997 and involving the applicant, the first respondent and the third respondent. He was an honest and straightforward witness and I accept his evidence. Mr Pasch is what is called an AP compliance officer and he is employed by IBM Australia and New Zealand. At the request of the third respondent he prepared a report dated 12 June 1997 about a number of apparent system violations of the ATO's mainframe computer by the applicant during the period from January to May 1997. He was an honest and straightforward witness and I accept his evidence.
20 The applicant made various challenges to the evidence called by the respondents. Those challenges and my reasons for rejecting them, cannot be fully understood without first understanding the events surrounding the three decisions. I will now set out in chronological order the events surrounding the three decisions. The facts which follow are largely uncontentious but where there is a dispute I will indicate its nature.
21 It is convenient to start with a brief description of the ATO's computer system. The ATO has two different "computer environments". They were described by the third respondent and later by the second respondent as the mainframe environment and the TAXLAN environment. The ATO's two mainframes are production and development, respectively, and they are primarily used for the storage and "manipulation" of taxpayer data. They are also used to store and process the personnel records of ATO staff, including salary and leave details. These particular records are stored in a database known as the National Organisational Management Database (NOMAD). A database is a computer file which stores records which can be searched, sorted and updated by those persons who have appropriately authorised access to the database. The NOMAD database is run on the production mainframe. Every staff member of the ATO has access to their own salary and leave records in NOMAD, but they do not have access to the records of other staff. The only persons who have access to the records of other staff are those responsible for personnel administration. The applicant was not responsible for personnel administration.
22 The ATO's mainframe environment was run on IBM software and that included what the witnesses called the "RACF" software. The RACF software controlled a person's level of access to the mainframe system. A person's RACF profile was created by a system security administrator and it defined the person's authorisations in a mainframe environment. A person may have no authorisation or a "read-only" authorisation or an "update" authorisation. An unauthorised attempt to read or update data on the mainframe was recorded and was referred to as a system violation.
23 The TAXLAN environment is separate from the mainframe environment. It contains the ATO's word processing, spreadsheet and electronic mail software. It is possible to have access from any individual terminal to either the mainframe or TAXLAN environment.
24 The third respondent joined the Commonwealth public service in 1968 and he has considerable experience working in the development and use of computers, including training of staff, database development, quality assurance and applications development and support. He has also been involved in writing computer programs. From 1986 to 1997, he was Assistant Commissioner in the IT Services Line of the ATO. His branch consisted of 700 staff members employed on a national level.
25 The applicant was a Commonwealth public servant employed within the IT services group of the ATO, between 1987 and December 1995. The applicant was absent from work due to illness from 2 January 1996 to 15 December 1996. He returned to work in December 1996 and from that time to about 5 May 1997 he was under the direct supervision of the third respondent. His position was that of a senior information technology officer grade B.
26 When the applicant returned to work in December 1996 the third respondent was mindful of giving him such work as would give him the best opportunity to reintegrate into the workforce. The applicant was given a number of projects between his return to work in December 1996 and the date of his suspension from duty (that is, on 4 June 1997). The first was referred to as the "business resumption planning project" ("BRP project"). The third respondent considered that it would take the applicant two to three months to complete the BRP project. He considered that all the resources the applicant would need for the project were available in the TAXLAN environment, save perhaps for internet access for personal research for which the applicant never asked. He did not consider that the applicant would need access to the mainframe computers. He said that all the applicant was required to do was to carry out research and prepare a paper. The research could be done by discussion with others and reading books. By about mid-March 1997, the third respondent became concerned about the time it was taking the applicant to complete the project and by the extent to which he appeared to be accessing the ATO mainframes.
27 The third respondent arranged a second project for the applicant to undertake after he had finished the BRP project. The second project was referred to as the "applications development environment project" and the third respondent and the applicant discussed what it would involve in late March or early April 1997. The third respondent asked the applicant to prepare a document setting out the proposed terms of reference for the project. However, in late April or early May 1997, the third respondent became aware that the applicant had commenced legal proceedings against three Commonwealth public servants who worked within the ATO. The third respondent discussed this action with the applicant on 2 May 1997 and then on 6 May 1997, he decided that he could not allow the applicant to proceed with the applications development environment project because that project would involve the applicant working in close proximity to people he was pursuing by way of legal proceedings. The applicant sought from the third respondent written reasons for his decision, apparently under s 13 of the ADJR Act and, on 7 May 1997, the third respondent provided written reasons for his decision to the applicant.
28 The third and final project discussed by the third respondent and the applicant was referred to as the "single sign-on project". That project was discussed between them on or about 8 or 9 May 1997. The third respondent asked Mr Geoff Best to supervise the applicant during the period in which he was carrying out the project, and the applicant commenced working on the project on or around the dates it was discussed.
29 As I have said, the third respondent had become concerned about the applicant's usage of the mainframes and he asked Mr Best "to keep an eye" on the applicant's mainframe access. The third respondent said that on or around 6 or 7 May 1997, he received information from Mr Best that caused him to carry out further investigations into the applicant's mainframe usage. It is likely it was a little later than this bearing in mind the timing of the events referred to in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the relevant events happened and that the steps the third respondent then took may be summarised in point form as follows:
1. On 7 or 8 May 1997 he asked Mr Graham Littlejohn, who was a computer specialist working under Mr Best, to perform an audit of the mainframe logs to check the applicant's usage.
2. At about the same time, he spoke to the first respondent about the ATO's options if the applicant had been making unauthorised use of its mainframes.
3. Within two to four days, Mr Littlejohn gave the third respondent material showing a number of system violations by the applicant.
4. The third respondent formed the view that the applicant was seeking access to a number of files including the following:
s Files showing any variations to the normal pay of any staff member in the ATO;
s Files worked on by people in the database area of the ATO which were used in the running of the ATO's mainframe, including a file belonging to one of those persons against whom the applicant had brought legal proceedings; and
s Files belonging to the ATO's senior security administrator, who was the RACF administrator for the ATO. This person could look at anything in the ATO's computer system. As the third respondent said, he has "the power to corrupt or destroy all the mainframe files that contain data about taxpayers".
5. In late May 1997 the third respondent ascertained that the applicant's system violations were abnormal compared with his peer group and that the amount of time he spent on the mainframe from December 1996 to late May 1997 was over 200 hours.
30 The third respondent had not considered that the applicant would have needed any significant access to the ATO's mainframes in the period from December 1996 to May 1997, and he had never discussed access to the mainframes with the applicant. He viewed the problem as a serious one and one which had become urgent. He knew that the applicant was a disaffected staff member who was aggrieved by the actions of the ATO and of some of its staff.
31 At about this time, and quite independently of his concerns about the applicant's access to the ATO's mainframes, the third respondent prepared a report about the applicant's program for returning to work and how it had been carried out between mid-December 1996 and early May 1997. The report, which I will refer to as the return to work report, is dated 27 May 1997.
32 The third respondent decided to confront the applicant about his usage of the mainframes. He decided that at the same time, he would give him the return to work report. The third respondent had spoken to the first respondent by telephone in about mid-May 1997, and he had given her details of the applicant's work history and of his concerns about the applicant's usage of the mainframes. They had discussed the options as to how to proceed and the first respondent had later spoken to a case manager about the applicant's return to work programme and to Mr Molineux, who was based in the ATO's office in Melbourne, about discipline and suspension issues.
33 The third respondent prepared a series of questions to ask the applicant at a meeting he proposed to have with the applicant and he discussed those questions with the first respondent. They agreed that they would not give the applicant prior notice of the fact that they would confront him about his mainframe usage. They decided not to give the applicant notice because security issues were involved and they were concerned that if given notice, the applicant could take steps which could interfere with, or compromise information stored on the mainframe, or otherwise harm the system.
34 For her part, the first respondent held a delegation enabling her to suspend the applicant from duty under s 63B of the PSA. She was briefed on the apparent system violations by the third respondent. For his part, the third respondent was an authorised officer for the purposes of s 61(2) of the PSA and would, if he formed the opinion that the applicant may have failed to fulfil his duty as an officer, provide that opinion to the first respondent under s 63B(1)(b). The evidence is that of the two of them, the third respondent was the one with sufficient knowledge in information technology to determine the adequacy of any answers given by the applicant. Before the meeting, the third respondent had advised the first respondent that, for the reasons he gave, it "would be extremely difficult" to give the applicant other work which did not involve having any access to the ATO's computer systems.
35 The meeting took place on 4 June 1997. The applicant, the third respondent, the first respondent and Mr Molineux were present. Mr Molineux took notes of the meeting and those notes were subsequently produced in typewritten form. He did not otherwise play any part in the meeting. The third respondent asked the applicant the questions he had previously prepared. In the case of many of the violations the applicant said that he had no recollection of the matter about which he was questioned. The third respondent considered that the applicant's responses were unsatisfactory. He and the first respondent left the room in which the meeting was held. They then discussed the matter between themselves. The third respondent advised the first respondent that the applicant's responses were unsatisfactory and that until more was known his opinion was that the applicant was a potential risk to the ATO's computer systems and that until the matter was further investigated he ought to be denied any further access to those systems. The first respondent agreed and she decided to suspend the applicant. She formed the view that the interests of the ATO, particularly its security systems, were best served by suspending the applicant and conducting a more formal investigation. She signed a notice of suspension under s 63B of the PSA and gave it to the applicant. Relevantly, the notice said:
1. WHEREAS an officer authorised for the purposes of subsection 61(2) has informed me that she is of the opinion that you may have failed to fulfil your duty as an officer within the meaning of s 56 of the Act;
2. AND WHEREAS having considered your comments I am of the opinion that it would be prejudicial to
* the effective operation of the service
* the interests of the public
* your interests
* the interests of your fellow officers
if you were to continue to perform the duties of your existing office pending a decision whether you are to be charged with misconduct.
3. TAKE NOTICE THEREFORE THAT I hereby suspend you pursuant to s 63B of the Act with effect from the time of delivery of this notice to you. …
36 Although in paragraph 1 of the notice reference is made to information provided by a female, I am satisfied the third respondent provided the opinion required by s 63B(1)(b) and that the first respondent made the decision to suspend and that both were authorised to act in the way each did.
37 The third respondent and the first respondent discussed who should undertake the investigation and they agreed that it should be a person, to use the first respondent's words, "not immediately associated with" the applicant "in order to maximise the objectivity (and perceived objectivity on Colin Dunstan's part) - of the investigation process".
38 Shortly after the meeting on 4 June 1997 the third respondent instructed Mr David Pasch to examine the apparent system violations of the ATO's mainframe computer by the applicant. Mr Pasch's duties at that time included general mainframe systems programming with the mainframe security product, RACF, as his specialisation. As part of his duties, he was responsible for the maintenance of the RACF product and also for implementing IBM's internal control systems, including maintenance and review of security reporting applications. Mr Pasch was required to assist the security administration teams with investigations of potential security interests.
39 The third respondent provided terms of reference to Mr Pasch and under the heading "Purpose of this Assignment" he said the following:
The purpose of this assignment is to review the evidence provided by the ATO and give an independent assessment of the severity of these violations.
I would like this achieved through a short written Report which contains:
1. Advice and comments in relation to each of the "recorded violations" in terms of:
s The opportunity of others to falsify the systems records or reports produced;
s The contents of the data sets and their purpose in the ATO environment; and
s An assessment of the security implications of each.
2. Comment in respect of the recorded behaviour of this User when compared with the access records of his peer group and a number of other ATO officers. The ATO is concerned about the "intent" behind these actions; and
3. An interpretation of TaxLan copies of a number of mainframe listings provided.
40 Mr Pasch prepared a report dated 12 June 1997 and in his "overview" Mr Pasch expressed the following opinions:
The violation reporting was validated and there is a high degree of confidence in the reports, although the integrity of SMF and system log data used could not be guaranteed.
Violations were recorded against a variety of data, the most serious being the read attempts to NOMAD production data and datasets belonging to users with security administration authorities, as well as an update attempt to commonly-used system EXEC library.
Personal datasets were examined in an effort to understand the violations which had been generated. This investigation revealed analysis of DB2 security as well as analysis of fire call and access groups within RACF appeared to have been undertaken by the user.
Both the violations generated, plus the analysis that appears to have been performed, can be interpreted as attempts to circumvent security controls and as such explanations need to be obtained.
If no acceptable explanations are available, the ATO must consider its actions.
41 In his report Mr Pasch also set out a series of questions which he suggested should be asked of the applicant. The third respondent formulated a further series of questions based on Mr Pasch's report and on 16 June 1997 he wrote to the applicant enclosing Mr Littlejohn's report of system violations, the series of questions he prepared for the meeting to be held on 4 June 1997, the typewritten notes of that meeting and the further questions he prepared based on Mr Pasch's report. The applicant provided a detailed response by letter dated 18 June 1997.
42 Thereafter, the third respondent was involved in briefing the second respondent about the matter.
43 In his evidence Mr Pasch provided a clear description of the system violations and characterised them in the following way:
1. Attempt to look at NOMAD production data. The material included in the data consisted of the personal details of ATO staff including salary and wage details.
2. Attempt to update a system library which is software which makes the operating system run. If the attempt had been successful the operating system may have been compromised and other users could have unwittingly performed activities that they had not intended to. Mr Pasch said that an attempt to update a system library is a common way of trying to "hack" into an operating system, and is termed a Trojan horse style of attack.
3. Attempt to access files used by various administrators, being database administrators, security administrators and other support personnel, and Mr Pasch expressed the view, which I accept, that if a person intended to compromise an operating system, an examination of these files would inform the individual of the security structures that had been set up and any weakness in the system.
4. Attempt to analyse firecall and access groups, that is to say, people that had after hours or emergency type access into ATO computer systems. Mr Pasch expressed the same view in relation to this matter as he did in relation to the matter referred to in 3.
44 The second respondent joined the Commonwealth public service in 1969. He has been employed in the computing field in a number of different capacities including writing, testing and installing computer programs and managing computer software, networks and databases. He commenced working within the ATO in 1986 and he was involved in the establishment of a new computer infrastructure. Thereafter he managed all of the ATO systems software, that is, all the software necessary for the operation of the computer system. From 1995 to October 1997 he was an Assistant Commissioner working in what was known within the ATO as the "individuals non-business line". That section within the ATO was involved in the management of computer systems for the income tax functions of the ATO. In October 1997 he became an Assistant Commissioner for Information Technology in the tax reform project. That position involved him in an examination of systems issues in relation to tax reform.
45 On 18 June 1997 the second respondent was asked by the third respondent to act as an authorised officer under the PSA in relation to a disciplinary issue involving the applicant. At the time, the second respondent was an authorised officer for the purposes of s 61(2) of the PSA.
46 In order to carry out his task under s 61(2) of deciding if the applicant may have failed to fulfil his duty as an officer and, if so, whether he should be charged, the second respondent collected information and communicated with the applicant.
47 As far as collecting information is concerned, the second respondent obtained copies of Mr Pasch's report, a transcript of the meeting held on 4 June 1997 and the applicant's letter to the third respondent dated 18 June 1997. He also obtained written confirmation of his authorisation. The second respondent gave evidence as to his understanding of Mr Pasch's report. He said that he understood Mr Pasch's first conclusion was that it was highly likely that the reports of the system violations were correct. His understanding was that the three violations which Mr Pasch identified as the most serious were as follows:
1. Attempts to read NOMAD production data being personnel data about staff, such as date of birth, address, salary and leave entitlements;
2. Attempts to read computer files or datasets of persons within the ATO who are responsible for its security system. Those files or datasets may have within them the person's password or USERID.
3. Attempts to change a computer program that contains instructions upon which the mainframe computer systems run. This violation occurred on 28 April 1997. The second respondent understood that Mr Pasch was expressing the opinion that the applicant may have been trying to alter the scope of his authority to do things in the mainframe system in a way that bypassed the need to request the RACF administrator to change the applicant's RACF profile.
48 The second respondent spoke with the third respondent, Mr Littlejohn and Mr Best, between 20 and 26 June 1997. The third respondent provided the bulk of the information with certain matters being confirmed by either Mr Littlejohn or Mr Best. The third respondent advised the second respondent of the following matters. First, after describing the nature of the BRP project the third respondent said the applicant did not require access to the mainframes for the purpose of writing his paper. Secondly, the third respondent advised the second respondent, and this matter was confirmed by Mr Best, that the applicant never approached them during the course of performing his employment about computer access levels. Thirdly, the third respondent advised the second respondent, and this matter was confirmed by Mr Littlejohn, that on examination of system violations by others there were, apart from password errors, which were relatively common, very few system violations by other people of the type recorded by the applicant.
49 The second respondent also spoke by telephone with Mr Pasch and Mr Pasch said to him words to the following effect:
The records of Mr Dunstan's computer use suggested he may have been "navigating" the ATO computer system in search of a point of weakness through which he could access systems files, which in turn could have enabled him to access production data.
50 In terms of his communications with the applicant, the second respondent spoke to the applicant on the telephone on 26 June 1997 and wrote to him on 1 July 1997. In his letter to the applicant he said:
Last Friday, 27 June 1997, I telephoned you to inform you that I was the Authorised Officer in relation to the consideration of allegations of misconduct which have been made against you.
In that conversation you asked that I provide some material to define my role. Attached is a minute from HR Services which describes that role.
I also mentioned that I would need to discuss the allegations with you as part of this role this week. Unfortunately, other commitments have generated delays to having that discussion. I will now try to arrange a time during the week commencing 7 July 1997. I will contact you to confirm a date and time.
51 The applicant responded by letter dated 4 July 1997. Part of what he said is as follows:
Please note:
1. I was interviewed at some length by Mr John Growder and Ms Robyn Orr on 4 June 1997.
2. On Friday, 13 June 1997, Mr Growder advised me that an independent review of my work had been undertaken by an unnamed IBM consultant.
3. Consequent upon this "independent review", Mr Growder handed me a list of 19 questions - on Monday, 16 June 1997. He directed that I furnish written answers within 2 days - by close of business on Wednesday, 18 June 1997.
4. Mr Growder had in his possession on 14 June 1997 a reasonably detailed transcript of the interview that I attended on 4 June 1997. (See 1 above.)
5. On Wednesday, 18 June 1997, I supplied written answers to Mr Growder's 19 questions - as per his direction of 16 June 1997. These answers are quite comprehensive, especially in view of the limited time that I was given to respond. My response is 8 typewritten pages in length.
In relation to your proposal to arrange a date and time during the week commencing 7 July 1997 to hold some discussion:
1. If not for being suspended from duty, I had intended to be on recreation leave for the period Monday, 7 July 1997 to Friday, 18 July 1997 inclusive.
2. I have a number of family and other commitments to attend to, including:
a. My sister-in-law and her daughter are visiting from Paris, and are staying with my wife and me.
b. My father is quite ill.
In view of the above, I request that, subject to there being a legitimate reason for you to discuss anything with me, that you contact me on Monday 21 July 1997 to confirm a date and time.
In the interim, please carefully review the document I supplied to Mr Growder on 18 June 1997, together with the record of interview I attended on 4 June 1997.
You could also use this period to familiarise yourself with:
1. Commonwealth Crimes Act, 1914 - Part III - Offences Relating to the Administration of Justice. See sections 36A, 41, 42 and 43.
2. Also within the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, see section 5.
3. Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, section 94.
4. My understanding that public servants are under an obligation to not follow unlawful directions. This would include directions to aid in the commission of a criminal offence. (I think this may be in the Public Service Act that is available on TAXLAN under the "Commonwealth Managers Toolbox" icon - as is the text of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914.)
52 Based on this response from the applicant the second respondent considered that the applicant was of the view that he had put forward all relevant information and that he did not want to speak to the second respondent. In my opinion, the second respondent's conclusion was one reasonably open to him.
53 The second respondent was required to travel overseas in August 1997 and on his return at the end of September 1997, he had decided that it was appropriate to charge the applicant with misconduct under the PSA. He considered that the implications of the applicant's attempt at mainframe access could be very serious and that the circumstances surrounding the applicant's attempted security breaches warranted further investigation. He did not consider that counselling would be sufficient.
54 Two charges against the applicant were laid by the second respondent on 13 October 1997. Relevantly, the charges were in the following terms:
Charge A:
I, John Neville Higham, SES Band 1, Australian Taxation Office, National Office, Canberra, an officer authorised by Commissioner of Taxation for the purposes of subsection 61(2) of the Public Service Act 1922 ("the Act"), being of the opinion that Colin George Dunstan, Senior Information Technology Officer Grade B of the Australian Taxation Office, may have failed to fulfil his duty as an officer HEREBY CHARGE the said Colin George Dunstan with having failed to fulfil his duty as an officer within the meaning of paragraph 56(d) of the Act in that he engaged in improper conduct as an officer.
PARTICULARS OF THE CHARGE are that on 28 April 1997 he used a computer located in Information Technology Services, Australian Taxation Office, Canberra, to force a system violation in seeking to update the SYS4.USER.EXEC data set belonging to Systems Software, Communications and Access Control staff, when it was not necessary to do so for his official duties.
Charge B:
I, John Neville Higham, SES Band 1, Australian Taxation Office, National Office, Canberra, an officer authorised by the Commissioner of Taxation, for the purposes of subsection 61(2) of the Public Service Act 1922 ("the Act"), being of the opinion that Colin George Dunstan, Senior Information Technology Officer Grade B of the Australian Taxation Office, may have failed to fulfil his duty as an officer HEREBY CHARGE the said Colin George Dunstan with having failed to fulfil his duty as an officer within the meaning of paragraph 56(d) of the Act in that he engaged in improper conduct as an officer:
PARTICULARS OF THE CHARGE are that in the period 16 January 1997 to 7 May 1997 he used a computer located in Information Technology Services, Australian Taxation Office, Canberra, on numerous occasions to force a system violation in seeking access to Computer System Data Sets, when it was not necessary to do so for his official duties.
FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE CHARGE are that he did so on the occasions, and in respect of the Computer Systems Data Sets, set out in the enclosed schedule.
Schedule to Charge B
Date Domain Resource
16 January 1997 TSOD GIRM.SMIC.CNTL
3 February 1997 TSOP GSPP.USER.EXEC
3 March 1997 TSOP PASPD.NOMAD.EXT969.DATA
4 March 1997 TSOP PASPP.UNLOAD.CNTL
5 March 1997 TSOD UAOGD.SPFTEMP1.CNTL
5 March 1997 TSOD UAUVB.SPFLOG1.LIST
6 March 1997 TSOD GACS.SQL.SKELS
19 March 1997 TSOP UAGGJ.USER.CNTL
2 April 1997 TSOP PASPD.NOMAD.EXT969.DATA
2 April 1997 TSOP PASPD.NOMAD.EXT969.DATA.PRE2000
2 April 1997 TSOD PASPD.NOMAD.PVA
28 April 1997 TSOD PDBAADA.DIARY
28 April 1997 TSOD PDBADEV.DB2.EXEC
28 April 1997 TSOD DDBADEV.DATABASE.SQL
28 April 1997 TSOD DDBADEV.GENERAL.CNTL
28 April 1997 TSOD ADBADEV.DML.SQL